Trump's 'Liberation Day' Tariffs: Fair trade or global trade war?

FA may 2024 2024 年 5 月/6 月M Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink U.S. Diplomacy Remains the Key to Regional Stability Vali Nasr This article is paywall-free A suspect from the Crocus City Hall attack in court in Moscow, March 2024 A New Recruiting Ground for ISIS Why Jihadism Is Thriving in Tajikistan Marlene Laruelle This article is paywall-free A Ukrainian serviceman at a press conference of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, Kyiv, April 2024 NATO Cannot Survive Without America If Trump Pulls Out, the Alliance Would Likely Fall Apart Hans Binnendijk, R. D. 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Medeiros Searching for dead bodies inside al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, April 2024 Dawoud Abu Alkas / Reuters PODCAST Competition Without Catastrophe How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China By Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan September/October 2019 Published on August 1, 2019 Donald Trump and Xi Jinping attend a dinner after the G-20 summit in Buenos Aires, December 2018 The United States is in the midst of the most consequential rethinking of its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Although Washington remains bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close. The debate now is over what comes next. Like many debates throughout the history of U.S. foreign policy, this one has elements of both productive innovation and destructive demagoguery. Most observers can agree that, as the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy put it in 2018, “strategic competition” should animate the KURT M. CAMPBELL is Chair and CEO of the Asia Group. He is 2018–19 Kissinger Fellow at the McCain Institute and was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2009 to 2013. JAKE SULLIVAN is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served as National Security Adviser to the U.S. Vice President in 2013–14 and as Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State in 2011–13. MORE BY KURT M. CAMPBELL MORE BY JAKE SULLIVAN More: North America United States East Asia China Diplomacy Science & Technology Strategy & Conflict U.S. Foreign Policy Trump Administration The Biden Team World Order Most-Read Articles Competition Without Catastrophe How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan The New Moral Resistance to Putin Relearning a Soviet-Era Art Amid Repression and War Andrei Kolesnikov Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink U.S. Diplomacy Remains the Key to Regional Stability Vali Nasr Mexico’s Vote for Autocracy How AMLO Undermined Democracy and Brought Back Party Dominance Denise Dresser Recommended Articles Obama and Xi in Washington, September 2015 Did America Get China Wrong? The Engagement Debate Wang Jisi; J. Stapleton Roy; Aaron Friedberg; Thomas Christensen and Patricia Kim; Joseph S. Nye, Jr.; Eric Li; Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner The era of good feelings: Xi and Obama in China, September 2016. The China Reckoning How Beijing Defied American Expectations Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner 沒有災難的競爭 美國如何既挑戰中國又與中國共存 庫爾特·M·坎貝爾和傑克·沙利文 對普丁的新道德抵制 在鎮壓和戰爭中重新學習蘇聯時代的藝術 安德烈·科列斯尼科夫 伊朗和以色列為何從懸崖邊退了一步 美國外交仍然是區域穩定的關鍵 瓦利·納斯爾 墨西哥投票支持獨裁統治 奧夫拉多爾如何破壞民主並奪回政黨統治地位 丹尼斯·德萊瑟 中國將如何擠壓而不是奪取台灣 緩慢的絞殺可能和戰爭一樣糟糕 作者：艾薩克·卡登和珍妮佛·卡瓦納 2024 年 5 月 21 日 2023 年 4 月，北京，螢幕上播放中國台灣附近海軍演習 2023 年 4 月，北京，螢幕上播放中國台灣附近海軍演習 王廷書/路透社 登入並儲存以供稍後閱讀 列印這篇文章 透過電子郵件發送 分享到Twitter 在臉書上分享 在領英上分享 獲取連結 頁面網址 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/how-china-will-squeeze-not-seize-taiwan 請求轉載權限 即將退休的美軍印太聯合部隊司令菲利普·戴維森海軍上將將於 2021 年在參議院軍事委員會作證，他對中國正在加快通過兩棲入侵統一台灣的時間表表示擔憂。他警告說：“我認為威脅在這十年中顯而易見，事實上在未來六年中。”這種認為美國面臨阻止中國攻擊台灣的緊急最後期限的評估——被稱為「戴維森之窗」——此後已成為美國亞洲國防戰略和政策的驅動力。 事實上，國防部已將中國可能入侵台灣定義為“節奏情景”，美國的軍事能力將以此為基準，進行重大投資，並訓練和部署聯合部隊。台北對這特殊威脅的關注度有所降低。但在過去十年中，隨著海峽兩岸的軍事平衡向有利於北京的方向傾斜，台灣領導人加強了軍事開支和訓練力度，以威懾和否認此類襲擊。 然而，兩棲入侵的威脅並不是美國保育台灣的重點。中國耐心、長期的台灣政策將統一視為“歷史必然性”，再加上其在海外採取的軍事行動不多，這表明北京更有可能的計劃是逐步強化其已經在推行的政策：悄然侵入台灣地區。世界應該期待看到更多所謂的「灰色地帶行動」——軍事和經濟領域不屬於戰爭的強制活動。 隨時了解狀況。 每週提供深入分析。 這種正在進行的灰色地帶影響力運動本身並不會迫使台灣與大陸正式統一。但多年來，中國將軍事、準軍事和民事行動擴展到台灣公認的地區，可能會達到某些中間目標——最重要的是，阻止台灣正式獨立——同時保留北京今後使用武力的選擇。如果不受到挑戰，北京的灰色地帶行動也可能顯示美國在亞洲的實力有限。例如，如果中國不以公然入侵的形式提供明確的宣戰理由，美國及其盟國就不太可能使用他們在該地區建立的先進飛彈系統。相反，美國領導人可能會發現自己陷入了關於中國是否跨越紅線的爭論。由於華盛頓對中國打算將其灰色地帶策略推行到何種程度的不確定性感到束手無策，反擊中國侵犯行動的大部分責任將落到台灣身上。 儘管台灣領導人經常提請人們關注中國在台灣海峽及其周邊地區的脅迫性活動，但他們近年來進行的大部分重大軍事投資——包括戰鬥機、坦克和國產潛艇——與其陰險本質並不相符。灰色地帶威脅。展望未來，台北應集中在所有領域建立緩衝區，強化其通訊基礎設施，並加速外國直接投資，以建立更能抵禦中國幹擾的經濟聯繫。 美國也必須打破對入侵前景的執著，對緩慢扼殺台灣所帶來的危險更加警覺。華盛頓應該支持台北的努力，增強台灣的監視能力，擴大美國海岸防衛隊在南海和東海以及台灣海上通道周圍的作用，並與可能感到遵守北京限制的壓力的商業行為者進行協調。如果目前的趨勢持續下去，戴維森之窗很可能會在沒有戰爭的情況下到來和消失，但台灣的自治和美國的信譽將大大降低。 烏雲變暗 過去十年，中國在東亞空域、水域和資訊領域的實力不斷增強。中國海岸防衛隊和其他海上執法船隻使用非致命手段對印尼、日本、馬來西亞、菲律賓、韓國和越南有爭議的水域獲得不同程度的控制。僅在 2024 年前幾個月，中國海警船隻就採取了危險的行動並發射高壓水槍，以阻止菲律賓向軍事前哨基地補給；中國外交官無視國際海洋法，對北部灣提出新的主權主張；中國船隻警告在釣魚島（日本稱為尖閣列島）周圍日本領空飛行的日本飛機。 這些措施反映了將中國國內法強加於爭議領土的根本意圖。儘管香港比南海和東海有爭議的海域更直接受中國控制，但北京對香港自治權的不斷壓制與其對聲稱擁有主權的海域的戰略相似。中國已採取法律行動，擴大對香港治理關鍵方面的有效控制，而所有這些都沒有訴諸軍事力量。 台灣日益成為類似中國在南海和東海灰色地帶的脅迫活動的目標。根據每日發布的報告，自 2022 年 1 月以來，中國空軍入侵台灣防空識別區（飛機需要向台灣當局表明身份的區域）的次數幾乎是 2018 年至 2021 年期間的三倍台灣國防部。北京也經常派艦艇和飛機越過台灣海峽的中線，抹殺了 1955 年劃定的事實上的邊界。空域進行空中管制，有效包圍台灣。中國在資訊戰方面的強大能力也突顯在其灰色地帶作戰概念中。北京向台灣媒體充斥虛假訊息，並涉嫌切斷通往台灣控制下的離島的海底網路電纜。 自2022年以來，北京採取了風險較小的措施來慢慢擠壓台灣。 中國在台海的灰色地帶活動不應被視為兩棲入侵的前奏。相反，北京在附近水域持續使用類似策略表明，此類行動是旨在不訴諸入侵的情況下征服台灣的耐心長期戰略的主要方法。透過這種做法，中國試圖切斷該島對週邊海域和空域的控制，並限制其自主做出軍事、外交和經濟決策的能力。沿著這些路線採取的行動遠遠達不到成功的兩棲入侵可能提供的徹底佔領。然而，這場更模糊的運動可能會產生類似的結果，讓北京以大多數重要方式控制台灣，而無需任何正式投降。 俄羅斯在 2022 年入侵烏克蘭後未能迅速佔領基輔，生動地增強了這項戰略的吸引力。自2022年以來，北京對緩慢擠壓台灣島的更便宜、風險更小的措施表現出越來越大的興趣，這可能反映出，在莫斯科的軍事鬥爭之後，北京認識到很難在軍事上迅速取得對台灣的勝利。中國可以透過在台灣海峽更大範圍內進行更多特別海岸警衛隊巡邏，或實施海關或檢疫措施來限製商業流動，從而繼續收緊絞索。例如，這些可能的行動不會偏離北京已經在金門島周圍進行的活動。此類行動並不構成行動或法律上的封鎖，但它們實現了類似的目標，並保留了未來更全面和致命行動的選擇。 低風險，更多回報 由於戴維森是美國在印太地區最高級的軍官，並且由於美國國家安全界對中國軍事現代化步伐的日益擔憂，戴維森窗口很快就被美國政策制定者和軍事領導人接受為教條。但許多因素使得中國在 2027 年之前和未來很長一段時間內發動徹底的軍事入侵的可能性都低於低強度的入侵行動。中國共產黨已將與台灣的統一與2049年「民族復興」的更廣泛目標聯繫起來，但中國領導人習近平本人對於這種統一的實際意義仍然含糊其辭。中國有能力在不背離其長期對台政策的情況下，將其時間表推遲到戴維森窗口之後。 中國也因缺乏近期作戰經驗以及對其開展聯合行動的能力缺乏信心而受到限制。只要北京的強制措施擴大了對台灣的有效控制，中國就可能繼續走這條老路——一條可以以兩棲入侵成本的一小部分來滿足其願望的道路。迄今為止，美國及其盟國對中國脅迫戰略的反應不溫不火，但這並沒有讓北京領導人洩氣。在南海有爭議的南沙群島建立前哨基地並進行軍事化、將菲律賓逐出黃岩島、通過阻止河內實際進入這些地點來破壞越南開發海上石油和天然氣田的努力，這些都是擴大規模的一系列小成功的一部分。 實行這樣的灰色地帶策略會帶來一些風險。中國必須仔細調整其強制活動的時機和程度，以避免華盛頓和地區盟友做出適得其反的反應。中國限製或切斷關鍵食品、燃料或資訊流向台灣的行動尤其可能會招緻美國的對稱反應。但灰色地帶方法也有明顯的優勢。北京在針對台灣的活動中可以嚴重依賴執法和民用資產，但美國缺乏以牙還牙所需的非軍事海上力量。華盛頓可能會採取經濟或外交措施，但這些措施不能直接扭轉中國的實體和業務收益，也不太可能施加足以迫使中國改變路線的成本。 美國一直在努力與盟友和夥伴進行有效協調，以阻止中國日益更具強制性的灰色地帶行動。只要北京不直接阻礙台灣海峽的商業交通，大多數國家就可能保持觀望。一些外國行為者，包括中國的地區鄰國和航運公司等商業實體，可能會適應北京可能對台灣施加的多種新限制。跨國公司已經開創了聽從北京的令人擔憂的先例：例如，日本和韓國公司多年來一直在飛越台灣海峽的商業航班上遵守北京的通知規則（而不是台北制定的通知規則）。 關鍵變化 如果美國和台灣仍然狹隘地關注戴維森窗口，他們將做出與中國更有可能的戰略選擇不相匹配的決定。對精確彈藥的投資以及在亞洲前沿部署大量美國軍艦和飛機與中國為使這些資產發揮作用而採取的行動不相匹配。同樣，台灣對潛艇和戰鬥機等高端軍事硬體的追求以及以擊退中國侵略者為重點的升級軍事訓練，無助於阻止中國透過執法和其他非致命策略悄悄實施強制控制。 相反，台灣應該帶頭積極反擊中國的侵犯，建立保護其領空、水域和經濟的緩衝區。僅僅引起人們對中國灰色地帶運作的關注是不夠的。台灣將受益於將國防投資集中於領域感知能力，例如，獲取更先進的陸基和海基感測器，以更好地探測和監控附近空域和水域的中國飛機和船隻的存在。它還應該建立一支由廉價的空中和海上無人機組成的大型機隊，以支持台灣邊遠地區的監視行動，並以合理的成本應對中國大陸驚人規模的入侵。台灣也必須擴大其海岸警衛隊，以更有力地反擊中國海岸警衛隊和海上民兵的活動。台北在這些方向上已經採取了一些溫和的步驟，但進展太慢，無法應對中國加強行動帶來的挑戰。台灣需要迅速增加本土能力發展的支出，並將所有來自美國的外國軍事資金集中在這些類型的系統上。 在資訊領域，台灣應強化其通訊系統，並培養更先進的網路防禦隊伍。更重要的是，台灣必須加緊努力，擴大其衛星通訊服務和基礎設施並使其多樣化，以抵禦中國對其資訊網路和海底網路電纜的攻擊。台灣已經與 Eutelsat OneWeb 簽署了一份合同，該系統類似於星鏈系統，事實證明在烏克蘭非常重要，但台灣應該在短期內採取進一步措施來增加衛星頻寬。 如果華盛頓仍然狹隘地關注入侵台灣的前景，它就會犯錯。 華盛頓對於台灣的緩衝區戰略也至關重要。 4月份，國會撥出20億美元用於印太地區的國防援助，但這筆錢將如何分配仍不清楚。美國應使用部分可用資金來增強台灣的空中和海上監視和情報能力及其空中、海上和水下無人機機隊。華盛頓也應考慮擴大美國海岸防衛隊在台灣海峽及其周邊地區的角色。目前，美國海岸防衛隊部隊在日本和菲律賓等美國盟友的專屬經濟區巡邏，維護國際海洋法，並與地區夥伴進行演習。例如，擴大海岸警衛隊在台灣附近海域的任務範圍，包括對附近漁場進行巡邏，以確保進入並支持資源保護，這可能會阻礙中國控制這些地區的努力，同時與北京使用執法船的做法相匹配。使用海岸防衛隊船隻比使用美國海軍更不可能引發升級，更適合旨在維持脆弱現狀的政策。 最後，美國應該與企業協調，支持台灣的經濟緩衝，特別是那些透過海運和空運向台灣運送貨物的企業。來自國防部、國土安全部和國務院的跨部門小組應建立評估新興風險的管道，並與大型跨國貿易公司、托運人和保險公司的領導人分享預警指標。這項演習應在私人環境中進行，以促進應急計劃，並為這些公司提供政府和軍事支持，以進行物質和財務準備，以確保台灣進入全球市場。 如果未來行為的最佳預測是過去的行為，那麼美國和台灣就應該像防止徹底入侵一樣，集中精力製定防止台灣緩慢被征服的戰略。如果華盛頓不能改變其一意孤行的觀點，那麼當台灣在無聲的既成事實中逐漸落入中國的控制之下時，它最終可能會成為一個旁觀者。 您正在閱讀一篇免費文章。 訂閱《外交事務》即可獲得無限的存取權限。 免費閱讀新文章和一個多世紀的檔案 解鎖對 iOS/Android 應用程式的存取權以保存版本以供離線閱讀 每年六期印刷版和線上版，以及音頻文章 ISAAC KARDON 是卡內基國際和平基金會亞洲計畫的高級研究員。 詹妮弗·卡瓦納 (JENNIFER KAVANAGH) 是卡內基國際和平基金會美國治國方略計畫的高級研究員。 艾薩克·卡登的更多作品 更多詹妮弗·卡瓦納的作品 更多的： 中國 台灣 經濟 商業 貿易 安全 防務 與軍事 美國外交政策 中台關係 最常閱讀的文章 沒有災難的競爭 美國如何既挑戰中國又與中國共存 庫爾特·M·坎貝爾和傑克·沙利文 對普丁的新道德抵制 在鎮壓和戰爭中重新學習蘇聯時代的藝術 安德烈·科列斯尼科夫 伊朗和以色列為何從懸崖邊退了一步 美國外交仍然是區域穩定的關鍵 瓦利·納斯爾 墨西哥投票支持獨裁統治 奧夫拉多爾如何破壞民主並奪回政黨統治地位 丹尼斯·德萊瑟 推薦文章 台灣新總統將如何對待中國？ 賴清德的不穩定平衡行為 尼克·弗里施 2024 年 1 月，台灣海軍艦艇在台灣高雄附近 台灣是新柏林 美國與中國競爭的冷戰教訓 德米特里·阿爾佩羅維奇 How China Will Squeeze, Not Seize, Taiwan A Slow Strangulation Could Be Just as Bad as a War By Isaac Kardon and Jennifer Kavanagh May 21, 2024 A screen broadcasting Chinese naval exercises near Taiwan, in Beijing, April 2023 Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2021, Admiral Philip Davidson, the retiring commander of U.S. military joint forces in the Indo-Pacific, expressed concern that China was accelerating its timeline to unify with Taiwan by amphibious invasion. “I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years,” he warned. This assessment that the United States is up against an urgent deadline to head off a Chinese attack on Taiwan—dubbed the “Davidson Window”—has since become a driving force in U.S. defense strategy and policy in Asia. Indeed, the Defense Department has defined a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan as the “pacing scenario” around which U.S. military capabilities are benchmarked, major investments are made, and joint forces are trained and deployed. Taipei has been somewhat less fixated on this particular threat. But over the last decade, as the cross-strait military balance has tilted in Beijing’s favor, Taiwan’s leaders have ramped up their military spending and training expressly to deter and deny such an attack. The threat of an amphibious invasion, however, is the wrong focal point for the United States’ efforts to protect Taiwan. China’s patient, long-term Taiwan policy, which treats unification as a “historical inevitability,” together with its modest record of military action abroad, suggests that Beijing’s more probable plan is to gradually intensify the policy it is already pursuing: a creeping encroachment into Taiwan’s airspace, maritime space, and information space. The world should expect to see more of what have come to be known as “gray-zone operations”—coercive activities in the military and economic domains that fall short of war. This ongoing gray-zone influence campaign will not itself force Taiwan’s formal unification with the mainland. But over the course of many years, the expansion of China’s military, paramilitary, and civilian operations into Taiwan’s recognized spaces could reach certain intermediate objectives—most important, preventing the island from achieving formal independence—while preserving Beijing’s options to use force down the road. Left unchallenged, Beijing’s gray-zone campaign could also demonstrate the limits of the United States’ power in Asia. The United States and its allies are unlikely, for instance, to use the advanced missile systems they have built up in the region if China never provides a clear casus belli in the form of a brazen invasion. Instead, U.S. leaders may find themselves mired in debates over whether China has crossed a redline. With Washington hamstrung by uncertainty over how far China intends to push its gray-zone tactics, much of the responsibility for countering China’s campaign of encroachment will fall to Taiwan. Although Taiwan’s leaders frequently draw attention to China’s coercive activities in and around the Taiwan Strait, most of the major military investments they have made in recent years—including fighter aircraft, tanks, and an indigenously produced submarine—are not well aligned with the insidious nature of the gray-zone threat. Going forward, Taipei should concentrate its efforts on building buffer zones across all domains, hardening its communications infrastructure, and accelerating its foreign direct investment to build economic links that are more resilient against Chinese disruption. The United States must also break its fixation on the prospect of an invasion and become more alert to the dangers posed by a slow strangulation of Taiwan. Washington should bolster Taipei’s efforts by augmenting Taiwan’s surveillance capabilities, expanding the role of the U.S. Coast Guard across the South China and East China Seas and around Taiwan’s maritime approaches, and coordinating with commercial actors who may feel pressure to comply with Beijing’s restrictions. If current trends persist, it is likely that the Davidson Window will come and go with no war—but with Taiwan’s autonomy and the United States’ credibility greatly diminished. DARKENING CLOUDS Over the past decade, China has asserted itself with increasing potency in East Asian airspace, waters, and information sphere. Its coast guard and other maritime law enforcement vessels have used nonlethal methods to gain varied levels of control over waters disputed by Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam. In the early months of 2024 alone, Chinese coast guard vessels have undertaken dangerous maneuvers and fired water cannon to prevent the Philippines from resupplying a military outpost, Chinese diplomats have ignored the international Law of the Sea with new claims in the Gulf of Tonkin, and Chinese vessels have warned off Japanese aircraft operating in Japan’s territorial airspace around the Diaoyu Islands (known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands). These measures reflect a fundamental intent to impose Chinese domestic law over disputed territories. Although Hong Kong is more directly under Chinese control than are the contested waters in the South China and East China Seas, Beijing’s steady suffocation of the city’s autonomy resembles its strategy toward claimed maritime spaces. China has implemented legal actions that expand its effective control over critical aspects of Hong Kong’s governance, all without resorting to military force. Taiwan has increasingly become the target of coercive activities that resemble China’s gray-zone repertoire in the South China and East China Seas. The Chinese air force has conducted nearly three times as many incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (the area in which aircraft are required to identify themselves to Taiwanese authorities) since January 2022 as it did between 2018 and 2021, according to reports released daily by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. Beijing has also routinely sent ships and aircraft across the median line running through the Taiwan Strait, effacing a de facto boundary that was defined in 1955. The Chinese military has increased the frequency, intensity, and duration of live-fire drills that temporarily establish sea and air control in the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan, effectively encircling the island. China’s formidable capabilities in information warfare also figure prominently into its gray-zone concept of operations. Beijing saturates Taiwanese media with disinformation and is suspected of cutting submarine Internet cables to outlying islands under Taiwan’s control. Since 2022, Beijing has pursued less risky measures to slowly squeeze Taiwan. China’s gray-zone activities in the Taiwan Strait should not be viewed as a mere prelude to an amphibious invasion. Rather, Beijing’s persistent use of similar tactics in nearby waters suggests such actions are the primary methods in a patient, long-term strategy aimed at subjugating Taiwan without resorting to an invasion. With this approach, China is attempting to choke off the island’s control of surrounding waters and airspace and limit its ability to make autonomous military, diplomatic, and economic decisions. Actions along these lines would fall well short of the outright occupation that a successful amphibious invasion might offer. Yet this more ambiguous campaign may yield similar outcomes, leaving Beijing in control of Taiwan in most ways that matter without the necessity of any formal capitulation. Russia’s failure to rapidly seize Kyiv after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine vividly reinforces the appeal of this strategy. Since 2022, Beijing has shown increased interest in cheaper and less risky measures to slowly squeeze the island, likely a reflection of its recognition, following Moscow’s military struggles, that a swift military victory over Taiwan will be difficult to achieve. China could keep tightening the noose by rolling out more special coast guard patrols that cover ever-greater swaths of the Taiwan Strait or by imposing customs or quarantine measures to curtail commercial flows. These possible operations would not stray far from activities Beijing has already undertaken around Kinmen Island, for example. Such actions do not amount to a blockade in operational or legal terms, but they achieve similar objectives and preserve the option to conduct a more comprehensive and lethal campaign in the future. LOW RISK, MORE REWARD Because Davidson was the most senior U.S. military officer in the Indo-Pacific and thanks to rising concern across the U.S. national security community about the pace of China’s military modernization, the Davidson Window was quickly accepted as dogma by U.S. policymakers and military leaders. But a number of factors make an outright Chinese military invasion less likely than a low-intensity encroachment campaign, both before 2027 and well into the future. The Chinese Communist Party has linked unification with Taiwan to the wider goal of “national rejuvenation” by 2049, but Chinese leader Xi Jinping himself has remained vague about what such unification means in practice. China can afford to push its timeline well beyond the Davidson Window without departing from its long-term policy toward Taiwan. China is also limited by a lack of recent combat experience and low confidence in its capability to conduct joint operations. As long as Beijing’s coercive measures are expanding its effective control over Taiwan, China is likely to keep traveling down this well-worn path—one that can give it much of what it desires at a tiny fraction of the cost of an amphibious invasion. The tepid response to China’s coercion strategy thus far from the United States and its allies has done little to discourage leaders in Beijing. Building and militarizing outposts on the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, evicting the Philippines from Scarborough Shoal, and undermining Vietnam’s efforts to develop offshore oil and gas fields by blocking Hanoi’s physical access to the sites are among a litany of small successes that expand China’s control and build confidence in its capacity to scale up those efforts. Pursuing such a gray-zone strategy entails some risks. China must carefully calibrate the timing and extent of its coercive activities to avoid counterproductive reactions from Washington and regional allies. Chinese actions to restrict or sever critical flows of food, fuel, or information to Taiwan, in particular, risk inviting symmetric responses from the United States. But the gray-zone approach also offers distinct advantages. Beijing can rely heavily on law enforcement and civilian assets in its activities against Taiwan, but the United States lacks the nonmilitary maritime forces required to respond in kind. Washington may turn toward economic or diplomatic measures, but these cannot directly reverse China’s physical and operational gains and are unlikely to impose costs sufficient to force China to change course. The United States has struggled to coordinate effectively with allies and partners to prevent China’s progressively more coercive gray-zone actions. As long as Beijing does not directly impede the flow of commercial traffic through the Taiwan Strait, most countries are likely to remain on the sidelines. Some foreign actors, including China’s regional neighbors and commercial entities such as shipping firms, would likely accommodate many types of new restrictions Beijing might place on Taiwan. Multinational firms have already set a worrisome precedent of deferring to Beijing: Japanese and South Korean firms, for example, have for years deferred to Beijing’s notification rules (as opposed to those set by Taipei) for commercial flights traveling over the Taiwan Strait. KEY CHANGE If the United States and Taiwan remain narrowly focused on the Davidson Window, they will make decisions that are poorly matched to China’s more probable strategic choices. Investments in precision munitions and the forward deployment of large numbers of U.S. warships and aircraft in Asia are mismatched against Chinese actions calibrated to stay just beneath the threshold that would make these assets useful. Similarly, Taiwan’s pursuit of high-end military hardware such as submarines and fighter jets and upgraded military training focused on repelling Chinese invaders will do little to impede China’s creeping exercise of coercive control through law enforcement and other nonlethal tactics. Instead, Taiwan should take the lead in proactively pushing back on China’s encroachment by creating buffer zones that protect its airspace, waters, and economy. Calling attention to Chinese gray-zone operations will not be sufficient on its own. Taiwan would benefit from focusing its defense investments on domain-awareness capabilities—for instance, acquiring more advanced ground- and sea-based sensors to better detect and monitor the presence of Chinese aircraft and ships in nearby airspace and waters. It should also build a large fleet of inexpensive air and sea drones that could support surveillance operations in Taiwan’s outlying areas and respond to the staggering scale of Chinese incursions at reasonable cost. Taiwan must also expand its coast guard to more assertively push back against the activities of China’s coast guard and maritime militia. Taipei has made some modest steps in these directions but is moving far too slowly to meet the challenges posed by China’s intensifying campaign. Taiwan will need to quickly increase its spending on the development of indigenous capabilities and focus any foreign military financing from the United States on these types of systems. In the information domain, Taiwan should harden its communication systems and train a more sophisticated cyberdefense workforce. Even more important, Taiwan must accelerate its efforts to expand and diversify its satellite communications services and infrastructure to defend against Chinese attacks on its information networks and submarine Internet cables. Already, Taiwan has signed a contract with Eutelsat OneWeb—an analog to the Starlink system that has proved so vital in Ukraine—but it should take further steps to augment satellite bandwidth in the near term. If Washington remains narrowly focused on the prospect of an invasion of Taiwan, it will make mistakes. Washington will also be crucial to Taiwan’s buffer zone strategy. In April, Congress earmarked $2 billion for defense aid to the Indo-Pacific, but how this money will be allocated remains unclear. The United States should use a portion of available funds to bolster Taiwan’s aerial and maritime surveillance and intelligence capabilities and its fleets of air, sea, and subsurface drones. Washington should also consider an expanded role for the U.S. Coast Guard in and around the Taiwan Strait. Currently, U.S. Coast Guard forces patrol the exclusive economic zones of U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines, uphold the international Law of the Sea, and engage in exercises with regional partners. Extending the Coast Guard’s mandate in waters near Taiwan to include, for example, patrolling nearby fisheries with the aim of ensuring access and supporting resource conservation could push back against China’s efforts to control these areas while matching Beijing’s use of law enforcement vessels. Using Coast Guard vessels is less likely to provoke escalation than employing the U.S. navy and better suits a policy aimed at preserving the fragile status quo. Finally, the United States ought to coordinate with corporations to support Taiwan’s economic buffer, especially those that ship goods to the island via sea and air. An interagency group from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State should establish channels to assess emerging risks and share early warning indicators with the leaders of large multinational trading firms, shippers, and insurers. This exercise should be conducted in a private setting to facilitate contingency planning and provide governmental and military support for these corporations to undertake physical and financial preparations that will ensure Taiwan’s access to global markets. If the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, the United States and Taiwan should be as focused on developing strategies to prevent Taiwan’s slow subjugation as they are on forestalling outright invasion. If Washington cannot alter its single-minded outlook, it could end up as a bystander as Taiwan slips under creeping Chinese control in a silent fait accompli. ISAAC KARDON is Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. JENNIFER KAVANAGH is Senior Fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. MORE BY ISAAC KARDON MORE BY JENNIFER KAVANAGH More: China Taiwan Economics Business Trade Security Defense & Military U.S. Foreign Policy Chinese-Taiwanese Relations Most-Read Articles Competition Without Catastrophe How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan The New Moral Resistance to Putin Relearning a Soviet-Era Art Amid Repression and War Andrei Kolesnikov Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink U.S. Diplomacy Remains the Key to Regional Stability Vali Nasr Mexico’s Vote for Autocracy How AMLO Undermined Democracy and Brought Back Party Dominance Denise Dresser Recommended Articles How Will Taiwan’s New President Handle China? Lai Ching-te’s Precarious Balancing Act Nick Frisch Taiwanese naval vessels near Kaohsiung, Taiwan, January 2024 Taiwan Is the New Berlin A Cold War Lesson for America’s Contest With China Dmitri Alperovitch Gaza and the Breakdown of International Law A Conversation With Oona Hathaway May 16, 2024 View Transcript Speed: 0.75x1x1.25x1.5x2x FOLLOW THE PODCAST https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/gaza-and-breakdown-international-law-oona-hathaway Request Reprint Permissions There’s no question that Hamas violated international law when it attacked Israel on October 7, and as it continues to hold hostages in Gaza. But more than seven months into Israel’s response, the issue of whether Israel is violating international law—or even committing war crimes—is coming to a head. Washington is debating holding up deliveries of weapons to Israel. And the International Criminal Court is rumored to be preparing a case against leaders of both Hamas and the Israeli government. What’s happening in Gaza may seem unprecedented. But as the legal scholar Oona Hathaway writes in Foreign Affairs, “The conflict in Gaza is an extreme example of the breakdown of the law of war, but it is not an isolated one.” Hathaway is the Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale University School of Law and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In 2014–15, she took leave to serve as special counsel to the general counsel at the U.S. Department of Defense. Foreign Affairs Deputy Editor Kate Brannen spoke with her on May 13 about the causes of that breakdown—and what, if anything, can be done to salvage the rules meant to protect civilians in wartime. Sources: “War Unbound” by Oona A. Hathaway “U.S. Military’s Plea to Israel: Do More to Protect Gazans in War Zone” by The New York Times’ Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt Things Not Foreseen at Paris The Future in Retrospect By Arnold J. Toynbee April 1934 Published on April 1, 1934 The delegations signing the Treaty of Versailles in the Hall of Mirrors. June 28 1919 US National Archives AHistory of the Peace Conference of Paris. Edited by H. W. V. Temperley. London: Frowde, 1920-1924, 6 volumes. It is certainly easy to be wise after the event; and yet this facile wisdom is sometimes illuminating; for life, after all, is a game of blindman’s buff or a horse-race in which some dark horse is always the winner. If this is true of life in general, it is eminently true of the game of international politics; and it is true above all of peace conferences following general wars, when statesmen whom war exigencies and war psychology have carried into A UN Trusteeship for Palestine{聯合國對巴勒斯坦的託管} A Temporary Fix That Can Lead to an Enduring Peace By Lloyd Axworthy, Michael W. Manulak, and Allan Rock May 15, 2024 A tent camp for displaced Palestinians in Deir Al-Balah, Gaza Strip, May 2024 The current crisis in the Middle East, sparked seven months ago by Hamas’s attack on Israel, shows worrying signs of worsening. Tit-for-tat strikes between Israel and Iran in April, unprecedented in their directness, threaten to turn the long-standing shadow war between the two countries into outright military confrontation. Now, as Israel begins its ground assault in Rafah, the situation inside Gaza is deteriorating swiftly. With more than 34,000 civilian deaths already, accusations of genocide, and indications of a manmade famine, the humanitarian imperative is enormous and urgent. Outside Gaza, new Jewish settlements and incursions by the Israel Defense Forces in the West Bank stoke further tensions. The elements of a wider regional deal, built around the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations and a pathway for Palestinian statehood, have been circulating for months and would be welcomed by the United States and many other countries. A key obstacle to realizing such an agreement, however, is Israel’s reluctance to end the war, with the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seemingly unwilling to bring the military campaign to an end. Another obstacle is a refusal on the Palestinian side to recognize that Hamas can play no role in postconflict governance. Basic questions must also be answered for both sides to move toward this future. How would Gaza be administered? By whom? How could Israeli security be guaranteed? So far, few answers have emerged. Israel lacks a political vision for the war’s end. An Israeli occupation of Gaza, perhaps the most likely outcome currently, will come at enormous cost to Israel, in terms of blood, treasure, and international reputation. But neither is the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas in a position to govern Gaza. The PA needs reform and fresh leadership to regain credibility among Palestinians. And a return to rule by Hamas, which thrives on violence and the suffering of those it governs, is even less viable. The situation cries out for an international arrangement to help all sides realize their self-interest in a durable peace for Gaza and, ultimately, a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To last, any such arrangement will have to be backed by regional leaders, have the clear goal of strengthening Palestinian institutions as a prelude to statehood, and guarantee Israel’s security. Fortunately, there is an established, long-dormant mechanism that can do just that: a UN trusteeship. WORK YOURSELF OUT OF A JOB The administration of UN trusteeships is supervised by the UN Trusteeship Council, a forum that was set up shortly after the creation of the United Nations in 1945. Trusteeships were established for remaining League of Nations mandates, the colonies of the Axis powers in World War II, and any other territories placed under the system. Trust territories included Western Samoa, Cameroon, Togoland, New Guinea, Italian Somaliland, among others. One of six organs of the UN system—alongside the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice—the Trusteeship Council suspended operations in November 1994 when its final trust territory, Palau, achieved independence. In total, the Trusteeship Council oversaw 11 trust territories. The Trusteeship Council, a rare example of an international institution that unambiguously fulfilled its agenda, provided a vital mechanism for facilitating decolonization in Africa and the Pacific. It exceeded even the most optimistic expectations of governments. It could continue this legacy with a trusteeship for Palestine, putting Palestinians on a pathway toward statehood. As made clear under Article 76 of the UN Charter, trusteeships have the express purpose of fostering “progressive development towards self-government and independence” based on the “expressed wishes of the people concerned,” alongside respect for human rights and the furtherance of international peace and security. The trusteeship should establish a time frame for full Palestinian statehood. UN trusteeships are a product of what are known as administrative agreements, pacts negotiated by UN member states and approved by the General Assembly. These agreements are devised by one or more states that assume a duty under the UN Charter to aid the trust territory in strengthening its institutions of governance as it moves toward independence. This includes the provision of force, as necessary, to maintain peace and security. Supervision by the Trusteeship Council ensures the support and oversight of the international community. With these layers of oversight, trusteeships are designed to benefit the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories. They work with the consent of the governed, accompanying them as they develop their institutions and capacity. Though suspended, the current membership of the Trusteeship Council includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. It could be reconvened by request of the Security Council or the General Assembly, or by a decision of current Trusteeship Council members. Upon convening, members of the Trusteeship Council would duly elect a president and vice president. A trusteeship for Palestine has been considered before. In 2003, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk made the case for a U.S.-led and UN-endorsed trusteeship for Palestine in Foreign Affairs. “Without some form of effective international intervention, Israelis and Palestinians will continue to die and their circumstances will continue to deteriorate, fueling vast discontent and anger at the United States in the Muslim world and placing Israel’s future well-being in jeopardy,” he wrote. In 2007, he renewed his proposal for a UN-mandated international force to replace Israeli forces in the Palestinian territories. Although similar in spirit, what’s needed now is something different. Although firm U.S. backing is necessary, the trusteeship should be under the aegis of the UN and led by regional actors. GOVERNING GAZA A temporary trusteeship in Palestine should include both Gaza and the West Bank. If the objective is to forge a unified Palestinian state, as it must be, both territories should be included. Negotiation of an administrative agreement might also consider the future of the UN agency serving Palestinian refugees (known as UNRWA), the status of East Jerusalem, and Jewish settlements in the West Bank. As specified in the UN Charter, provision must be made to ensure that the expressed wishes of the Palestinian people will be the overriding consideration in state building throughout the trusteeship, including political, economic, social, and educational advancement. The trusteeship should establish a time frame for full Palestinian statehood. A timeline would help focus state-building efforts and guard against the risk that this temporary measure becomes more enduring than initially intended, which is what happened to the UNRWA. UN trusteeships are designed to come to an end. Many UN trusteeships were concluded within 15 years, with some complete in less than ten. Conceivably, a Palestinian trusteeship could lead to statehood even more swiftly. Like most other former mandates established under the League of Nations after World War I, Palestine very nearly became a UN trust in 1948. Indeed, senior U.S. officials believed strongly that this was the most suitable option and circulated a draft agreement at the UN to achieve it. The plan was scuppered at the last moment—with not a little embarrassment at the State Department—by objections from U.S. President Harry Truman, some say for domestic political reasons, as well as by hesitations on the part of Jewish and Palestinian groups. UN trusteeship offers a path to progress on an intractable problem. Using the Trusteeship Council to pave the way to a two-state solution would require no amendment to the UN Charter, since the organ would be used for its intended purpose. Indeed, it would arguably rectify the error made in 1948. Moreover, agreement on a trusteeship would not be subject to a UN Security Council veto. Trusteeships fall under the responsibility of the General Assembly, and so the administrative agreement to establish the trusteeship would need merely a majority vote of all members. This was a hard-earned win for states that are not permanent members of the Security Council at the San Francisco conference in 1945. This arrangement avoids veto-power-induced wrangling over a Security Council resolution that, in all likelihood, would result in the same type of fractured, ambiguous mandate that has bedeviled other UN missions. It might also save the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) from excessive politicization, moving discussions from a security-focused venue to a more technical forum. Negotiations over an administrative agreement would be complex. All sides would need to feel that their interests would be safeguarded. The support of Israel, the PA, moderate forces in Gaza, and the United States would be necessary. The agreement would need to support the wider regional deal on Israeli-Saudi normalization, offering value to all sides. The trusteeship should be administered by a small group of regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which would assume primary responsibility for the trusteeship. Active Israeli collaboration in some form would be essential on the ground, especially—if it were not itself elected to the Trusteeship Council—as a nonvoting participant in discussions. Israel, often skeptical of UN solutions, would likely need some convincing to back a trusteeship, up to and including the type of U.S. arm-twisting seen recently over weapons shipments. Although key regional players have in the past voiced concern about assuming responsibility for postconflict Gaza, they have a strong interest in Palestinian statehood and might welcome the more formal institutional backing of the UN in any solution. The staggering costs of rebuilding Gaza will be a key consideration for these regional actors in embarking on any administrative agreement, making the broad international support of the UN system especially appealing. Once an administrative agreement for the trusteeship has been finalized and approved by a majority vote at the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council could be reconstituted. With only one trust territory, the revived organ could be small, limited in number to the administrative authorities—in this case Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and any other actors in the region that assume the responsibility—and, as stipulated in Article 86 of the UN Charter, an equal number of nonadministrative members elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. Members of the Trusteeship Council would convene in New York to review progress toward Palestinian statehood, issuing by majority vote decisions or recommendations in support of this process. Any abstaining governments are not counted in votes. The permanent members of the UN Security Council would be included among the membership of the Trusteeship Council. Any additional nonadministrative members should be elected on a geographically representative basis, taking into account the experience of candidate countries with state building. The small size of the Trusteeship Council would be a virtue, bringing coherence and, with luck, depoliticizing the endeavor. BUYING TIME Although the initiative would not be simple to negotiate, it is probably less complicated than the alternatives and could open the way to the wider regional deal centered on Israeli-Saudi normalization. Although the PA is currently in no position to govern, a temporary trusteeship would offer the international administrative and supervisory support required to aid its transition to government. The Trusteeship Council has proved it can do this sort of work. With Saudi Arabia leading the administering authority, alongside one or two other regional partners, Hamas could be disbanded, Israeli security could be guaranteed, and Palestine’s pathway to statehood clarified. Troops would be provided, chiefly by administering states, but with contributions from other UN member states. All this would be done within a UN framework and with the support of the UN membership. UN trusteeship thus offers a path to progress on an intractable problem. The Palestinian question has remained an open wound, triggering resentment and accusations of Western hypocrisy for decades. It has also proved highly divisive domestically in many countries, as seen recently on U.S. university campuses. A temporary trusteeship also sidesteps a fractured Security Council, offering the hope of resolving a conflict in the midst of great-power competition. Although the notion of trusteeship may seem anachronistic, it could offer a useful tool for UN-led state building beyond Palestine. As civil wars rage with renewed ferocity around the world, a reinvigorated Trusteeship Council might serve as a useful means of fostering the transition to statehood for other non-self-governing regions, such as the Western Sahara and 15 others, that may require support to transition to independence. Ending these conflicts would mark an important achievement for a UN system in need of a victory. And in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it offers the best chance of peace. LLOYD AXWORTHY is Chair of the World Refugee and Migration Council. He was Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 2000. MICHAEL W. MANULAK is an Assistant Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University and the author of Change in Global Environmental Politics: Temporal Focal Points and the Reform of International Institutions. ALLAN ROCK is President Emeritus of the University of Ottawa. He was Canadian Minister of Justice from 1993 to 1997 and Canadian Ambassador to the UN from 2003 to 2006. MORE BY LLOYD AXWORTHY MORE BY MICHAEL W. MANULAK MORE BY ALLAN ROCK 聯合國對巴勒斯坦的託管 可以帶來持久和平的臨時解決辦法 作者：勞埃德·阿克斯沃西、邁克爾·W·曼努拉克和艾倫·洛克 2024 年 5 月 15 日 2024 年 5 月，加薩走廊代爾巴拉赫為流離失所的巴勒斯坦人搭建的帳篷營地 七個月前哈馬斯襲擊以色列引發的當前中東危機顯示出令人擔憂的惡化跡象。以色列和伊朗四月針鋒相對的攻擊前所未有地直接，有可能將兩國之間長期存在的影子戰爭轉變為徹底的軍事對抗。現在，隨著以色列開始對拉法發動地面進攻，加薩境內的局勢正快速惡化。目前已有超過 34,000 名平民死亡、種族滅絕指控以及人為飢荒的跡象，人道主義當務之急是巨大而緊迫的。在加薩之外，新的猶太人定居點和以色列國防軍對西岸的入侵加劇了緊張局勢。 圍繞以色列與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化和巴勒斯坦建國之路建立的更廣泛區域協議的內容已經流傳數月，並將受到美國和許多其他國家的歡迎。然而，實現這項協議的一個主要障礙是以色列不願結束戰爭，總理班傑明·內塔尼亞胡的政府似乎不願意結束軍事行動。另一個障礙是巴勒斯坦方面拒絕承認哈馬斯在衝突後治理中無法發揮任何作用。 雙方也必須回答基本問題才能邁向這個未來。加薩將如何管理？透過誰？以色列的安全如何得到保障？到目前為止，答案還很少。以色列缺乏結束戰爭的政治願景。以色列佔領加薩可能是目前最有可能的結果，但以色列將付出巨大的代價，包括血、財富和國際聲譽。但馬哈茂德·阿巴斯總統領導下的巴勒斯坦權力機構也無法治理加薩。巴勒斯坦權力機構需要改革和新的領導才能重新贏得巴勒斯坦人的信任。哈馬斯靠著暴力及其統治者的痛苦而繁榮，恢復其統治更是不可行。 目前的局勢迫切需要一項國際安排，幫助各方實現加薩持久和平的自身利益，並最終實現以色列-巴勒斯坦衝突的兩國解決方案。最後，任何此類安排都必須得到地區領導人的支持，有明確的目標：加強巴勒斯坦機構，作為建國的前奏，並確保以色列的安全。幸運的是，有一個已建立的、長期休眠的機制可以做到這一點：聯合國託管。 擺脫工作，努力工作 聯合國託管的管理工作由聯合國託管理事會進行監督，該理事會是 1945年聯合國成立後不久設立的一個論壇。置於該系統之下的任何其他領土。託管領土包括西薩摩亞、喀麥隆、多哥蘭、紐幾內亞、義屬索馬利蘭等。 託管理事會是聯合國體系的六個機構之一（其他六大機構包括安理會、大會、經濟及社會理事會、秘書處和國際法院），並於1994 年11 月其最後託管領土帛琉獲得獨立後暫停運作。託管理事會總共監管 11 個託管領土。託管理事會是明確履行其議程的國際機構的罕見典範，為促進非洲和太平洋非殖民化提供了重要機制。它甚至超越了政府最樂觀的預期。 它可以透過對巴勒斯坦的託管來延續這一遺產，使巴勒斯坦人走上建國之路。正如《聯合國憲章》第七十六條明確規定的那樣，託管的明確目的是在“有關人民明確表示的願望”的基礎上，促進“朝著自治和獨立的方向逐步發展”，同時尊重人權和促進國際社會的發展。 託管應為巴勒斯坦全面建國制定一個時間表。 聯合國託管是所謂行政協議的產物，即由聯合國成員國談判並經聯合國大會批准的協議。這些協議是由一個或多個國家製定的，這些國家根據《聯合國憲章》承擔著幫助託管領土在走向獨立的過程中加強其治理機構的義務。這包括在必要時提供武力，以維持和平與安全。託管理事會的監督確保了國際社會的支持和監督。透過這些層層監督，託管旨在使非自治領土的居民受益。他們在被統治者同意的情況下工作，並陪伴他們發展自己的機構和能力。 儘管暫停，託管理事會目前的成員包括聯合國安理會五個常任理事國。應安全理事會或大會的要求，或託管理事會現任成員的決定，可以重新召開會議。託管理事會會議召開後，成員將正式選舉主席和副主席。 此前曾考慮對巴勒斯坦進行託管。 2003年，前美國駐以色列大使馬丁·因迪克在外交事務上提出了由美國領導、聯合國認可的巴勒斯坦託管權。他寫道：「如果沒有某種形式的有效國際幹預，以色列人和巴勒斯坦人將繼續死亡，他們的情況將繼續惡化，加劇穆斯林世界對美國的巨大不滿和憤怒，並將以色列的未來福祉置於危險之中。 2007年，他再次提議建立聯合國授權的國際部隊，以取代巴勒斯坦領土上的以色列軍隊。儘管精神上相似，但現在需要的是不同的東西。儘管美國的堅定支持是必要的，但託管應在聯合國的支持下並由地區行為體領導。 治理加沙 巴勒斯坦的臨時託管應包括加薩和西岸。如果目標是建立一個統一的巴勒斯坦國（這是必須的），那麼這兩個領土都應該包括在內。行政協議的談判也可能考慮為巴勒斯坦難民提供服務的聯合國機構（稱為近東救濟工程處）的未來、東耶路撒冷的地位以及西岸的猶太人定居點。正如《聯合國憲章》所規定的，必須做出規定，確保巴勒斯坦人民表達的願望成為整個託管期間國家建設的首要考慮因素，包括政治、經濟、社會和教育進步。 託管應為巴勒斯坦全面建國制定一個時間表。時間表將有助於集中國家建設工作，並防範這項臨時措施比最初預期更持久的風險，近東救濟工程處就發生了這種情況。聯合國託管制度注定要結束。許多聯合國託管在 15 年內結束，有些在不到 10 年內完成。可以想像，巴勒斯坦的託管可能會更快建國。 與第一次世界大戰後在國際聯盟下建立的大多數其他前託管地一樣，巴勒斯坦在1948 年幾乎成為聯合國託管地。一份協議草案，以實現這一目標。該計劃在最後一刻因美國總統哈里·杜魯門的反對（有人說是出於國內政治原因）以及猶太和巴勒斯坦團體的猶豫而流產，這讓國務院感到不小的尷尬。 聯合國託管為解決這一棘手問題提供了一條途徑。 利用託管理事會為兩國解決方案鋪平道路不需要修改《聯合國憲章》，因為該機構將用於其預期目的。事實上，它可以說糾正了 1948 年所犯的錯誤。託管權屬於大會的職責，因此建立託管權的行政協議只需要所有成員的多數票。對於 1945 年舊金山會議上的非安理會常任理事國來說，這是一場來之不易的勝利。模糊的任務授權也困擾著其他聯合國特派團。它也可能使安理會五個常任理事國（中國、法國、俄羅斯、英國和美國）免於過度政治化，將討論從以安全為重點的場所轉移到技術性更強的論壇。 關於行政協議的談判將會很複雜。各方都需要覺得自己的利益得到了保障。以色列、巴勒斯坦權力機構、加薩溫和勢力和美國的支持是必要的。該協議需要支持更廣泛的以色列與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化的區域協議，為各方提供價值。託管應由一小部分地區國家管理，包括沙烏地阿拉伯和約旦，它們將承擔託管的主要責任。以色列以某種形式積極進行實地合作至關重要，特別是（如果以色列本身沒有被選為託管理事會成員的話）作為討論的無投票權參與者。以色列經常對聯合國的解決方案持懷疑態度，可能需要一些說服力來支持託管，包括美國最近在武器運輸方面施加的壓力。儘管該地區的主要參與者過去曾對承擔衝突後加薩的責任表示擔憂，但他們對巴勒斯坦建國抱有濃厚的興趣，並可能歡迎聯合國在任何解決方案中提供更正式的機構支持。加薩重建的巨大成本將成為這些區域行為者在簽署任何行政協議時的關鍵考慮因素，這使得聯合國體系的廣泛國際支持特別有吸引力。 一旦託管行政協議最終確定並在大會上以多數票通過，託管理事會就可以重組。由於只有一個託管領土，恢復的機構可能很小，數量也僅限於行政當局——在本例中是沙烏地阿拉伯、約旦和該地區承擔責任的任何其他行為體——而且，根據《公約》第86條的規定， 《聯合國憲章》規定，非行政成員人數相等，由大會選舉產生，任期三年。託管理事會成員將在紐約召開會議，審查巴勒斯坦建國的進展情況，並以多數票決定或建議支持此進程。任何棄權的政府不計入選票。聯合國安理會常任理事國將納入託管理事會成員範圍。任何額外的非行政成員都應在地域代表性的基礎上選舉，同時考慮候選國國家建設的經驗。託管理事會的規模較小將是一種美德，可以帶來一致性，如果幸運的話，還可以使這項努力非政治化。 爭取時間 儘管該倡議的談判並不容易，但它可能比其他替代方案複雜，並且可以為以以色列-沙烏地阿拉伯正常化為中心的更廣泛的區域協議開闢道路。儘管巴勒斯坦權力機構目前無法進行治理，但臨時託管將提供所需的國際行政和監督支持，以協助其向政府過渡。託管理事會已經證明它可以完成此類工作。如果沙烏地阿拉伯領導管理機構，並與其他一兩個區域夥伴一起，哈馬斯可能會被解散，以色列的安全可能會得到保障，巴勒斯坦的建國之路也將變得清晰。部隊將主要由管理國提供，但也有其他聯合國成員國的捐助。所有這一切都將在聯合國框架內並在聯合國會員國的支持下完成。 因此，聯合國託管制度為解決這個棘手問題提供了一條途徑。巴勒斯坦問題仍然是一個未癒合的傷口，幾十年來引發了人們的不滿和對西方虛偽的指責。事實證明，它在許多國家的國內也引起了高度分歧，正如最近在美國大學校園所看到的那樣。臨時託管還可以避開支離破碎的安理會，為在大國競爭中解決衝突帶來希望。 儘管託管的概念似乎不合時宜，但它可以為聯合國領導的巴勒斯坦以外的國家建設提供有用的工具。隨著世界各地內戰再度激烈，重新煥發活力的託管理事會可能成為促進其他非自治地區（例如西撒哈拉和其他 15 個國家）向國家過渡的有用手段，這些地區可能需要支持向獨立過渡。結束這些衝突將標誌著需要勝利的聯合國體系的重要成就。就以色列-巴勒斯坦衝突而言，它提供了最好的和平機會。 勞埃德‧艾克斯沃西 (LLOYD AXWORTHY) 是世界難民和移民理事會主席。 1996年至2000年任加拿大外交部長。 邁克爾·W·馬努拉克 (MICHAEL W. MANULAK) 是卡爾頓大學諾曼帕特森國際事務學院的助理教授，也是《全球環境政治的變化：時間焦點和國際機構改革》一書的作者。 艾倫洛克 (ALLAN ROCK) 是渥太華大學名譽校長。他於1993年至1997年擔任加拿大司法部長，並於2003年至2006年擔任加拿大駐聯合國大使。 勞埃德·阿克斯沃西的更多作品 邁克爾·W·曼努拉克的更多作品 艾倫洛克的更多作品 更多的： 以色列 巴勒斯坦領土 外交地緣 政治 國際機構 聯合國 安全 防衛與軍事 戰爭與軍事戰略 巴以衝突 以色列與哈馬斯戰爭 哈馬斯加沙 最常閱讀的文章 台灣是新柏林 美國與中國競爭的冷戰教訓 德米特里·阿爾佩羅維奇 伊朗和以色列為何從懸崖邊退了一步 美國外交仍然是區域穩定的關鍵 瓦利·納斯爾 聯合國對巴勒斯坦的託管 可以帶來持久和平的臨時解決辦法 勞埃德·阿克斯沃西、邁克爾·W·曼努拉克和艾倫·洛克 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 2024 年 5 月 10 日 2024 年 5 月，一名巴勒斯坦男子在加薩走廊拉法東部觀看以色列的攻擊 2024 年 5 月，一名巴勒斯坦男子在加薩走廊拉法東部觀看以色列的攻擊 哈特姆哈立德/路透社 5月 6 日，為了阻止以色列在拉法的幾乎肯定的行動，哈馬斯領導人表示，他們可能準備接受與以色列的人質換囚犯協議。在哈馬斯數週的阻撓之後，這項宣佈在華盛頓燃起了希望，認為仍有可能達成某種協議，釋放數十名人質，並暫停以色列在加薩地帶的攻勢。但即使是現在，仍不清楚哈馬斯對執行這項協議的決心有多大，或者它是否只是在尋求一種方法來保護其拉法據點，以色列認為這裡是拉法據點。 即將到來的北韓危機 以及華盛頓如何防止它 蘇米特里 本文無需付費 台灣新總統將如何對待中國？ 賴清德的不穩定平衡行為 尼克·弗里施 本文無需付費 PODCAST 加薩與國際法的崩潰 與烏娜·海瑟薇的對話 本文無需付費 2024 年 1 月，台灣海軍艦艇在台灣高雄附近 台灣是新柏林 美國與中國競爭的冷戰教訓 德米特里·阿爾佩羅維奇 本文無需付費 最常閱讀的文章 台灣是新柏林 美國與中國競爭的冷戰教訓 德米特里·阿爾佩羅維奇 伊朗和以色列為何從懸崖邊退了一步 美國外交仍然是區域穩定的關鍵 瓦利·納斯爾 聯合國對巴勒斯坦的託管 可以帶來持久和平的臨時解決辦法 勞埃德·阿克斯沃西、邁克爾·W·曼努拉克和艾倫·洛克 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 普丁與習近平的邪惡聯盟 為什麼西方無法離間俄羅斯和中國 亞歷山大·加布耶夫 推薦文章 2024 年 4 月，以色列軍事人員在以色列阿拉德附近檢查一枚伊朗彈道飛彈的明顯殘骸 伊朗和以色列為何從懸崖邊退了一步 美國外交仍然是區域穩定的關鍵 瓦利·納斯爾 2024 年 5 月，一名巴勒斯坦男子在加薩走廊拉法東部觀看以色列的攻擊 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 More: Israel Palestinian Territories Diplomacy Geopolitics International Institutions United Nations Security Defense & Military War & Military Strategy Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Israel-Hamas War Hamas Gaza Most-Read Articles Taiwan Is the New Berlin A Cold War Lesson for America’s Contest With China Dmitri Alperovitch Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink U.S. Diplomacy Remains the Key to Regional Stability Vali Nasr A UN Trusteeship for Palestine A Temporary Fix That Can Lead to an Enduring Peace Lloyd Axworthy, Michael W. Manulak, and Allan Rock What Hamas Wants in Postwar Gaza The Power to Fight Without the Burden of Governing Matthew Levitt Recommended Articles Israeli military personnel inspect the apparent remains of an Iranian ballistic missile near Arad, Israel, April 2024 Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink U.S. Diplomacy Remains the Key to Regional Stability Vali Nasr A Palestinian man watching Israeli strikes in eastern Rafah, Gaza Strip, May 2024 What Hamas Wants in Postwar Gaza The Power to Fight Without the Burden of Governing Matthew Levitt 劇變的軸心 美國的對手如何联合起來推翻全球秩序 安德里亞·肯德爾-泰勒和理查德·方丹 2024 年 5 月/6 月 發表於2024 年 4 月 23 日 中國、伊朗、北韓、俄羅斯領導人綜合形象 馬特·尼德爾插圖；圖片來源：路透社 1月2日凌晨，俄羅斯軍隊對烏克蘭城市基輔和哈爾科夫發動大規模飛彈攻擊，造成至少5名平民死亡、百餘人受傷，基礎建設受損。這事件之所以引人注目，不僅是因為它造成了傷害，還因為它表明俄羅斯並不孤單。俄羅斯當天的攻擊是使用配備中國技術的武器、北韓的飛彈和伊朗的無人機進行的。在過去兩年裡，這三個國家都成為莫斯科在烏克蘭戰爭機器的關鍵推動者。 The Coming North Korean Crisis And How Washington Can Prevent It By Sue Mi Terry May 16, 2024 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspecting a missile facility, May 2024 U.S. President Joe Biden has plenty of foreign policy crises on his hands. But unfortunately for him, as the United States heads into November’s elections there’s a high chance of yet another emergency: renewed provocations from North Korea. Pyongyang has a history of acting out during U.S. elections. Research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, found that North Korea stages more than four times as many weapons tests in U.S. election years than in other years. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is already growing fraught. On January 10, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared South Korea to be an enemy state, ending all talk of peaceful reunification and setting the stage for more hostilities. Any such outburst could outstrip whatever has come before. After decades of working with Washington to control Kim and restrain his nuclear program, Beijing and Moscow have decided to embrace North Korea’s leader, allowing him to act with newfound impunity. The real nature of any forthcoming North Korean crisis is difficult to predict. At a minimum, Pyongyang will likely carry out nonlethal provocations—such as cyberattacks on government, defense, telecommunications, and financial institutions. It could also test the Hwasong-18, its solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in hope of improving its reliability. And North Korea could explode a tactical nuclear weapon: a small nuclear weapon designed for the battlefield. But North Korea could also go beyond saber-rattling and launch an actual, if limited, military attack against South Korea, akin to when it sank a South Korean naval vessel and shelled the island of Yeonpyeong in 2010. Such a strike could quickly spin out of control. Current South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol is an avowed hawk and has promised to respond forcefully to any North Korean attack. He is unlikely to be restrained by the fact that his party lost seats in April’s National Assembly elections. Instead, Yoon might violate North Korean airspace with unmanned aerial vehicles or fire back, hitting one of North Korea’s many artillery positions along the border. If Yoon does respond in kind to a North Korean provocation, the peninsula could quickly find itself ensnared in a conflict that nobody wants—especially not the United States. As a treaty ally, Washington is obligated to come to Seoul’s defense, and being drawn into a war with a nuclear-armed rogue state is a nightmare scenario for already overstretched American officials. But to stop this from happening, the Biden administration must step up efforts to deter North Korea. It must dry up the illicit finance pipeline that supplies the country’s military. It must also review and update contingency plans with Japan and South Korea. That way, Washington is prepared in the event that Pyongyang does decide to attack. BIGGER AND BADDER Over the last five years, the Kim regime has been rapidly expanding its nuclear weapons program. Since his meetings with Trump fell apart, Kim has refused all offers of serious negotiations with the United States and tested new weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads, including powerful solid-fuel ICBMs and an underwater nuclear weapons system. Pyongyang is also developing hypersonic missiles designed to penetrate U.S. air defenses and a large multiple launch rocket system that, according to Kim, could “collapse” South Korea’s capital and destroy “the structure of its military forces.” Meanwhile, North Korea successfully launched a military reconnaissance satellite in November, and it has vowed to put several more satellites into orbit this year. These launches will give it something it has long desired: more real-time information about U.S. and South Korean military activities on the peninsula. Back on earth, North Korea is expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities in order to make more nuclear weapons. Kim has vowed to “exponentially increase nuclear weapons production to realize all kinds of nuclear strike methods.” At a party plenum in December, he called for an increase in the country’s nuclear weapons stockpile, and North Korea’s uranium enrichment site is now bigger than ever. Recent satellite imagery indicates that the country is expanding a suspected nuclear facility near Pyongyang. Meanwhile, intelligence reports suggest it is ready to resume underground nuclear testing at its Punggye-ri site. As North Korea has ramped up its weapons efforts, it has also escalated its rhetorical assault on its southern neighbor. Kim has recently abandoned Pyongyang’s decades-old goal of reunification, instead declaring South Korea to be its primary adversary. In the regime’s new worldview, the two countries no longer share any kinship, and North Korea is preparing for a “military showdown” with South Korea. To prove that it is serious, the regime-run Korean Central News Agency recently deleted hundreds of texts that spoke about the possibility of unification. The regime used to refer to its country as the “northern half” of the Korean Peninsula. That phrase, along with many others, has now been expunged. The Biden administration must step up efforts to deter North Korea. There is no indication that Kim is gearing up for all-out war. The regime is not mobilizing troops or equipment, there is no increase in activity at its military bases, and South Korean officials have not detected a significant buildup near the border. But Kim’s rhetoric does suggest a smaller attack could be forthcoming. And if he does resolve to strike, it will be hard to stop him. Both China and Russia are now much more closely aligned with Pyongyang than with Western governments, and so they are unlikely to force him to back off. In fact, in late March, China abstained from—and Russia vetoed—a motion to extend the UN Panel of Experts, an independent body that monitors North Korea’s compliance with nuclear sanctions. Zhao Leji, one of China’s top officials, recently met with Kim in Pyongyang to increase trust and cooperation. Kim met with Putin in September 2023, and ever since, Pyongyang has welcomed a steady flow of Russian delegations—including a March visit from Sergei Naryshkin, the director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. According to The Korea Herald, Naryshkin “deeply discussed practical issues for further boosting cooperation” with his North Korean counterpart. The North Korean–Russian partnership is, ultimately, one of convenience. But practical partnerships can still be powerful, and the Moscow-Pyongyang entente is no exception. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a convergence of political needs and material interests that has prompted North Korea to ship weapons to Russia en masse. North Korea, meanwhile, is receiving more economic and technological assistance from Russia. Moscow, for example, appears to have aided Pyongyang with its military satellite program. Russia could soon offer North Korea assistance with space launch vehicles—assistance that would help North Korea develop better ICBMs. For Kim, the biggest prize would be the transfer of sensitive, cutting-edge Russian military technology and advanced weaponry. He particularly wants help building solid-fuel missiles and reentry vehicles, which would advance North Korea’s nuclear program. Russia could also assist North Korea with its nuclear submarine and its submarine-launched ballistic missiles—areas in which Russia has significant experience. Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing may seem weak compared to North Korea’s burgeoning connection to Russia. But China remains North Korea’s most valuable ally, and the two states are increasingly united by their enmity toward Washington. China is also now cooperating more with Russia, suggesting that Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang are creating a dangerous, if informal, tripartite pact. As Bruce Bennett, a defense researcher at RAND, has warned, these three countries could “convert Ukraine into a Russia-China-North Korea laboratory for examining and improving various weapons and tactics in actual warfare.” The likely result will be improved military capabilities for each. The cooperation could also increase North Korea’s willingness to take risks, raising the prospect of fresh attacks on its southern neighbor. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED So far, Biden and his aides have largely ignored the Korean Peninsula—and understandably so. With wars raging in Ukraine and Gaza and tensions rising with China and Iran, the administration has had little bandwidth to focus on Kim’s antics. But North Korea is one of only three countries, along with China and Russia, that could plausibly launch a nuclear strike against the continental United States, and it menaces two major U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, as well. And so the administration has little choice but to focus on the peninsula. Admittedly, Washington has few good options, particularly given that Kim is less isolated than he was even three years before. His newfound strength has prompted some Korea watchers to argue that it is time for Washington to drop its unrealistic pursuit of denuclearization and focus on risk reduction via negotiations. They urge the Biden administration to lure Pyongyang back to the negotiating table by offering to relax sanctions in return for confidence-building negotiations, such as a freeze or even a slowdown in nuclear enrichment. Such an approach could be modeled on the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, which banned most types of nuclear tests and slightly thawed tensions at the height of the Cold War. There are few downsides to exploring negotiations with Pyongyang. But the reality is that North Korea has not shown much interest in talking since Trump’s 2019 summit ended early without any agreement. The North Korean leader has even less incentive to make compromises now than he did then, thanks to the assistance the regime gets from China and Russia. And even if Kim were interested in making some kind of deal with the United States, it would make sense for him to first advance North Korea’s nuclear program as far as possible to increase his bargaining leverage. Kim might also imagine that, by making trouble for Biden, he could facilitate the return of President Donald Trump, who was eager to meet with him and even claimed that the two leaders had fallen in love. Kim was disappointed by the 2019 summit with Trump in Hanoi, but he must be even more disappointed by the Biden administration, which has largely ignored his regime. For an attention-hungry tyrant, indifference is the cruelest blow of all. Now is not the time to lift sanctions. Now is the time to double down. This reality means that Biden has little choice but to keep strengthening U.S. deterrence against North Korea. To that end, he should double down on his efforts to protect South Korea and enhance defense cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo. He could, for example, provide more real-time data and intelligence to South Korea and collaborate on the development of missile defense systems, surveillance equipment, drones, and weapons enabled with artificial intelligence—leveraging the technological strengths of both countries. Given the increased risk of a conventional confrontation, Seoul and Washington also need to boost conventional deterrence capabilities, including by adding more air-to-surface missiles that can attack enemy radars, such as the S-400 air defense system Russia may provide to North Korea. There are also steps that the United States can take to keep up economic pressure on North Korea, despite Beijing and Moscow’s entente. According to Joshua Stanton, the principal architect of a 2016 bill that strengthened sanctions against North Korea, the Biden administration can build a coalition of the willing to limit Pyongyang’s access to illicit finance. The Kim regime, for example, earns revenue by sending laborers abroad to work at restaurants, construction sites, and sweatshops in countries around the world. These workers smuggle cash back to North Korea in bulk, and they engage in money laundering and cybercrimes. Washington and its allies can trace and expose the supply chains behind products made with North Korean forced labor and ban them from being sold in their borders. There are critics of stringent approaches. For example, the historian John Delury has argued that stricter sanctions enforcement will only foreclose opportunities for diplomacy and further raise tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Tougher sanctions, Delury argues, are “not only futile” but also “counterproductive and dangerous.” But this analysis is incorrect. As Stanton points out, history has shown that Pyongyang is in fact more willing to negotiate when restrictions are effective and more inclined to self-isolate, proliferate, and provoke when they are not. North Korea, he observed, returned to negotiations between 2005 and 2007, and again between 2018 and 2019, following periods of relatively strong sanctions enforcement. Pyongyang’s nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2016, by contrast, coincided with periods when Washington was relatively lax. Tellingly, Kim’s principal demand during past negotiations with the United States was sanctions relief. “It was all about the sanctions,” Trump told reporters in 2019. “They wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety, and we couldn’t do that.” Now is not the time to lift sanctions, either. Now, in fact, is the time to double down. If Biden wants to prevent North Korea from acting out, he needs to first provide the government with new incentives to talk—and that means new restrictions Washington can use as carrots. Biden, in other words, needs to take North Korean policy off autopilot and launch a proactive effort to deter Pyongyang. Otherwise, he risks encouraging an already emboldened Kim to stage a major provocation. SUE MI TERRY is Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. A former CIA analyst, she served on the National Intelligence Council from 2009 to 2010 and the National Security Council from 2008 to 2009. MORE BY SUE MI TERRY More: North Korea South Korea Security Defense & Military Nuclear Weapons & Proliferation Strategy & Conflict War & Military Strategy U.S. Foreign Policy Biden Administration Most-Read Articles Taiwan Is the New Berlin A Cold War Lesson for America’s Contest With China Dmitri Alperovitch Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink U.S. Diplomacy Remains the Key to Regional Stability Vali Nasr A UN Trusteeship for Palestine A Temporary Fix That Can Lead to an Enduring Peace Lloyd Axworthy, Michael W. 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Some fear that it may have been its last anniversary with the United States playing a leading role. Former U.S. President Donald Trump still views the alliance as obsolete. If reelected, he says he would encourage Russian leaders to do “whatever the hell they want” to member states that do not pay what he considers to be enough for defense. A second Trump presidency could have dire implications for European security. Trump’s defenders argue that he is bluffing to pressure Europe into spending more on defense. But former U.S. officials who worked closely with Trump on NATO during his tenure, including one of us (Hooker), are convinced he will withdraw from the alliance if he is reelected. Trump hugely resents the more moderate advisers who kept him in check during his first term. If he reaches the White House in 2025, the guardrails will be off. The U.S. Congress is concerned, too. It recently enacted legislation to prohibit a president from withdrawing from NATO unless Congress approves, either by a two-thirds vote in the Senate or an act of both houses of Congress. But Trump could circumvent this prohibition. He has already raised doubts about his willingness to honor NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause. By withholding funding, recalling U.S. troops and commanders from Europe, and blocking important decisions in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s top deliberative body), Trump could dramatically weaken the alliance without formally leaving it. Even if he does not withdraw American support completely, Trump’s current position on NATO and his disinterest in supporting Ukraine, if adopted as national policy, would shatter European confidence in American leadership and military resolve. EUROPE, ABANDONED If Trump is reelected and follows through on his anti-NATO instincts, the first casualty would be Ukraine. Trump has opposed additional military aid to Kyiv and continues to fawn over Russian President Vladimir Putin. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg is already trying to Trump-proof aid to Ukraine by coordinating it under the aegis of the alliance rather than the U.S.-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Should the United States weaken or terminate its defense commitment to Europe under Trump, European countries would feel more vulnerable and may become increasingly reluctant to send Ukraine their own vital military supplies. With dramatic aid cuts, Kyiv could be forced to negotiate an unfavorable agreement with Moscow that would leave Ukraine a rump state militarily and economically vulnerable to Russia. Should Ukraine’s defenses collapse altogether, brutal repression and forced Russification await some 38 million people. The disastrous consequences would only start there. A deflated NATO would struggle to mount an effective conventional deterrent against further Russian aggression. Russia is now on a war footing, spending six percent of its GDP on defense, and its authoritarian leader is committed to an ultranationalistic mission to consolidate his rule over what he calls the “Russian world,” an unspecified geographic space that extends well beyond his country’s internationally recognized borders. Moscow could reconstitute its armed forces relatively quickly. After subjugating all of Ukraine, Putin would probably focus on the Baltic states—NATO members covered by the alliance’s security umbrella but claimed as historic Russian lands by Putin. Should NATO’s conventional deterrence be weakened by the withdrawal of U.S. support, Russia would only be tempted to act more brazenly. NATO countries collectively now spend two percent of GDP on defense, but in the absence U.S. support, European armies are still not sufficiently prepared, equipped, and able to fight against a major-power adversary. Europe remains heavily reliant on the United States in several important areas. On its own, it lacks many of the key tools necessary for successful defense, including airlift capabilities, air-to-air refueling, high-altitude air defense, space assets, and operational intelligence—these are all supplied primarily by the United States. Without American help, NATO would lose much of its military edge over Russia. Europe’s defense industry remains badly fragmented, and developing the needed defense capacities to compensate for the loss of American backing could take the remainder of this decade. A deflated NATO would struggle to mount an effective conventional deterrent against further Russian aggression. Should the United States abandon NATO, the erosion of nuclear deterrence would severely compound Europe’s conventional deterrence problem. Nuclear weapons underpin the United States’ commitment to defend its allies and its nuclear capabilities form the bedrock of NATO’s capacity for deterrence. Should Trump close the American nuclear umbrella, Europe would have to rely on less than 600 British and French strategic nuclear warheads, a fraction of Russia’s total force of over 5,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads. Since Europe has no tactical nuclear weapons, it can hope to deter a Russian tactical nuclear attack only by threatening escalation to the strategic level, a move that Moscow may not find credible. In an attempt to scare Europeans away from backing Ukraine, Russia has on many occasions hinted it might use tactical nuclear weapons. Unlike the United States, France and the United Kingdom have not extended their nuclear deterrent to protect their allies. Should Washington leave Europe to fend for itself, Moscow might calculate that it could successfully resort to nuclear blackmail to capture the territory of NATO member states. Without U.S. leadership in NATO, cohesion and unity among members would be difficult to maintain. It often requires a strong American voice to bring disparate member states to a consensus. Since NATO’s founding, a U.S. general officer has led the organization’s command structure, overseeing the military activities of all NATO member states. It is doubtful that any other country in the alliance could play this role. NATO without the United States might limp along, but it is more likely that the alliance would collapse altogether. The European Union is not in a position to take NATO’s place any time soon, as its military capabilities are limited and more capable of managing regional crises than fighting major wars. Even if a rump NATO survives without strong American involvement, the challenges of divided leadership, inadequate deterrence capabilities, and an assertive adversary would heighten the risk of war with Russia, a major power bent on overturning the liberal international order. THE FALLOUT The damage would not be limited to Europe. If Trump wants to withdraw from NATO to punish allies for their inadequate defense spending, why would the United States maintain its commitments to its Asian allies, many of whom currently spend even less than NATO countries? For now, the defense ties between the United States and its allies in Asia, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, are growing stronger in the face of Chinese provocations. But a lack of confidence in U.S. commitments may well lead some of these countries to pursue nuclear weapons to offset China’s and North Korea’s nuclear advantages, undercutting the fragile stability that has prevailed in the region for decades. The withering of U.S. global leadership would also have profoundly negative consequences in the Middle East, where U.S. forces and U.S.-led coalitions are needed to deal with terrorist threats. The United States’ economy might also suffer. Should a breakdown of deterrence trigger a general war with Russia or China, the economic costs would be staggering. Just a few Houthi fighters in Yemen have been able to disrupt global shipping through their attacks in the Red Sea. Imagine the consequences of a war among major powers. Moreover, trade ties often follow security ties. Last year, two-way transatlantic trade in goods topped $1.2 trillion. The United States has about $4 trillion invested in European industry. Some five million Americans work in European-owned industries. The United States has a huge economic stake in maintaining a peaceful Europe. The United States has been here before. Before both world wars, Washington sought neutrality. Neither effort at isolationism worked and only prevented the United States from being able to help deter the aggressors in those wars. Eventually, the United States was pulled into both conflicts. After World War II, having learned the dangers of isolationism, the United States remained engaged and paved the way for the founding of NATO and 75 years of relative peace in Europe. The United States must not forget the painful lessons of the last century. To do so would risk undercutting U.S. global leadership, undermining the Washington-built international order, and making the world safer for authoritarian rule. HANS BINNENDIJK is a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was Senior Director for Defense Policy at the National Security Council, Vice President of the National Defense University, and Legislative Director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. R. D. HOOKER, JR., is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was Dean of the NATO Defense College and Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the National Security Council. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW is a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a Senior Adviser at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. He was U.S. Ambassador to NATO and Russia, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and NATO Deputy Secretary-General. MORE BY HANS BINNENDIJK MORE BY R.D. HOOKER JR. MORE BY ALEXANDER VERSHBOW More: Foreign Policy International Institutions NATO Politics & Society Security U.S. Foreign Policy Trump Administration U.S. Politics Most-Read Articles Things Not Foreseen at Paris The Future in Retrospect Arnold J. 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Feaver 沒有美國，北約就無法生存 如果川普退出，聯盟可能會分崩離析 作者：Hans Binnendijk、RD Hooker, Jr. 和 Alexander Vershbow 2024 年 5 月 13 日 2024 年 4 月，一名烏克蘭軍人出席烏克蘭總統弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基和北約秘書長延斯·斯托爾滕貝格在基輔舉行的新聞發布會 上個月，世界上最成功的軍事聯盟北約慶祝了 75 週年。有些人擔心，這可能是美國發揮主導作用的最後一個週年紀念日。美國前總統川普仍然認為該聯盟已經過時。他表示，如果再次當選，他將鼓勵俄羅斯領導人對那些未支付他認為足以支付國防費用的成員國「為所欲為」。川普連任總統可能會對歐洲安全產生可怕的影響。 川普的支持者認為，他是在虛張聲勢，向歐洲施壓，要求增加國防開支。但在川普任職期間與川普在北約問題上密切合作的前美國官員，包括我們中的一位（胡克），相信如果他再次當選，他將退出該聯盟。川普非常怨恨那些在他的第一個任期內對他進行控制的溫和派顧問。如果他在 2025 年入主白宮，護欄就會關閉。 美國國會也對此表示擔憂。它最近頒布了一項立法，禁止總統退出北約，除非國會通過參議院三分之二的投票或國會兩院的法案批准。但川普可以規避這項禁令。他已經對自己是否願意遵守北約第五條共同防禦條款表示懷疑。透過扣留資金、從歐洲召回美軍和指揮官以及阻止北大西洋理事會（北約最高審議機構）的重要決定，川普可能會在不正式退出聯盟的情況下大幅削弱該聯盟。即使川普不完全撤回美國的支持，川普目前對北約的立場以及他對支持烏克蘭的不感興趣，如果被採納為國家政策，也會動搖歐洲對美國領導力和軍事決心的信心。 歐洲，被遺棄 如果川普連任並繼續其反北約本能，第一個受害者將是烏克蘭。川普反對向基輔提供更多軍事援助，並繼續巴結俄羅斯總統普丁。北約秘書長延斯·斯托爾滕貝格已經在嘗試在該聯盟而非美國領導的烏克蘭防務聯絡小組的支持下協調對烏克蘭的援助，以防止川普對烏克蘭的援助。如果美國在川普領導下削弱或終止對歐洲的國防承諾，歐洲國家將感到更加脆弱，並可能越來越不願意向烏克蘭提供自己的重要軍事物資。隨著援助大幅削減，基輔可能被迫與莫斯科談判不利的協議，這將使烏克蘭成為軍事和經濟上容易受到俄羅斯影響的殘餘國家。如果烏克蘭的防禦完全崩潰，大約 3800 萬人將遭受殘酷鎮壓和被迫俄羅斯化。 災難性的後果只會從這裡開始。潰敗的北約將難以對俄羅斯的進一步侵略形成有效的常規威懾。俄羅斯現在處於戰爭狀態，將其GDP 的6% 用於國防，其獨裁領導人致力於執行極端民族主義使命，以鞏固他對他所謂的「俄羅斯世界」的統治，「俄羅斯世界」是一個遠遠超出其統治範圍的未指定的地理空間。莫斯科可以相對較快地重組其武裝部隊。在征服整個烏克蘭之後，普丁可能會將重點放在波羅的海國家——這些北約成員國受到該聯盟安全保護傘的保護，但普丁聲稱這些國家是俄羅斯歷史上的土地。如果美國撤回支持，削弱北約的常規威懾力，俄羅斯只會採取更明目張膽的行動。 北約國家現在總共將GDP的2%用於國防，但在沒有美國支持的情況下，歐洲軍隊仍然沒有充分準備、裝備和能力來對抗大國對手。歐洲在幾個重要領域仍然嚴重依賴美國。就其本身而言，它缺乏成功防禦所需的許多關鍵工具 ，包括空運能力、空對空加油、高空防空、太空資產和作戰情報——這些都主要由美國提供。如果沒有美國的幫助，北約將失去對俄羅斯的大部分軍事優勢。歐洲的國防工業仍然嚴重分散，發展所需的國防能力以彌補美國支持的損失可能需要本十年的剩餘時間。 潰敗的北約將難以對俄羅斯的進一步侵略形成有效的常規威懾。 如果美國放棄北約，核威懾力量的削弱將嚴重加劇歐洲的常規威懾問題。核武是美國保衛其盟友的承諾的基礎，其核能力是北約威懾能力的基石。如果川普關閉美國的核子保護傘，歐洲將不得不依賴英國和法國不到 600 枚戰略核彈頭，而這只是俄羅斯 5,000 多枚戰略和戰術核彈頭總數的一小部分。由於歐洲沒有戰術核武器，它只能透過威脅升級到戰略層面來阻止俄羅斯的戰術核攻擊，但莫斯科可能認為此舉不可信。為了嚇唬歐洲人不要支持烏克蘭，俄羅斯多次暗示可能使用戰術核武。與美國不同，法國和英國並未擴大核威懾力量來保護其盟友。如果華盛頓離開歐洲自生自滅，莫斯科可能會認為它可以成功地訴諸核子詐欺來奪取北約成員國的領土。 如果沒有美國在北約的領導，成員國之間的凝聚力和團結將難以維持。通常需要美國發出強而有力的聲音才能讓不同的成員國達成共識。自北約成立以來，一名美國將軍領導該組織的指揮結構，監督所有北約成員國的軍事活動。聯盟中的任何其他國家能否扮演這一角色值得懷疑。 沒有美國的北約可能會步履維艱，但更有可能的是聯盟徹底崩潰。歐盟短期內無法取代北約，因為其軍事能力有限，而且管理區域危機的能力比打大規模戰爭的能力更強。即使北約在沒有美國強有力參與的情況下生存下來，領導層分裂、威懾能力不足以及自信的對手等挑戰也會增加與俄羅斯這個一心推翻自由國際秩序的大國發生戰爭的風險。 後果 損害不僅限於歐洲。如果川普想退出北約來懲罰盟友的國防開支不足，那麼美國為什麼要維持對亞洲盟友的承諾，其中許多亞洲盟友目前的國防開支甚至低於北約國家？目前，面對中國的挑釁，美國與其亞洲盟友（例如澳洲、日本和韓國）之間的防衛關係正在變得更加牢固。但對美國承諾缺乏信心很可能導致其中一些國家尋求核武器，以抵消中國和北韓的核武優勢，從而破壞該地區數十年來脆弱的穩定。美國全球領導地位的衰落也會對中東產生深遠的負面影響，中東需要美國軍隊和美國領導的聯盟來應對恐怖主義威脅。 美國經濟也可能受到影響。如果威懾崩潰引發與俄羅斯或中國的全面戰爭，經濟成本將是驚人的。也門的少數胡塞武裝分子就能夠透過在紅海的襲擊來擾亂全球航運。想像一下大國之間戰爭的後果。此外，貿易關係往往先於安全關係。去年，跨大西洋雙向貨物貿易額突破1.2兆美元。美國向歐洲工業投資了約4兆美元。大約有五百萬美國人在歐洲企業工作。維持歐洲的和平對美國有著巨大的經濟利益。 美國以前就來過這裡。在兩次世界大戰之前，華盛頓都尋求中立。這兩種孤立主義的努力都沒有奏效，只會阻止美國幫助遏制那些戰爭中的侵略者。最終，美國被捲入了這兩場衝突。第二次世界大戰後，美國在認識到孤立主義的危險後，仍然參與其中，為北約的成立和歐洲 75 年的相對和平鋪平了道路。美國絕不能忘記上世紀的慘痛教訓。這樣做可能會削弱美國的全球領導地位，破壞華盛頓建立的國際秩序，並使世界對獨裁統治更加安全。 漢斯·賓尼迪克 (HANS BINNENDIJK) 是大西洋理事會的傑出研究員。他曾擔任國家安全委員會國防政策高級主任、國防大學副校長和參議院外交關係委員會立法主任。 RD HOOKER, JR. 是大西洋理事會的高級研究員。他曾擔任北約國防學院院長以及國家安全委員會歐洲和俄羅斯事務高級主任。 亞歷山大‧弗什鮑 (Alexander VERSHBOW) 是大西洋理事會的傑出研究員和賓州大學佩里世界之家的高級顧問。他曾任美國駐北約和俄羅斯大使、助理國防部長和北約副秘書長。 漢斯·賓內代克的更多作品 更多 RD 胡克 JR. 的作品 亞歷山大·維什鮑的更多作品 更多的： 外交政策 國際機構 北約 政治與社會 安全 美國外交政策 川普政府 美國政治 最常閱讀的文章 巴黎未預見的事情 回顧未來 阿諾德·J·湯因比 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 東亞即將到來的人口崩潰 以及它將如何重塑世界政治 尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特 為什麼烏克蘭應該繼續襲擊俄羅斯煉油廠 華盛頓對能源市場的擔憂是錯誤的 麥可·利布賴希、勞瑞·米利維爾塔和山姆·溫特-利維 推薦文章 美國總統候選人唐納德·川普於 2024 年 3 月在弗吉尼亞州里士滿舉行的競選集會上 川普對歐洲的威脅 他的第一個任期考驗了跨大西洋關係，但他的第二個任期將打破這種關係 利亞娜·菲克斯和邁克爾·金馬奇 美國前總統川普於 2024 年 2 月在南卡羅來納州康威 川普2.0的真正挑戰 世界將需要新的方法來應對同樣的舊策略 彼得·D·費弗 美國、中國與宿命論陷阱 如何管理世界上最重要的關係 週波 2024 年 5 月 13 日 中國外交部長王毅於 2024 年 4 月在北京與美國國務卿安東尼‧布林肯會面 根據拜登政府2022年發布的《國家安全戰略》，美國與中國的競爭面臨「決定性的十年」。中國官員也開始相信同樣的事情。隨著華盛頓越來越強烈地表達出與北京競爭的願望，中國政府已經從驚訝轉向抗議，再轉變為公開反擊的決心。在北京看來，美國擔心失去主導地位，並將這場鬥爭強加在中國身上。反過來，中國別無選擇，必須“敢打”，正如中共二十大報告所強調的那樣。 這種加劇的對抗令人遺憾，但並非不可避免。環城公路分析家過度誇大了中國對西方民主制度和國際秩序的所謂威脅。近年來，美國領導人將中國描述為修正主義國家，並引發了民主與專制之間全球衝突的幽靈。但二十一世紀的民主困境與中國無關。根據自由之家 2023 年的報告，17 年來，世界各地的自由民主制度一直在穩步衰退。這不是中國做的。中國並沒有在海外宣揚其社會主義價值觀。自 1979 年以來，它沒有直接參與任何戰爭。 事實上，中國遠遠不是一個尋求顛覆世界的修正主義國家，而是維持現狀。它加入了二戰後以美國為首的西方所建立的幾乎所有國際政權和機構。作為世界最大貿易國和全球化最大受益者，中國深植於現有國際秩序，並願意維護這個體系。儘管存在分歧、緊張甚至爭端，中國與西方仍保持著牢固的關係。雙方都無法容忍自入侵烏克蘭以來西方與俄羅斯之間發生的那種斷絕關係。 中國推動上海合作組織、金磚國家多邊組織、「一帶一路」倡議等新機構建設全球基礎設施，所有這些都可能改變國際政治和經濟格局。但這些轉變將有助於改革而不是取代國際秩序，使其更加公平並提高許多較不繁榮國家的利益。 然而，如果聽聽西方決策機構的聲音，就會聽到劃定界線的聲音。今天人們常聽到的一句話表明，世界已經進入了一場新的冷戰。現在判斷中美之間的競爭是否真的像蘇聯和美國之間的競爭——以及事實上是否會繼續冷淡還為時過早。但這個類比未能抓住一個關鍵區別：與冷戰不同，這種競爭是在兩個單獨的巨人之間而不是兩個對抗陣營之間進行的。華盛頓無法組成一個不可調和的反華聯盟，就像北京無法領導一個一致敵視美國的集團一樣。大多數美國盟友都將中國作為最大的貿易夥伴。就像日益多極化的世界中的所有其他國家一樣，他們會在具體問題上挑選立場，而不是盲目地站在美國一邊。華盛頓在團結盟友和夥伴制定旨在遏制中國的安排方面取得了一定的成功，例如被稱為“四方”的印度-太平洋安全夥伴關係以及被稱為“AUKUS”的澳大利亞、英國和美國之間的軍事夥伴關係。但這些分組並不算什麼：它們看起來就像是浩瀚海洋中的幾個小島。在世界許多地方，特別是在非洲，美國已經輸給了中國，中國幫助當地經濟，但沒有提供有關治理和價值觀的說教陳詞濫調。 但這些關係並不代表反西方、親中國陣營的形成。中美關係不能像美國總統拜登曾經宣稱的那樣簡單地用「極端競爭」來定義。相反，它們將競爭與合作結合起來，保持不斷變化的平衡。在華盛頓專注於與北京競爭的情況下，北京對這種呼籲置若罔聞，堅持合作是沒有用的。雙方可以達成的共識是一條根本性的紅線——不讓競爭陷入徹底的對抗。為此，中國和美國必須保持對話的意願，以幫助避免誤解和誤判，並安撫焦慮的世界。 信任但說話 不幸的是，近年來北京和華盛頓之間的對話比冷戰後半段這兩個超級大國的對話要少得多。當時，雙方儘管互相警惕，但仍致力於對話。 1987 年12 月，美國總統羅納德·雷根(Ronald Reagan) 在與蘇聯領導人米哈伊爾·戈巴契夫(Mikhail Gorbachev) 簽署《中程核力量條約》後，使用了一句著名的俄羅斯諺語“信任但要核實”，這是禮貌地暗示他實際上並不信任蘇聯，但這不會阻止他與他們進行談判並達成協議。同樣的邏輯仍然適用：信任不一定是對話或互動的前提。在缺乏信任的情況下，蘇聯和美國仍然在軍控、消滅天花以及為和平目的聯合探索太空等領域進行了合作。 如果說「信任但要核實」是冷戰後期的特徵，那麼這句諺語的修改版就是今天中國和美國的正確範式：「信任但要說」。在歐巴馬政府期間，兩國就雙邊、區域和全球問題進行了廣泛的會談，這種相對和藹的態度不太可能很快恢復。川普政府的強硬政策、新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 疫情以及美國眾議院議長南希·佩洛西 (Nancy Pelosi) 2022 年訪台，最終結束了那個時代。拜登保留了川普對中國的許多立場，華盛頓兩黨已達成共識，即美國必須對最接近的地緣政治對手採取更強硬的態度。 然而，談判現在已斷斷續續地恢復，特別是包括裴洛西訪問台灣後中斷的軍方間的通訊。其中包括高層通話、中美防務官員之間的國防政策協調會談、中美軍事海上磋商協議有關海上和航空爭端的討論以及中美之間溝通的新管道。這樣的會談是一個好的開始，但也只是一個開始。高級軍官應更頻繁地相互訪問，雙方應更頻繁地使用2008年設立的危機管理熱線，並應鼓勵飛行員和水手之間的直接溝通，以避免在空中和海上發生危險的近距離接觸。 意外和護欄 北京和華盛頓很少有人不同意需要建立護欄或建立信任措施來減少衝突的可能性。南海海域和空域是產生相當大摩擦和緊張局勢的地區之一，中國的領土主張很少受到尊重。美國飛機定期對中國專屬經濟區進行密切監視和偵察。美國海軍艦艇駛過中國聲稱擁有主權的南海諸島礁附近海域。在五角大廈關於中國軍事的最新報告中，美國記錄了 2021 年秋季至 2023 年秋季期間中國飛機在該地區對美國飛機進行「脅迫和危險」攔截的 180 多起事件，這表明緊張局勢日益加劇。 這種動態可能會持續下去，因為雙方都不願意讓步。美國人希望進行技術討論，希望減少事故和潛在衝突的可能性。對中國人來說，他們覺得這樣的對話有點奇怪。他們更廣泛地關注自身安全，將美國海軍在中國專屬經濟區的行動和在南海的演習視為魯莽的挑釁。換句話說，美國人可能想要求監視美國船隻的中國船隻保持一定的距離；中國人會回應說，如果美國人根本不在那裡的話，那是最安全的。 中國原則上同意美國提出的護欄，但北京擔心這種護欄旨在凍結有利於華盛頓的現狀。顯然，解放軍的整體軍事實力落後於美軍。但在中國週邊地區，隨著近幾十年來中國軍事能力的突飛猛進，解放軍與美軍之間的差距正在縮小。美國擔心中國想將其趕出西太平洋。因此，華盛頓正在該地區加大軍事投資，並呼籲其盟友和夥伴聯合起來對抗中國。這反過來又激怒了北京，並使局勢更加不穩定。 北京和華盛頓都不希望發生意外，更不希望發生對抗。 2020年，中國國防部和美國國防部召開了首次危機溝通工作小組，透過視訊電話會議討論如何預防危機。這樣一個工作小組代表了朝著正確方向邁出的一步。如果南海發生意外，可能會激起兩國民族主義的憤怒，但很難相信它會引發全面戰爭。 2001年，一架中國戰鬥機與一架美國偵察機之間致命的相撞事件並沒有被證明是世界末日；致命事件產生的危機在11天內解決了。巧妙的外交佔了上風，雙方都保住了面子。 嚴峻的海峽 唯一可能將中美拖入全面衝突的問題是台灣爭端。目前，一個危險的循環正在展開。美國擔心來自大陸的潛在攻擊，正在加快軍售、擴大培訓和人員交流，以增強台灣的防禦能力，將台灣變成「豪豬」。憤怒但越來越自信的中國做出了回應，派遣更多戰機定期飛越台灣海峽中線，該海峽此前充當雙方之間的緩衝區。 許多西方觀察家認為台灣將成為下一個烏克蘭。然而，美國國防部長勞埃德·奧斯汀在 2023 年香格里拉對話會上表示，與中國的衝突既不是迫在眉睫，也不是不可避免。只要北京相信仍有可能和平統一台灣，台灣戰爭就不會發生。如果它懷疑和平統一的前景永遠消失，那麼它的盤算就會改變。但即使在台灣一月選舉民進黨的賴清德擔任台灣領導人之後，也沒有跡象顯示北京方面已得出這樣的結論。 （賴過去稱自己為「台獨政治工作者」。）四月份，習近平在會見台灣前領導人馬英九時表示，推動兩岸關係和平發展勢在必行，堅持一個中國原則，即中國和台灣在形式上仍然是一個國家的觀念。 台灣是唯一可能將中國和美國拖入全面衝突的問題。 中國從未公佈過統一時間表。中國的國防預算佔GDP的比例仍然很低——幾十年來一直低於百分之二。這個數字充分說明了中國的信心以及北京對其與華盛頓關係的評估。中國正保持克制。裴洛西的到訪引發了中國在台灣週邊的軍事演習，其中包括發射實彈和飛彈。但台灣領導人蔡英文於 2023 年 4 月在加州會見了佩洛西的繼任者凱文·麥卡錫，中國隨後的演習則要溫和得多。 北京也正竭盡全力贏得台灣民眾的支持。在 COVID-19 大流行之前，約有 150 萬台灣人在大陸工作和生活，這一數字相當於台灣人口的 6% 左右。他們似乎並不介意生活在完全不同的政治體系中，只要這能為他們提供比台灣更好的經濟機會。 2023 年9 月，中國宣布了一項計劃，其中北京將為台灣人民在福建省（海峽對岸）生活和工作提供便利，包括允許他們購買房產，並承諾對在福建省就讀的台灣學生提供平等待遇。 對北京來說，台灣的地位仍然是一個非常敏感的問題，華盛頓絕不能掉以輕心。為了台海實現和平，美國應該向中國保證，美國無意背離對「一個中國」政策的承諾。儘管俄羅斯的越軌行為十分嚴重，但美國領導人拒絕就烏克蘭問題與俄羅斯發生直接衝突。同樣，他們應該將與中國的戰爭視為不可逾越的紅線。 不是朋友，也不是敵人 除了這些摩擦領域之外，仍然存在著很大的合作空間。三個領域尤其值得關注：網路空間、外太空和人工智慧。中美作為地球上最強大的國家，應該在這些領域中發揮領導作用。在網路戰中，各國應避免攻擊關鍵資訊網絡，例如軍事指揮和控制系統。北京和華盛頓應該交換一份敏感目標清單，這些目標應被視為越界，並且在任何情況下都不應受到攻擊。為了避免外層空間軍備競賽，他們應該同意談判一項具有約束力的條約，承諾各國不在外層空間部署武器，並鼓勵審議規則和負責任的行為。 2023 年 11 月，拜登和習近平在加州會面，同意建立人工智慧政府間對話。即使不可能阻止人工智慧被用於軍事目的，中國和美國至少應該在降低人工智慧軍事系統相關風險方面發揮領導作用。在這方面，沒有什麼比確保人類對核指揮與控制系統的絕對控制更重要的了。 與冷戰期間一樣，另一個重要的合作領域是限制核武帶來的風險。但中美之間關於核裁軍的討論在可預見的將來不會發生。中國在核武方面相對於美國的劣勢使得北京不願參加有關核裁軍的雙邊或多邊談判。目前，雙方沒有計劃舉行核子領域高層會談。 但中美兩國過去曾在這一領域進行合作。 1998年印度、巴基斯坦成功試爆核彈後，中美兩國共同譴責核試驗，並達成核武「非目標化」協議；也就是說，他們承諾不將核武瞄準對方。 2000年，五個主要核武國家（中國、法國、俄羅斯、英國和美國）都同意這麼做。合乎邏輯的下一步是互相做出「不先使用」的承諾，承諾永遠不發動核攻擊。中國已經維持了這樣的政策，但美國卻沒有，儘管目前的政策正如拜登政府所描述的那樣非常接近：美國祇會「在極端情況下考慮使用核武器來捍衛切身利益」美國或其盟友和夥伴的。承諾不先使用並不排除核報復，因此不會抵消核武的威懾力。 雙方可以就根本性的紅線達成一致——不讓競爭陷入徹底的對抗。 中美實力差距的縮小可能會加劇兩國的競爭，但這也意味著兩國有更多的理由面對共同的挑戰。例如，在中東，北京和華盛頓現在在兩個重大問題上有著相似的立場：尋找解決以色列-巴勒斯坦衝突的兩國解決方案和阻止伊朗發展核彈。隨著以色列加薩戰爭的持續，兩國解決方案可能看起來像是一個異想天開的夢。但戰爭讓更多人意識到現狀是不可持續的。沒有戰爭會永遠持續下去。北京和華盛頓應該共同努力，使兩國解決方案成為指導未來路線圖的首要原則，從而勾勒出以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之間和平共處的道路。 北京和華盛頓也必須共同努力阻止伊朗發展核武。在這個問題上，中國可以發揮重要作用：它贏得了伊朗的信任。面對美國制裁，中國透過購買伊朗石油為伊朗提供了經濟命脈。北京應該向德黑蘭明確表示，儘管它有權為和平目的發展核能，但不得發展核武。這樣做很可能會引發以色列先發制人，甚至以色列和美國聯合打擊。發展核武肯定會招致聯合國對伊朗的嚴厲制裁——而中國，儘管是伊朗最大的貿易夥伴，也必須遵守這些制裁。 作為一個大國，中美可能永遠不會成為好朋友。但他們可以抵製成為敵人。冷靜的頭腦和謹慎的樂觀態度將有助於維持世界上最重要關係的穩定。宿命論和魯莽只會將兩國推向雙方都不希望發生的衝突。 週波， 清華大學國際安全與戰略研究中心資深研究員，中國人民解放軍退役大校。 更多周波的作品 更多的： 美國 中國 台灣 外交 政治與社會 安全 防務與軍事 美國外交政策 拜登政府 美中關係 中台關係 最常閱讀的文章 巴黎未預見的事情 回顧未來 阿諾德·J·湯因比 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 東亞即將到來的人口崩潰 以及它將如何重塑世界政治 尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特 為什麼烏克蘭應該繼續襲擊俄羅斯煉油廠 華盛頓對能源市場的擔憂是錯誤的 麥可·利布賴希、勞瑞·米利維爾塔和山姆·溫特-利維 推薦文章 支持烏克蘭的示威活動，台灣台北，2023 年 2 月 透過保衛烏克蘭來保衛台灣 世界民主國家的命運相互關聯 吳嘉希 2024 年 4 月，在北京走過美國和中國國旗 美國對華戰略存在可信度問題 混亂的經濟制裁方式不會阻止北京 艾米莉·基爾克里斯 America, China, and the Trap of Fatalism How to Manage the World’s Most Important Relationship By Zhou Bo May 13, 2024 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Beijing, April 2024 According to the National Security Strategy that the Biden administration issued in 2022, the United States faces a “decisive decade” in its rivalry with China. Chinese officials have come to believe the same thing. As Washington has grown ever more voluble in its desire to compete with Beijing, the Chinese government has turned from surprise to protest to an avowed determination to fight back. In Beijing’s view, the United States fears losing its primacy and forces this struggle on China. In turn, China has no choice but must “dare to fight,” as the report of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party insisted. Such intensifying confrontation is lamentable but not inevitable. Beltway analysts have greatly exaggerated China’s supposed threat to Western democratic systems and international order. In recent years, U.S. leaders have cast China as a revisionist power and invoked the specter of a global clash between democracy and autocracy. But democracy’s troubles in the twenty-first century have little to do with China. According to a 2023 report from Freedom House, liberal democracy around the world has been in steady decline for 17 years. That is not China’s doing. China has not promoted its socialist values abroad. It has not been directly involved in any war since 1979. Despite its partnership with Russia, it has not supplied lethal aid to the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Indeed, far from being a revisionist power seeking to upend the world, China upholds the status quo. It has joined almost all the international regimes and institutions established by the U.S.-led West after World War II. As the world’s top trader and the largest beneficiary of globalization, China is deeply embedded in the existing international order and wishes to safeguard that system. Despite disagreements, tensions, and even disputes, China maintains robust ties with the West; neither side could countenance the kind of severing of relations that has occurred between the West and Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. China has advanced new institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the multilateral BRICS grouping, and the Belt and Road Initiative to build global infrastructure, all of which could change the international political and economic landscape. But these shifts would serve to reform, rather than replace, the international order, making it more equitable and elevating the interests of many less prosperous countries. And yet if one listens to the policymaking establishments in the West, one can hear the sound of lines being drawn. A refrain one hears often today suggests that the world has entered a new cold war. It is still too early to judge whether the rivalry between China and the United States really resembles the one between the Soviet Union and the United States—and, indeed, if it will continue to remain cold. But the analogy fails to capture a critical distinction: unlike the Cold War, this rivalry is between two individual titans rather than two confrontational camps. Washington cannot rally an implacably anti-Chinese alliance, just as Beijing cannot lead a bloc that is uniformly hostile to the United States. Most U.S. allies have China as their largest trading partner. Like all other countries in an increasingly multipolar world, they will pick and choose positions on specific issues, not blindly take the United States’ side. Washington has enjoyed modest success in rallying allies and partners in arrangements meant to contain China, such as the Indo-Pacific security partnership known as the Quad and the military partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States known as AUKUS. But these groupings do not amount to much: they look like a few tiny islands in a vast ocean. In many parts of the world, especially in Africa, the United States has already lost to China, which helps local economies without delivering moralizing bromides about governance and values. But those ties do not represent the formation of an anti-Western, pro-Chinese camp. Relations between China and the United States cannot simply be defined by “extreme competition,” as U.S. President Joe Biden once declared. Instead, they combine competition and cooperation in an ever-shifting balance. At a time when Washington is focused on competition with Beijing, it is useless for Beijing to insist on cooperation when such calls fall on deaf ears. What both sides can agree on is a fundamental redline—not letting their competition slide into outright confrontation. To that end, China and the United States must remain willing to talk to help avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations—and to reassure an anxious world. TRUST BUT TALK Unfortunately, Beijing and Washington have talked to each other much less in recent years than the two superpowers did during the latter half of the Cold War. Back then, both sides remained committed to dialogue even if they were wary of each other. When U.S. President Ronald Reagan used a famous Russian proverb—“trust but verify”—after signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987, he was politely suggesting that he did not, in fact, trust the Soviets, but that that would not stop him from entering into negotiations and agreements with them. The same logic still applies: trust is not necessarily a precondition for dialogue or interaction. In the absence of trust, the Soviet Union and the United States still managed to cooperate in a number of areas, including arms control, the eradication of smallpox, and the joint exploration of space for peaceful purposes. If “trust but verify” characterized the later years of the Cold War, a modified version of the proverb is the right paradigm for China and the United States today: “trust but talk.” The relative bonhomie of the Obama administration, when the countries held wide-ranging talks on bilateral, regional, and global issues, is unlikely to return any time soon. The hard-line policies of the Trump administration, the COVID-19 pandemic, and U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 put a definitive end to that era. Biden has retained many of Trump’s positions on China, and a bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington that the United States must get tougher on its closest geopolitical peer. Talks, however, have now haltingly resumed, notably including the military-to-military communications that were severed after Pelosi’s Taiwan visit. They have included phone calls between high-level officials, the U.S.-Chinese Defense Policy Coordination Talks between defense officials, discussions relating to the U.S.-Chinese Military Maritime Consultative Agreement about maritime and aviation disputes, and a new channel of communication between Chinese and American theater commanders. Such talks represent a good start, but they are only a start. Senior military officers should visit with one another more regularly, both sides should use the hotline that was established in 2008 for crisis management more often, and they should encourage direct communications between pilots and sailors to help avoid dangerous close encounters in the air and at sea. ACCIDENTS AND GUARDRAILS Few in Beijing and Washington disagree about the need to establish guardrails or confidence-building measures to make conflict less likely. One area that produces considerable friction and tension are the waters and airspace in the South China Sea, where China’s territorial claims are seldom respected. U.S. aircraft regularly conduct close surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s exclusive economic zones. U.S. naval vessels sail through waters off the islands and rocks in the South China Sea over which China claims sovereignty. In the Pentagon’s latest report on China’s military, the United States documented over 180 instances of Chinese aircraft conducting “coercive and risky” intercepts of U.S. aircraft in the region between the fall of 2021 and the fall of 2023, a measure of growing tensions. This dynamic will likely persist, as neither side is willing to back down. The Americans want to have technical discussions in the hope of making accidents and potential skirmishes less likely. The Chinese, for their part, find such conversations a bit odd. They are focused more broadly on their security, interpreting the U.S. Navy’s operations in China’s exclusive economic zones and maneuvers in the South China Sea as reckless provocations. Put another way, the Americans may want to ask Chinese ships that are monitoring U.S. ships to maintain a particular distance; the Chinese would respond by saying that the Americans would be safest if they weren’t there at all. China in principle agrees to guardrails proposed by the United States, but Beijing fears that such guardrails are meant to freeze in place a status quo that favors Washington. Obviously, the overall military strength of the PLA lags behind that of the U.S. military. But in China’s vicinity, the gap between the PLA and the U.S. military is closing, as Chinese military capacities have grown by leaps and bounds in recent decades. The United States fears that China wants to drive it out of the western Pacific. As a result, Washington is investing more militarily in the region and calling on its allies and partners to gang up on China. This in turn irks Beijing and makes the situation more volatile. Neither Beijing nor Washington wants an accident, let alone a confrontation. In 2020, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense convened the first Crisis Communication Working Group, meeting by video teleconference to discuss how to prevent a crisis. Such a working group represents a step in the right direction. Were an accident in the South China Sea to occur, it might spur nationalist outrage in both countries, but it is hard to believe that it would trigger a full-blown war. The deadly collision between a Chinese fighter and an American spy plane in 2001 didn’t prove to be the end of the world; the crisis produced by the fatal incident was resolved in 11 days. Skillful diplomacy prevailed and both sides saved face. DIRE STRAIT The only issue that could drag China and the United States into a full-blown conflict is the dispute over Taiwan. Currently, a dangerous cycle is unfolding. The United States fears a potential attack from the mainland and is speeding up arms sales and expanding training and personnel exchanges to boost Taiwan’s defense and turn the island into a “porcupine.” An angry but increasingly confident China has responded by sending more warplanes to routinely fly over the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which previously acted as a buffer between the sides. Many Western observers suggest that Taiwan will be the next Ukraine. And yet U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2023 that a conflict with China was neither imminent nor inevitable. A war over Taiwan will not come to pass as long as Beijing believes peaceful reunification with the island is still possible. If it suspects that the prospect of peaceful reunification is exhausted forever, then its calculus will change. But there is no indication that Beijing has drawn such a conclusion even after Taiwan elected William Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party as the Taiwanese leader in January. (Lai has in the past described himself as a “political worker for Taiwanese independence.”) In a meeting with former Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou in April, Xi said it was imperative to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, adhering to the one-China principle, the notion that China and Taiwan remain formally one country. Taiwan is the only issue that could drag China and America into a full-blown conflict. China has never announced a timetable for reunification. As a proportion of GDP, China’s defense budget remains low—below two percent, where it has been for decades. That figure speaks volumes about China’s confidence and about Beijing’s assessment of its relationship with Washington. China is exercising restraint. Pelosi’s visit to the island triggered Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that involved firing live ammunition and missiles. But Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen met with Pelosi’s successor, Kevin McCarthy, in California in April 2023, and China’s subsequent exercises were much more subdued. Beijing is also trying its best to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, around 1.5 million Taiwanese worked and lived on the mainland—a figure that equals around six percent of the Taiwanese population. It seems that they did not mind living in a totally different political system as long as it provided them with better economic opportunities than they had in Taiwan. In September 2023, China unveiled a plan in which Beijing would make it easier for Taiwanese people to live and work in Fujian Province (across the strait from the island), including by allowing them to buy property, promising equal treatment for Taiwanese students enrolled in public schools, and linking the Chinese port city of Xiamen with the Taiwanese island of Kinmen, which are just a few miles apart, via a bridge and gas and electricity connections. Taiwan’s status remains a very sensitive issue for Beijing, something that Washington should never take lightly. For peace to prevail in the Taiwan Strait, the United States should reassure China that it has no intention of straying from its professed commitment to the “one China” policy. U.S. leaders have refused to enter into direct conflict with Russia over Ukraine despite the gravity of the Russian transgression. Equally, they should consider war with China a redline that cannot be crossed. NOT FRIENDS, BUT NOT ENEMIES Beyond these areas of friction, there remains plenty of room for collaboration. Three areas are particularly noteworthy: cyberspace, outer space, and artificial intelligence. As the strongest countries on earth, China and the United States should take the lead in crafting rules and regulations in these domains. In cyberwarfare, countries should refrain from striking critical information networks, such as military command-and-control systems. Beijing and Washington should exchange a list of sensitive targets that should be considered out of bounds and should not be attacked in any circumstance. To avoid an arms race in outer space, they should agree to negotiate a binding treaty that would commit countries to not placing weapons in outer space and encourage deliberations on rules and responsible behavior. At their meeting in California in November 2023, Biden and Xi agreed to establish an intergovernmental dialogue on AI. Even if it is not possible to prevent AI from being used for military purposes, China and the United States should at least lead in reducing risks related to AI-enabled military systems. In this regard, nothing is more important than ensuring absolute human control over nuclear command-and-control systems. Another important area for cooperation, much as it was during the Cold War, is in limiting the risks posed by nuclear weapons. But discussions about nuclear disarmament between China and the United States won’t happen in the foreseeable future. China’s nuclear inferiority to the United States makes Beijing reluctant to join bilateral or multilateral talks on nuclear disarmament. Currently, there are no high-level talks in the nuclear field planned between the two sides. But China and the United States have cooperated in this field in the past. After India and Pakistan successfully tested nuclear bombs in 1998, China and the United States jointly condemned the tests and reached an agreement on “nontargeting” of nuclear weapons; that is, they pledged not to target nuclear weapons at each other. In 2000, the five major nuclear powers (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) all agreed to do so. The logical next step would be to issue mutual “no first use” pledges, promising never to initiate a nuclear attack. China already maintains such a policy, but the United States does not, although the current policy, as described by the Biden administration, comes awfully close: the United States will only “consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” Committing to no first use does not exclude nuclear retaliation, so it would not neutralize the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. Both sides can agree on a fundamental redline—not letting their competition slide into outright confrontation. The narrowing power gap between China and the United States may intensify their competition, but it also means they have more reason to confront shared challenges. For example, in the Middle East, Beijing and Washington now have a similar stance on two major issues: finding a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and preventing Iran from developing a nuclear bomb. As the Israeli war in Gaza continues, the two-state solution may look like a fanciful dream. But the war has led more people to realize that the status quo is unsustainable. No war will last forever. Beijing and Washington should work together in making the two-state solution the paramount principle guiding any future road maps that sketch the way to peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. Beijing and Washington must also work together to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. On this issue, China has a major role to play: it enjoys Iran’s trust. China has given Iran an economic lifeline in the face of U.S. sanctions by buying the country’s oil. Beijing should make it clear to Tehran that although it is entitled to develop nuclear power for peaceful uses, it must not develop nuclear weapons. Doing so would very likely spur a preemptive strike by Israel or even a joint strike by Israel and the United States. Going nuclear will also surely invite severe UN sanctions on Iran—and China, despite being Iran’s largest trading partner, would have to abide by them. As great powers, China and the United States may never become great friends. But they can resist becoming enemies. Level heads and cautious optimism will help maintain the stability of the world’s most important relationship. Fatalism and recklessness will only drive the countries toward a conflict that neither wants. ZHOU BO is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a retired Senior Colonel in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. MORE BY ZHOU BO More: United States China Taiwan Diplomacy Politics & Society Security Defense & Military U.S. Foreign Policy Biden Administration U.S.-Chinese Relations Chinese-Taiwanese Relations Most-Read Articles Things Not Foreseen at Paris The Future in Retrospect Arnold J. 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On April 1, an Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders, including two generals. Two weeks later, Iran retaliated with a barrage of drones and missiles, almost all of which were intercepted. Israel swiftly responded with its own drone and missile attack on an airbase in Iran. The exchange brought the shadow war the two countries have been fighting for more than a decade into the open. It is now clear that the spiraling rivalry between Iran and Israel will shape regional security and drive Middle East politics for the foreseeable future. Each views the other as an arch enemy that it must defeat by military means. Left unchecked, their dangerous competition will destabilize the region, and it could ultimately trigger a conflict that drags the United States into a costly war. It now falls on Washington to craft a diplomatic strategy to calm the escalatory forces that precipitated a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel in April—and could do so again. THE SPECTER OF A LARGER WAR Hamas’s October 7 attack dented Israel’s aura of invincibility and diminished its sense of security. Israel has launched a ferocious response, seeking to destroy Hamas, free the Israeli hostages that remain in Gaza, and restore confidence in its ability to deter outside attacks and protect its population. All three goals have thus far eluded Israel. Israel’s strike on the Iranian consulate, like its campaign in Gaza, was in part motivated by the desire to ensure an attack on the scale of October 7 can never be repeated. The strike killed Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the Revolutionary Guard commander who coordinated the military operations of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and other armed groups in the region that Tehran has mobilized in support of Hamas in the past six months. By targeting Zahedi, Israel made clear that it considers Iran to be ultimately responsible for the current crisis. And by killing him in a diplomatic compound, it demonstrated its willingness and ability to assassinate senior Iranian officials anywhere and at any time. This was not the first time Israel had struck Iranian bases in Syria or killed senior Revolutionary Guard officers and commanders there. Even before October 7, Israel had attacked Iranian industrial infrastructure and military installations, killed nuclear scientists inside Iran, struck bases used by Iraqi Shiite militias close to the Iraqi-Syrian border, and routinely targeted convoys of trucks traveling from Iran to Syria through Iraq. Israeli attacks in Syria became more brazen beginning in early 2022, when Russia, having reduced its footprint there to focus on Ukraine, no longer served as a check on where and when Israeli jets and drones could strike. Left unchecked, the dangerous competition between Iran and Israel will destabilize the region. Iran generally refrained from responding directly. The last time Iran engaged in a tit for tat with Israel was in February 2018, when Israel replied to an Iranian-operated drone entering its airspace (an accusation Tehran denied) with a strike on Iranian positions in Syria. A skirmish followed in which Syrian forces shot down an Israeli F-16 fighter jet. Iran had since avoided direct confrontation in favor of what it calls “strategic patience,” focusing on building its military capabilities in Syria and abstaining from measures that could result in escalation with Israel. But when Israel attacked its consulate, Iran changed its strategy. It interpreted the move as a significant provocation that called for a direct response. Iran’s leaders saw little reason to assume that Israel would not escalate further—not just in Syria, but in Lebanon and even in Iran—if they failed to restore deterrence. The scale of Iran’s reaction, however, was both surprising and worrisome. Tehran did give notice of its intentions, communicating its planned response to the United States through European and Arab intermediaries. Then, by launching hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel, Iran made clear that it would no longer practice strategic patience and henceforth would respond when attacked. Israel repelled most of Iran’s drones and missiles with help from Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Tehran likely expected such an outcome. Iran’s intent was not to provoke a war, only to demonstrate its willingness to attack Israel. Still, Israel retaliated, launching a missile strike on a major military airbase in central Iran. That strike seems to have ended this round of reciprocal attacks, but it also confirmed that the rules that guided Iran and Israel’s shadow war for years no longer apply. Now, an attack by either side will invite a direct response by the other, raising the specter of a larger war. LOWER THE TEMPERATURE Washington and its allies want to avoid such escalation—and Tehran knows this. Immediately after the Damascus consulate attack, the United States and its partners across Europe and the Middle East acted quickly to prevent the crisis from spiraling into war. The United States assured Iran that it did not know of Israel’s plans for the strike in advance and then signaled its concerns about the dangers of a larger war both in public statements and via intermediaries. Arab and European diplomats, carrying messages from Washington, spoke to Iranian officials directly. They urged Tehran not to respond at all but also emphasized that if a response were to happen, it should be measured, with a limited scope and range of targets, so as not to provoke further escalation. After Iran retaliated, Washington and its allies redirected their efforts, this time leaning on Israel to temper its response. The diplomatic surge succeeded in keeping the crisis contained. It also made clear that the United States’ highest priority is to prevent the war in Gaza from igniting a regional conflagration and dragging the United States into another costly war in the Middle East. A fact working in Washington’s favor is that neither Iran nor Israel is keen on direct conflict, their recent show of force notwithstanding. Iran understands that Israel is a nuclear state with superior conventional capabilities and that war with Israel would ultimately mean war with the United States. Israel, for its part, knows that a larger conflict with Iran would compel Hezbollah to fire many more missiles at Israeli cities and military facilities. Still, if the tenuous truce between Iran and Israel is to hold, Washington must remain deeply engaged. It must work closely with Israel to address the country’s security concerns, and it should build on the diplomatic progress it has made with Iran in recent weeks. Meanwhile, the prospect of another dangerous escalation looms over the region. An Israeli incursion into Rafah could precipitate another confrontation if Iran and its allies feel compelled to take action as the humanitarian crisis there worsens or to prevent the annihilation of Hamas. A long-term cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, too, could set the stage for further conflict, as it would free Israel to focus on Hezbollah—as it has hinted it intends to do—or once again target Iran in Syria. Iran and Israel are not ready to fight now, but if they continue to see each other as a mortal threat that can only be confronted militarily, then a future conflict is all but certain. MOUNTING RISKS Both countries’ preparations for that conflict will alter the region’s security balance in several ways. The first is through an arms race—after their recent military exchange, Iran and Israel will accelerate their pursuits of more advanced offensive and defensive capabilities. Because Iran and Israel do not share a common border, a war between them is less likely to require tanks, artillery, and soldiers than it is to be fought with missiles and drones—and, on the Israeli side, fighter jets. Amassing these weapons will not only make a war between the two enemies more likely and more devastating, it will also spur a destabilizing military buildup across the region. And Tehran, knowing that it will not likely be able to keep up with a conventional arms race, may redouble its efforts to secure nuclear weapons. Both countries will also be looking to gain a geographical advantage. In the recent round of attacks, the relative effectiveness of Iranian and Israeli strikes depended not only on technological capabilities but also on their launch positions. Iran’s drones and missiles had to traverse Iraq and Jordan to reach Israel, reducing the element of surprise and providing Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States the opportunity to intercept a significant number before they reached their targets. Israel, by contrast, likely launched its attack from Iraqi airspace right across the Iranian border. Iran has long pursued a strategy of arming Hezbollah with missiles on Israel’s borders while trying to deny Israel a similar perch in countries surrounding Iran. Tehran did not call on Hezbollah in the latest back-and-forth, but it could next time. Iran may also seek to augment its missile and drone capabilities in Syria, which shares a border with Israel. This would present a significant threat to Israel, which would likely respond by stepping up attacks on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s positions in Lebanon and Syria. U.S. troops that remain in Syria to fight the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) could thus be drawn into another mission: preventing an Iranian military buildup that could trigger an Iranian-Israeli war. As Iran strengthens its military capacity on Israel’s borders, Israel may reciprocate by entrenching its intelligence and military presence on Iran’s borders. Azerbaijan and the Kurdish region of northern Iraq are already staging grounds for Israeli operations. Israel will likely expand that footprint, which will invite Iranian diplomatic and military pressure on both Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran recently conducted large-scale military maneuvers on its border with Azerbaijan and has launched missiles at alleged Israeli intelligence bases in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Such pressures could grow more intense. Azerbaijan and the Kurdistan Regional Government may then look to Turkey and the United States for diplomatic support and air defense. Turkey might be able to mediate between Iran and Azerbaijan, but only the United States can provide protection to the KRG—and such protection would likely require a strengthened U.S. military presence. Tehran did not call on Hezbollah in the recent volley of attacks and counterattacks between Iran and Israel, but it could next time. The potential expansion of Israel’s partnerships in the Persian Gulf could be even more consequential. Israel has close formal ties with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, and those countries, along with Saudi Arabia, collaborate with Israel on intelligence and security issues. But Israel does not yet have a base of operations in this region from which it could target Iran directly. Even before October 7, Iran feared a U.S.-brokered deal in which Israel would attain a base in Saudi Arabia that would be protected by an American defense pact with Riyadh. As Saudi public opinion has turned sharply against Israel since the onset of the war in Gaza, that prospect is not imminent. But stalled Israeli-Saudi normalization talks will not stop the United States and Saudi Arabia from deepening their strategic partnership. That partnership would inevitably become entangled in the Iranian-Israeli conflict, jeopardizing the Gulf States’ security and undermining their economic ambitions. For these countries, the possibility of a defense pact with Washington presents a conundrum. They crave such an assurance, but it would also make them targets in any conflict involving Iran. Iranian missiles can reach their shores in seconds; a diplomatic agreement does not change that fact. Ironically, a defense pact is more attractive in a scenario where the United States and Iran have lowered the tensions among them. The Gulf States are therefore likely to try to stay in the gray zone between Iran and Israel, at least for now. But maintaining a balance will become more difficult as they face pressure from each side to deny the other access to their territory and airspace. Israel will press Washington to use its influence in Gulf capitals to secure cooperation, whereas Iran will threaten consequences for those who cooperate. Arab populations incensed by the war in Gaza will also pressure their governments not to help Israel. Jordan, for one, has discovered the difficulty of navigating these hardening battle lines. It followed the United States’ lead to shoot down Iranian drones heading for Israel, but popular criticism for that decision has pushed the government to step up its criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza. Iraq will suffer more than any other country in the tug of war between Iran and Israel. Already, Iran has used Iraqi territory and militias to support its own operations in Syria and to attack U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria, and Israeli intelligence has carried out operations inside Iran from the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. During the recent confrontation, Iranian drones and missiles flew over Iraq to reach Israel, and Israel likely launched its attack on Iran from Iraqi skies. Iraq will only become more important as a first line of defense against Iranian missile attacks, which could encourage the United States to retain and even expand its military footprint in the country. For its part, Iran will intensify pressure on the Iraqi government to push the United States out. Shiite militias, for example, may increase their attacks on U.S. military installations and personnel in Iraq. Tehran will also want the KRG to cease cooperation with Israel and the United States. Iran has already carried out missile attacks on targets in northern Iraq it claims are linked to the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, and the KRG has asked for U.S. air-defense protection against Iran. All these proxy battles will put Iraq’s tenuous stability at risk. A RETURN TO STATECRAFT Escalation between Iran and Israel could compel the United States to abandon its plans to reduce its military footprint in the Middle East. If Washington’s goal is to avoid entanglement in a regional war, then it must ensure regional stability. Washington’s instinct may be to rely on its military muscle to deter Iran, but in truth it needs a primarily nonmilitary strategy to contain and manage the conflict. To start, it should deploy the full force of its diplomatic power to work toward an end to the war in Gaza, followed by a serious and sustained pursuit of a viable Palestinian state. This outcome is necessary to build a broader regional order that constrains the escalatory impulses that now drive both Iranian and Israeli decision-making. The war in Gaza has intensified those impulses, and only by ending it can the tensions simmer down. The end of one war must not be the beginning of another in Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah will need to restore the cold peace they had maintained between their war in 2006 and October 7 last year. Success on this front, combined with steps toward a political resolution of the Palestinian issue, is critical to meaningful normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as between Israel and the rest of the Arab world. The final piece of the puzzle is Iran itself. Managing the threat Iran now poses to Israel must go beyond arming Israel and instilling fear of U.S. retaliation in Tehran. The United States must also consider a diplomatic push, similar to its efforts to mediate between Israel and Hezbollah over the past six months, to establish redlines between Israel and Iran. Each side would clarify the kinds of provocations they would view as cause for escalation and make a tacit agreement to avoid crossing those thresholds. For such a process to begin, though, the United States and Iran must reduce their own tensions by renewing the discussions about Iran’s nuclear program and regional issues that they started in Oman last year but abandoned after October 7. It is in the United States’ interest to resume these talks, which could lower the temperature between Iran and Israel. Such de-escalation is necessary before any diplomatic breakthrough regarding Iran’s nuclear program—an urgent issue made more so by the Iranian-Israeli rivalry—is possible. The silver lining to the crisis in April was that Washington and Tehran talked behind the scenes throughout the two weeks. Their communication was key to averting catastrophe. As it charts its next diplomatic course, the United States should take advantage of that opening to lower the risk of a larger war. It should engage Iran on a host of regional issues, such as the Houthi threat to international shipping in the Red Sea, and build on its previous diplomatic efforts to bring calm to the Israeli-Lebanese border. This is not a time for the United States to fall back on military options as the solution of first resort. The region’s perilous security conditions instead demand that Washington realize the potential of American statecraft. VALI NASR is Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is a co-author of How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare. MORE BY VALI NASR More: Israel Iran Diplomacy Security Defense & Military War & Military Strategy U.S. Foreign Policy Hezbollah Hamas Israel-Hamas War 伊朗和以色列為何從懸崖邊退了一步 美國外交仍然是區域穩定的關鍵 瓦利·納斯爾 2024 年 5 月 14 日 2024 年 4 月，以色列軍事人員在以色列阿拉德附近檢查一枚伊朗彈道飛彈的明顯殘骸 4月前兩週，伊朗和以色列的連發攻擊和反擊，徹底改變了中東的戰略格局。 4月1日，以色列對伊朗駐大馬士革領事館進行空襲，造成七名伊斯蘭革命衛隊指揮官死亡，包括兩名將軍。兩週後，伊朗用一系列無人機和飛彈報復，幾乎全部被攔截。以色列迅速做出反應，用無人機和飛彈襲擊了伊朗的空軍基地。這次交流使兩國十多年來一直進行的影子戰爭公開化。 現在很明顯，伊朗和以色列之間不斷升級的競爭將在可預見的未來影響區域安全並推動中東政治。雙方都將對方視為必須以軍事手段擊敗的宿敵。如果不加以控制，它們危險的競爭將破壞該地區的穩定，並最終可能引發一場衝突，將美國拖入一場代價高昂的戰爭。現在華盛頓有責任制定一項外交戰略，以平息四月導致伊朗和以色列直接對抗的升級力量——而且可能會再次這樣做。 更大規模戰爭的幽靈 哈馬斯 10 月 7 日的襲擊削弱了以色列不可戰勝的光環，削弱了其安全感。以色列發起了猛烈的回應，試圖摧毀哈馬斯，釋放留在加薩的以色列人質，並恢復人們對其阻止外部襲擊和保護其人民的能力的信心。迄今為止，以色列都未能實現這三個目標。 以色列對伊朗領事館的襲擊，就像其在加薩的行動一樣，部分原因是希望確保 10 月 7 日規模的襲擊永遠不會重演。這次襲擊殺死了革命衛隊指揮官穆罕默德·禮薩·扎赫迪（Mohammad Reza Zahedi），他負責協調黎巴嫩真主黨、也門胡塞武裝以及德黑蘭在過去六個月中動員支持哈馬斯的該地區其他武裝團體的軍事行動。透過針對扎赫迪，以色列明確表示，它認為伊朗應對當前危機負有最終責任。透過在外交大院刺殺他，它表明了其隨時隨地暗殺伊朗高級官員的意願和能力。 這並不是以色列第一次襲擊伊朗在敘利亞的基地或殺害那裡的革命衛隊高級軍官和指揮官。甚至在10月7日之前，以色列就已經襲擊了伊朗的工業基礎設施和軍事設施，殺害了伊朗境內的核科學家，襲擊了伊拉克什葉派民兵在伊拉克和敘利亞邊境附近使用的基地， 並 經常襲擊從伊朗經伊拉克前往敘利亞的卡車車隊。從 2022 年初開始，以色列在敘利亞的攻擊變得更加明目張膽，當時俄羅斯減少了在敘利亞的足跡，將重點放在烏克蘭，不再對以色列噴射機和無人機的攻擊地點和時間進行製衡。 如果不加以控制，伊朗和以色列之間的危險競爭將破壞該地區的穩定。 伊朗一般不會直接回應。伊朗上一次與以色列針鋒相對是在 2018 年 2 月，當時以色列對一架伊朗操作的無人機進入其領空（德黑蘭否認這一指控）作出回應，對伊朗在敘利亞的陣地進行了襲擊。隨後發生了一場小衝突，敘利亞軍隊擊落了一架以色列 F-16 戰鬥機。 此後，伊朗避免了直接對抗，轉而採取所謂的“戰略耐心”，專注於在敘利亞建立軍事能力，並避免採取可能導致與以色列關係升級的措施。 但當以色列襲擊其領事館後，伊朗改變了策略。它將此舉視為重大挑釁，需要直接回應。伊朗領導人認為，如果以色列未能恢復威懾力，他們就沒有理由認為以色列不會進一步升級——不僅在敘利亞，而且在黎巴嫩，甚至在伊朗。 然而，伊朗的反應規模既令人驚訝又令人擔憂。德黑蘭確實注意到了其意圖，並透過歐洲和阿拉伯中間人向美國傳達了其計劃的反應。隨後，伊朗向以色列發射了數百架無人機和飛彈，明確表示將不再實行戰略耐心，未來將在受到攻擊時做出回應。 以色列在約旦、英國和美國的幫助下擊退了伊朗的大部分無人機和飛彈。德黑蘭可能會預期會出現這樣的結果。 伊朗的意圖並不是要挑起戰爭，只是為了表明其攻擊以色列的意願。儘管如此，以色列還是進行了報復，對伊朗中部的一個主要軍事空軍基地發動了飛彈襲擊。那次攻擊似乎結束了這一輪的相互攻擊，但也證實了多年來指導伊朗和以色列影子戰爭的規則不再適用。現在，任何一方的攻擊都會引起另一方的直接反應，引發更大規模戰爭的可能性。 降溫 華盛頓及其盟友希望避免這種升級——德黑蘭也知道這一點。大馬士革領事館攻擊事件發生後，美國及其歐洲和中東地區的合作夥伴立即採取行動，以防止危機升級為戰爭。美國向伊朗保證，它事先並不知道以色列的襲擊計劃，然後透過公開聲明和中間人表達了對爆發更大規模戰爭危險的擔憂。阿拉伯和歐洲外交官傳達了華盛頓的訊息，直接與伊朗官員交談。他們敦促德黑蘭完全不要做出回應，但也強調，如果要做出回應，應該在有限的範圍和目標範圍內進行衡量，以免引發進一步升級。伊朗進行報復後，華盛頓及其盟友改變了努力方向，這次依靠以色列來緩和其反應。 外交努力成功地控制了危機。它也明確表示，美國的首要任務是防止加薩戰爭引發區域大火，並將美國拖入另一場代價高昂的中東戰爭。一個對華盛頓有利的事實是，儘管伊朗和以色列最近展示了武力，但它們都不熱衷於直接衝突。伊朗明白，以色列是一個擁有優越常規能力的核武國家，與以色列的戰爭最終意味著與美國的戰爭。就以色列而言，它知道與伊朗發生更大規模的衝突將迫使真主黨向以色列城市和軍事設施發射更多飛彈。儘管如此，如果伊朗和以色列之間的脆弱休戰要維持下去，華盛頓就必須繼續深入參與。它必須與以色列密切合作，解決該國的安全問題，並應在最近幾週與伊朗的外交進展的基礎上再接再厲。 同時，該地區局勢再次危險升級的前景隱約可見。如果伊朗及其盟友感到有必要在人道主義危機惡化時採取行動或阻止哈馬斯被消滅，那麼以色列入侵拉法可能會引發另一場對抗。以色列和哈馬斯之間的長期停火也可能為進一步的衝突奠定基礎，因為這將使以色列能夠專注於真主黨（正如它所暗示的那樣），或者再次在敘利亞針對伊朗。伊朗和以色列現在還沒有做好戰鬥的準備，但如果他們繼續將彼此視為只能透過軍事手段來應對的致命威脅，那麼未來的衝突幾乎是肯定的。 風險不斷增加 兩國為這場衝突所做的準備工作將從多個方面改變該地區的安全平衡。首先是透過軍備競賽——在最近的軍事交流之後，伊朗和以色列將加速追求更先進的攻防能力。由於伊朗和以色列沒有共同邊界，因此兩國之間的戰爭不太可能需要坦克、大砲和士兵，而是需要飛彈和無人機，而以色列方面則需要戰鬥機。累積這些武器不僅會使兩個敵人之間爆發戰爭的可能性更大、更具破壞性，而且還會刺激整個地區的軍事集結，破壞穩定性。德黑蘭知道自己不太可能跟上常規軍備競賽，可能會加倍努力確保核武安全。 兩國也將尋求獲得地理優勢。在最近一輪襲擊中，伊朗和以色列襲擊的相對有效性不僅取決於技術能力，還取決於其發射位置。伊朗的無人機和飛彈必須穿越伊拉克和約旦才能到達以​​色列，這減少了突然性，並為約旦、英國和美國提供了在到達目標之前攔截大量無人機和飛彈的機會。相較之下，以色列很可能從伊拉克領空越過伊朗邊境發動攻擊。 伊朗長期以來一直奉行在以色列邊境用飛彈武裝真主黨的戰略，同時試圖阻止以色列在伊朗週邊國家擁有類似的地位。德黑蘭在最近的一次來回中沒有呼籲真主黨，但下次可能會。伊朗也可能尋求增強其在與以色列接壤的敘利亞的飛彈和無人機能力。這將對以色列構成重大威脅，以色列可能會加強對伊朗和真主黨在黎巴嫩和敘利亞陣地的攻擊作為回應。因此，留在敘利亞打擊伊斯蘭國（也稱為伊斯蘭國）的美國軍隊可能會被捲入另一項任務：防止伊朗的軍事集結，從而引發伊朗與以色列的戰爭。 隨著伊朗加強在以色列邊境的軍事能力，以色列可能會透過鞏固其在伊朗邊境的情報和軍事存在來回報。亞塞拜然和伊拉克北部庫德地區已成為以色列行動的集結地。以色列可能會擴大其足跡，這將招致伊朗對亞塞拜然和伊拉克庫德斯坦的外交和軍事壓力。伊朗最近在與亞塞拜然邊境進行了大規模軍事演習，並向伊拉克北部庫德地區所謂的以色列情報基地發射了飛彈。這種壓力可能會變得更加強烈。亞塞拜然和庫德斯坦地區政府可能會向土耳其和美國尋求外交支持和防空支持。土耳其也許能夠在伊朗和亞塞拜然之間進行調解，但只有美國才能為庫德族政府提供保護——而這種保護可能需要加強美國的軍事存在。 在最近伊朗和以色列之間的一系列攻擊和反擊中，德黑蘭沒有呼籲真主黨，但下次可能會。 以色列在波斯灣的夥伴關係的潛在擴展可能更為重要。 以色列與巴林和阿拉伯聯合大公國有著密切的正式關係，這些國家以及沙烏地阿拉伯在情報和安全問題上與以色列合作。但以色列尚未在該地區建立可以直接針對伊朗的行動基地。甚至在 10 月 7 日之前，伊朗就擔心美國斡旋達成協議，以色列將在沙烏地阿拉伯建立一個基地，該基地將受到美國與利雅德簽訂的國防協議的保護。自加薩戰爭爆發以來，沙烏地阿拉伯公眾輿論急劇轉向反對以色列，因此這種前景並非迫在眉睫。但陷入僵局的以色列與沙烏地阿拉伯正常化談判不會阻止美國和沙烏地阿拉伯深化戰略夥伴關係。這種夥伴關係將不可避免地捲入伊朗與以色列的衝突，危及海灣國家的安全並削弱其經濟雄心。 對這些國家來說，與華盛頓達成國防協議的可能性是個難題。他們渴望這樣的保證，但這也將使他們成為任何涉及伊朗的衝突的目標。伊朗導彈可以在幾秒鐘內到達其海岸；外交協議並不能改變這一事實。諷刺的是，在美國和伊朗緩解緊張局勢的情況下，國防協議更具吸引力。 因此，海灣國家可能會試圖留在伊朗和以色列之間的灰色地帶，至少目前是如此。但保持平衡將變得更加困難，因為雙方都面臨著拒絕對方進入其領土和領空的壓力。以色列將迫使華盛頓利用其在海灣國家首都的影響力來確保合作，而伊朗將威脅要對合作者承擔後果。因加薩戰爭而憤怒的阿拉伯民眾也會向本國政府施壓，要求不要幫助以色列。喬丹就是其中之一，他發現了應對這些日益嚴峻的戰線的困難。它效法美國擊落了前往以色列的伊朗無人機，但這項決定受到廣泛批評，促使政府加強了對以色列在加薩行為的批評。 在伊朗和以色列的拉鋸戰中，伊拉克將比其他國家遭受更大的損失。伊朗已經利用伊拉克領土和民兵來支持其在敘利亞的行動，並攻擊美國在伊拉克和敘利亞的基地，以色列情報部門也從伊拉克北部的庫德族地區在伊朗境內展開行動。在最近的對峙中，伊朗的無人機和飛彈飛越伊拉克上空抵達以色列，以色列很可能從伊拉克上空對伊朗發動攻擊。作為抵禦伊朗飛彈襲擊的第一道防線，伊拉克只會變得更加重要，這可能會鼓勵美國保留甚至擴大在該國的軍事足跡。就伊朗而言，它將加大對伊拉克政府的壓力，以將美國趕出伊拉克。例如，什葉派民兵可能會增加對伊拉克境內美國軍事設施和人員的攻擊。德黑蘭也希望庫德地區政府停止與以色列和美國的合作。伊朗已經對伊拉克北部的目標發動了飛彈襲擊，據稱這些目標與以色列情報機構摩薩德有聯繫，庫德地區政府已要求美國對伊朗提供防空保護。所有這些代理人之爭都將使伊拉克脆弱的穩定面臨風險。 回歸治國之道 伊朗和以色列之間的升級可能迫使美國放棄減少在中東軍事足跡的計畫。如果華盛頓的目標是避免捲入區域戰爭，那麼它就必須確保區域穩定。華盛頓的本能可能是依靠其軍事力量來威懾伊朗，但實際上它需要一種主要是非軍事的戰略來遏制和管理衝突。首先，它應該充分利用外交力量，努力結束加薩戰爭，然後認真、持續地尋求建立一個有生存能力的巴勒斯坦國。這一結果對於建立更廣泛的區域秩序是必要的，該秩序可以限制目前推動伊朗和以色列決策的升級衝動。加薩戰爭加劇了這些衝動，只有結束戰爭才能緩和緊張局勢。 黎巴嫩一場戰爭的結束絕對不能成為另一場戰爭的開始。以色列和真主黨需要恢復從 2006 年戰爭到去年 10 月 7 日之間維持的冷和平。這方面的成功，再加上政治解決巴勒斯坦問題的步驟，對於以色列和沙烏地阿拉伯之間以及以色列和阿拉伯世界其他國家之間關係的有意義的正常化至關重要。 最後一塊拼圖是伊朗本身。應對伊朗現在對以色列構成的威脅，不能只限於武裝以色列和在德黑蘭灌輸對美國報復的恐懼。美國也必須考慮透過外交推動，類似於過去六個月在以色列和真主黨之間進行調解的努力，以在以色列和伊朗之間劃定紅線。雙方將澄清他們認為導致升級的挑釁類型，並達成默契以避免跨越這些門檻。不過，要開始這樣的進程，美國和伊朗必須重新開始有關伊朗核計劃和地區問題的討論，以緩和各自的緊張局勢。談判，這可能會降低伊朗和以色列之間的關係。在伊朗核計畫（因伊朗與以色列的競爭而變得更加緊迫）方面取得任何外交突破之前，這種緩和局勢是必要的。 四月危機的一線希望是華盛頓和德黑蘭在兩週內進行了幕後談話。他們的溝通是避免災難的關鍵。在製定下一步外交路線時，美國應該利用這個機會來降低爆發更大規模戰爭的風險。它應該就一系列地區問題與伊朗接觸，例如胡塞武裝對紅海國際航運的威脅，並在先前的外交努力的基礎上為以色列和黎巴嫩邊境帶來平靜。現在不是美國將軍事選擇作為首要解決方案的時候。相反，該地區危險的安全狀況要求華盛頓認識到美國治國之道的潛力。 VALI NASR 是約翰霍普金斯大學高級國際研究學院國際事務和中東研究馬吉德·哈杜里教授。他是《制裁如何運作：伊朗與經濟戰的影響》一書的合著者。 更多瓦利·納斯爾的作品 更多的： 以色列 伊朗 外交 安全 防禦與軍事 戰爭與軍事戰略 美國外交政策 真主黨 哈馬斯 以色列與哈馬斯戰爭 最常閱讀的文章 巴黎未預見的事情 回顧未來 阿諾德·J·湯因比 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 東亞即將到來的人口崩潰 以及它將如何重塑世界政治 尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特 為什麼烏克蘭應該繼續襲擊俄羅斯煉油廠 華盛頓對能源市場的擔憂是錯誤的 麥可·利布賴希、勞瑞·米利維爾塔和山姆·溫特-利維 推薦文章 2024 年 4 月，以色列士兵在加薩-以色列邊境巡邏 以色列為何應宣布加薩單方面停火 扭轉哈馬斯和伊朗局面並推動與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化的機會 丹尼斯·羅斯和大衛·馬科夫斯基 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The Limits of Cooperation Between Israel and the Arab States Dalia Dassa Kaye and Sanam Vakil 透過保衛烏克蘭來保衛台灣 世界民主國家的命運相互關聯 作者：Jaushieh Joseph Wu 2024 年 5 月 9 日 支持烏克蘭的示威活動，台灣台北，2023 年 2 月 俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭是一記警鐘：是時候超越冷戰後世界的願景了，在這個世界中，莫斯科和北京的政權將成為基於規則的國際秩序中負責任的利益相關者。相反，出現的是一個飽受威權侵略困擾的日益充滿爭議的世界，最危險的例子是中國和俄羅斯之間的“無限夥伴關係”，兩國透過這種夥伴關係支持了彼此的鎮壓和擴張主義議程。 然而，這仍然是一個經濟和社會相互關聯的全球化世界：一個單一、不可分割的舞台，其中每個國家的安全都與其他國家的安全密切相關。對於世界民主國家來說尤其如此，它們的聯盟和夥伴關係受到了意圖分裂民主世界的獨裁國家的攻擊。 有些人認為，國際社會對保衛烏克蘭免受俄羅斯侵略的支持正在消耗人們對抗中國侵略這項任務的注意力和資源。根據這種觀點，烏克蘭的防禦使台灣等民主國家變得更加脆弱。 但這論點低估了世界民主國家地緣戰略利益的關聯程度——正如莫斯科和北京的議程一樣。美國官員得出的結論是，至少從 2023 年下半年開始，中國一直在向俄羅斯提供除致命武器之外的軍事支持，這是自俄羅斯對烏克蘭戰爭初期北京採取更中立的立場以來的一個重大轉變。中國顯然已經決定，它不僅對支持俄羅斯有強烈興趣，而且對重塑歐洲地緣政治格局也有強烈興趣。 由於中俄關係如此密切，民主國家之間的協調行動就顯得更加必要。為此，以美國為首的世界民主國家必須維持對烏克蘭的軍事、經濟和人道援助。這種支持的目標不僅僅是恢復歐洲大陸的現狀。透過幫助烏克蘭，民主國家可以增強對抗中俄聯盟的相對實力。 本著這種精神，台灣歡迎美國國會最近決定繼續美國對烏克蘭的軍事支持。這種捍衛民主的堅定和不容置疑的決心並沒有減損對台灣等地的防禦：事實上，這是北京方面冒險主義的關鍵威懾因素。 台灣為何重要 正如保護烏克蘭民主的鬥爭具有全球影響力一樣，保衛台灣也具有全球影響力。根據彭博經濟研究稱，中國入侵台灣將對全球經濟造成約 10 兆美元的損失，相當於全球 GDP 的近 10%，這使得烏克蘭戰爭、COVID - 19 大流行以及 2019 年全球金融危機的影響相形見絀。中國對台灣的封鎖將減少直接造成的破壞，但仍將對全球經濟造成約 5 兆美元的損失。 原因很簡單：超過 90% 的先進晶片是在台灣生產的，全球大約一半的貨櫃船隊都經過台灣海峽。台灣是全球供應鏈中不可或缺、不可取代的一部分，保衛台灣需要全球共同努力。但台灣安全的價值不僅在於經濟，還在於經濟。這也是地緣戰略問題。維持海峽現狀對於維護美國的同盟體系、區域力量平衡和核不擴散至關重要。這三個關鍵支柱使印太地區幾代人保持穩定和繁榮，如果中國控制台灣，它們將受到威脅。隨著時間的推移，經濟損失和供應鏈中斷可能會得到緩解。但地緣戰略向中國威權擴張主義有利的方向轉變將在未來幾十年損害世界。 今年4月，台灣遭受了25年來最嚴重的地震，中國繼續派遣軍艦和飛機穿越海峽——儘管中國駐聯合國代表團竟然厚顏無恥地感謝世界對地震表示同情，彷彿北京代表台灣發言。與中方佯裝關切形成鮮明對比的是，80多個國家對台灣表示支持，我對此表示最誠摯的感謝。 透過幫助烏克蘭，民主國家可以增強對抗中俄聯盟的相對實力。 這就是台灣每天面臨的情況。但當中國試圖透過軍事脅迫、外交孤立和資訊戰在台灣人民中製造恐懼時，台灣人民會以舉國之力做出回應。台灣特別自豪的是擁有多個致力於加強民防和反擊中國假訊息的草根組織。他們是台灣民主和韌性的象徵。 台灣政府在應對中國提出的安全挑戰方面取得了長足進展。在蔡英文總統的領導下，台灣加強了自衛力道。去年，台灣的國防預算增加了約 14%，達到約 190 億美元，佔全國 GDP 的 2.5%。八年前，國防預算不到 GDP 的 2.0%。 台灣將其資源用於最迫切的需求。主要重點是發展不對稱戰爭能力、實施民防改革和加速本土國防工業。在民眾的廣泛支持下，台灣也將義務兵的訓練期限從四個月延長至一年。 台灣只有堅定地致力於自衛，才能獲得志同道合國家的大力支持。這是台灣從烏克蘭對俄羅斯的防禦中學到的第一個也是最重要的一課。因為烏克蘭人願意為民主而戰，世界其他國家也願意提供協助。在我們的新總統賴清德的領導下，我們保衛自己的決心只會變得更加堅定。 台灣如何堅持 中國已經透過多種方式改變了印太地區的現狀。首先，儘管北京公開承諾不會這樣做，但它還是將南海軍事化。中國根據其「珍珠鍊」戰略，在孟加拉、緬甸、巴基斯坦和斯里蘭卡等地建造了具有潛在軍事用途的港口。去年，北京與所羅門群島簽署了安全條約，並與其他太平洋島國簽署了類似協議。 中國的戰略基於兩個假設。首先，中國必須降低武力併吞台灣的潛在成本，讓美國在中國發動攻擊時更難部署保衛台灣的軍事勢力。第二，控制台灣將有助於北京將力量投射到所謂的第一島鏈之外，威脅到航道並削弱美國在該地區許多盟友的安全。 防止這些事態發展需要世界民主國家拿出前所未有的決心和協調。澳洲、日本和美國之間長期存在的三邊安全關係，以及澳洲、英國和美國之間新興的 AUKUS 夥伴關係，提供了穩定的支柱。日本、菲律賓和美國之間新生的夥伴關係將補充這些安排。而最近日本、韓國和美國之間升級的安全合作將確保東北亞的穩定，而這與台海的和平密切相關。這些相互關聯的聯盟是印太地區有利地緣戰略環境的最強保障。 確實，只有將其視為國際問題，才能維護台海的和平與穩定。當然，海峽另一邊的領導人卻另有說法，並孜孜不倦地將台灣的未來視為需要由「中國人」解決的問題。但北京越是大力推動這種虛假敘述，就越證明台灣走在正確的軌道上。 台灣需要什麼 儘管如此，國際社會可以採取更多措施來阻止中國的侵略。志同道合的國家可以更積極地解決三個領域的問題，以維持現狀。 第一個是中國的灰色地帶脅迫，涉及虛假訊息宣傳、選舉幹擾陰謀以及經常飛越台灣海峽中線等軍事挑釁等活動。 此類行動對台灣構成了日常的心理和安全挑戰，其可怕程度不亞於封鎖或入侵的威脅，如果不應對這些挑戰，將對台灣的士氣造成災難性影響。除了在面對這種脅迫時向台灣提供政治和道德支持外，其他民主國家 也應該給中國的這種策略貼上價格標籤，向北京表明挑釁是有後果的。 台灣第二個需要更多幫助的領域是經濟整合。絕不能讓中國決定台灣與世界的經濟關係。加強與台灣的經濟夥伴關係將有助於其他民主國家為本國經濟培養有彈性的供應鏈。台北和華盛頓目前正在談判《美台21世紀貿易倡議》第二階段，該貿易協定將有助於台灣中小企業融入全球貿易體系。一旦該協議完成，台灣希望與歐盟簽署經濟夥伴關係協議，並加入名為《跨太平洋夥伴關係全面進步協議》的貿易協議。這些協議不僅將加強台灣及其合作夥伴的經濟，而且向北京表明，世界民主國家正在對台灣的未來進行長期投資。 台灣朋友還可以做更多事情的第三個領域是抵制對北京頒布的一項聯合國決議的誤解，該決議是北京為其侵犯台灣權利辯護的理由。台灣敦促志同道合的國家與美國一起反對中國歪曲聯合國大會第2758號決議，該決議於1971年通過，並將所謂的中國在聯合國的席位交給了北京政府，但中國並沒有這樣做聲稱，將台灣只是中國的一個省的錯誤觀念寫入國際法。更多國家也應該在台灣海峽行使航行自由權，北京拒絕承認台灣海峽為國際水域。當中國看到其他國家不讓其船隻進入該海峽時，它就得出結論，其霸凌策略正在發揮作用。 台灣是國際社會負責任的一員，維持兩岸現狀的立場不會改變。但它需要世界民主國家盡最大努力透過力量和團結來幫助維護和平。透過繼續支持烏克蘭在面對俄羅斯侵略時為生存而戰，世界民主國家已經展現了台灣也需要的那種決心和道德清晰度。我們不能讓本世紀見證獨裁者可以消滅正義和自由的世界秩序的誕生。未來幾年，台灣的命運將像烏克蘭一樣，成為世界民主國家絕不能失敗的重大考驗。 吳耀旭 (Joseph WU) 是台灣外交部長。本月晚些時候，他將出任台灣國家安全委員會秘書長。 更多吳鑷燮的作品 更多的： 中國 台灣 烏克蘭 地緣政治 對外 援助 安全 防禦與軍事 戰略與衝突 戰爭與軍事戰略 烏克蘭戰爭 中 台關係 世界秩序 最常閱讀的文章 巴黎未預見的事情 回顧未來 阿諾德·J·湯因比 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 東亞即將到來的人口崩潰 以及它將如何重塑世界政治 尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特 為什麼烏克蘭應該繼續襲擊俄羅斯煉油廠 華盛頓對能源市場的擔憂是錯誤的 麥可·利布賴希、勞瑞·米利維爾塔和山姆·溫特-利維 推薦文章 中國核子擴張的真正動機 北京尋求地緣政治槓桿而非軍事優勢 趙通 中國國家主席習近平和馬爾地夫總統穆罕默德·穆伊祖，北京，2024 年 1 月 亞洲搖擺州的神話 大國競爭不再主導該地區政治 Defending Taiwan by Defending Ukraine The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies By Jaushieh Joseph Wu May 9, 2024 A demonstration in support of Ukraine, Taipei, Taiwan, February 2023 The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call: it was time to move past the vision of a post‒Cold War world in which regimes in Moscow and Beijing would become responsible stakeholders in a rules-based international order. What has emerged, instead, is an increasingly contentious world plagued by authoritarian aggression, most dangerously exemplified by the “no-limits partnership” between China and Russia, through which the two countries have bolstered each other’s repressive, expansionist agendas. This remains, however, a globalized world of interconnected economies and societies: a single, indivisible theater in which the security of every country is intimately How Will Taiwan’s New President Handle China? Lai Ching-te’s Precarious Balancing Act By Nick Frisch May 16, 2024 Taiwanese President-elect Lai Ching-te holds a press conference in Taipei, Taiwan, January 2024 Ann Wang / Reuters On May 20, in a ceremony in Taipei, Lai Ching-te is scheduled to be inaugurated as the next leader of Taiwan. Currently vice president, Lai is taking over from President Tsai Ing-wen at a delicate moment in Taiwan’s relations with Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regards the self-ruling island of 23 million people as a renegade province to be unified with the mainland by force, if necessary. And although Taiwan has managed to maintain significant trade and interpersonal ties to mainland China while postponing discussions over its sovereignty, this ambiguous status quo has recently frayed amid political headwinds from both Beijing and Taipei. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has explicitly made taking Taiwan part of his plans to “rejuvenate” China. But Taiwan’s people are less interested than ever in unifying with the mainland. When Lai, a known China skeptic, triumphed in January’s election, international headlines suggested that Taiwan’s voters had worsened this breach by keeping the presidency in the hands of the Democratic Progressive Party, to which Tsai and Lai both belong. The DPP has historically advocated that Taiwan alter its constitution to formally declare independence, although the party’s political candidates today say they have no plans to do so. Lai himself was once a vocal independence activist. As a result, CCP leaders in Beijing despise the DPP and Lai as irreconcilable separatists. But despite such media attention, the 2024 election was not an overwhelming victory for Taiwanese voters favoring independence. The DPP’s supporters may have celebrated Lai’s victory in the streets of Taipei, but the party’s own strategists did not. In the 2016 and 2020 elections, voters elected Tsai with more than half the ballots cast and awarded the party unprecedented legislative majorities. This time around, Taiwan’s voters rendered a mixed verdict. Lai won with only a plurality; the island’s more China-friendly opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), now controls a larger bloc in parliament. Had the KMT successfully struck a joint-ticket deal with a popular third-party insurgent, Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), it might have won the presidency. Lai’s victory, then, does not symbolize some new provocation in the dispute with Beijing. Nor does it signal voters’ endorsement of pro-independence politicians over pro-Chinese candidates. Instead, January’s election was a muddle—the sort that healthy democracies sometimes deliver. Outside powers should respond accordingly. Despite Beijing’s dislike of the DPP, and the CCP’s evident discomfort with a free vote held on its doorstep, the results of January’s contest need not invite disaster. Rather, China is now looking at a Taiwan in which Beijing’s most implacable political foe, the DPP, is electorally diminished. Washington, meanwhile, must understand Lai’s precarious position and the party’s internal tensions so it can play the ambiguous hand dealt by Taiwanese voters. If U.S. leaders wish to bolster deterrence across the Taiwan Strait, they can now do so in a political climate less likely to generate initiatives (such as sensitive referendum votes) that a more emboldened DPP might have been tempted to take. Lai has declared that he will continue the “no surprises” status quo embodied by his predecessor. Beijing, Taipei, and Washington may therefore be able to breathe easier, at least in the near term, instead of girding for conflict—and if they play their cards right, they may yet buy more time for peace. NEW SHOOTS Born in rural Taiwan in 1959, Lai was raised by a single working-class mother after his father died in a mining accident. His parents grew up under the Japanese empire, which ruled Taiwan as a showcase colony featuring hallmarks of modernity such as electrification, roads, and baseball leagues, until Tokyo’s surrender at the end of World War II. The island then came under the control of the Chinese nationalist KMT, whose forces were fighting a losing civil war on the mainland against Mao Zedong’s communist insurgency. After KMT troops, escorted by U.S. Navy ships, arrived in Taiwan in 1945, they proceeded to brutalize locals suspected of harboring Japanese or left-wing sympathies. In 1949, the remnants of the KMT—including its leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—fled to Taiwan after losing to communist forces. As Mao consolidated power and founded the People’s Republic of China, the nationalist exiles maintained their separate and competing government in Taipei: the Republic of China. Both governments claimed sovereignty over the island and the mainland. Mao and Chiang agreed on little but concurred that Taiwan was part of China. The contest between PRC and ROC turned the Taiwan Strait into a Cold War frontier, with the “Red” Chinese mainland facing an island stronghold of “Free China.” The moniker was a bitter joke to local Taiwanese who resented the Washington-backed junta in Taipei, feeling themselves neither free nor Chinese. In Lai’s youth, Taiwanese politics were dominated by martial law under the one-party rule of the KMT, which ran the government, military, and society through a corps of political commissars. These elites saw themselves as the continent’s legitimate government, unwillingly exiled to a peripheral province, and ruled native islanders accordingly. In school, the “national language” of Mandarin was mandatory; the Lai family’s Hokkien dialect, forbidden. Textbooks taught Chinese history and literature from a continental perspective. Students were drilled to be “exemplary Chinese” in preparation for the KMT’s eventual recovery of the mainland from what the party called “communist bandits.” The security services persecuted activists who campaigned for locals’ civic and economic rights, and Chiang’s cronies favored fellow exiled mainlanders over native-born islanders for posts in politics and business. If Beijing, Taipei, and Washington play their cards right, they may yet buy more time for peace. But in 1987, Chiang’s son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, lifted martial law and slowly moved to democratize Taiwan. The junior Chiang, once the KMT’s spy chief, bowed to pressure from Washington and rising civic activism at home by releasing political prisoners and widening freedoms. Eventually, elements of the KMT elite also softened their stance on former communist foes across the strait. Beijing, after all, had embraced elements of capitalism, welcoming investors from Taiwan who hailed from old mainlander money. And in so doing, the CCP had made China rich and strong. As Taiwan’s rival political parties began competing in free elections, underground agitators for democracy and formal independence emerged into the open, founding the DPP. Democratization spurred the KMT, now obliged to win votes, to recast itself as a normal political party. Given the KMT’s repressive past and lingering ties to China, however, many native middle-aged Taiwanese voters remain deeply distrustful of the organization. Some DPP stalwarts even fear that older KMT voters sentimental toward China will form a fifth column and assist Beijing in the event of an invasion. Lai came of age against this evolving political landscape. As a boy, he read kung-fu fantasy novels and dreamed of becoming a professional baseball player but eventually, heeding his mother’s advice, pursued medicine. Lai won renown in Taiwan as a spinal specialist and earned a public health degree from Harvard. After leading a physicians’ professional association, he was elected to a parliamentary seat in 1996. An assured politician with carefully coifed hair, Lai represented a district for over a decade in Tainan, a city full of Hokkien-speaking native Taiwanese that reliably elects DPP candidates. Through his tenure in Taiwan’s occasionally unruly parliament, Lai earned a reputation for candor and, occasionally, confrontation. In 2005, he was captured on video shouting at an opponent in frustration over a defense budget bill. Then, as now, the presidency was held by a DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, but the parliament was dominated by the KMT, which was holding up military appropriations meant to deter Beijing. Incensed, Lai turned to a KMT legislator and bellowed, “You block everything!” The video, which went viral, captured Lai’s frustration with what he perceived as the KMT’s soft position on China. Three years later, with a massive corruption scandal hanging over the DPP, the KMT recaptured the presidency and retained parliament. Taipei’s stance toward China soon grew more cordial as the KMT government cut spending on defense and promoted more trade and tourism across the strait. THE PATH TO POWER When Lai traded his parliamentary seat for the mayoralty of Tainan in 2010, he was already tipped as a possible future presidential candidate. His rhetoric on Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence thrilled the DPP’s base. Some party insiders murmured that Lai might be stronger presidential timber than Tsai, then the party’s chairwoman, who had never lived or worked in the south of the island. But Tsai, a former trade lawyer and Taipei technocrat, had spent her opposition years diligently salvaging the DPP’s tarnished brand after Chen’s wreck of an administration. Regarded as capable by her peers and the electorate, she became the party’s nominee. Tsai’s prospects as a 2016 candidate were buoyed by protests against the incumbent KMT government by the youthful Sunflower Movement. The demonstrations began in 2014 when students, outraged by a KMT-backed trade bill that would have opened sensitive economic sectors such as the media to mainland Chinese investment, occupied parliament. They ultimately succeeded in blocking the law, helping propel the DPP to capture both parliament and the presidency in 2016. As a candidate, Tsai repeatedly promised to maintain the status quo when it came to China. Nonetheless, when she took office, Beijing was contemptuous—and Washington, wary. Observers anxious about mounting tensions with China worried that internal DPP party pressure might win out over Tsai’s cautious instincts, pushing her to use her presidential powers or legislative majority to attempt constitutional changes or other moves toward formal independence for Taiwan. Yet Tsai kept her word and held off on making drastic moves, disappointing her party’s base but providing stable leadership. She won reelection by a large margin. U.S. policymakers must wind back their own inflammatory and unhelpful rhetoric over Taiwan. Despite Tsai’s electoral success, the DPP’s base vote clearly favored a candidate in the mold of Lai. His seasoning in the southern byways of Taiwanese politics made him both a valuable ally and a dangerous rival. With Lai’s star rising, Tsai appointed him premier in 2017—only for him step down in 2019, along with other party leaders, after DPP midterm losses. In his resignation speech, Lai portentously cited a line from a trilogy by his favorite kung-fu novelist (Jin Yong, also a favorite of Chinese President Xi Jinping), assuring his supporters that “We will meet another day upon the rivers and the lakes.” His words, a winking nod to the roiling factional struggles in martial-arts fiction, foreshadowed real-life political intrigue: with Tsai weakened, Lai challenged her in the party’s 2020 presidential primary, unprecedented for a sitting incumbent. She prevailed, but Lai took about 27 percent of the vote and was given the vice-presidential slot on Tsai’s winning ticket. Now, Lai has made it to the top of Taiwanese politics. Yet thanks to the KMT’s parliamentary success, his inauguration appears less a confident passing of the baton than an awkward political transition. The preferred candidate of the pro-independence voter base has arrived in office at the exact moment that DPP has lost the ability to fulfill the political aspirations of its most ardent constituents. Moreover, after eight years in office, the party is no longer a fresh face. In the January election, youth voters gravitated toward Ko, the charismatic third-party candidate. A social media sensation, surgeon, and former mayor of Taipei with a more conciliatory stance toward China, Ko won a quarter of the presidential vote, and his insurgent TPP won enough seats in parliament to hold the balance of legislative power. Lai’s KMT opponent in the election, Hou Yu-ih, may also be the kind of candidate who can challenge the DPP in the future. The mayor of a Taipei suburb, Hou is a former police chief and native-born islander who speaks folksy Hokkien and acknowledges that Taiwan needs a credible military deterrent. LIVING BENEATH THE DAM Visitors to Taiwan often remark on how calm daily life seems, in contrast to foreign headlines that suggest war with China could come at any minute. In private conversations, Taiwanese citizens will confess unease, like residents of a town at the foot of a shaky dam holding back a rising reservoir. Still, few can imagine an overwhelming invasion in the coming months or years, and they do not vote based on the China issue alone. In fact, the electoral battle between the DPP, the KMT, and the insurgent TPP was fought as much over issues such as education and housing as it was over identity and security. Opinion polls show that most residents of Taiwan today, including descendants of mainlanders, do identify as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese.” But they value their democratic system more than an affiliation with any individual party. In his victory speech, Lai said the DPP was chastened by the lukewarm results. He pledged to reflect on the voters’ message to his party. By voting for a divided government, Taiwan’s voters have forced leaders in not only Taipei but also Beijing to adapt to a more nuanced political reality. Chinese President Xi Jinping is clearly impatient for progress on Taiwan, asserting in speeches that the issue cannot be handed down indefinitely from one generation to the next. Beijing has adopted an increasingly aggressive posture toward the island through such measures as cyberattacks, military patrols, hard-elbowed diplomacy, and disinformation campaigns. But the split in Taipei lessens the likelihood of a seismic constitutional or symbolic shift on sovereignty that the CCP might feel forces its hand to invade. If Lai and his administration successfully bolster deterrence, he may yet persuade Xi that any attempt to invade Taiwan runs too big a risk of wrecking the CCP’s other plans for China’s so-called “great rejuvenation.” The United States, meanwhile, can use the space created by Taiwan’s political muddle to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to the status quo. U.S. policymakers and pundits can begin by winding back their own inflammatory and unhelpful rhetoric over the issue. If Washington aims to bolster asymmetric deterrence through arms sales and training, for instance, policymakers should take care to expand such programs without fanfare or political posturing. The overriding objective should be to postpone the date of any potential conflict as far as possible into the future, in hopes that the political landscape will shift to allow for a peaceful, permanent settlement. Such patience is, after all, the route that Lai has chosen. As he stated in a television interview in December, quoting Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, “supreme excellence” is “breaking an opponent’s will without a fight.” NICK FRISCH is a Resident Fellow at Yale Law School’s Information Society Project. MORE BY NICK FRISCH More: China Taiwan Campaigns & Elections Diplomacy Foreign Policy Politics & Society Civil Society Security U.S. Foreign Policy Chinese-Taiwanese Relations Xi Jinping Most-Read Articles Taiwan Is the New Berlin A Cold War Lesson for America’s Contest With China Dmitri Alperovitch Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink U.S. Diplomacy Remains the Key to Regional Stability Vali Nasr A UN Trusteeship for Palestine A Temporary Fix That Can Lead to an Enduring Peace Lloyd Axworthy, Michael W. 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月的選舉中獲勝時，國際頭條新聞表明，台灣選民將總統職位掌握在蔡和賴都所屬的民進黨手中，從而加劇了這種違規行為。民進黨歷來主張台灣修改憲法以正式宣布獨立，儘管該黨的政治候選人今天表示他們沒有這樣做的計劃。賴本人曾經是一位直言不諱的獨立活動人士。因此，北京的中共領導人鄙視民進黨和賴以作為不可調和的分離主義者。 但儘管媒體如此關注，2024 年的選舉對於支持獨立的台灣選民來說並不是一場壓倒性的勝利。民進黨的支持者可能在台北街頭慶祝賴智的勝利，但該黨自己的戰略家卻沒有。在2016年和2020年的選舉中，選民以超過一半的選票選出了蔡英文，並為該黨贏得了前所未有的立法多數。這次，台灣選民的評價褒貶不一。黎智英僅以多數票獲勝；島上對中國更友善的反對黨國民黨現在在議會中控制著一個更大的團體。如果國民黨成功地與受歡迎的第三方叛亂分子台灣人民黨（TPP）的柯文哲達成聯合協議，它可能會贏得總統寶座。因此，賴智的勝利並不像徵著與北京的爭端出現新的挑釁。這也不顯示選民​​支持獨立的政治家而不是支持中國的候選人。相反，一月的選舉一片混亂——健康的民主國家有時會出現這種情況。 外部勢力應做出相應反應。儘管北京不喜歡民進黨，而中共也明顯對在家門口舉行的自由投票感到不安，但一月的選舉結果不一定會帶來災難。相反，中國現在關注的台灣是北京最頑固的政治對手民進黨在選舉中被削弱的局面。同時，華盛頓必須了解黎智英的不穩定地位和黨內的緊張局勢，以便能夠利用台灣選民的曖昧之手。如果美國領導人希望增強對台灣海峽的威懾力，那麼他們現在就可以在不太可能產生更大膽的民進黨可能會採取的舉措（例如敏感的公投）的政治氣氛中做到這一點。黎智英宣布，他將繼續其前任所體現的「不出意外」的現狀。因此，至少在短期內，北京、台北和華盛頓或許能夠鬆口氣，而不是為衝突做好準備——而且如果他們打得好牌，他們可能會為和平贏得更多時間。 新芽 黎智英1959年出生於台灣農村，父親在礦災中去世後，由單親工人階級母親撫養長大。他的父母在日本帝國統治下長大，日本帝國將台灣統治為一個展示殖民地，具有電氣化、道路和棒球聯盟等現代化標誌，直到第二次世界大戰結束東京投降為止。該島隨後被中國國民黨控制，國民黨軍隊正在大陸與毛澤東的共產主義叛亂進行一場失敗的內戰。 1945 年，國民黨軍隊在美國海軍艦艇的護送下抵達台灣，他們開始殘酷鎮壓被懷疑懷有日本或左翼同情心的當地人。 1949 年，國民黨殘餘勢力——包括其領導人蔣介石——在輸給共產黨軍隊後逃往台灣。隨著毛澤東鞏固權力並建立中華人民共和國，民族主義流亡者在台北維持著各自獨立且相互競爭的政府：中華民國。兩國政府都聲稱對該島和大陸擁有主權。毛澤東和蔣介石幾乎沒有達成一致，但都同意台灣是中國的一部分。中華人民共和國和中華民國之間的較量使台灣海峽成為冷戰前沿，「紅色」中國大陸面對「自由中國」的島嶼據點。這個綽號對當地台灣人來說是一個苦澀的笑話，他們對華盛頓支持的台北軍政府感到不滿，覺得自己既不自由，也不是中國人。 在賴智年輕時，台灣政治以國民黨一黨統治下的戒嚴法為主導，國民黨透過政委來管理政府、軍隊和社會。這些菁英將自己視為非洲大陸的合法政府，不情願地被流放到外圍省份，並據此統治當地島民。在學校裡，國語這個「國語」是必修課；黎家閩南語，禁止。教科書從大陸的角度教授中國歷史和文學。學生被訓練成“模範中國人”，為國民黨最終從共產黨所謂的“共產匪徒”手中收復大陸做準備。安全部門迫害為當地人爭取公民和經濟權利的活動人士，而蔣介石的親信則更青睞流亡的大陸同胞而不是本土出生的島民來擔任政治和商業職位。 如果北京、台北和華盛頓打得好牌，他們可能會為和平贏得更多時間。 但1987年，蔣介石的兒子和繼任者蔣經國解除了戒嚴令，慢慢走向台灣民主化。曾經是國民黨間諜頭子的小蔣介石屈服於華盛頓的壓力和國內日益高漲的公民活動，釋放了政治犯並擴大了自由。最終，國民黨菁英人士也軟化了對海峽兩岸前共產主義敵人的立場。畢竟，北京已經接受了資本主義的元素，歡迎來自大陸的台灣投資者。正是透過中共的努力，中國才變得富強起來。 隨著台灣的敵對政黨開始參與自由選舉，民主和正式獨立的地下鼓動者公開露面，成立了民進黨。民主化促使現在必須贏得選票的國民黨將自己重塑為一個正常的政黨。然而，鑑於國民黨的鎮壓歷史以及與中國的長期關係，許多台灣本土中年選民仍然對該組織深感不信任。一些民進黨的堅定支持者甚至擔心，對中國有感情的國民黨老選民會組成第五縱隊，在北京入侵時協助北京。 黎智英是在這種不斷變化的政治格局中成長起來的。小時候，他讀過功夫奇幻小說，夢想成為職業棒球運動員，但最後聽從母親的建議，開始從事醫學。賴以脊椎專家的身份在台灣享有盛譽，並獲得了哈佛大學的公共衛生學位。在領導一個醫師專業協會後，他於1996 年當選為國會議員。城市可靠地選舉民進黨候選人。 在台灣偶爾不守規矩的議會任職期間，賴智贏得了坦誠、偶爾對抗的聲譽。 2005年，影片中他因國防預算法案而對對手大喊大叫。當時和現在一樣，總統職位由民進黨候選人陳水扁擔任，但議會由國民黨主導，國民黨持有旨在威懾北京的軍事撥款。黎智英憤怒地轉向一名國民黨立委怒吼：“你阻止一切！”這段影片在網路上瘋傳，表達了黎智英對國民黨對華立場軟弱的不滿。三年後，在民進黨面臨大規模腐敗醜聞的情況下，國民黨重新奪回了總統寶座並保留了議會。隨著國民黨政府削減國防開支並促進海峽兩岸的貿易和旅遊業發展，台北對中國的立場很快就變得更加友好。 權力之路 2010年，當黎智英放棄國會席位出任台南市長時，他就已經被認為是未來總統候選人的可能。他關於台灣主權和獨立的言論讓民進黨的支持者感到興奮。一些黨內人士私下議論，黎智英可能比時任黨主席蔡英文更堅強，後者從未在台灣南部生活或工作過。但曾任貿易律師和台北技術官僚的蔡英文在陳水扁政府垮台後，在她的反對黨歲月裡一直在努力挽救民進黨受損的品牌。她被同僚和選民視為有能力的人，成為該黨的提名人。 年輕的太陽花運動針對現任國民黨政府的抗議活動提振了蔡英文作為 2016 年候選人的前景。示威活動始於2014年，當時學生們對國民黨支持的貿易法案感到憤怒，該法案將向中國大陸開放媒體等敏感經濟領域的投資，佔領了議會。他們最終成功阻止了這項法律，幫助民進黨在 2016 年贏得了國會和總統寶座。 作為候選人，蔡英文多次承諾在中國問題上維持現狀。儘管如此，當她上任時，北京對此表示輕蔑，華盛頓則持謹慎態度。擔心與中國的緊張關係加劇的觀察人士擔心，民進黨內部的壓力可能會戰勝蔡英文的謹慎本能，迫使她利用總統權力或立法多數來嘗試修憲或採取其他行動，以實現台灣的正式獨立。然而，蔡英文信守諾言，沒有採取激烈行動，雖然令黨內基礎選民失望，但卻提供了穩定的領導階層。她以大幅優勢贏得連任。 美國政策制定者必須收回他們在台灣問題上的煽動性和無益的言論。 儘管蔡英文在選舉中取得了成功，但民進黨的基礎選票顯然偏向賴智那樣的候選人。他在台灣政治南邊的經歷使他既是一個寶貴的盟友，也是一個危險的對手。隨著賴智星的崛起，蔡英文於 2017 年任命他為總理，但在民進黨中期選舉失敗後，他於 2019 年與其他黨內領導人一起下台。賴在辭職演講中，引述了他最喜歡的功夫小說家（金庸，也是中國國家主席習近平的最愛）三部曲中的一句台詞，向他的支持者保證“我們會在江湖上相見” 」。他的話就像是對武俠小說中激烈的派系鬥爭的眨眼致敬，預示著現實生活中的政治陰謀：隨著蔡英文的衰弱，賴以在黨內2020 年總統初選中向她發起挑戰，這對現任總統來說是史無前例的。她獲勝了，但賴智獲得了大約 27% 的選票，並在蔡英文獲勝的票上獲得了副總統席位。 如今，賴智已經登上了台灣政壇的頂峰。然而，由於國民黨在議會取得了成功，他的就職典禮與其說是一次自信的接力棒傳遞，不如說是一次尷尬的政治過渡。在支持獨立選民的首選候選人上任之際，民進黨已經失去了滿足其最熱心選民政治慾望的能力。 而且，執政八年後，黨內不再是新面孔。在一月份的選舉中，年輕選民傾向柯這位具有超凡魅力的第三方候選人。柯南是一位社交媒體紅人、外科醫生和前台北市市長，對中國採取更為和解的立場，他贏得了四分之一的總統選票，而他的叛亂者TPP 在議會中贏得了足夠的席位來維持立法權的平衡。黎智英的國民黨競選對手侯裕義，也可能是未來可以挑戰民進黨的候選人。侯是台北郊區的市長，曾任警察局長，也是土生土長的島民，他說著平易近人的閩南語，並承認台灣需要可靠的軍事威懾。 生活在大壩下 造訪台灣的遊客經常評價日常生活看起來多麼平靜，這與暗示與中國隨時可能發生戰爭的外國頭條新聞形成鮮明對比。在私下談話中，台灣民眾會坦承不安，就像住在搖搖欲墜的大壩腳下的小鎮居民一樣，阻擋了水位上升。儘管如此，很少人能夠想像未來幾個月或幾年內會出現壓倒性的入侵，而且他們的投票不僅僅基於中國問題。事實上，民進黨、國民黨和叛亂的TPP之間的選舉之爭不僅圍繞著身份和安全問題，還圍繞著教育和住房等問題。民調顯示，如今大多數台灣居民，包括大陸人的後裔，確實認為自己是“台灣人”，而不是“中國人”。但他們更看重自己的民主制度，而不是與任何個別政黨的隸屬關係。黎智英在勝選演說中表示，民進黨因冷淡的選舉結果而受到了打擊。他承諾將反思選民向他的政黨傳達的訊息。 透過投票支持一個分裂的政府，台灣選民不僅迫使台北領導人，也迫使北京領導人適應更微妙的政治現實。中國國家主席習近平顯然對台灣問題的進展不耐煩，他在演講中聲稱，這個問題不能無限期地代代相傳。北京透過網路攻擊、軍事巡邏、強硬外交和虛假資訊宣傳等措施，對台灣採取了日益咄咄逼人的姿態。但台北的分裂降低了主權重大憲法或像徵性轉變的可能性，而中共可能會認為這種轉變迫使其出手入侵。如果黎智英和他的政府成功地增強了威懾力，他可能還會說服習近平，任何入侵台灣的企圖都可能會破壞中共所謂「偉大復興」的其他計劃。 同時，美國可以利用台灣政治混亂所創造的空間來重申華盛頓對現狀的承諾。美國政策制定者和專家可以先收回自己在這個議題上的煽動性和無益的言論。例如，如果華盛頓的目標是透過軍售和培訓來加強不對稱威懾，政策制定者就應該注意在不大張旗鼓或政治姿態的情況下擴大此類計劃。最重要的目標應該是盡可能延後任何潛在衝突的發生日期，希望政治格局能夠發生轉變，以實現和平、永久的解決。畢竟，這樣的耐心是賴所選擇的路線。正如他在 12 月的一次電視採訪中引用《孫子兵法》中所說， “至高無上”就是“不戰而屈人之兵”。 尼克‧弗里施 (NICK FRISCH) 是耶魯大學法學院資訊社會計畫的常駐研究員。 更多尼克‧弗里施的作品 更多的： 中國 台灣 競選與選舉 外交 外交政策 政治與社會 公民社會 安全 美國外交政策 中台關係 習近平 最常閱讀的文章 台灣是新柏林 美國與中國競爭的冷戰教訓 德米特里·阿爾佩羅維奇 伊朗和以色列為何從懸崖邊退了一步 美國外交仍然是區域穩定的關鍵 瓦利·納斯爾 聯合國對巴勒斯坦的託管 可以帶來持久和平的臨時解決辦法 勞埃德·阿克斯沃西、邁克爾·W·曼努拉克和艾倫·洛克 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 推薦文章 中國外交部長王毅於 2024 年 4 月在北京與美國國務卿安東尼‧布林肯會面 美國、中國與宿命論陷阱 如何管理世界上最重要的關係 週波 支持烏克蘭的示威活動，台灣台北，2023 年 2 月 透過保衛烏克蘭來保衛台灣 世界民主國家的命運相互關聯 吳嘉希 Taiwan Is the New Berlin A Cold War Lesson for America’s Contest With China By Dmitri Alperovitch May 15, 2024 Taiwanese naval vessels near Kaohsiung, Taiwan, January 2024 American histories of the Cold War tend to depict the Berlin Wall as a symbol of the era’s worst depredations. In doing so, however, Americans forget the complexity of the 15-year crisis over the status of Berlin that preceded the wall’s 1961 construction—a nuanced story that holds powerful lessons for today’s great-power struggle. In fact, U.S. President John F. Kennedy was relieved when the wall began to go up in 1961, a stark contrast with President Ronald Reagan, who 25 years later powerfully exhorted the Soviet Union to “tear down this wall.” Between the end of World War II and the early 1960s, the question of who would control Berlin—the Americans and their allies or the Soviets—had been the Cold War’s most dangerous flash point, threatening to escalate the two countries’ rivalry into a hot or even a nuclear war. Presidents Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and Kennedy managed this crisis deftly. The city’s partition was an enormous human tragedy for the people of East Germany. But it also represented the end of the Cold War’s riskiest phase. As the United States now accelerates its plunge into a dangerous rivalry with China, U.S. policymakers must not forget the lessons of the Berlin crisis—lessons about how two sparring superpowers tiptoed back from war and ultimately arrived at an uneasy détente. Today’s new global battle for hegemony and influence has an analog to Berlin: Taiwan. There are, of course, key differences between the two. Taiwan is more strategically important to China than Berlin ever was to the Soviet Union, both symbolically and geopolitically. The United States’ official policy toward Taiwan’s defense has been one of strategic ambiguity, unlike Kennedy’s explicit commitment to defend West Berlin at all costs—although President Joe Biden has repeatedly proclaimed his intent to defend Taiwan. But the similarities are more meaningful. The United States’ competition with China is a sprawling, multifaceted struggle that bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War: it is a race for diplomatic and economic influence, a conventional and nuclear arms race, a space race, a scramble to establish military bases in Africa and East Asia, an ideological struggle between authoritarianism and democracy, a tech and economic war, and an espionage war. Taiwan, like West Berlin, is small, but it is the only place in the world where that competition risks sparking a hot conflict and, indeed, the only place where both countries are actively preparing for war. There is little real chance that either the United States or China will commit themselves to risking nuclear war over the small reefs in the East China and South China Seas. Taiwan, like Berlin, also has a powerful symbolic value—as a strategically vital semiconductor-manufacturing powerhouse and, more generally, as an example of a democratic and free China. It is also a geopolitically crucial place that U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, in the 1950s, called an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” If U.S. policymakers revisited and learned from the Cold War’s Berlin crisis and its role in midwifing the United States’ 1970s détente with the Soviet Union, they would better understand how to navigate their strategic predicament when it comes to managing the current geopolitical confrontation with China. During the Cold War, U.S. leaders made multiple early attempts to improve relations, from the 1950s meetings between Eisenhower and Nixon and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to the 1961 Vienna summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Yet the Soviets’ ongoing threat to end West Berlin’s status as a free capitalist enclave stymied all those efforts. Only when Washington was able to convince Moscow that it was serious about defending the city did the Soviets blink and pull back from confrontation. And only when the construction of the Berlin Wall commenced in August of 1961 did an opportunity arise to hold a hot war at bay and stave off some of the era’s most catastrophic potentials, including a nuclear holocaust. Today, a similarly muscular deterrence strategy to convince China that an invasion of Taiwan would trigger catastrophic consequences is the United States’ best chance to achieve a similar détente with China. HOW TO CARRY A BIG STICK After World War II ended in Europe in May 1945, the war’s victors—the Allied powers and the Soviet Union—divided conquered Berlin into sectors that each side would administer. Almost immediately, however, the city became a tinderbox for tensions between the Soviets and the West. In 1948, threatened by the Allies’ efforts to create a separate West German state with a new currency and a capitalist economy, the Soviet Union tried to shut off access to West Berlin. Recognizing that West Berlin had come to represent a “symbol of the American intent” and that remaining in Berlin was “essential” to the United States “prestige in Germany and in Europe”—as General Lucius Clay, the military governor of the American area of Berlin, put it—the Truman administration opted for a strategy of strong support for the embattled city, launching the legendary Berlin airlift. Although the Soviets lifted the blockade in mid-1949, tensions over Berlin never fully abated. Khrushchev understood that West Berlin was strategically important to the Soviet Union, too, as a capitalist territory inside the communist camp that was compelling a very visible brain drain out of East Berlin. So he chose a confrontational tack. Soviet troops were still arrayed around the isolated city, and European, Soviet, and U.S. leaders knew that in a conventional battle, communist forces could easily seize West Berlin. Throughout the 1950s, as the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States escalated into a proxy war in Asia, a nuclear arms race, and a full-blown struggle for ideological influence worldwide, West Berlin—and particularly its symbolism as an example of the success of the capitalist model—remained a critical point of confrontation. The United States believed that working to preserve the balance of power in Europe was worth risking a war with the Soviets. Losing West Berlin would be seen as a major defeat for the United States and might embolden Moscow to be more aggressive worldwide. But European and Soviet leaders also always wondered what the United States would actually sacrifice to protect the city. Would—or should—a U.S. president and NATO go to war for the freedom of the people living in West Berlin? Kennedy showed his determination to defend U.S. interests in Europe, even at an unimaginable cost. In the late 1950s, as millions of East Germans fled to West Germany, the conflict over Berlin came to a head. In November of 1958, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the United States and its allies, demanding they pull their troops out of West Berlin within six months. But Eisenhower resisted the blackmail attempt and Moscow blinked, withdrawing the demand. Three years later, at the 1961 summit in Vienna, Kennedy hoped to agree on a balance of power in Europe with Khrushchev, but the summit broke down and failed to arrive at a resolution on the status of West Berlin. On July 25 of that year, Kennedy delivered a televised address from the Oval Office to alert the American public that the situation in Berlin risked escalating into war. “We have given our word that an attack upon that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all,” he said. “We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force.” Warning that the conflict could even devolve into a nuclear exchange, he directed Congress to allocate $207 million to, in part, identify and mark existing spaces for nuclear fallout shelters across the United States and to improve the country’s air raid and fallout detection systems. Kennedy’s determination to defend American strategic interests in Europe, even at an unimaginable cost, caused the Soviets to blink once again and abandon their ambitions to extinguish freedom in West Berlin. Just a little over two weeks after Kennedy’s address, East Germany—under orders from the Soviet Union—began the massive operation to erect the barrier that would end up dividing Berlin for more than a quarter of a century. In Washington, Kennedy expressed a reaction that may surprise Americans who grew up learning about the Berlin Wall’s evils: relief. “Why would Khrushchev put up a wall if he really intended to seize West Berlin?” he wondered privately to his aides. He deduced that erecting the wall was Khrushchev’s way of de-escalating the conflict. “It’s not a very nice solution,” Kennedy concluded, “but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.” THE TAIWANESE TINDERBOX Kennedy’s intuition proved correct. Although the Cold War dragged on for three more decades, the de-escalation of tensions over Berlin and the building of the wall represented a turning point. The struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States would provide many more tense moments, including the 13-day Cuban missile crisis that emerged, in part, from Khrushchev’s frustration at losing the confrontation over West Berlin a year earlier. But never again did it approach the extreme danger of the period between 1961 and 1962. The United States and the Soviet Union were able to find a sustainable détente undergirded by more clearly articulated arms control agreements and spheres of influence that each side could live with. Almost certainly, there would never have been a Cold War détente had the Berlin Wall not been built, an act that reduced the threat to West Berlin. Today, the United States is again embroiled in a great-power rivalry whose extraordinary complexities are coalescing in a pitched struggle over the future of a territory barely larger than the U.S. state of Maryland. The Berlin crisis shows just how dangerous such flash points can be in a global competition between two large nuclear powers. During the 1950s, Soviet leaders wondered how much the United States really cared about Berlin and looked for ways to test American resolve. Similarly, today, many wonder whether the United States would truly defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. But the United States can no more draw back from the Taiwan conflict than it could abandon West Berlin. If China is permitted to conquer Taiwan without the United States coming to the island’s aid, it would be a disaster for the Taiwanese people. In the summer of 2022, Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to France, declared that China intends to “re-educate” the Taiwanese population “to eliminate separatist thought and secessionist theory.” A white paper on Taiwan policy that the Chinese government released shortly afterward—leaving open the possibility of an extended military occupation of the island—made it clear that Lu’s statement was no mere bluster. China would surely do to Taiwan what it has done to Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong: attack human rights and suppress liberties such as the right to peaceful assembly, the freedom of speech, and the freedom to practice one’s religion. Today, many wonder whether the United States would defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. More broadly, a Chinese conquest of Taiwan would rapidly reconfigure the geopolitical power structures across Asia and the Pacific and beyond by establishing a Chinese sphere of influence over East Asia. The United States’ ability to guard trade routes to secure its economic growth, protect allies from Chinese military and economic coercion, and project its power across Asia would drastically decline, because a Taiwan controlled by China would become a strategically vital naval, missile, and radar base that would pose a stark risk to the U.S. Navy’s operations in the Western Pacific. And many countries throughout Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and even worldwide, would lose their faith in the United States’ security guarantees. Economically important nations such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea would have to shift their national security policies to accommodate China, the new regional superpower, much as states in Central Asia must accommodate Russia and its interests. Newly emboldened by its seizure of Taiwan and its increased strategic influence in East Asia, China’s bellicosity would likely grow dramatically, as appetite tends to grow with eating. China’s takeover of Taiwan would create a world in which, as Zbigniew Brzezinski suggested in 1997, corporate and world leaders would ask themselves before making a decision, “What would Beijing think of this?” rather than “What would America think of this?” Recall the efforts made by corporations such as the NBA to stay on China’s good side, and imagine these amplified a hundredfold. BUILD THAT WALL During the Berlin crisis, U.S. leaders realized that there could be no détente with the Soviet Union without forcing Moscow to back off its threats to destroy freedom in West Berlin. To do so, they had to stand strong and commit to the outpost’s defense against bullying and coercion from the Kremlin, without going so far as to trigger a conflict themselves. The United States must learn from this dance that Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy performed. These leaders preserved West Berlin’s position as a beacon of democracy while avoiding provoking a devastating global conflagration until an era of stability could take hold. Ultimately, there can be no détente with China without the creation of a figurative “wall” across the Taiwan Strait. This would require the United States to position significant munitions—anti-ship missiles, mines, coastal and air defense batteries throughout the region and on Taiwan itself—enough to convince China that any attempt to take the island would prove futile. In addition, the United States must focus on increasing its economic leverage over China, and decreasing China’s over the United States, in key areas such as semiconductors, critical minerals, AI, biotech and synthetic biological products, space technology and green energy. Beijing must understand that even if it could somehow achieve a military victory over Taiwan, such a takeover would come at a devastating cost to China’s economy and prosperity. Once again, the United States’ strategy in this new cold war must be to convince the other side that an unsatisfactory status quo—in which the fate of Taiwan’s independence undetermined but which nevertheless contributes to peace and coexistence—is preferable to a potentially existential conflict. But arriving at the détente the Soviet Union and the United States reached in the 1970s took time—something U.S. leaders came to realize in the early stages of the Cold War. The Chinese Communist Party’s rule over China may last for generations. Even if the Chinese government becomes more democratic, many of Washington’s conflicts with Beijing will not disappear, just as the fall of the communist regime in Moscow did not ease all the serious conflict between the United States and Russia. Stalling can, once again, be a winning strategy. Slowing China’s advance down a month here and a year there is critical, as is letting China make its own mistakes. As it did during the Berlin crisis, the United States must now walk an incredibly thin, delicate line. By investing rapidly in military and economic deterrence without triggering a full decoupling from China, U.S. policymakers must make sure that Chinese leaders wake up and think, “Today is not the day to invade Taiwan”—but also imagine that tomorrow could be, so that they wake up one morning years from now with the same conclusion at which Khrushchev arrived in August 1961 about Berlin: the window to invade has closed entirely. Just as it was during the Cold War, time is on Washington’s side. And if the United States can avoid a crisis over Taiwan in the next few years, China’s economic and demographic weaknesses will likely force Beijing into making more and more compromises, just as the Soviet Union did during the 1970s and 1980s. But the United States must use that time wisely. Fortunately, it has a historic blueprint. DMITRI ALPEROVITCH is Chairman of Silverado Policy Accelerator, host of the podcast Geopolitics Decanted, and the author of World on the Brink: How America Can Beat China in the Race for the Twenty-First Century. MORE BY DMITRI ALPEROVITCH More: Taiwan Diplomacy Geopolitics Security U.S. Foreign Policy Cold War Chinese-Taiwanese Relations 台灣是新柏林 美國與中國競爭的冷戰教訓 德米特里·阿爾佩羅維奇 2024 年 5 月 15 日 2024 年 1 月，台灣海軍艦艇在台灣高雄附近 美國冷戰史傾向將柏林圍牆描述為該時代最嚴重掠奪的象徵。然而，在這樣做的過程中，美國人忘記了1961年建造柏林圍牆之前長達15年的柏林地位危機的複雜性——這個微妙的故事為當今的大國鬥爭提供了有力的教訓。事實上，當1961年隔離牆開始建造時，美國總統約翰·F·甘迺迪鬆了一口氣，這與25年後強烈勸告蘇聯「推倒這堵牆」的羅納德·雷根總統形成鮮明對比。從第二次世界大戰結束到20 世紀60 年代初，誰將控制柏林——美國及其盟友還是蘇聯——的問題一直是冷戰中最危險的導火線，有可能將兩國的競爭升級為白熱化。哈里·杜魯門、德懷特·艾森豪威爾和甘迺迪總統巧妙地應對了這場危機。這座城市的分裂對東德人民來說是一場巨大的人間悲劇。但這也代表著冷戰最危險階段的結束。 隨著美國現在加速陷入與中國的危險競爭，美國決策者絕不能忘記柏林危機的教訓——兩個爭吵不休的超級大國如何小心翼翼地從戰爭中退出，並最終達成令人不安的緩和。今天新的全球霸權和影響力之戰與柏林有一個相似之處：台灣。當然，兩者之間存在關鍵差異。無論是像徵意義還是地緣政治意義，台灣對中國的戰略重要性比柏林對蘇聯的重要性還要高。與甘迺迪明確承諾不惜一切代價保衛西柏林不同，美國對台灣國防的官方政策一直是一種戰略模糊性——儘管喬·拜登總統一再宣稱他打算保衛台灣。但相似之處更有意義。美國與中國的競爭是一場規模龐大、多方面的鬥爭，與冷戰有著驚人的相似之處：這是一場外交和經濟影響力的競賽，一場常規軍備競賽和核軍備競賽，一場太空競賽，一場爭奪在美國建立軍事基地的競賽。 台灣和西柏林一樣很小，但它是世界上唯一一個競爭有可能引發激烈衝突的地方，事實上，它也是唯一一個兩國都在積極準備的地方。美國和中國都不太可能冒著核戰的風險爭奪東海和南海的小島礁。與柏林一樣，台灣也具有強大的象徵價值——作為具有戰略意義的半導體製造強國，更廣泛地說，作為民主和自由中國的典範。它也是一個地緣政治上至關重要的地方，被美國將軍道格拉斯·麥克阿瑟在 20 世紀 50 年代稱為“不沉的航空母艦”。 如果美國政策制定者重新審視冷戰時期的柏林危機及其在美國 1970 年代與蘇聯緩和關係中所發揮的作用並從中吸取教訓，他們將更好地了解如何在應對當前與中國的地緣政治對抗時擺脫戰略困境。冷戰期間，從 1950 年代艾森豪威爾、尼克森與蘇聯領導人尼基塔·赫魯曉夫的會晤，到 1961 年甘迺迪和赫魯雪夫的維也納峰會，美國領導人多次嘗試改善關係。然而，蘇聯持續威脅要結束西柏林作為自由資本主義飛地的地位，這阻礙了所有這些努力。只有當華盛頓讓莫斯科相信它是認真保衛這座城市時，蘇聯才眨眼並從對抗中撤退。只有當 1961 年 8 月開始建造柏林圍牆時，才有機會遏制熱戰並避免該時代一些最具災難性的可能性，包括核浩劫。今天，美國與中國實現類似緩和關係的最佳機會是採取類似的強有力的威懾戰略，讓中國相信入侵台灣將引發災難性後果。 如何攜帶大棍子 1945 年 5 月，第二次世界大戰在歐洲結束後，戰爭的勝利者——盟軍和蘇聯——將被征服的柏林劃分為雙方各自管理的部分。然而，這座城市幾乎立刻就成為了蘇聯與西方之間緊張關係的導火線。 1948 年，由於受到盟軍試圖建立一個擁有新貨幣和資本主義經濟的獨立西德國家的威脅，蘇聯試圖切斷通往西柏林的通道。認識到西柏林已經成為“美國意圖的象徵”，而留在柏林對於美國“在德國和歐洲的威望”“至關重要”——美洲地區軍事總督盧修斯·克萊將軍杜魯門政府選擇了對這座陷入困境的城市提供強有力支持的策略，啟動了傳奇般的柏林空運。 儘管蘇聯在 1949 年中期解除了封鎖，但柏林的緊張局勢從未完全緩解。赫魯雪夫明白，西柏林對蘇聯也具有重要的戰略意義，因為它是共產主義陣營內的資本主義領土，迫使東柏林的人才外流。於是他選擇了對抗的策略。蘇聯軍隊仍然排列在這座孤立的城市周圍，歐洲、蘇聯和美國領導人都知道，在常規戰鬥中，共產主義軍隊可以輕鬆佔領西柏林。 在整個 20 世紀 50 年代，隨著蘇聯和美國之間的競爭升級為亞洲代理人戰爭、核軍備競賽以及全球範圍內意識形態影響力的全面鬥爭，西柏林——尤其是其像徵意義——資本主義模式的成功——仍然是對抗的關鍵點。美國認為，為了維護歐洲的權力平衡，值得冒與蘇聯發生戰爭的風險。失去西柏林將被視為美國的重大失敗，並可能鼓勵莫斯科在全球範圍內採取更激進的行動。但歐洲和蘇聯領導人也一直想知道美國實際上會犧牲什麼來保護這座城市。美國總統會——或者應該——和北約為了生活在西柏林的人民的自由而開戰嗎？ 甘迺迪展現了他捍衛美國在歐洲利益的決心，即使付出難以想像的代價。 1950年代末，隨著數百萬東德人逃往西德，圍繞柏林的衝突達到了白熱化。 1958年11月，赫魯雪夫向美國及其盟軍發出最後通牒，要求他們在六個月內從西柏林撤軍。但艾森豪威爾拒絕了勒索企圖，莫斯科眨了眨眼，撤回了要求。三年後，在1961年維也納峰會上，甘迺迪希望與赫魯雪夫就歐洲均勢問題達成一致，但高峰會破裂，未能就西柏林地位達成決議。當年7月25日，甘迺迪在橢圓形辦公室發表電視講話，提醒美國公眾柏林局勢有升級為戰爭的危險。 「我們已經承諾，對該城市的攻擊將被視為對我們所有人的攻擊，」他說。 “我們不能也不會允許共產黨將我們逐出柏林，無論是逐步的還是武力的。”他警告說，衝突甚至可能演變成核交鋒，並指示國會撥款 2.07 億美元，部分用於識別和標記美國各地現有的核輻射避難所空間，並改善該國的空襲和輻射檢測系統。 甘迺迪決心捍衛美國在歐洲的戰略利益，甚至付出難以想像的代價，這讓蘇聯人再次眨眼，放棄了消滅西柏林自由的野心。就在甘迺迪發表演說兩週多後，東德在蘇聯的命令下開始大規模行動，建造隔離牆，最後將柏林分割了超過四分之一個世紀。在華盛頓，甘迺迪表達了一種可能會讓從小就了解柏林圍牆罪惡的美國人感到驚訝的反應：寬慰。 “如果赫魯雪夫真想奪取西柏林，他為什麼要建造隔離牆？”他私下向助手們詢問。他推斷，建造隔離牆是赫魯雪夫緩和衝突的方式。 “這不是一個很好的解決方案，”肯尼迪總結道，“但建牆比戰爭好得多。” 台灣人的火藥桶 事實證明甘迺迪的直覺是對的。儘管冷戰又持續了三十多年，但柏林緊張局勢的緩和和隔離牆的建造代表了一個轉折點。蘇聯和美國之間的鬥爭將帶來許多更加緊張的時刻，包括為期13 天的古巴飛彈危機，這場危機的部分原因是赫魯雪夫在一年前在西柏林的對抗中失敗而感到沮喪。但它再也沒有接近 1961 年至 1962 年期間的極端危險。幾乎可以肯定的是，如果沒有建造柏林圍牆，冷戰局勢​​永遠不會緩和，柏林圍牆的建造減少了對西柏林的威脅。 如今，美國再次捲入一場大國競爭，這場競爭極其複雜，正在圍繞著一塊僅比美國馬裡蘭州大一點的領土的未來展開激烈的鬥爭。柏林危機表明，在兩個核武大國之間的全球競爭中，這類爆發點是多麼危險。 1950 年代，蘇聯領導人想知道美國到底有多關心柏林，並尋找方法來測試美國的決心。同樣，今天，許多人想知道美國是否會真正保衛台灣免受中國的入侵。 但美國無法從台灣衝突中撤退，就像它無法放棄西柏林一樣。如果中國在沒有美國援助的情況下征服台灣，這對台灣人民來說將是一場災難。 2022年夏天，中國駐法國大使盧沙野宣稱，中國打算對台灣民眾進行“再教育”，“消除分裂主義思想和分裂主義理論”。中國政府不久後發布了一份關於台灣政策的白皮書——保留了對台灣進行長期軍事佔領的可能性——明確表明盧的聲明不僅僅是虛張聲勢。中國肯定會像對待西藏、新疆和香港那樣對待台灣：攻擊人權並壓制和平集會權、言論自由和信奉宗教自由等自由。 如今，許多人想知道美國是否會保衛台灣免受中國的入侵。 更廣泛地說，中國征服台灣將透過建立中國在東亞的勢力範圍，迅速重新配置整個亞太地區及其他地區的地緣政治權力結構。美國保衛貿易路線以確保其經濟成長、保護盟國免受中國軍事和經濟脅迫以及在亞洲投射力量的能力將急劇下降，因為由中國控制的台灣將成為具有重要戰略意義的海軍、飛彈和軍事基地。雷達基地將對美國海軍在西太平洋的行動構成巨大風險。亞洲和印太地區乃至全世界的許多國家都將失去對美國安全保障的信心。日本、菲律賓和韓國等經濟重要國家必須改變國家安全政策，以適應新的區域超級大國中國，就像中亞國家必須適應俄羅斯及其利益一樣。 由於奪取台灣和在東亞戰略影響力的增強，中國的好戰情緒可能會急劇增長，因為食慾往往會隨著吃的增加而增加。中國接管台灣將創造一個世界，正如茲比格涅夫·布熱津斯基(Zbigniew Brzezinski) 1997 年所建議的那樣，企業和世界領導人在做出決定之前會問自己：「北京對此有何看法？而不是“美國對此有何看法？”回想一下NBA等公司為站在中國這邊所做的努力，想像這些努力會放大一百倍。 建造那堵牆 柏林危機期間，美國領導人意識到，如果不迫使莫斯科放棄摧毀西柏林自由的威脅，就不可能與蘇聯緩和關係。為此，他們必須堅強地站起來，致力於保衛前哨免受克里姆林宮的霸凌和脅迫，而又不至於引發衝突。美國必須學習杜魯門、艾森豪威爾和甘迺迪表演的這種舞蹈。這些領導人保留了西柏林作為民主燈塔的地位，同時避免引發毀滅性的全球大火，直到進入一個穩定的時代。 最終，如果不在台灣海峽兩岸建立一座象徵性的“牆”，就不可能與中國實現緩和。這將要求美國在整個地區和台灣本土部署重要的軍火——反艦飛彈、水雷、沿海和防空砲台——足以讓中國相信任何奪取台灣島的企圖都是徒勞無功的。此外，美國必須集中精力在半導體、關鍵礦產、人工智慧、生物技術和合成生物製品、太空技術和綠色能源等關鍵領域提高對中國的經濟影響力，並降低中國對美國的經濟影響力。北京必須明白，即使它能夠以某種方式取得對台灣的軍事勝利，這種接管也會為中國的經濟和繁榮帶來毀滅性的代價。再次強調，美國在這場新冷戰中的戰略必須是讓對方相信，令人不滿意的現狀——台灣獨立的命運尚未確定，但仍有助於和平與共存——比潛在的生存衝突要好。 但蘇聯和美國在 20 世紀 70 年代達成的緩和關係需要時間——美國領導人在冷戰初期就意識到了這一點。中國共產黨對中國的統治可能會持續幾個世代。即使中國政府變得更加民主，華盛頓與北京的許多衝突也不會消失，就像莫斯科共產主義政權的垮台並沒有緩解美俄之間的所有嚴重衝突一樣。 拖延再次成為制勝策略。讓中國的前進速度在這裡放慢一個月、在那裡放慢一年至關重要，讓中國犯下自己的錯誤也很重要。正如柏林危機期間所做的那樣，美國現在必須走一條極其微妙、微妙的路線。透過在不引發與中國全面脫鉤的情況下迅速投資於軍事和經濟威懾，美國決策者必須確保中國領導人醒來並思考“今天不是入侵台灣的日子”，但也要想像明天可能會發生，這樣，幾年後的一個早晨，他們醒來時得出的結論與 1961 年 8 月赫魯雪夫抵達柏林時得出的結論相同：入侵的窗口已經完全關閉。 正如冷戰期間一樣，時間站在華盛頓這邊。如果美國能夠在未來幾年內避免台灣危機，中國的經濟和人口弱點可能會迫使北京做出越來越多的妥協，就像蘇聯在 1970 年代和 1980 年代所做的那樣。但美國必須明智地利用這段時間。幸運的是，它有一個歷史性的藍圖。 德米特里·阿爾佩羅維奇 (DMITRI ALPEROVITTCH) 是西爾弗拉多政策加速器 (Silverado Policy Accelerator) 的主席、播客《地緣政治 Decanted》的主持人，也是《瀕臨邊緣的世界：美國如何在二十在一世紀的競賽中擊敗中國》一書的作者。 德米特里·阿爾佩羅維奇的更多作品 更多的： 台灣 外交 地緣政治 安全 美國外交政策 冷戰 中台關係 最常閱讀的文章 台灣是新柏林 美國與中國競爭的冷戰教訓 德米特里·阿爾佩羅維奇 伊朗和以色列為何從懸崖邊退了一步 美國外交仍然是區域穩定的關鍵 瓦利·納斯爾 聯合國對巴勒斯坦的託管 可以帶來持久和平的臨時解決辦法 勞埃德·阿克斯沃西、邁克爾·W·曼努拉克和艾倫·洛克 哈馬斯在戰後加薩想要什麼 沒有治理負擔的戰鬥力量 馬修·萊維特 推薦文章 中國外交部長王毅於 2024 年 4 月在北京與美國國務卿安東尼‧布林肯會面 美國、中國與宿命論陷阱 如何管理世界上最重要的關係 週波 支持烏克蘭的示威活動，台灣台北，2023 年 2 月 透過保衛烏克蘭來保衛台灣 世界民主國家的命運相互關聯 吳嘉希 Most-Read Articles Taiwan Is the New Berlin A Cold War Lesson for America’s Contest With China Dmitri Alperovitch Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink U.S. Diplomacy Remains the Key to Regional Stability Vali Nasr A UN Trusteeship for Palestine A Temporary Fix That Can Lead to an Enduring Peace Lloyd Axworthy, Michael W. Manulak, and Allan Rock What Hamas Wants in Postwar Gaza The Power to Fight Without the Burden of Governing Matthew Levitt Recommended Articles Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Beijing, April 2024 America, China, and the Trap of Fatalism How to Manage the World's Most Important Relationship Zhou Bo A demonstration in support of Ukraine, Taipei, Taiwan, February 2023 Defending Taiwan by Defending Ukraine The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies Jaushieh Joseph Wu 保羅‧史丹尼蘭 What Hamas Wants in Postwar Gaza The Power to Fight Without the Burden of Governing By Matthew Levitt May 10, 2024 A Palestinian man watching Israeli strikes in eastern Rafah, Gaza Strip, May 2024 On May 6, in an effort to forestall an all-but-certain Israeli operation in Rafah, Hamas leaders said that they might be prepared to accept a hostage-for-prisoners agreement with Israel. Coming after weeks of stonewalling by Hamas, the announcement raised hopes in Washington that some kind of deal might still be reached that could free dozens of hostages and bring about a pause in Israel’s offensive in the Gaza Strip. But even now, it remained unclear how committed Hamas was to carrying out this deal, or whether it was simply seeking a means to preserve its Rafah stronghold, where Israel believes its remaining brigades and Gaza-based leadership are holed up. After seven months of war in Gaza, the Israel-Hamas conflict has caused untold devastation to the more than two million Gazans that Hamas claims to represent and has all but destroyed Hamas’s governance project in the strip. It is worth asking two basic questions: What are Hamas’s goals? And what is its strategy for achieving them? With its heinous October 7 assault on Israel, Hamas sought to put itself and the Palestinian issue back at the center of the international agenda, even if that meant destroying much of Gaza itself. The attack was also meant to thwart a possible normalization pact between Israel and Saudi Arabia that would promote Palestinian moderates and sideline Hamas. But Hamas’s leaders also have political aims that may at first seem counterintuitive. They are trying to relieve themselves of the sole burden of governing the Gaza Strip, which had become an impediment to achieving the group’s goal of destroying Israel. And as talks hosted by China in early May between Hamas and Fatah officials have underscored, the Hamas leadership is also trying to jump-start a process of reconciliation with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA), which Fatah controls, despite years of fierce hostility between the two groups. Those goals, in turn, serve a deeper purpose. In seeking to force a new governance structure on Gaza and to refashion the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in its own image, Hamas hopes to impose a Hezbollah model on the territory. Like Hezbollah, the heavily armed, Iranian-backed Shiite militant movement in Lebanon, Hamas wants a future in which it is both a part of, and apart from, whatever Palestinian governance structure next emerges in Gaza. That way, as with Hezbollah in Lebanon, it hopes to wield political and military dominance in Gaza and ultimately the West Bank without bearing any of the accountability that comes from ruling alone. To understand this larger Hamas project and its important implications for Israel and the region, it is necessary to examine the evolution of Hamas in the years leading up to the October 7 attack and what Hamas hoped to achieve by murdering and kidnapping scores of Israeli civilians. CHANGING THE EQUATION Four days after October 7, a Hamas official publicly acknowledged that the group had been secretly planning the attack for more than two years. After a brief war with Israel in May 2021, Hamas leaders reassessed their fundamental aims. At that point, they had ruled the Gaza Strip for 14 years—having seized full control from the PA in 2007, two years after an Israeli withdrawal—and could have continued to maintain the status quo. Notwithstanding intermittent skirmishes with Israel, Hamas was firmly ensconced in Gaza and sustained by hundreds of millions of dollars in aid from the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, or UNRWA, and in funds from Qatar to cover public salaries. But shortly after the 2021 war, Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, presented Israel with what he described as two alternative outcomes. In an appearance on Al Jazeera, the Qatari-funded satellite network, Sinwar stressed that Hamas continued to aim for the “eradication” of Israel but that he was amenable to entering a long-term truce with the country—provided that Israel agreed to a laundry list of demands, including dismantling all settlements, releasing Palestinian prisoners, and allowing a Palestinian right of return. But any such truce, he said, would be temporary and driven by the imperative of achieving unity among Palestinian factions, presumably meaning support for Hamas’s position of ultimately eradicating Israel. Sinwar also boasted that Hamas was already in contact with its “brothers in Lebanon” (Hezbollah) and with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and suggested that these allies would have supported Hamas in the 2021 war if it had intensified. Soon, Hamas began meeting regularly with officials from Iran and Hezbollah. Four months later, Hamas also sponsored a conference in Gaza hosted by Sinwar himself that was devoted to plans for the “liberation of Palestine” once Israel “disappears.” The conference called for replacing the PLO with a new Council for the Liberation of Palestine that would include “all Palestinian and Arab forces who endorse the idea of liberating Palestine, with the backing of friendly forces.” At the same time, instead of prioritizing its governance project in the Gaza Strip, Hamas began to secretly put in play a long-held but still notional plan to launch a ground assault on Israel and initiate what it hoped would be a chain reaction that would lead to the destruction of Israel. The group’s leaders pretended to be focused on governing Gaza and addressing the needs of Palestinians living there, while in fact they were stockpiling small arms and, as a Hamas official named Khalil al-Hayya later conceded, “preparing for this big attack.” Ultimately, as al-Hayya put it, Hamas concluded that it needed to “change the entire equation” with Israel. NOW OR NEVER With planning for the October 7 attack already well underway, Hamas leaders became increasingly convinced of the urgency of doing something drastic. First, the movement’s support in Gaza appeared to be eroding. Israel’s pre-October 7 strategy toward Hamas was based on buying calm by allowing Qatari funds to flow into Gaza in the hopes that this would decrease support for Hamas militancy among the Gazan population. For all the criticism Israel has faced for this approach in the months since Hamas’s attack, there is some indication that it was working. Polling conducted in July 2023 by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, for example, revealed that 72 percent of Gazans agreed that “Hamas has been unable to improve the lives of Palestinians in Gaza” and that 70 percent supported the proposal that Hamas’s rival, the PA, take over security in Gaza. Looking at these numbers, Hamas could only have concluded that its governance project in Gaza was floundering. Hamas knew the Israeli response would end its governance project in Gaza. Hamas also feared Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were demanding that Israel take tangible and irreversible steps toward a two-state solution and that Washington enter into a formal security treaty with Riyadh; in exchange, the Saudis would formally recognize Israel. Most Palestinians likely saw progress on Palestinian statehood as a good thing, but not Hamas, which has always been dead set against a two-state solution and committed to Israel’s destruction. Hamas also understood that under a two-state solution both sides would be expected to clamp down on their respective violent extremists, which would not bode well for Hamas and its allies. At the same time, Hamas likely saw prolonged instability in Israel as a golden opportunity. Alongside rising violence in the West Bank and clashes between Palestinian worshipers and Israeli security forces at Jerusalem’s al Aqsa mosque, Netanyahu’s right-wing government had faced months of protests over its proposed judicial reforms. The heightened tensions in the West Bank—driven in part by the efforts of Hamas’s external leaders, such as Salah al-Arouri, to instigate attacks against Israelis—the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had moved more resources there, leaving the Gazan border more vulnerable. It was amid these developments that Hamas decided to launch its October 7 attack. Harking back to Sinwar’s 2021 conference, in which he had threatened to respond to actions that Hamas perceived as undermining Palestinian claims to Jerusalem, Hamas called the October 7 operation “the al Aqsa Flood.” “WE NEED THIS BLOOD” From the outset of its planning, Hamas anticipated that its invasion of southern Israel would draw Israel into a larger conflict, one that it hoped Hezbollah and other members of Iran’s “axis of resistance” would quickly join. (It is now understood that Hamas kept the precise details of its attack, including the exact date, closely held, but Iran and Hezbollah were aware of the general concept.) Hamas leaders also planned for the possibility that the attack could achieve more, including a scenario in which Gaza-based Hamas militants would link up with fighters in the West Bank and follow up on the initial assault by targeting Israeli cities and military bases. To this end, when they broke out of Gaza on October 7, Hamas militants were carrying enough food and gear to last several days. Israeli forces ultimately disrupted those maximalist plans, but before they could regain control of the border areas around Gaza, the Hamas attackers committed horrific atrocities, murdering around 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals, taking more than 200 hostages, and recording and broadcasting their crimes. Hamas even used stolen phones to hijack victims’ social media and WhatsApp accounts, from which it livestreamed attacks, issued threats to victims’ families, and called for further acts of violence. Israeli forces later found documents on the bodies of slain Hamas attackers instructing them to “kill as many people as possible” and “capture hostages.” One document specifically directed operatives to target children at an elementary school and a youth center. In orchestrating and sensationalizing this mayhem, Hamas sought to provoke Israel into a major land invasion of Gaza. A core pillar of this strategy was to start a war that would cause high numbers of Palestinian casualties, as Hamas’s political leader in Doha, Ismail Haniyeh, bluntly confirmed in a video address days after October 7: “We are the ones who need this blood, so it awakens within us the revolutionary spirit, so it awakens within us resolve, so it awakens with us the spirit of challenge and [pushes us] to move forward.” It was not by accident that Hamas built more than 300 miles of tunnels in Gaza to protect its fighters but not a single bomb shelter to protect Palestinian civilians. Hamas knew full well that the Israeli response would lead to civilian Palestinian casualties—and that it would also end the Hamas governance project in Gaza, a responsibility that the group was eager to relinquish. CATASTROPHIC SUCCESS Despite its own maximalist aspirations to reach Tel Aviv and connect with fellow militants in Hebron, Hamas appears to have been unprepared for its initial success on October 7. Hamas was able to get far more of its fighters into Israel than it had expected, having anticipated that Israeli security systems and forces would kill and capture more attackers along the border than they did. Moreover, two additional waves of attackers followed as news spread in Gaza that Hamas had breached the border fence. The first included members of other terrorist groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the second included unaffiliated Gazans, many of whom killed, kidnapped, and carried out other atrocities in Israeli communities near the border. Although the attack went unchecked for hours, and it took Israeli forces days to apprehend or kill all the attackers and regain control of the border, it did not produce several of Hamas’s hoped-for outcomes. For one thing, Israel did not immediately launch a land war in Gaza, in which Hamas thought it would have a major advantage because of its tunnel network. Instead, Israel took a couple of weeks to plan its response, which started with a punishing air offensive followed weeks later by a combined air and ground offensive aimed at uprooting the military infrastructure Hamas had built within and under civilian communities. Nor did Hezbollah and other members of the axis of resistance launch a full-scale attack on Israel. When Iran carried out a major attack in April in response to an Israeli strike on senior Iranian commanders in Syria, Israeli and allied air defenses largely neutralized what proved to be a one-off operation. Both Hezbollah and Iran, Hamas’s most powerful allies, were keen to join the fight, but neither wanted a full-scale war. In short, the Israel-Hamas war has been devastating, but it has not set off a regional war that threatens Israel’s survival—and Hamas is fine with that, for now. For Hamas, strategic patience is a virtue. Although the group planned for the possibility of still greater success, its primary goal was to initiate a longer and inexorable process leading to Israel’s destruction. To do that, Hamas needed to get out from under the burden of governing the Gaza Strip, which it had concluded was undermining rather than enabling its attacks on Israel. Freed of that responsibility, Hamas could now pledge “to repeat the October 7 attack, time and again, until Israel is annihilated.” THE HEZBOLLAH MODEL In launching the October 7 attack, Hamas upended the status quo in Gaza. Less noted has been what it wants instead. In fact, as debate ensues over postwar administration of the strip, Hamas has begun to lay the groundwork for reconciling with and ultimately taking over the PLO, thereby guaranteeing that it is part of whatever governance structure emerges. Al-Hayya, the Hamas official who explained that his group wanted to change the whole equation, recently acknowledged this plan and has floated the idea of a five-year truce with Israel based on the armistice lines that existed before the 1967 war and on a unified Palestinian government that controls both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Indeed, since December, senior leaders from Hamas have been meeting with factions of Fatah that are opposed to Mahmoud Abbas, the deeply unpopular leader of the PA, to discuss just such a rapprochement. On April 21, Haniyeh explicitly proposed restructuring the PLO to include all Palestinian factions. For a militant Islamist movement that has long disavowed the more moderate and secular Palestinian Authority, seeking to join forces with the PLO may seem surprising. But behind Hamas’s recent push is the more important strategic goal of emulating the Hezbollah model. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is nominally part of the weak Lebanese state, allowing it to influence policy and have at least some say in directing government funds, yet it maintains complete autonomy in running its own powerful military and in fighting Israel. Under a new arrangement for Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas hopes to exert the same influence and independence with its own movement and militia, neither beholden to nor controlled by a government. Hamas has laid the groundwork for reconciling with and ultimately taking over the PLO. In fact, Hamas’s leaders in Gaza looked to Hezbollah for guidance as they planned the October 7 attack, which came straight out of Hezbollah’s playbook. Although Hamas’s external leadership in Qatar, Turkey, and Lebanon has been more interested in bringing the war to a close, Sinwar—who holds most of the cards by virtue of being on the ground in Gaza and controlling the Israeli hostages—is fixated on absorbing Israel’s hits, surviving, and declaring “divine victory.” He is clearly looking to the 2006 war with Israel, in which Hezbollah became the first Arab army not to be destroyed by the IDF, despite heavy losses, and enjoyed a significant boost to its regional stature as a result. Surviving the Israeli military offensive, Sinwar appears to have calculated, would position him well for a senior position in a future Palestinian government. Of course, the idea that Sinwar might have a future place in a Palestinian unity government is preposterous, and not only because of the heinous nature of what Hamas did on October 7. After all, as a longtime sworn enemy of Fatah and the PA, Hamas took over the Gaza Strip by armed force in 2007 after a civil war with Fatah. Moreover, the Biden administration has explicitly ruled out any postwar governance structure that includes Hamas. But without a concerted effort to fully dismantle the group’s political infrastructure in Gaza and build alternatives, Hamas may yet succeed in positioning itself to be one of several parties in control when the fighting stops. Should that happen, Hamas might well adopt other aspects of the Hezbollah approach. Just as Hezbollah has used its haven in Lebanon to launch cross-border attacks on Israel as terrorist plots against Israelis and Jews around the world, Hamas could expand its military operations beyond the borders of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip and carry out plausibly deniable terrorist attacks abroad. So far, Hamas has never carried out an international terrorist attack—although it has come close on several occasions. But since October 7, European intelligence agencies have discovered Hamas plots in Germany and Sweden, as well as logistical operations in Bulgaria, Denmark, and the Netherlands. PREVENTING A POSTWAR VICTORY Notwithstanding Hamas’s belated announcement in early May that it might approve some version of a hostage-for-prisoners deal, Biden administration officials have long blamed Hamas’s leadership for prolonging the war by not releasing the Israeli hostages and laying down arms. But they are not the only ones. There are indications that Gazans themselves, increasingly desperate after nearly seven months of devastating war, are losing patience with the movement and its failure to take steps to protect them from the Israeli retaliation Hamas was determined to provoke. “I pray every day for the death of Sinwar,” one Gazan told the Financial Times in April. Polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research suggests that over the past three months, Hamas’s popularity has dropped by about a quarter, from 43 percent to 34 percent. “Almost everyone around me shares the same thoughts,” a freelance journalist in Gaza told The Washington Post recently. “We want this waterfall of blood to stop.” Hunkered down in their underground tunnels, Hamas’s leaders are surely aware that the civilians they have left unprotected aboveground are growing increasingly angry at the movement, which may account for the more moderate tone of some statements the movement’s leaders have recently released. But they are wary of agreeing to any swap of hostages for prisoners that does not come with a complete cease-fire and save the remaining Hamas battalions in Rafah. Indeed, poor polling numbers are likely only to underscore the importance of securing a position within whatever governance structure comes next—one in which Hamas will not be the only party ruling Gaza and therefore not the one blamed when things don’t go well. Hamas understands that after it releases the remaining hostages, the best leverage it will have is its remaining fighting cadre. So as Hamas sees it, it must first secure a Hezbollah-style victory, simply by surviving. Then, it must adopt a Hezbollah model in its relation to the postwar governance structure that emerges—joining with the PLO and changing the Palestinian movement from within while maintaining Hamas as an independent fighting force. For Hamas, this would be a return to first principles: it could pursue its fundamental commitment to destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamist Palestinian state in all of what it considers historic Palestine. To arrest this plan before it is set in motion, it will be paramount for Israel, the United States, and their Arab and Western allies to keep Hamas out of whatever Palestinian governance structure is built. If they do not, the group could soon create a situation that is far more dangerous and destabilizing than the one that allowed it to launch the October 7 attack. The peril lies in the fact that both Hamas and Hezbollah truly believe that Israel’s destruction is inevitable, and that October 7 is simply the beginning of an irreversible process that will ultimately achieve just that. Anyone who truly supports the idea of securing a durable settlement to this conflict must oppose including Hamas in Palestinian governance for the simple reason that Hamas’s fundamental goals are incompatible with peace. MATTHEW LEVITT is Fromer-Wexler Fellow and Director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God. MORE BY MATTHEW LEVITT More: Israel Palestinian Territories Politics & Society Security Defense & Military Post-Conflict Reconstruction War & Military Strategy Hamas Israel-Hamas War Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Hezbollah Most-Read Articles Why Ukraine Should Keep Striking Russian Oil Refineries Washington’s Fears About Energy Markets Are Misplaced Michael Liebreich, Lauri Myllyvirta, and Sam Winter-Levy East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse And How It Will Reshape World Politics Nicholas Eberstadt Defending Taiwan by Defending Ukraine The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies Jaushieh Joseph Wu Russia’s Pro-Putin Elites How the Dictator Recruited Them to His Anti-Western Agenda Tatiana Stanovaya Recommended Articles Lebanese watching an address by Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Beirut, April 2024 Israel’s Next Front? Iran, Hezbollah, and the Coming War in Lebanon Maha Yahya Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar at a rally in Gaza City, December 2022 Hamas’s Goal in Gaza The Strategy That Led to the War—and What It Means for the Future Leila Seurat A New Recruiting Ground for ISIS Why Jihadism Is Thriving in Tajikistan By Marlene Laruelle May 14, 2024 A suspect from the Crocus City Hall attack in court in Moscow, March 2024 In March, terrorists affiliated with Islamic State Khorasan, also known as ISIS-K, attacked Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, killing 145 people and wounding several hundred. The authorities swiftly arrested twelve young men, all of whom were from Tajikistan, the most southern and poorest republic of the former Soviet Union. Tajikistan’s economy is moribund, and the combination of a low growth rate and a youthful population has created an immense diaspora: at least a quarter of Tajikistan’s working-age men are currently living abroad. The country they left behind is repressive, with a government as hostile to many forms of Islam as it is to any signs of dissent. Socioeconomic and political factors have combined to make young Tajik men uniquely susceptible to radicalization. Russia’s intelligence services are currently overstretched by the war in Ukraine and the need for continued action at home. But radicalization among labor migrant communities in Russia and the circulation of weapons from the Ukrainian battlefield have raised the domestic terrorist risk—and this threat is likely to grow. A DEEP MALAISE Tajikistan is the only country that was part of the former Soviet Union that suffered a full-scale civil war in the early 1990s. Pitching the central government (which enjoyed Russian backing) against provincial rebels, the conflict left 50,000 dead and half a million people displaced. That war sparked a massive labor migration from Central Asia to Russia, which continued in the first two decades of this century and has not been arrested by the ongoing war in Ukraine. In 2023, almost one million Tajik citizens were registered as migrants in Russia, some ten percent of Tajikistan’s population. They are the victims of the country’s weak economy. About half of Tajikistan’s population is under 25 years old, and, consequently, youth unemployment is high. Young men move abroad in search of opportunity, and the majority go to Russia. In power since 1994, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon presides over a highly repressive regime that kills or imprisons opposition figures, including leaders and members of the main opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, and controls the public space through propaganda and corruption. Rahmon’s regime is nepotistic, and several of his sons and daughters hold senior government positions. One son, Rustam, is the chair of the National Assembly of Tajikistan and widely believed to be his father’s successor. Due to the country’s lack of resources, the economy is struggling, reliant on remittances sent by migrants—Tajikistan has one of the highest shares of remittances to GDP ratios—and heroin trafficking from Afghanistan. The small agricultural sector, which employs half the population, remains dysfunctional, and the service sector is underdeveloped. Since the civil war ended in 1997, the Rahmon regime has treated Islam as a threat to its legitimacy and subjected the religion to strict controls. The security services monitor sermons and religious personnel, women are forbidden to pray in mosques, and children cannot receive certain forms of religious education. All “foreign” Islamic customs—such as wearing a hijab in an Emirati or a Turkish fashion—are forbidden, and men who undergo religious education abroad are not allowed to become imams when they return. The regime accuses its opponents of being “Wahhabi,” “Salafi,” or “jihadi”—all labels used to describe foreign-inspired, political Islam. The regime routinely blames Islamism for any internal upheavals. For example, several localized conflicts in the autonomous Pamir region and its city of Khorog have been framed by the regime as Islamist, although they were mostly the result of struggles between elites. For Rahmon, the emergence of ISIS-K has, consequently, been both a blessing and a curse. Although it has enabled him to associate his opponents with Islamist militancy and potentially win international support for the resulting repressive policies, it may also destabilize his regime. A NEW ISLAMIC IDENTITY The Soviet Union and many of the Central Asian states born from it saw Islam as a form of national culture that had to be made subservient to the state. But that understanding is coming under increasing pressure from a more religious, universalist, and rebellious interpretation of Islam. For many in the younger generations in Tajikistan, Islam offers an attractive code of morality and discipline, a shelter from the immiseration and repression in their country. Under the influence of these trends, gender roles have been retraditionalized, with young women increasingly pushed out of the workforce and defined by their reproductive role. Many young Tajiks see themselves as part of the ummah, the global community of Muslims, rather than just members of their nation-state, and look beyond their country for inspiration. The United Arab Emirates appears to many as a successful model of a state where faith flourishes alongside modernization and economic prosperity. The Islamization of Tajik society is not in and of itself a harbinger of future mayhem and jihadi violence; those calling for terrorist attacks and the utopia of the caliphate are a very small minority. Moreover, social marginalization is more likely to drive people toward violence than religious fervor. Research on ISIS fighters conducted by academics including Harvard’s Noah Tucker has consistently shown that the main drivers for recruitment are poverty, a lack of social opportunities, and petty criminalization. This is true of ISIS-K, which was launched in 2015 as the regional branch of the Islamic State, or ISIS, at a time when the militant group held sway in many parts of Iraq and Syria. Its mission is to unite fighters from Khorasan—a historic region that covers northern Afghanistan and much of the settled (as opposed to steppe) areas of Central Asia. Like its parent group, ISIS-K regards itself as the custodian of jihadi ideology, dedicated to creating a world caliphate. But it has also developed more local obsessions and enmities, including with the Taliban, a group that ISIS-K’s leaders accuse of being insufficiently orthodox and of promoting a nationalized, Pashtun-centric, Islam. In Tajikistan, Islam offers a shelter from immiseration and repression. In Afghanistan, ISIS-K has attacked the Taliban, the Shiite Hazara minority, and Hindu and Sikh temples. But the group also has many foes outside Afghanistan. It inveighs against India—because of New Delhi’s cooperation with the government in Kabul prior to the Taliban takeover in 2021 and the discrimination toward Muslims that has intensified under India’s ruling Hindu nationalist government—as well as the militant groups Hamas and Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iran. The group is also set against Russia, owing to Moscow’s cooperation with Iran, Syria, and the Taliban. It has organized several terrorist acts in Turkey, as well as in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. ISIS-K has found Central Asia—and Tajikistan in particular—to be a fertile recruiting ground. It has successfully used social media to find receptive audiences via content posted in Russian and Central Asian languages. The group publishes in Cyrillic Tajik online and on social media platforms including Telegram, with at least four outlets—Protectors of the Ummat, Movarounnahr, Voice of Khurasan, and Voice of Khurasan Radio—offering religious content, news about ISIS activities, updates on regional and international affairs, and instructions for aspiring jihadis. These channels criticize Rahmon’s dictatorial and nepotistic rule, with many propaganda videos featuring faked images of his humiliation and death. ISIS-K may be recruiting Tajik citizens radicalized at home, but it is also tapping into Tajik diaspora communities. Disenfranchised migrants, cut off from their relatives and community, living in humiliating conditions and facing xenophobia, are often more promising targets for radicalization than those who live in their own communities. Many Tajik migrants have been radicalized while in France, Germany, Russia, and Turkey. Concerned by this phenomenon and in the wake of the Crocus City Hall attacks, Turkish authorities canceled the visa exemption that had been granted to Tajik citizens since 2018, making it harder for them to travel to the country. A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT Russia has treated Tajik migrants poorly. Systemic corruption leaves them at the mercy of police decisions and extortion schemes. Xenophobia is widespread, and, although Russian authorities have suppressed the skinhead violence that was prevalent in the first two decades of this century, far-right groups still regularly harass and threaten Central Asian migrants. Many migrants live in segregated spaces, in barracks or containers, in degrading conditions. Many young men have responded to these pressures and indignities by adopting an Islamic identity that stresses discipline and set moral values. For them, the ordeals of the migrant experience have turned them toward the order and comfort of religion. Since the war in Ukraine began, Moscow has pushed migrants to take Russian citizenship and then recruited them into the armed forces to fight at the front. Russian authorities began cracking down on Tajik and other Central Asian migrants after the Crocus City Hall attacks. They have expelled several hundred who were in Russia illegally, detained hundreds in airports, and conducted intimidatory searches on centers and organizations that offer legal assistance to migrants. Moscow has also pressured the security services in Tajikistan and its Central Asian neighbors to tackle domestic Islamism. But that strategy has little chance of success, as it does not address the systemic origins of jihadi recruitment. Crackdowns and deportations will not end rural poverty, the humiliating lives that migrants lead, the lack of economic opportunities, the dissatisfaction of young people, or the difficulties migrants face integrating into host societies. As the fastest-growing jihadi group in Russia, ISIS-K now dominates the local jihadi scene. In January, it announced a new global campaign “against Jews, Christians, and Shiites,” and it aims to recruit desperate young people to fight for the movement. Tajikistan will continue to be a cradle for jihadi recruitment—and Islamist militancy emanating from Central Asia will continue to threaten Russia, Turkey, and the West—until governments find a way to address its root causes. MARLENE LARUELLE is Research Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at the George Washington University. 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A cyberattack on a payment platform. An earthquake disrupting silicon-chip production in Taiwan. Elon Musk deciding which countries have access to the Internet. At first glance, these things have nothing in common other than their recent prominence in news headlines. But an invisible through line connects them: each one highlights modern society’s dependence on complex infrastructure to function. Disruptions in the Panama Canal can delay the delivery of critical shipments around the world. Computer failures can interrupt routine medical care provided by clinics across the United States. A brief halt in the production of semiconductors causes panic. And a billionaire’s whim can turn the tide of war. The complex hardwiring and technological dependence of modern life have made people reliant on a wide array of infrastructure systems, and governments now compete to create and maintain the networks that deliver essential services, from electricity to clean water to telecommunications. A country’s power hinges on its ability to influence and manage this vast set of systems. In this infrastructure-dominated world, governments and their officials no longer maintain unilateral control over international relations. Instead, corporations, technology, and environmental conditions combine and interact with governments to shape world order. Even though the landscape of global affairs has shifted, U.S. approaches to policymaking too often remain shackled to outdated conceptions of bipolar competition and great-power rivalry. It is past time to prioritize infrastructure as the organizing principle of modern life. The infrastructural turn in geopolitics has revealed that the world has a new set of power brokers, from multinational banks to satellite operators, and that solving global problems requires new forums and strategies to coordinate the activities of these actors. Infrastructure’s central role in today’s world also explains why seemingly small bottlenecks, such as the Houthi rebels’ attack on Red Sea cargo ships or production delays at a single electronics factory, can unleash ripple effects that imperil international supply chains and upend geopolitics. Adapting to a new infrastructure-dominated reality requires policymakers to, first, reorganize their thinking to account for the complex material and technological interconnections that underlie geopolitical conflicts and, second, work with a new set of power brokers rather than rely on the traditional channels of government-to-government dialogue. INFRASTRUCTURE OF YORE Infrastructure isn’t new to the twenty-first century. The term became popular among nineteenth-century French engineers to describe the earthworks that enabled the smooth transit of trains, such as the embankments, trestles, and bridges that undergirded railway lines, rather than just the tracks. Infrastructure entered mainstream English in the early Cold War as NATO negotiators in the late 1940s and 1950s used infrastructure to describe the supporting systems needed to ensure military preparedness in Europe—air bases, communications networks, and radar systems, for example. In 1950, Winston Churchill scoffed at fellow politicians’ use of the term: “Knowing well that there was no such word [as infrastructure], Mr. Churchill … said he must reserve his comments till he had consulted a dictionary,” one report noted. In 1952, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson said he found the term baffling, according to the New York Times. These objections aside, “infrastructure” caught on. Since the late 1950s, U.S. politicians have used the term to describe everything from interstate highways to organized crime networks to health-care systems. Governments’ reliance on infrastructure is also a centuries-old story. Throughout the 1800s, the British Empire used its supremacy over infrastructure in banking, telegraph networks, and maritime transportation to control distant colonies and punish rivals. Similarly, the United States consolidated claims over far-flung territories by channeling infrastructural power to build the Transcontinental Railway and the Panama Canal. The pursuit of infrastructure supremacy is an old story, but what’s new about today’s infrastructure is both our reliance on it and the interconnectedness and interdependence of networks themselves. Nearly three-quarters of global goods—80 percent of the international trade in goods by volume—move on intricately connected maritime networks. These networks are not naturally occurring, but constructed and maintained through hundreds of intermediaries, technological systems, and processes. Sending a shipment across borders—flowers from Kenya to the Netherlands, for example—requires an average of 36 documents and 240 copies. The world has a new set of power brokers, from multinational banks to satellite operators. And that’s just the beginning. The world’s most promising breakthroughs in knowledge and technology, from genomics to renewable energy, demand even greater infrastructure complexity. Artificial intelligence computing, for example, relies on billions of “parameters” powered by tens of thousands of high-tech processing units. Those processors are manufactured through intricate supply chains involving thousands of Ph.D.’s, rare minerals, and sophisticated machinery—such as photolithography machines, which require 800 suppliers and can each cost as much as a Boeing 747. Energy grids, shipping routes, AI networks, and digital payment platforms are, on their own, massively complex systems, and they’re also interdependent. Doctors cannot maintain their caseloads without billing software and digital communications. Electronics manufacturers cannot produce smartphones without the international supply chains for silicon chips and strategic minerals. The dense layering of modern infrastructure systems has become so entangled and continuous that it now operates as the substrate of modern existence. The interconnected networks and systems of modern life enable astonishing complexity, such as gaining permission to cross an international border simply by walking through a retinal scan. But they also create gaping vulnerabilities. For example, a single cyberattack on an Australian port operator imperiled 40 percent of the country’s flow of goods. These massive networks of interwoven systems have become so vital to the functioning of U.S. society that the federal government has designated 16 domains as “critical infrastructure,” meaning their destruction would have a debilitating effect on national security. These include everything from nuclear reactors to financial services. THE NEW POWER BROKERS Who wields more power, Elon Musk or Greece? According to traditional financial rankings, Musk’s net worth of more than $200 billion falls within striking distance of Greece’s GDP of roughly $220 billion. But examining financial rankings alone misses the interdependence of today’s global actors and the importance of infrastructure to shaping world order. In terms of geopolitical heft, Musk’s infrastructural power is dizzying. His decisions influence—or even outright determine—whether Ukrainian forces can launch attacks against Russian targets or whether humanitarian agencies in the Gaza Strip can access wireless networks. He wields this power because he controls SpaceX, which provides satellite connectivity via its Starlink service. He decides when and where Starlink’s network of low-orbit satellites will provide access to communications networks during a crisis. Musk’s infrastructural power far outstrips his wealth. Furthermore, Starlink is not just an infrastructure system operating in isolation. It depends on and benefits from other systems, from the universities that train its engineers to the U.S. government, which has contracted with SpaceX for classified defense projects for more than two decades, including a recent $1.8 billion deal. Focusing on nation-states as the key actors of global affairs overlooks the layering and interconnections of these new power dynamics. Thinking in terms of infrastructure pushes beyond ideological binaries. Traditional international relations tend to distinguish between state and nonstate actors as operating in different spheres, but today, entrepreneurs, investors, or consultants are often every bit as relevant as political officials. Financiers play a particularly important role in shaping infrastructure politics, as infrastructure investing has become central to international finance and global politics. In 2018, the G-20 developed the Roadmap to Infrastructure as an Asset Class to encourage investors to fund projects from ports to schools to telecommunications networks, especially in emerging markets. Goldman Sachs and McKinsey have created specialized divisions to focus on infrastructure investment and development. In January 2024, the world’s largest asset manager, BlackRock, announced its biggest acquisition since the global financial crisis: Global Infrastructure Partners, the third-largest infrastructure investment firm in the world. Although infrastructure already provides the backbone of daily life, the recent push to transform it into an asset class also makes it a financial product that can be traded on secondary markets. This dual role—infrastructure as both a concrete reality and a financial construct—changes how people interact with large-scale, earth-moving projects in their communities. Decisions about allocating resources and managing the debt of a hydropower project, for example, are shifted to higher, more distant levels of decision-making, where asset managers and consultants can assess the risk profiles and “bankability” of projects. The pressure from investors to “de-risk” infrastructure can constrain communities’ decision-making about what gets built and how it operates. The model incentivizes governments to conform to standards set by the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank, for example, rather than focusing on whether communities’ needs are better served by less “bankable” projects, such as hospitals and schools. Today, global power brokers include not only the countries and companies that build complex networks but also standards-setting entities, such as the International Maritime Organization and the Internet Engineering Task Force, that shape the global protocols for building and operating infrastructure. This shift downgrades the power of local communities and elevates a middle tier of international players—consulting firms such as EY and KPMG, and multinational law firms such as Clifford Chance and White & Case, as the legal scholar Nahuel Maisley has noted. The push to standardize and accelerate “green infrastructure,” for example, can constrain the way cities address housing insecurity, and in the process exacerbate gentrification. BEYOND IDEOLOGY At the heart of the competition between China and the United States is a fight over who controls today’s infrastructure. Beijing seems to understand this. But U.S. efforts to counter China’s large-scale construction with its own projects suggest that Washington has not mastered the nuances of infrastructure statecraft. U.S. policymakers constantly portray China as an existential challenge to the current world order. It’s “a battle between democracy and autocracy,” according to U.S. President Joe Biden. This characterization depicts two systems competing for supremacy over limited resources. A win for China, such as its dominance in software for managing logistics operations, represents a threat to U.S. security. By contrast, thinking in terms of infrastructure pushes beyond ideological binaries to focus on how different actors shape the terms of engagement and the systems that move information, money, and goods. This approach draws attention to the material networks of communications, finance, military procurement, shipping, and manufacturing, rather than fixating on a clash of worldviews. The power accrued in operating networks often has less to do with the grand designs of master planners than with the second-order relationships, long-term ties, and gradual evolution of a project. After all, infrastructure is not just a one-time investment of pouring concrete or bulldozing a ditch. Projects must be maintained, serviced, and financed over decades. It is often the second-order relationships—the enduring work of maintenance firms, financial agents, and ancillary services—that transform isolated procurement contracts into durable connections. In terms of geopolitical heft, Elon Musk’s infrastructural power is dizzying. Under a traditional view of geopolitics, infrastructure represents just another theater of competition between rivals. But this approach mischaracterizes infrastructure power. Meaningful control depends not just on the nationality of, say, a software platform’s owner, but also on the functionality of that platform, whom it empowers, and what activities it precludes or enables. A more constructive framing would do more than denounce Chinese software or seek to “reshore” manufacturing that hasn’t happened in the United States since the 1980s (producing, say, container cranes, a market that China now dominates). Instead, an infrastructure-oriented approach would envision a thicket of strategies to ensure that critical networks such as shipping and payment systems are anchored to market relationships, norms, and regulatory systems that provide transparency and accountability. Infrastructure’s functionality depends on how people use it, not just who builds it. The early history of the Internet provides a telling example: its architecture promised an egalitarian, end-to-end design that democratized access to information. Yet this design was soon transformed, as increasingly oligarchic corporations seized on its potential to amass astounding profits for themselves and their shareholders. The mere act of building infrastructure does not predetermine how societies will adopt it. In the same vein, the Chinese origins of a software program or platform does not mean it should be tallied on a ledger of great-power competition or classified as categorically antidemocratic. Instead, its international adoption shows how central infrastructure control has become to geopolitical rivalries. It is the substrate—the earthworks and embankments—undergirding “strategic competition,” a buzzword of choice among U.S. and European security planners. For the United States to compete more ably on these terms, policymakers must become attuned to implementation, long-term management, and oversight of modern societies’ hardwiring. CALL TO ACTION In the United States, the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act and the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act committed over $1 trillion to revamping the nation’s infrastructure. The European Union has countered with investments in European semiconductor manufacturing, renewable energy, and climate mitigation. But as the world gets rewired, today’s global leaders remain bound to outdated conceptions of state-dominated geopolitics. It is time for policymakers to reorient their thinking about where true power lies in the global system and how that power can be harnessed to address today’s problems. First, policymakers must focus on governance more than governments. The decisions of Musk or BlackRock, for example, might carry more weight than those of the United Arab Emirates or Denmark. Once the U.S. government can identify the gatekeepers, designers, financiers, and implementers who control different layers of service delivery, it can better understand how networks are managed and what vulnerabilities they create. In a world where a small group of armed rebels can imperil an artery on which roughly 15 percent of the world’s trade depends, flexing hard power to combat the rebels’ threat to international shipping isn’t enough. After all, the Red Sea region is also a communications chokepoint through which 90 percent of the subsea cable capacity between Europe and Asia passes. Downed ships pose a risk to communications connectivity, as the world learned when several lines were severed in March, disrupting a quarter of data traffic passing between Europe and Asia. Improving resilience means not only addressing the proximate threat but also working with insurers, shippers, cable operators, and others to protect critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, the complexity of world-spanning problems has only grown. Managing the future of biomedicine—unlocking the promise of cloning and gene editing, for example, while balancing their risks—will require high-level negotiations and complex agreements, and not just between governments. Space policy and pandemic response are two areas in which it has been demonstrated that, when working in isolation, national governments lack the power and tools to regulate effectively. States will play a leading role in an infrastructural order, but they must learn to work with new partners and traditional adversaries in novel ways. Policymakers must focus on governance more than governments. Because infrastructure projects exist in a quasi-public–quasi-private middle ground, they are often shielded from traditional market competition and public accountability. Building large-scale networks tends to be expensive, time-consuming, and dependent on public commitments and licensing. Centralized decision-making can reduce transaction costs, and network operators tend to benefit from rich-get-richer effects. These features do not lend themselves to democratic governance or public accountability. The world needs better mechanisms to ensure that the infrastructure of modern life can answer to communities’ calls for justice, transparency, and an equitable distribution of resources. As infrastructure blocs fracture into U.S.- and Chinese-leaning domains, go-between locations such as Qatar, Singapore, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates will gain prominence and neutral intermediaries will become more important, says Alexander Geisler of the German Shipbrokers’ Association. The mutual suspicion with which Chinese and U.S. policymakers view each other’s infrastructure increases the likelihood that different specifications and patterns of lock-in will emerge. One bloc’s payment platform might be organized around the U.S. dollar while an alternative architecture enables the movement of China’s renminbi and other currencies. Similarly, one network of logistics and shipping businesses could facilitate trade between the United States and its allies, while Chinese-backed technologies and hardware could enable connectivity among other maritime centers. Infrastructure competition means battles over standards will likely escalate in the coming years, and places and entities that can work as trusted intermediaries will become more essential. As global challenges interconnect and amplify one another, world leaders will miss opportunities if they don’t see more clearly how infrastructure is operating today. Global power is no longer defined by stockpiling munitions in bunkers, dominating a single supply chain, or wielding dominion over one technology. High-tech networks are central to the basic functioning of modern societies, but today’s infrastructure is too multifaceted, layered, and interconnected for any one state to truly control it. In the age of infrastructure, shaping world order requires political leaders to find new ways to collaborate with the entrepreneurs, builders, bankers, and operators who manage the interdependent systems that sustain twenty-first-century life. MARY BRIDGES is an Ax:son Johnson Fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the author of the forthcoming book Dollars and Dominion: U.S. Bankers and the Making of a Superpower. MORE BY MARY BRIDGES More: United States World Geopolitics Economics Energy Politics & Society Science & Technology Artificial Intelligence Automation Most-Read Articles Why Ukraine Should Keep Striking Russian Oil Refineries Washington’s Fears About Energy Markets Are Misplaced Michael Liebreich, Lauri Myllyvirta, and Sam Winter-Levy East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse And How It Will Reshape World Politics Nicholas Eberstadt Defending Taiwan by Defending Ukraine The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies Jaushieh Joseph Wu Russia’s Pro-Putin Elites How the Dictator Recruited Them to His Anti-Western Agenda Tatiana Stanovaya Recommended Articles U.S. President Joe Biden at a new semiconductor manufacturing facility in New Albany, Ohio, September 2022 Biden’s Incomplete Industrial Policy How to Finish Building an Economy That Works for Everyone Mariana Mazzucato and Sarah Doyle An employee at a semiconductor company in Suqian, China, February 2023 China Goes on the Offensive in the Chip War What the United States Should Do to Keep Its Lead Sihao Huang and Bill Drexel Defending Taiwan by Defending Ukraine The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies By Jaushieh Joseph Wu May 9, 2024 A demonstration in support of Ukraine, Taipei, Taiwan, February 2023 The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call: it was time to move past the vision of a post‒Cold War world in which regimes in Moscow and Beijing would become responsible stakeholders in a rules-based international order. What has emerged, instead, is an increasingly contentious world plagued by authoritarian aggression, most dangerously exemplified by the “no-limits partnership” between China and Russia, through which the two countries have bolstered each other’s repressive, expansionist agendas. This remains, however, a globalized world of interconnected economies and societies: a single, indivisible theater in which the security of every country is intimately linked to the security of every other. That is particularly true of the world’s democracies, whose alliances and partnerships have come under assault by authoritarian powers intent on splitting and dividing the democratic world. Some have argued that international support for defending Ukraine from Russian aggression is draining attention and resources away from the task of standing up to Chinese aggression. According to this view, the defense of Ukraine has left democracies such as Taiwan more vulnerable. But that argument underestimates the extent to which the geostrategic interests of the world’s democracies are linked—as are the agendas of Moscow and Beijing. U.S. officials have concluded that since at least the second half of 2023, China has been providing military support short of lethal arms to Russia, a significant shift since the initial phase of Russia’s war on Ukraine, when Beijing took a somewhat more neutral stance. China has clearly decided that it has a strong interest not just in propping up Russia but in reshaping the geopolitical landscape in Europe. With China and Russia in such close alignment, it is all the more imperative for democracies to act in coordination. To that end, the democracies of the world, led by the United States, must sustain their military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The objective of this support goes beyond returning to the status quo ante in the European continent. By helping Ukraine, democracies can increase their relative strength against the Chinese-Russian coalition. In this spirit, Taiwan welcomes the U.S. Congress’s recent decision to continue American military support for Ukraine. Such a display of unabated and unquestionable resolve to safeguard democracy does not detract from the defense of places such as Taiwan: in fact, it is a key deterrent against adventurism on Beijing’s part. WHY TAIWAN MATTERS Just as the fight to protect democracy in Ukraine has global implications, so, too, does the defense of Taiwan. According to Bloomberg Economics, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would cost the global economy around $10 trillion, the equivalent of nearly ten percent of global GDP—dwarfing the impacts of the war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the global financial crisis of 2008–9. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan would result in less immediate destruction but would still cost the global economy around $5 trillion. The reason is simple: over 90 percent of advanced chips are produced in Taiwan, and approximately half of the global fleet of ships that carry shipping containers pass through the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan is an indispensable and irreplaceable part of the global supply chain, and defending it requires a global effort. But the value of Taiwanese security is not merely economic; it is also geostrategic. Preserving the status quo in the strait is vital to maintaining the U.S. alliance system, the regional balance of power, and nuclear nonproliferation. These three critical pillars have kept the Indo-Pacific region stable and prosperous for generations and would be threatened were China to gain control of Taiwan. Economic losses and supply chain disruptions could be mitigated over time. But a geostrategic shift to the advantage of China’s authoritarian expansionism would harm the world for decades to come. In April, as Taiwan endured its biggest earthquake in the last 25 years, China continued to send warships and aircraft across the strait—even as its delegation to the UN had the audacity to thank the world for expressions of sympathy about the earthquake, as if Beijing spoke on Taiwan’s behalf. In sharp contrast to China’s feigned concern, over 80 countries expressed support for Taiwan, for which I extended my sincerest gratitude. By helping Ukraine, democracies can increase their relative strength against the Chinese-Russian coalition. This is what Taiwan faces every day. But when China seeks to sow fear among the people of Taiwan through military coercion, diplomatic isolation, and information warfare, the Taiwanese people respond with a whole-of-nation effort. Taiwan is particularly proud to have multiple grassroots organizations dedicated to strengthening civil defense and countering Chinese disinformation. They are emblematic of Taiwan’s democracy and resilience. Taiwan’s government has made great strides in meeting the security challenge posed by China. Under President Tsai Ing-wen’s leadership, Taiwan has ramped up its efforts to enhance its self-defense. Last year, Taiwan increased its defense budget by around 14 percent, to approximately $19 billion, or 2.5 percent of national GDP. Eight years ago, the defense budget equaled less than 2.0 percent of GDP. Taiwan spends its resources on its most pressing needs. The primary focus has been on developing asymmetric warfare capabilities, implementing civil-defense reforms, and accelerating the indigenous defense industry. With broad public support, Taiwan also extended its training period for military conscripts from four months to one year. Taiwan can expect robust support from like-minded countries only if it makes a strong commitment to self-defense. That was the first and most important lesson Taiwan learned from Ukraine’s defense against Russia; because the Ukrainians were willing to fight for their democracy, the rest of the world was willing to help. And our determination to defend ourselves will grow only stronger under our new president, William Lai. HOW TAIWAN PERSEVERES China has already altered the status quo in several ways in the Indo-Pacific region. For starters, Beijing has militarized the South China Sea despite its public pledge not to do so. The Chinese have built ports with potential military uses under its “string of pearls” strategy, including in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Last year, Beijing signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands and similar agreements with other Pacific island countries. China’s strategy rests on two assumptions. The first is that China must lower the potential cost of annexing Taiwan by force by making it harder for the United States to carry out a military deployment to defend the island in the event of a Chinese attack. The second is that controlling Taiwan would help Beijing project power beyond the so-called first island chain, threatening access to shipping lanes and reducing the security of many U.S. allies in the region. Preventing those developments will require an unprecedented level of determination and coordination on the part of the world’s democracies. The long-standing trilateral security relationship among Australia, Japan, and the United States, and the emerging AUKUS partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, provide an anchor of stability. The nascent partnership among Japan, the Philippines, and the United States will complement those arrangements. And the recently upgraded security cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States will ensure stability in Northeast Asia, which is closely linked to peace in the Taiwan Strait. These interconnected coalitions are the strongest guarantor of a favorable geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait can be maintained only by viewing and treating it as an international issue. Leaders on the other side of the strait claim otherwise, of course, and tirelessly frame the future of Taiwan as an issue to be resolved among “the Chinese.” But the harder Beijing pushes that false narrative, the more Taiwan is proved to be on the right track. WHAT TAIWAN NEEDS Still, the international community could do even more to deter Chinese aggression. There are three areas that like-minded countries could address more assertively to preserve the status quo. The first is China’s gray-zone coercion, which involves activities such as disinformation campaigns, election interference plots, and military provocations such as jet sorties that routinely cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Such operations pose a daily psychological and security challenge to Taiwan that is no less dire than the threat of a blockade or an invasion, and failing to respond to them would have a disastrous impact on Taiwan’s morale. In addition to providing Taiwan with political and moral support in the face of this coercion, other democracies should also put a price tag on such Chinese tactics, demonstrating to Beijing that provocations have consequences. The second area where Taiwan needs more help is economic integration. China must not be allowed to dictate Taiwan’s economic ties with the world. And strengthening economic partnerships with Taiwan would help other democracies foster resilient supply chains for their own economies. Taipei and Washington are currently negotiating the second phase of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, a trade deal that will help Taiwan’s small and medium-sized enterprises integrate into the global trading system. Once that agreement is completed, Taiwan hopes to sign an economic partnership agreement with the European Union and to join the trade deal known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. These agreements will not only strengthen the economies of Taiwan and its partners but demonstrate to Beijing that the world’s democracies are making long-term investments in Taiwan’s future. The third area where Taiwan’s friends could do still more is in pushing back against the misinterpretation of a UN resolution that Beijing promulgates to justify its encroachments on Taiwan’s rights. Taiwan urges like-minded countries to join the United States in rejecting China’s distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which was adopted in 1971 and gave the so-called Chinese seat at the UN to the government in Beijing—but did not, as China claims, enshrine into international law the false idea that Taiwan is a mere province of China. More countries should also exercise their right to freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait, which Beijing refuses to recognize as international waters. When China sees countries keeping their ships out of the strait, it concludes that its bullying tactics are working. Taiwan is a responsible member of the international community, and its position on maintaining the cross-Strait status quo will not change. But it needs the world’s democracies to do their utmost to help maintain peace through strength and unity. By continuing to support Ukraine in its fight for survival in the face of Russian aggression, the world’s democracies have demonstrated exactly the kind of resolve and moral clarity that Taiwan also needs from them. We cannot allow this century to witness the birth of a world order in which authoritarians can stamp out justice and freedom. In the coming years, the fate of Taiwan, like that of Ukraine, will be a crucial test that the world’s democracies must not fail. JAUSHIEH JOSEPH WU is Foreign Minister of Taiwan. Later this month, he will become Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council. MORE BY JAUSHIEH JOSEPH WU More: China Taiwan Ukraine Geopolitics Foreign Aid Security Defense & Military Strategy & Conflict War & Military Strategy War in Ukraine Chinese-Taiwanese Relations World Order Most-Read Articles Why Ukraine Should Keep Striking Russian Oil Refineries Washington’s Fears About Energy Markets Are Misplaced Michael Liebreich, Lauri Myllyvirta, and Sam Winter-Levy East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse And How It Will Reshape World Politics Nicholas Eberstadt Defending Taiwan by Defending Ukraine The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies Jaushieh Joseph Wu Russia’s Pro-Putin Elites How the Dictator Recruited Them to His Anti-Western Agenda Tatiana Stanovaya Recommended Articles The Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion Beijing Seeks Geopolitical Leverage More Than Military Advantage Tong Zhao Chinese President Xi Jinping and Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu, Beijing, January 2024 The Myth of the Asian Swing State Great-Power Competition No Longer Dominates the Region’s Politics Paul Staniland Russia’s Pro-Putin Elites How the Dictator Recruited Them to His Anti-Western Agenda By Tatiana Stanovaya May 9, 2024 Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Moscow, May 2024 In March, a group of terrorists attacked the Crocus City Hall, a music venue and vast shopping complex on the outskirts of Moscow. Four gunmen shot into crowds indiscriminately and started a fire that caused the building to collapse, killing over 140 people. Islamic State Khorasan, or ISIS-K, an Afghanistan-based branch of the militant group, claimed responsibility for the attack. But the Russian government blamed Ukraine for the carnage, and, by extension, the West. Many outside Russia saw the deadly terrorist attack—the worst in Russia since the 2004 Beslan school siege—as a major failure of the country’s supposedly infallible secret services and a humiliation for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Western media speculated about how the event could influence the military campaign in Ukraine, erode the unity among Russia’s elites, potentially turn the broader public away from the government, and undermine the president’s image as the guarantor of a powerful, unified state. Russians would not be blamed if the killings in Moscow provoked them to anger at the Kremlin. In the weeks leading up to the atrocity, Russian leaders received warnings not only from the United States, an adversary, but also from Iran, a Russian partner, that such an attack might take place. U.S. intelligence even specified that Crocus City Hall was a likely target. And yet Russian authorities did little to head off the terrorists. In a democratic state, the fact that the government had advance warning of a terrorist attack of this magnitude would have caused major outrage, leading to inquests and repercussions for officials who failed to keep the public safe. But not in today’s Russia. Rather than fragmenting, Russia’s elites are becoming increasingly bellicose and marching in lockstep with the regime. The terrorist attack and its aftermath have demonstrated the country’s imperturbability. Russian society is aligned with the state and broadly accepts Putin’s resolute hostility to Ukraine and the West. IF YOU CAN’T BEAT THEM Before the March attack, many top Russian officials had in fact pronounced at length on the threat posed by Islamist groups and from ISIS-K in Afghanistan. Alexander Bortnikov, director of the Federal Security Service, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Security Council, and Sergei Shoigu, the defense minister, had warned about the escalating threat of ISIS-K, insisting that the organization sought to establish new militant training camps and recruit supporters with the intention of striking Russia. But after the massacre in March, they swiftly pivoted away from Islamist terrorism. Instead, they spewed speculative vitriol about a “Ukrainian trail,” suggesting that Kyiv had some involvement in the attack. Fortunately for them, this narrative turned out to be the only storyline palatable to Putin: the president’s fixation with Ukraine allowed the Russian security services an opportunity to obscure their failure to prevent the terrorist attack. During a period when officials and the media might have focused on addressing the threat of Islamist violence and exploring effective countermeasures, they instead directed attention toward possible Ukrainian aggression. This deflection is not altogether surprising. The conflict with Ukraine and, more broadly, the existential confrontation with the West have profoundly reinforced a sense of tunnel vision among the Russian elites. The truth is secondary to the Kremlin’s fictions. Those who were aware that Ukraine was not to blame were compelled to remain silent, while others parroted the most politically safe narrative. If you were to ask a high-profile individual in Moscow off the record whether he genuinely believed that Ukraine was responsible for the violence, you might hear speculative comments suggesting that Americans are waging war against Russia, with Ukraine and even radical Islamists involved as the West’s opportunistic tools. In Russia, many observers see a connection between the West and Islamist militants. Pro-war Russian channels on the social media platform Telegram have widely propagated the notion that U.S. actions and the West’s mishandling of regional conflicts are responsible for the emergence of ISIS, al Qaeda, and other extremist groups. The truth is secondary to the Kremlin’s fictions. Many of Russia’s elites readily blur the distinctions between Islamist terrorists, Ukrainians, and Americans, viewing them as components of a world system defined by its hostility to Russia. In their view, it makes no difference who perpetrated the Crocus City Hall attack. The important thing is that the attack was further evidence of a broad conspiracy against Russia, emanating from a global order that must be transformed. More than two years of war have made the Russian elites more anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian than ever, binding them to Putin as their sole assurance of survival. The anti-Western narrative is now pervasive across all segments of the elite, including the siloviki (members of the security services), technocrats within the administration, former liberals now serving Putin, and hawks. This uniformity significantly narrows the potential for future dialogue with the West. The very idea of compromise with the West is repellent to many in the elite. Putin’s reelection in March, in which he won an unprecedented 87 percent of the vote, has reinforced among many the belief that change is impossible, fostering a sense of both powerlessness and dependence. In this situation, all one can do is accept reality: a Russia that is repressive, aggressive, jingoistic, and merciless. It’s not that elites trust Putin—it’s that to survive they have to reconcile themselves to the implacable, tightening grasp of the regime. Those who hoped to simply wait out this period of repression and zealotry now realize that there is no returning to the way things were. The only escape from despair and hopelessness that seems viable requires them to join the ranks of Putin’s devotees: becoming pro-war, radically anti-Western, and often gleeful about anything that hints at the crumbling of the U.S.-led international rules-based order. The war and Putin’s escalating confrontation with the West are foreclosing the space for internal divisions and disagreements. In matters of national security and geopolitics, Putin has managed to forge an impressively homogenous political landscape where nothing can challenge the commitment to the war in Ukraine and hostility to the West. The regime has denied the dissenting segment of society—which accounts for approximately 25 percent of the population, a significant proportion, according to the surveys conducted by the Levada Center, Russia’s most reliable independent polling agency—any meaningful political infrastructure and the ability to express antiwar sentiment without risking imprisonment. TO THE BITTER END Many Western observers assumed that war fatigue, resource shortages, and intelligence failures would spur public dissatisfaction, internal conflicts among elite, and disillusionment with Putin. That has demonstrably not happened. A centripetal force is bearing down on Russia, with the Kremlin exerting greater control over state and society. Both the Russian elite and the broader public desire peace, but strictly on terms favorable to Russia—ideally with the de facto capitulation of Ukraine. They want Russia at a minimum to evade suffering a strategic defeat in Ukraine, but what constitutes an acceptable victory remains a matter of debate. Even to that nebulous end, they appear ready to fight forever. Judging by off-the-record talks I had with contacts in Moscow, it became clear that nobody is looking for an exit strategy from the war or an opportunity to initiate dialogue with the West; nobody is concerned with persuading the West to ease sanctions; nobody is hungry for compromise with Ukraine, at least under its current leadership. There is no conjecture about what would constitute an acceptable deal to end this conflict. Instead, the Russian leadership and elites are proceeding on the basis that Russia cannot afford to lose the war, and to ensure it does not, the country must keep up the pressure on Ukraine, for no matter how long. The exact nature of that victory remains vague in the minds of Russian elites, who instead seem to find more safety in Russia’s posture of aggression alone. The war has become a goal in and of itself, serving multiple purposes: it staves off defeat, creates new opportunities for career growth and business ventures, and boosts the economy. Critiquing the war makes you an enemy of the state (and by extension, the public) and hoping for its imminent end is too wishful; a Russian defeat, after all, could make many in the country vulnerable to being held accountable for complicity in war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. Some observers argue that Ukraine should acknowledge that it cannot retake all the territories conquered by Russia and that Kyiv should be willing to cede land to Moscow to pave the way to peace. But that may not be enough for the Kremlin and the elites that serve it. Putin’s dispute over territory is a strategy rather than a final objective; his ultimate goal is not the seizure of a few provinces but the disbanding of Ukraine as a state in its present political form. A centripetal force is bearing down on Russia, with the Kremlin exerting greater control over state and society. In this context, French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent comments about the necessity of sending Western troops to Ukraine “if the Russians were to break through the frontlines” have significant implications. France’s decision to intensify Western discussions about boots on the ground in Ukraine, along with giving Ukraine greater license to use Western arms to strike targets in Russian territory, have made the Kremlin more willing to escalate. This week, Putin ordered his forces to carry out exercises related to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, explicitly signaling that Moscow will not hesitate to use such arms if the Western presence in Ukraine grows more threatening. As Russian leaders weigh which nuclear options might best deter the West from taking bolder steps in Ukraine, many within the Russian elite welcome the escalation. “How does Europe not understand this?” one Moscow source in policymaking circles told me. “There’s noticeable excitement among the elites and the military: the prospect of engaging NATO soldiers is far more motivating than confronting Ukrainians. For Putin, any form of intervention would be a welcome scenario.” In addition, there is a belief in Moscow’s corridors of powers that the deployment of Western soldiers to Ukraine would actually work in Russia’s favor, since it would inevitably result in Western casualties and consequently exacerbate divisions within Western societies and political classes, leading to the weakening of Western support for Ukraine. Many in Russia are in fact eagerly anticipating the further escalation of the conflict, confident in their country’s invincibility. FOREVER WAR Among Russian elites, the prevailing belief is that only a military defeat or a prolonged, severe financial crisis could halt their country’s momentum. Right now, neither seems imminent. Against this backdrop, the Crocus City Hall attack is perceived as merely a minor incident in a broader existential conflict with the U.S.-led international order, of which Islamic terrorism is seen as a byproduct. The Kremlin’s insistence that challenging the West—and revising the flawed and dangerous global order—will make the world safer has proved remarkably persuasive. Many Russians see defeating Ukraine as a crucial step in the Kremlin’s anti-Western agenda. Forget territorial gains or even preventing NATO expansion—establishing a political regime in Ukraine that is friendly to Russia, thereby denying the West a beachhead on Ukrainian soil, would mark a significant defeat for the West. Although this objective is on its face unrealistic and hard to attain, it drives Putin’s military strategy. Neither terrorist attacks nor the prospect of Western boots on the ground in Ukraine can deter this broadly shared commitment to an anti-Western strategy. Attempting to appease Putin is futile, and wishfully seeking for fragmentation within Russia is unlikely to be effective as long as the country remains financially robust, maintains the upper hand over Ukraine, and secures total domestic control. The authorities are rapidly becoming more hawkish, the elites are increasingly embracing Putin’s war agenda, and the broader society is unable (or indeed unwilling) to exert the kind of pressure that might push Russia in a different directions. Western leaders face the unenviable task of determining how to engage with a Russia that has grown increasingly self-confident, bold, and radical. TATIANA STANOVAYA is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center and the Founder and CEO of the political analysis firm R.Politik. 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All of the region’s main states—China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—are about to enter into an era of depopulation, in which they will age dramatically and lose millions of people. According to projections from the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic Social Affairs, China’s and Japan’s populations are set to fall by eight percent and 18 percent, respectively, between 2020 and 2050. South Korea’s population is poised to shrink by 12 percent. And Taiwan’s will go down by an estimated eight percent. The U.S. population, by contrast, is on track to increase by 12 percent. People—human numbers and the potential they embody—are essential to state power. All else being equal, countries with more people have more workers, bigger economies, and a larger pool of potential soldiers. As a result, growing countries find it much easier to augment power and extend influence abroad. Shrinking ones, by contrast, struggle to maintain their sway. East Asian countries will be no exception: the realm of the possible for its states will be radically constricted by the coming population drop. They will find it harder to generate economic growth, accumulate investments, and build wealth; to fund their social safety nets; and to mobilize their armed forces. They will face mounting pressure to cope with domestic or internal challenges. Accordingly, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan will be prone to look inward. China, meanwhile, will face a growing—and likely unbridgeable—gap between its ambitions and capabilities. Because of the effects on China, East Asia’s loss promises to be Washington’s geopolitical gain. But the drag on East Asia’s democracies will create problems for Washington. These states will become less attractive partners for the United States, just as their need for partnership with the United States grows. The U.S. government might then come under pressure to invest less in these countries’ security, generating friction that American officials will have to manage carefully to protect Washington’s alliances. There is more to national power than head counts, of course. But depopulation will disadvantage East Asia’s states in ways that will become increasingly difficult to overcome. Demography is not destiny, but the power of demography means the long-heralded “Asian century” may never truly arrive. INFLECTION POINT In the decades after World War II, East Asia’s population boomed. Between 1950 and 1980, it increased by almost 80 percent. By 2020, the region had almost 2.5 times as many inhabitants as in 1950, growing from under 700 million to almost 1.7 billion. This population leap far exceeded the United States’ own total growth over those three generations, and it occurred faster. It was integral to East Asia’s extraordinary economic takeoff. But even as East Asia’s population rose, the underlying trend lines presaged a coming decline. In Japan in the early 1970s, fertility fell below the replacement level, which is generally defined as 2.1 births per woman. In the 1980s, the same thing happened in South Korea and Taiwan. China—the giant that accounts for five-sixths of East Asia’s total population—followed suit in the early 1990s. Since then, the region’s fertility has fallen even farther below replacement. As of 2023, Japan is East Asia’s most fertile country, even though its childbearing levels are over 40 percent below the replacement rate. China’s childbearing levels are almost 50 percent below the replacement rate; if that trend continues, each rising Chinese generation will be barely half as large as the one before it. Much the same is true for Taiwan. South Korea’s 2023 birth level was an amazing 65 percent below the replacement rate—the lowest ever for a national population in peacetime. If it does not change, in two generations South Korea will have just 12 women of childbearing age for every 100 in the country today. East Asia, in other words, is set on a course of decline that extends as far as the demographer’s eye can see. The region is set to shrink by two percent between 2020 and 2035. Between 2035 and 2050, it will contract by another six percent—and thereafter by another seven percent for each successive decade (if current trends hold). The depopulation extends beyond East Asia’s four main countries to their northern neighbor—Russia—where population is projected to decline by about nine percent between now and 2050. (Populations will change fractionally in Mongolia and North Korea, too, but those two countries today account for less than two percent of East Asia’s population.) This is not the first time East Asia has lost inhabitants. According to historical records, China has undergone at least four long-term depopulations over the past two millennia. Some of these bouts lasted for centuries. After AD 1200, for example, China’s population shrank by more than half. It took the country almost 350 years to recover. Japan and Korea also endured long-term depopulations before they began modernizing. But the impending depopulation is different from all the ones before it. In the past, East Asia’s (and every region’s) prolonged contractions were a consequence of dreadful calamity—such as war, famine, pestilence, or upheaval. Today, the decline is taking place under conditions of orderly progress, improvements in health conditions, and spreading prosperity. The coming depopulation, in other words, is voluntary. It is happening not because people are dying en masse but because they are choosing to have fewer children. China provides perhaps the starkest illustration of this fact. The country suspended its coercive one-child policy in 2015, yet in the years since, annual births have fallen by more than half. Current East Asian fertility patterns could change; demographers have no reliable tools for predicting long-term fertility trends. But there has never yet been an instance of a country where birthrates fell 25 percent below replacement and then rebounded to replacement levels, even temporarily. It will, therefore, not resemble past depopulations, where high birthrates restored population once famine, war, or other disasters subsided. After decades of sub-replacement fertility, East Asia’s trajectory of population loss has been largely baked into the cake for decades to come. East Asian demographic patterns stand in sharp contrast to those in the United States. Unlike that of East Asia, the U.S. population is still enjoying growth in both total numbers and its 15‒64 cohort. It is still tallying more births than deaths, despite high rates of illness compared with other rich Western societies. Death totals in the United States have been rising steadily over the postwar era, but death rates are not projected to outpace birthrates until the early to mid-2040s. The country’s birthrates are below replacement levels, but U.S. fertility is nonetheless over 40 percent higher than East Asia’s. The United States also attracts high numbers of immigrants, bolstering its population, whereas immigration is negligible in East Asia. It is impossible to forecast whether large-scale international migration into the United States will continue, but if it does, the country will continue to grow for decades. GOING GRAY Given that a very large share of East Asia’s 2050 population is already alive, demographers can speak about the outlook for the region’s countries with a high degree of confidence. What they have to say does not sound especially positive. By 2050, the population in every one of the region’s countries will be smaller and older than it is now. The China of 2050, for example, will have many fewer people under 60 than does today’s China. But it will have two and a half times as many septuagenarians, octogenarians, and nonagenarians as today—another 180 million of them—even though the country’s total population will decline. In other countries, the changes will be even more drastic. In 2050, Japan will likely have fewer people than it does today in every age cohort under 70. Taiwan will have more people over 75 than under 25. In South Korea, there will be more people over 80 than under 20. This demographic shift will cost these countries more than just their youth. It also threatens to sap them of economic vitality. As a rule of thumb, societies with fewer people tend to have smaller economies, as do societies where the elderly make up a disproportionate share of the population. The elderly work less than the young and the middle-aged: there is a reason why demographers conventionally refer to people between 15 and 64 as the “working age” population. And although East Asia’s working-age cohort grew until 2015, the region’s labor pool is now shrinking. If projections hold, China’s working-age population will be more than 20 percent smaller in 2050 than in 2020. Japan’s and Taiwan’s will be about 30 percent smaller, and South Korea will be over 35 percent smaller. In theory, East Asia could surmount this demographic disadvantage by jump-starting labor productivity. But there is no easy policy mechanism by which these states can accelerate worker efficiency, and East Asia’s depopulation will make it even harder for workers to increase national per capita output. The region’s “potential support ratios”—that is, the number of people who are between 20 and 64 relative to those who are 65 and older—are expected to plunge in the years ahead. In 2020, that ratio was 5.1 to 1 for China, 4.4 to 1 for Taiwan, 4.2 to 1 for South Korea, and 1.8 to 1 for Japan. In 2050, it will be 1.8 to 1 for China, 1.4 to 1 for Taiwan, and an almost unfathomable 1.2 to 1 in Japan and South Korea—meaning that, in Japan and South Korea, there will be almost as many people over 65 as between 20 and 64. This transformation will likely depress individual productivity, savings, and investments, as workers and their parents devote ever more time and money to elder care. It will also cost governments, which will have to figure out how to increase spending on social welfare—in particular, on pensions and health care—even as economic growth stalls. The economic crunch from graying and shrinking can be mitigated through healthy aging, more and better training and education, higher workforce participation, and longer careers. But states have only so much leeway to squeeze out more from less. And like it or not, the fastest-growing age demographic in these countries is likely to be the one least able to work: people over 80. In China, this “oldest old” contingent will more than quadruple between 2020 and 2050. By midcentury, one in ten of the country’s people will be an octogenarian or above. In Japan and South Korea, nearly one in six will be over 80 years old. By 2050, all of East Asia will have more people over 80 than children under 15. (In South Korea, there could be twice as many.) The United States will be aging, too, but will have a lower share of super-elders in 2050 than any East Asian country. This contrasts with 1990, at the end of the Cold War, when the United States had a higher share than any of them. Many of these super-elders will have few kin to care for them—or none at all. East Asia has the highest childlessness levels of any region on the planet today. Japanese demographers estimate that a Japanese woman born in 1990 stands an almost 40 percent chance of never having children—and slightly better-than-even odds of never having biological grandchildren. By 2050, over a sixth of Chinese men in their 60s will be so-called surplus boys from the days of the one-child policy who never married or had children. Exactly how old-age support will work in societies so bereft of descendants is a question that has typically been relegated to dystopian science fiction treatises. But now, those stories are looking a little less fantastical. In the 2022 Japanese film Plan 75, Tokyo has started paying seniors to euthanize themselves as a way to reduce their economic toll on society. When the director, Chie Hayakawa, was crafting its main character, she interviewed 15 elderly women—all of whom said they would welcome such a plan in real life. “It’s too real to be sci-fi,” Hayakawa said of the movie. “I specifically made this film to avoid a program like this becoming a reality.” NO MAN’S LAND East Asia’s population implosion is, foremost, a domestic socioeconomic challenge. But it also poses inescapable constraints on the region’s international clout. The East Asian population explosion helped produce large economies and strong militaries. In fact, it showed up in military-age men before it reached the rest of the adult population. The same will be true for the region’s fertility collapse. In every East Asian country, depopulation will hit the potential recruitment pool even faster—and even harder—than the general working-age population. Geopolitically, this decline will benefit Washington by weakening its main rival. Between 1950 and 1990, China’s cohort of military-age men—that is, men between 18 and 23—shot up from 30 million to 80 million. Since then, it has dropped to about 50 million, and it is expected to return to roughly 30 million by 2050. When China celebrates the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party’s civil war victory in 2049, it will have scarcely more potential recruits than it did during the year of its triumph. The United States, by contrast, is projected to have more military-age men in 2050 than it did at the end of the Cold War. Back in 1990, China had almost seven times as large a recruiting pool as the United States; by 2050, it is projected to be just two and a half times as large. This extraordinary shift will limit options for China, which will have to make difficult strategic tradeoffs concerning its precious 18-to-23-year-old manpower. The country’s supply of young adults with the highest educational attainment, the best technical skills, and perhaps the most promising human potential will have a harder time improving the country’s general global position. They will, after all, account for a smaller and smaller share of the national population than they do today. Should they go into the military, removing them from a flagging national economy? If they remain civilians, should they try to go immediately to work at the cost of long-term training? These are not the sort of calculations a rising power wants to face. In a real military crisis, there is usually no true substitute for manpower. What’s more, China’s remaining numerical advantage over the United States in military-age manpower may be further qualified by other demographic stressors. Beijing will have less money to spend on the armed forces if it spends more on elder care. Likewise, if China has few young men relative to its population of elders, society and the state could possibly grow more sensitive to casualties and thus more militarily risk-averse. This possibility is sharpened by the rise in the number of only children in the military’s recruitment pool. To be sure, China will remain an enormous country with a huge economy and military force. It can hardly help but remain a formidable power—indeed, it will be difficult for China to drop out of second place. The Chinese government may also be able to compensate for some unfavorable military demography with technology, such as artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons. But in a real military crisis, there is usually no true substitute for manpower. Fielding and funding a competitive military force is about to get much harder for Beijing relative to Washington, almost regardless of what the Chinese government decides. East Asia’s population implosion, however, will not count as an across-the-board win for Washington. The region’s other countries, after all, are shrinking as well, including states traditionally of great help to Washington. As Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan lose people, they may no longer be able (or willing) to offer the same contributions to regional security. Back in the late 1950s, for example, there were almost as many 18-to-23-year-old men in Japan as there were in the United States, making Tokyo a valuable U.S. Pacific ally. But that is now ancient history. By 2020, Japan had less than a third as many military-age men as the United States. By 2050, it could have barely a fifth. The South Korean military-age population was never as large as Japan’s, but its recruitment pool—once 25 percent as large as the United States’—was big enough to help the United States both on the Korean Peninsula and in broader planning for Northeast Asia’s defense. But by 2050, South Korea’s recruitment pool will be less than 10 percent as big as the United States’. Taiwan’s corresponding balance in relation to the United States is also falling sharply, from ten percent in 1990 to a projected five percent in 2050. These countries will still need Washington. In fact, the United States’ economic and military potential will be more important than ever for the safety of these shrinking countries. But thanks to population declines, it will be harder for Japan and South Korea to contribute to their formal security partnerships with Washington (and for Taiwan to pull its weight in any informal arrangement). Demographics will be constantly changing the terms of trade in these friendly partnerships, shifting more burden to the United States. Demographic trends should give Americans some hope. It is not hard to imagine how such strains could lead Washington to curtail aid. U.S. officials already routinely complain about allied countries spending too little on defense, and none of their populations have yet to truly crater. But the United States must not fall prey to this temptation. If resentment and acrimony undermine collective security in East Asia, democracies on both sides of the Pacific stand to lose while Beijing stands to gain (even as it depopulates). U.S. officials must therefore pay attention to the demographic trends facing East Asia over the next several decades and work proactively with regional partners to address the defense burdens that lie ahead. Provided such conversations succeed, these demographic trends should give Americans some hope—and not just because they will weaken China. The United States may be beset with domestic problems and divisions, but to the extent that demographics matter, its strategic future looks surprisingly bright. The country’s under-30 population is projected to be just slightly smaller in 2050 than today, and the overall working-age population will be larger. The country is set to gray, but much more modestly than any in East Asia. By 2050, the United States will have a higher potential support ratio than any major Western economy, with a projected 2.3 Americans of working age for every senior citizen. The power of demography is bestowing on the United States a great strategic gift in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. policymakers and strategists would be wise to recognize the opportunity and seize it. They need to think through the ways in which this big demographic tilt should change their approach to China and the region overall—including to their friends. Doing so will help Washington best take advantage of what one might call American demographic exceptionalism. NICHOLAS EBERSTADT is the Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute. 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Medeiros Why Ukraine Should Keep Striking Russian Oil Refineries Washington’s Fears About Energy Markets Are Misplaced By Michael Liebreich, Lauri Myllyvirta, and Sam Winter-Levy May 8, 2024 A fire at a Russian energy facility after a Ukrainian strike, Yartsevo, Russia, April 2024 Reuters On January 19, a Ukrainian drone struck an oil depot in the town of Klintsy, in Russia’s western Bryansk region, setting four gasoline tanks on fire and igniting some 1.6 million gallons of oil. Later that week, another strike lit a fire at Rosneft’s oil refinery in Tuapse, a Russian city some 600 miles from Ukrainian-held territory. In March, Ukrainian drones hit four Russian refineries in two days. April began with a Ukrainian drone attack on Russia’s third-largest refinery, located deep in the region of Tatarstan, around 800 miles away. The month ended with strikes on facilities in two more Russian cities, Smolensk and Ryazan. In all, Ukraine has launched at least 20 strikes on Russian refineries since October. Ukrainian security officials have indicated that the attacks’ objectives are to cut off fuel supplies to the Russian military and slash the export revenues that the Kremlin uses to fund its war effort. By the end of March, Ukraine had destroyed around 14 percent of Russia’s oil-refining capacity and forced the Russian government to introduce a six-month ban on gasoline exports. One of the world’s largest oil producers is now importing petrol. But the Biden administration has criticized the attacks. In February, Vice President Kamala Harris urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to refrain from targeting Russian oil refineries out of concern that the strikes would drive up global oil prices. Echoing that sentiment, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin warned the Senate Armed Services Committee in mid-April that the “attacks could have a knock-on effect in terms of the global energy situation.” Instead of striking oil infrastructure, Austin told the committee, “Ukraine is better served in going after tactical and operational targets that can directly influence the current fight.” Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. Washington’s criticism is misplaced: attacks on oil refineries will not have the effect on global energy markets that U.S. officials fear. These s​trikes reduce Russia’s ability to turn its oil into usable products; they do not affect the volume of oil it can extract or export. In fact, with less domestic refining capacity, Russia will be forced to export more of its crude oil, not less, pushing global prices down rather than up. Indeed, Russian firms have already started selling more unrefined oil overseas. As long as they remain restricted to Russian refineries, the attacks are unlikely to raise the price of oil for Western consumers. Yet they can still inflict pain inside Russia, where the price of refined oil products, such as gasoline and diesel, has begun to surge. The strikes are achieving the very objectives that Ukraine’s Western partners set but largely failed to meet through sanctions and a price cap on Russian oil: to degrade Russia’s financial and logistical ability to wage war while limiting broader damage to the global economy. Kyiv must take wins where it can, and a campaign to destroy Russia’s oil-refining capacity brings benefits to Ukraine with limited risk. TARGETED STRIKES Ukraine has so far concentrated its attacks on Russian oil refineries, not oil fields or crude oil export infrastructure. The distinction is important. After oil is extracted from a well, it is transported through pipelines and other infrastructure to refineries, where it is converted into products to be distributed to end users. In 2023, Russia extracted an estimated 10.1 million barrels of oil per day. Of this, around 50 percent was exported to refineries abroad, and the remaining 50 percent was refined domestically, creating products such as gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, and chemical feedstocks. Half these refined products were consumed domestically, with a substantial proportion diverted to fuel the Russian war machine. Russia also sells refined oil products abroad—the country was responsible for around ten percent of the world’s seaborne exports in 2023—but most Western countries have already stopped importing refined Russian fuel. The top destinations for Russia’s refined oil products are Turkey, China, and Brazil, though Russia has also been selling fuel to North Korea, in violation of UN sanctions, in exchange for munitions. The Ukrainian strikes have dealt a significant blow to Russia’s refining capacity, knocking out up to 900,000 barrels per day. Repairs will be slow and expensive, in part because refinery stacks—where oil is distilled into its constituent parts—are huge and complex pieces of equipment that take years to design and build, and in part because Western sanctions are hampering Russian firms’ access to specialized components. Russia’s oil storage capacity is limited. When a refinery is destroyed or damaged, therefore, extracted crude oil cannot simply be stocked for later use. This leaves Russian producers with just two options: increasing exports of crude oil or shutting wells and reducing production. Both options are painful for Russia, but increasing exports is less so than scaling back extraction. Russia can sell its oil only to select countries, including China, India, and Turkey, whose facilities are equipped to use the specific oil grades produced in Russia. These countries thus have leverage over Russia to buy at lower-than-market prices. Once the oil is refined, however, the final products can be sold internationally—meaning that Russia must pay market price to meet its domestic and military fuel needs. Attacks on Russian oil refineries will not have the effect on global energy markets that U.S. officials fear. If Russia chooses to shut wells instead of increasing exports, the global oil price would indeed rise—the outcome the Biden administration seeks to avoid. But Russia would then face an even sharper increase in the cost of refined products, only with lower export revenues to cushion the blow. It was not surprising, then, when Russia’s First Deputy Minister of Energy Pavel Sorokin suggested in March that Moscow would choose the first option and divert more crude oil for export. Data from recent months confirm that, as expected, Russia is exporting more crude oil at the same time that its refined fuel exports have hit near-historic lows. Moscow exported just over 712,000 tons of diesel and other petroleum products in the last week of April, a drop from more than 844,000 tons in the same week in 2023. Monthly exports of crude oil, however, increased by nine percent from February to March, reaching their highest level in nine months and their third highest since Western sanctions on Russian crude oil took effect in December 2022. The strikes have had no discernible effect on international crude oil prices, which remained stable until the end of March, when Russia cut its output under a preexisting agreement with OPEC. Western markets may not be hurting, but Russia is feeling the pinch. Since the Ukrainian strikes began, diesel production has fallen by 16 percent and gasoline production by nine percent. The average weekly wholesale price of gasoline and diesel in western Russia rose by 23 percent and 47 percent, respectively, between the end of 2023 and mid-March. In April, the cost of gasoline hit a six-month high, up more than 20 percent from the start of the year. Russia imported 3,000 tons of fuel from Belarus in the first half of March—up from zero in January—and the Kremlin has been forced to ask Kazakhstan to ready 100,000 tons of gasoline for supply in case of shortages. So far, Russian consumers have been largely shielded from these wholesale price increases. But in the last week of April, retail diesel prices jumped by ten percent. This lag suggests either that oil companies are earning slimmer margins, at the expense of their oligarch owners, or that the Kremlin has raised public fuel subsidies, diverting money it could have spent on the war in Ukraine. According to some reports, the Russian government may also consider lifting restrictions on low-quality gasoline usage to prevent a fuel shortage, a move that risks damaging engines, placing further strain on an already weak military vehicle maintenance capacity and rendering void the warranties of foreign-made vehicles. Altogether, the political, economic, and military costs are mounting for the Kremlin as the strikes on oil refineries continue. GOOD STRATEGY Ukraine’s campaign is working. It is inflicting pain on Russian energy markets, and it is putting exactly the kind of pressure on Moscow that the U.S.-led sanctions regime was designed for but has had limited success in delivering. In the early months of the war, the Biden administration assembled a coalition of countries to impose economic penalties on Russia, including a price cap on Russian crude oil exports. The idea behind the price cap was to set it high enough that Russia would keep oil flowing, helping avoid a global recession, but low enough to depress Russia’s export earnings. In practice, inconsistent enforcement and monitoring have undermined the price cap’s effectiveness: Russia’s federal revenues hit a record $320 billion in 2023. The price cap may also have been set too high. A recent assessment by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, a Finnish think tank, determined that a lower rate could have slashed Russia’s oil export revenues by 25 percent between December 2022 and March 2024 without pushing Russian companies to shut off the taps. The EU and G-7 shipping industry, meanwhile, is still deeply entwined with Russia’s exports. In March this year, 46 percent of Russian oil shipments were carried on ships owned or insured in G-7 and EU countries, and some Western tankers have continued to transport oil priced above the cap. Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries are now doing what the sanctions regime has not. Without compromising global energy supply or driving up prices, the attacks are eating into Russian revenues and curtailing Russia’s ability to turn crude oil into the kinds of fuel that tanks and planes need to run. As long as Ukrainian forces avoid hitting crude oil pipelines or major crude oil export terminals, they can maintain this balance. Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries are now doing what the sanctions regime has not. The current strategy comes with limited risks. Ukrainian drones have generally been hitting their targets at night, causing few, if any, civilian casualties. As long as Ukraine continues to weigh potential harms to noncombatants every time it approves a strike, it should stay on the right side of international law. Targeting an industry that directly contributes to Russian military power is a reasonable wartime measure—one that past belligerents, such as the United States, have employed before, including in its recent operations against the Islamic State. Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries also seem unlikely to widen the conflict. At the very least, Russia will struggle to escalate in kind, given its long-running and far broader campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure: its forces destroyed Ukraine’s Kremenchuk oil refinery within weeks of the 2022 invasion, and the Ukrainian energy minister has said that Russian strikes earlier this year hit up to 80 percent of Ukraine’s conventional thermal power plants. Rather than threatening escalation in response to Ukraine’s strikes, the Kremlin has tended to play down their effects to avoid embarrassment. To keep the risks low, the United States should neither help Ukraine proceed with these attacks nor even publicly encourage them. But nor should it try to dissuade Kyiv from this course of action. Despite the U.S. Congress’s recent approval of $61 billion in military aid, Ukraine is at its most fragile point in more than two years. Strikes on Russian refineries alone will not force Moscow to capitulate, but they do make the war more difficult and expensive for Russia—and so, if nothing else, when the time comes for negotiations, they may push the Kremlin to make concessions. MICHAEL LIEBREICH is Founder of and Senior Contributor to Bloomberg New Energy Finance. He is a former adviser to the United Kingdom Board of Trade and the UN’s Sustainable Energy for All initiative. LAURI MYLLYVIRTA is Lead Analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. SAM WINTER-LEVY is a doctoral candidate at Princeton University and a Director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative. MORE BY MICHAEL LIEBREICH MORE BY LAURI MYLLYVIRTA MORE BY SAM WINTER-LEVY More: Ukraine Russia Diplomacy Geopolitics Energy Security Defense & Military War & Military Strategy War in Ukraine Most-Read Articles America’s China Strategy Has a Credibility Problem A Muddled Approach to Economic Sanctions Won’t Deter Beijing Emily Kilcrease The Secret to Japanese and South Korean Innovation How Tokyo and Seoul Partner With Startups—and What Silicon Valley Can Learn Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Robyn Klingler-Vidra Will Saudi Arabia Get the Bomb? 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Four gunmen shot into crowds indiscriminately and started a fire that caused the building to collapse, killing over 140 people. Islamic State Khorasan, or ISIS-K, an Afghanistan-based branch of the militant group, claimed responsibility for the attack. But the Russian government blamed Ukraine for the carnage, and, by extension, the West. Many outside Russia saw the deadly terrorist attack—the worst in Russia since the 2004 Beslan school siege—as a major failure of the country’s supposedly infallible secret services, and a humiliation for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Western media speculated about how the event could influence the military campaign in Ukraine, erode the unity among Russia’s elites, potentially turn the broader public away from the government, and undermine the president’s image as the guarantor of a powerful, unified state. Russians would not be blamed if the killings in Moscow provoked them to anger at the Kremlin. In the weeks leading up to the atrocity, Russian leaders received warnings not only from the United States, an adversary, but also from Iran, a Russian partner, that such an attack might take place. U.S. intelligence even specified that Crocus City Hall was a likely target. And yet Russian authorities did little to head off the terrorists. In a democratic state, the fact that the government had advance warning of a terrorist attack of this magnitude would have caused major outrage, leading to inquests and repercussions for officials who failed to keep the public safe. But not in today’s Russia. Rather than fragmenting, Russia’s elites are becoming increasingly bellicose and marching in lockstep with the regime. The terrorist attack and its aftermath have demonstrated the country’s imperturbability. Russian society is aligned with the state and broadly accepts Putin’s resolute hostility to Ukraine and the West. IF YOU CAN’T BEAT THEM Before the March attack, many top Russian officials had in fact pronounced at length on the threat posed by Islamist groups and from ISIS-K in Afghanistan. Alexander Bortnikov, director of the Federal Security Service, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Security Council, and Sergei Shoigu, the defense minister, had warned about the escalating threat of ISIS-K, insisting that the organization sought to establish new militant training camps and recruit supporters with the intention of striking Russia. But after the massacre in March, they swiftly pivoted away from Islamist terrorism. Instead, they spewed speculative vitriol about a “Ukrainian trail,” suggesting that Kyiv had some involvement in the attack. Fortunately for them, this narrative turned out to be the only storyline palatable to Putin: the president’s fixation with Ukraine allowed the Russian security services an opportunity to obscure their failure to prevent the terrorist attack. During a period when officials and the media might have focused on addressing the threat of Islamist violence and exploring effective countermeasures, they instead directed attention toward possible Ukrainian aggression. This deflection is not altogether surprising. The conflict with Ukraine and, more broadly, the existential confrontation with the West have profoundly reinforced a sense of tunnel vision among the Russian elites. The truth is secondary to the Kremlin’s fictions. Those who were aware that Ukraine was not to blame were compelled to remain silent, while others parroted the most politically safe narrative. If you were to ask a high-profile individual in Moscow off the record whether they genuinely believed that Ukraine was responsible for the violence, you might hear speculative comments suggesting that Americans are waging war against Russia, with Ukraine and even radical Islamists involved as the West’s opportunistic tools. In Russia, many observers see a connection between the West and Islamist militants. Pro-war Russian channels on the social media platform Telegram have widely propagated the notion that U.S. actions and the West’s mishandling of regional conflicts are responsible for the emergence of ISIS, al Qaeda, and other extremist groups. The truth is secondary to the Kremlin’s fictions. Many within Russia’s elites readily blur the distinctions between Islamist terrorists, Ukrainians, and Americans, viewing them as components of a world system defined by its hostility to Russia. In their view, it makes no difference who perpetrated the Crocus City Hall attack. The important thing is that the attack was further evidence of a broad conspiracy against Russia, emanating from a global order that must be transformed. More than two years of war have made the Russian elites more anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian than ever, binding them to Putin as their sole assurance of survival. The anti-Western narrative is now pervasive across all segments of the elite, including the siloviki (members of the security services), technocrats within the administration, former liberals now serving Putin, and hawks. This uniformity significantly narrows the potential for future dialogue with the West. The very idea of compromise with the West is repellent to many in the elite. Putin’s reelection in March, in which he won an unprecedented 87 percent of the vote, has reinforced among many the belief that change is impossible, fostering a sense of both powerlessness and dependency. In this situation, all one can do is accept reality: a Russia that is repressive, aggressive, jingoistic, and merciless. It’s not that elites trust Putin—it’s that to survive they have to reconcile themselves to the implacable, tightening grasp of the regime. Those who hoped to simply wait out this period of repression and zealotry now realize that there is no returning to the way things were. The only escape from despair and hopelessness that seems viable requires them to join the ranks of Putin’s devotees: becoming pro-war, radically anti-Western, and often gleeful about anything that hints at the crumbling of the U.S.-led international rules-based order. The war and Putin’s escalating confrontation with the West are foreclosing the space for internal divisions and disagreements. In matters of national security and geopolitics, Putin has managed to forge an impressively homogenous political landscape where nothing can challenge the commitment to the war in Ukraine and hostility to the West. The regime has denied the dissenting segment of society—which accounts for approximately 25 percent of the population, a significant proportion, according to the surveys conducted by the Levada Center, Russia’s most reliable independent polling agency—any meaningful political infrastructure and the ability to express antiwar sentiment without risking imprisonment. TO THE BITTER END Many Western observers assumed that war fatigue, resource shortages, and intelligence failures would spur public dissatisfaction, internal conflicts among elite, and disillusionment with Putin. That has demonstrably not happened. A centripetal force is bearing down on Russia, with the Kremlin exerting greater control over state and society. Both the Russian elite and the broader public desire peace, but strictly on terms favorable to Russia—ideally with the de facto capitulation of Ukraine. They want Russia at a minimum to evade suffering a strategic defeat in Ukraine, but what constitutes an acceptable victory remains a matter of debate. Even to that nebulous end, they appear ready to fight forever. Judging by off-the-record talks I had with contacts in Moscow, it became clear that nobody is looking for an exit strategy from the war or an opportunity to initiate dialogue with the West; nobody is concerned with persuading the West to ease sanctions; nobody is hungry for compromise with Ukraine, at least under its current leadership. There is no conjecture about what would constitute an acceptable deal to end this conflict. Instead, the Russian leadership and elites are proceeding on the basis that Russia cannot afford to lose the war, and that to ensure it does not the country must keep up the pressure on Ukraine, for no matter how long. The exact nature of that victory remains vague in the minds of Russian elites, who instead seem to find more safety in Russia’s posture of aggression alone. The war has become a goal in and of itself, serving multiple purposes: it staves off defeat, creates new opportunities for career growth and business ventures, and boosts the economy. Critiquing the war makes you an enemy of the state (and by extension, the public) and hoping for its imminent end is too wishful; a Russian defeat, after all, could make many in the country vulnerable to being held accountable for complicity in war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. Some observers argue that Ukraine should acknowledge that it cannot retake all the territories conquered by Russia and that Kyiv should be willing to cede land to Moscow to pave the way to peace. But that may not be enough for the Kremlin and the elites that serve it. Putin’s dispute over territory is a strategy rather than a final objective; his ultimate goal is not the seizure of a few provinces but the disbanding of Ukraine as a state in its present political form. A centripetal force is bearing down on Russia, with the Kremlin exerting greater control over state and society. In this context, French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent comments about the necessity of sending Western troops to Ukraine “if the Russians were to break through the front lines” have significant implications. France’s decision to intensify Western discussions about boots on the ground in Ukraine, along with giving Ukraine greater license to use Western arms to strike targets in Russian territory, have made the Kremlin more willing to escalate. This week, Putin ordered his forces to carry out exercises related to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, explicitly signaling that Moscow will not hesitate to use such arms if the Western presence in Ukraine grows more threatening. As Russian leaders weigh which nuclear options might best deter the West from taking bolder steps in Ukraine, many within the Russian elite welcome the escalation. “How does Europe not understand this?” one Moscow source in policymaking circles told me. “There’s noticeable excitement among the elites and the military: the prospect of engaging NATO soldiers is far more motivating than confronting Ukrainians. For Putin, any form of intervention would be a welcome scenario.” In addition, there is a belief in Moscow’s corridors of powers that the deployment of Western soldiers to Ukraine would actually work in Russia’s favor, since it would inevitably result in Western casualties and consequently exacerbate divisions within Western societies and political classes, leading to the weakening of Western support for Ukraine. Many in Russia are in fact eagerly anticipating the further escalation of the conflict, confident in their country’s invincibility. FOREVER WAR Among Russian elites, the prevailing belief is that only a military defeat or a prolonged, severe financial crisis could halt their country’s momentum. Right now, neither seems imminent. Against this backdrop, the Crocus City Hall attack is perceived as merely a minor incident in a broader existential conflict with the U.S.-led international order, of which Islamic terrorism is seen as a byproduct. The Kremlin’s insistence that challenging the West—and revising the flawed and dangerous global order—will make the world safer has proved remarkably persuasive. Many Russians see defeating Ukraine as a crucial step in the Kremlin’s anti-Western agenda. Forget territorial gains or even preventing NATO expansion—establishing a political regime in Ukraine that is friendly to Russia, thereby denying the West a beachhead on Ukrainian soil, would mark a significant defeat for the West. Although this objective is on its face unrealistic and hard to attain, it drives Putin’s military strategy. Neither terrorist attacks nor the prospect of Western boots on the ground in Ukraine can deter this broadly shared commitment to an anti-Western strategy. Attempting to appease Putin is futile, and wishfully seeking for fragmentation within Russia is unlikely to be effective as long as the country remains financially robust, maintains the upper hand over Ukraine, and secures total domestic control. The authorities are rapidly becoming more hawkish, the elites are increasingly embracing Putin’s war agenda, and the broader society is unable (or indeed unwilling) to exert the kind of pressure that might push Russia in a different directions. Western leaders face the unenviable task of determining how to engage with a Russia that has grown increasingly self-confident, bold, and radical. TATIANA STANOVAYA is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center and the Founder and CEO of the political analysis firm R.Politik. MORE BY TATIANA STANOVAYA More: Russia Politics & Society Political Development Public Opinion Security Strategy & Conflict War & Military Strategy Vladimir Putin War in Ukraine Most-Read Articles America’s China Strategy Has a Credibility Problem A Muddled Approach to Economic Sanctions Won’t Deter Beijing Emily Kilcrease The Secret to Japanese and South Korean Innovation How Tokyo and Seoul Partner With Startups—and What Silicon Valley Can Learn Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Robyn Klingler-Vidra Will Saudi Arabia Get the Bomb? How to Rein in Riyadh’s Nuclear Ambitions Daniel Byman, Doreen Horschig, and Elizabeth Kos Why Israel Should Declare a Unilateral Cease-Fire in Gaza A Chance to Turn the Tables on Hamas and Iran—and Advance Normalization With Saudi Arabia Dennis Ross and David Makovsky Recommended Articles Russian Volunteer Corps fighters near Ukraine’s border with Russia, May 2023 Putin’s Defector Obsession Moscow’s Ruthless Campaign Against Russians Who Fight for Ukraine Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan Russian leader Vladimir Putin speaking at a presidential campaign event in Moscow, January 2024 Putin’s Brittle Regime Like the Soviet One That Preceded It, His System Is Always on the Brink of Collapse Maksim Samorukov Defending Taiwan By Defending Ukraine The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies By Jaushieh Joseph Wu May 9, 2024 A demonstration in support of Ukraine, Taipei, Taiwan, February 2023 The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call: it was time to move past the vision of a post‒Cold War world in which regimes in Moscow and Beijing would become responsible stakeholders in a rules-based international order. What has emerged, instead, is an increasingly contentious world plagued by authoritarian aggression, most dangerously exemplified by the “no-limits partnership” between China and Russia, through which the two countries have bolstered each other’s repressive, expansionist agendas. This remains, however, a globalized world of interconnected economies and societies: a single, indivisible theater in which the security of every country is intimately linked to the security of every other. That is particularly true of the world’s democracies, whose alliances and partnerships have come under assault by authoritarian powers intent on splitting and dividing the democratic world. Some have argued that international support for defending Ukraine from Russian aggression is draining attention and resources away from the task of standing up to Chinese aggression. According to this view, the defense of Ukraine has left democracies such as Taiwan more vulnerable. But that argument underestimates the extent to which the geostrategic interests of the world’s democracies are linked—as are the agendas of Moscow and Beijing. U.S. officials have concluded that since at least the second half of 2023, China has been providing military support short of lethal arms to Russia, a significant shift since the initial phase of Russia’s war on Ukraine, when Beijing took a somewhat more neutral stance. China has clearly decided that it has a strong interest not just in propping up Russia but in reshaping the geopolitical landscape in Europe. With China and Russia in such close alignment, it is all the more imperative for democracies to act in coordination. To that end, the democracies of the world, led by the United States, must sustain their military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The objective of this support goes beyond returning to the status quo ante in the European continent. By helping Ukraine, democracies can increase their relative strength against the Chinese-Russian coalition. In this spirit, Taiwan welcomes the U.S. Congress’s recent decision to continue American military support for Ukraine. Such a display of unabated and unquestionable resolve to safeguard democracy does not detract from the defense of places such as Taiwan: in fact, it is a key deterrent against adventurism on Beijing’s part. WHY TAIWAN MATTERS Just as the fight to protect democracy in Ukraine has global implications, so, too, does the defense of Taiwan. According to Bloomberg Economics, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would cost the global economy around $10 trillion, the equivalent of nearly ten percent of global GDP—dwarfing the impacts of the war in Ukraine, the COVID pandemic, and the global financial crisis of 2008-9. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan would result in less immediate destruction but would still cost the global economy around $5 trillion. The reason is simple: over 90 percent of advanced chips are produced in Taiwan, and approximately half of the global fleet of ships that carry shipping containers pass through the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan is an indispensable and irreplaceable part of the global supply chain, and defending it requires a global effort. But the value of Taiwanese security is not merely economic; it is also geostrategic. Preserving the status quo in the strait is vital to maintaining the U.S. alliance system, the regional balance of power, and nuclear nonproliferation. These three critical pillars have kept the Indo-Pacific region stable and prosperous for generations and would be threatened were China to gain control of Taiwan. Economic losses and supply chain disruptions could be mitigated over time. But a geostrategic shift to the advantage of China’s authoritarian expansionism would harm the world for decades to come. In April, as Taiwan endured its biggest earthquake in the last 25 years, China continued to send warships and aircrafts across the strait—even as its delegation to the UN had the audacity to thank the world for expressions of sympathy about the earthquake, as if Beijing spoke on Taiwan’s behalf. In sharp contrast to China’s feigned concern, over 80 countries expressed support for Taiwan, for which I extended my sincerest gratitude. By helping Ukraine, democracies can increase their relative strength against the Chinese-Russian coalition. This is what Taiwan faces every day. But when China seeks to sow fear among the people of Taiwan through military coercion, diplomatic isolation, and information warfare, the Taiwanese people respond with a whole-of-nation effort. Taiwan is particularly proud to have multiple grassroots organizations dedicated to strengthening civil defense and countering Chinese disinformation. They are emblematic of Taiwan’s democracy and resilience. Taiwan’s government has made great strides in meeting the security challenge posed by China. Under President Tsai Ing-wen’s leadership, Taiwan has ramped up its efforts to enhance its self-defense. Last year, Taiwan increased its defense budget by around 14 percent, to approximately $19 billion, or 2.5 percent of national GDP. Eight years ago, the defense budget equaled less than 2.0 percent of GDP. Taiwan spends its resources on its most pressing needs. The primary focus has been on developing asymmetric warfare capabilities, implementing civil-defense reforms, and accelerating the indigenous defense industry. With broad public support, Taiwan also extended its training period for military conscripts from four months to one year. Taiwan can expect robust support from like-minded countries only if it makes a strong commitment to self-defense. That was the first and most important lesson Taiwan learned from Ukraine’s defense against Russia; because the Ukrainians were willing to fight for their democracy, the rest of the world was willing to help. And our determination to defend ourselves will grow only stronger under our new president, William Lai. HOW TAIWAN PERSEVERES China has already altered the status quo in several ways in the Indo-Pacific region. For starters, Beijing has militarized the South China Sea despite its public pledge not to do so. The Chinese have built ports with potential military uses under its “string of pearls” strategy, including in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Last year, Beijing signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands and similar agreements with other Pacific island countries. China’s strategy rests on two assumptions. The first is that China must lower the potential cost of annexing Taiwan by force by making it harder for the United States to carry out a military deployment to defend the island in the event of a Chinese attack. The second is that controlling Taiwan would help Beijing project power beyond the so-called first island chain, threatening access to shipping lanes and reducing the security of many U.S. allies in the region. Preventing those developments will require an unprecedented level of determination and coordination on the part of the world’s democracies. The long-standing trilateral security relationship among Australia, Japan, and the United States, and the emerging AUKUS partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, provide an anchor of stability. The nascent partnership among Japan, the Philippines, and the United States will complement those arrangements. And the recently upgraded security cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States will ensure stability in Northeast Asia, which is closely linked to peace in the Taiwan Strait. These interconnected coalitions are the strongest guarantor of a favorable geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait can be maintained only by viewing and treating it as an international issue. Leaders on the other side of the strait claim otherwise, of course, and tirelessly frame the future of Taiwan as an issue to be resolved among “the Chinese.” But the harder Beijing pushes that false narrative, the more Taiwan is proved to be on the right track. WHAT TAIWAN NEEDS Still, the international community could do even more to deter Chinese aggression. There are three areas that like-minded countries could address more assertively to preserve the status quo. The first is China’s gray-zone coercion, which involves activities such as disinformation campaigns, election interference plots, and military provocations such as jet sorties that routinely cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Such operations pose a daily psychological and security challenge to Taiwan that is no less dire than the threat of a blockade or an invasion, and failing to respond to them would have a disastrous impact on Taiwan’s morale. In addition to providing Taiwan with political and moral support in the face of this coercion, other democracies should also put a price tag on such Chinese tactics, demonstrating to Beijing that provocations have consequences. The second area where Taiwan needs more help is economic integration. China must not be allowed to dictate Taiwan’s economic ties with the world. And strengthening economic partnerships with Taiwan would help other democracies foster resilient supply chains for their own economies. Taipei and Washington are currently negotiating the second phase of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, a trade deal that will help Taiwan’s small and medium-sized enterprises integrate into the global trading system. Once that agreement is completed, Taiwan hopes to sign an economic partnership agreement with the European Union and to join the trade deal known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). These agreements will not only strengthen the economies of Taiwan and its partners but demonstrate to Beijing that the world’s democracies are making long-term investments in Taiwan’s future. The third area where Taiwan’s friends could do still more is in pushing back against the misinterpretation of a UN resolution that Beijing promulgates to justify its encroachments on Taiwan’s rights. Taiwan urges like-minded countries to join the United States in rejecting China’s distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which was adopted in 1971 and gave the so-called Chinese seat at the UN to the government in Beijing—but did not, as China claims, enshrine into international law the false idea that Taiwan is a mere province of China. More countries should also exercise their right to freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait, which Beijing refuses to recognize as international waters. When China sees countries keeping their ships out of the strait, it concludes that its bullying tactics are working. Taiwan is a responsible member of the international community, and its position on maintaining the cross-Strait status quo will not change. But it needs the world’s democracies to do their utmost to help maintain peace through strength and unity. By continuing to support Ukraine in its fight for survival in the face of Russian aggression, the world’s democracies have demonstrated exactly the kind of resolve and moral clarity that Taiwan also needs from them. We cannot allow this century to witness the birth of a world order in which authoritarians can stamp out justice and freedom. In the coming years, the fate of Taiwan, like that of Ukraine, will be a crucial test that the world’s democracies must not fail. JAUSHIEH JOSEPH WU is Foreign Minister of Taiwan. Later this month, he will become Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council. MORE BY JAUSHIEH JOSEPH WU More: China Taiwan Ukraine Geopolitics Foreign Aid Security Defense & Military Strategy & Conflict War & Military Strategy War in Ukraine Chinese-Taiwanese Relations World Order Most-Read Articles America’s China Strategy Has a Credibility Problem A Muddled Approach to Economic Sanctions Won’t Deter Beijing Emily Kilcrease The Secret to Japanese and South Korean Innovation How Tokyo and Seoul Partner With Startups—and What Silicon Valley Can Learn Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Robyn Klingler-Vidra Will Saudi Arabia Get the Bomb? How to Rein in Riyadh’s Nuclear Ambitions Daniel Byman, Doreen Horschig, and Elizabeth Kos Why Israel Should Declare a Unilateral Cease-Fire in Gaza A Chance to Turn the Tables on Hamas and Iran—and Advance Normalization With Saudi Arabia Dennis Ross and David Makovsky Recommended Articles America’s China Strategy Has a Credibility Problem A Muddled Approach to Economic Sanctions Won’t Deter Beijing By Emily Kilcrease May 7, 2024 Walking past U.S. and Chinese flags in Beijing, April 2024 In future crises or conflicts in U.S.-Chinese relations, the economic dimension will be critical. Yet Beijing currently has good reason to doubt the credibility of Washington’s sanctions threats. This is because the United States’s response has been muted in the face of recent Chinese provocations, including Beijing’s efforts to erode democracy in Hong Kong, the dispatching of a spy balloon over the United States, and Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Sanctions are a crucial part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, and they encompass a broad array of economic restrictions, including financial Why Israel Should Declare a Unilateral Cease-Fire in Gaza A Chance to Turn the Tables on Hamas and Iran—and Advance Normalization With Saudi Arabia By Dennis Ross and David Makovsky May 1, 2024 Israeli soldiers patrolling the Gazan-Israeli border, April 2024 Until last month, the war between Iran and Israel was largely fought in the shadows. The Iranians decided to take it out of the shadows, openly attacking Israeli territory directly, from Iranian soil, for the first time in the Islamic Republic’s history. Some observers have argued that Iran’s April 13 drone and missile assault on Israel was a symbolic gesture. Yet given the quantity of drones and missiles fired at Israel and their payloads, Iran clearly meant to inflict serious damage. Israel’s defenses were nearly flawless, but it did not repel Iran’s attack entirely on its own. Just as Iran’s assault was unprecedented, so was the direct military intervention of the United States and a number of its allies, including some Arab states. U.S. Central Command, with the participation of the United Kingdom and Jordan, intercepted at least a third of the drones and cruise missiles that Iran fired at Israel; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also shared intelligence that helped Israel defend itself. Their readiness to play this role was remarkable, given how unpopular Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza is among Arab publics. Five days later, when Israel responded to Iran’s attack, it took Washington’s calls for restraint into account, firing three missiles at a radar facility that guides the S-300 missile defense battery in Isfahan, the site of Iran’s uranium conversion plant. This was a very limited response, one crafted to avoid casualties while showing Israel can penetrate Iran’s defenses and strike any target it seeks to hit. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. Israel seemingly recognized that the best way to deal with the threat Iran and its proxies pose is to work with a coalition. This, too, is without precedent. The idea that Americans, Europeans, and Arabs would come together to help intercept drones and cruise missiles Iran launched against Israel would, in the recent past, have seemed like a fantasy—and, to Israel, undesirable. Israel’s ethos on defense has always been: “We defend ourselves by ourselves.” This has been both a source of pride and a principle—that no one besides Israelis would have to pick up weapons on Israel’s behalf. But now that Israel faces not only Iran but multiple Iranian proxy groups, the cost of taking on all these fronts by itself is simply becoming too high. This development, as well as the willingness that Arab states showed in April to join Israel to confront the threat Iran and its proxies pose, suggests that a window has opened for the creation of a regional coalition pursuing a common strategy to counter Iran and its proxies. To take advantage of this opening, however, Israel, the United States, and Arab countries—particularly Saudi Arabia—need to recognize the unique nature of the moment and seize it. A U.S.-brokered breakthrough in a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia would do a great deal to cement this emerging coalition. If the Saudis, whose king is the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites, made peace with Israel, that would likely transform Israel’s relationship with other Sunni-majority states within and outside the Middle East following suit. U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration, as well as Israeli and Saudi leaders, indicate that they would still like to see such a deal happen soon. But the Biden administration believes that the fighting in Gaza must be paused before negotiations about normalization can proceed. A unilateral cease-fire of four to six weeks would offer Israel many strategic benefits. There is some hope that negotiations in Egypt on a hostage deal between Israel and Hamas will finally be achieved and produce a cease-fire of at least six weeks. But the Biden administration must not put all its eggs in that basket. Again and again, Hamas has raised hopes that a deal is imminent only to dash them. Should no deal emerge in Egypt, the Biden administration should turn to the only realistic alternative: encouraging Israel to announce a unilateral cease-fire in Gaza of four to six weeks. Such an Israeli decision may be the only way to create the conditions for an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal to advance. Of course, a unilateral cease-fire would be controversial in Israel, both because it de-links pausing the fighting in Gaza from the release of hostages and because it may seem to concede something to Hamas for nothing in return. But a unilateral cease-fire of four to six weeks would, in fact, offer Israel many strategic benefits with few material drawbacks. And in truth, if their negotiations with Hamas fail once again, Israeli leaders will need to adopt a different approach if they hope to get hostages released while some are still alive. The fact that Israel listened to the Biden administration when crafting its response to Iran’s attack shows that it is open to U.S. persuasion. Indeed, a new reality may be taking shape in Israel, one that could change how it approaches defense, deterrence, and the region. A PRECEDENT FOR RESTRAINT When it comes to defense strategy, Israel has long been committed to doing its own fighting. All it asked of the United States was to help ensure that it had the means to do so. The help that Israel received to defend itself against the Iranian attack, however, might have been not only welcome but also necessary. But such help also creates an obligation on Israel’s part. When others participate in Israel’s defense, they gain the right to ask Israel to take their interests and concerns into account. After Iran’s attack, Biden made it clear to Israeli leaders that they did not need to retaliate because their successful defense itself constituted a great success—and, by implication, an embarrassing failure for Iran. For Israel, not to hit back at all would have contradicted the country’s basic concept of deterrence: if you attack us, you will pay, and no one can pressure us not to respond to threats. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not easily dismiss the American position. Israel’s concept of deterrence has always shaped its responses to direct threats—with one exception that is worth recalling today. During the 1991 Gulf War, the night after U.S. forces attacked Iraq, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein hit Israel with Scud missiles. The Israeli defense minister, Moshe Arens, and other senior military officials wanted to retaliate. But U.S. President George H. W. Bush’s administration, particularly Secretary of State James Baker, persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir not to do so. Baker reassured Shamir that Israel could give the United States specific targets it wanted hit, and the United States would hit them. But he also stressed that the world stood against Saddam, and that if Israel retaliated directly, it risked disrupting the coalition fighting Iraq. Saddam was trying to transform the conflict into an Arab-Israeli war, and it was not in Israel’s interest to play into his hands. In 1991, Israel’s prime minister accepted the counsel of the American president. There is, of course, one big difference between 1991 and today: back then, the U.S. military was attacking Iraq, not simply trying to intercept its missile launches. The United States is not about to attack Iran today. That said, in 1991, Israel was not already in the midst of another war, as it is today in Gaza. And unlike today, Israel was not also juggling a tense northern front with Hezbollah that could easily escalate into an all-out conflict. In 1991, Israel’s prime minister accepted the counsel of the American president and secretary of state because he could see that it was in Israel’s interest for the coalition against Saddam to remain intact. Shamir also believed that by responding favorably to the United States, he could repair his relationship with Bush, which had become strained over disagreements about Israel’s settlements policy. Bush appreciated Shamir’s decision, but the two leaders continued to clash over the United States’ provision of $10 billion in loan guarantees, which Israel needed to manage a surge in immigrants from the Soviet Union. Bush wanted to condition those guarantees on Israel’s freezing settlement building in the West Bank. Shamir would not agree, and the Bush administration did not provide the guarantees until it reached an agreement with Shamir’s successor, Yitzhak Rabin, on reducing the value of the guarantees by the amount the United States estimated that Israel was spending annually on settlements. MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY The nature of Israel’s response to the Iranian attack shows that Netanyahu, too, is willing to take American concerns into account—not going as far as Shamir did to placate Washington but clearly limiting Israel’s response. Today, Netanyahu is also under pressure to repair rifts in his relationship with America’s president, ones that have opened not over Israel’s fundamental war aims in Gaza—ensuring that Hamas can never again threaten Israel—but over Israel’s approach to its military campaign and to humanitarian assistance entering Gaza. As was the case in 1991, Israel’s restraint in its response to an outside attack will not, by itself, reset its relationship with the United States. With Israel’s assault on Rafah looming, the ties between Biden and Netanyahu could become even more strained. But a U.S.-brokered normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia is the most important thing that could change the trajectory of the relationship. Biden understands that because the Saudis require a credible political advance for the Palestinians in order to finalize a normalization deal, Netanyahu will have to take on the part of his political base that most staunchly opposes Palestinian statehood. And the negotiations cannot make serious progress unless the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is eased—something that cannot easily be done without a cease-fire. No doubt such a move will be politically difficult for Netanyahu to undertake. He is likely to argue that a pause would take the military pressure off Hamas. Having already greatly reduced its military presence in Gaza since November, however, Israel is not putting the kind of military pressure on Hamas that it was when a hostage deal was brokered that month. No hostages have been released since, a reality that suggests that Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, does not feel any serious pressure to seek a reprieve. Israel’s threat to invade Rafah may increase the pressure on Sinwar, but a Rafah operation cannot take place until Netanyahu fulfills his pledge to Biden that no invasion will happen before Israel evacuates the 1.4 million Palestinians crammed into the area. Because evacuation involves not only moving people but also ensuring they have a place to go that has adequate shelter, food, water, and medicine, an evacuation will itself take four to six weeks, probably longer. Netanyahu will have to choose between Biden and Ben-Gvir. In light of these realities, Israel should make a virtue of necessity. If it cannot go into Rafah for some weeks, the cease-fire means that it is giving up little but gaining a number of advantages. A four-to-six-week cease-fire would allow international organizations to ease conditions in Gaza and address the world’s concerns about famine there. They could put better mechanisms in place to ensure that sufficient humanitarian assistance not only enters Gaza but is also actually distributed to those most in need. A cease-fire would refocus the world’s attention onto Hamas’s intransigence and the plight of the Israeli hostages. And it would help alter the skeptical narrative that has taken hold about Israel internationally and reduce the pressure on it to end the war unconditionally. To be sure, the far-right Israeli ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir will oppose any unilateral cease-fire, no matter its duration. But their war aims are not the same as Netanyahu’s or the Israeli public’s. They want to reoccupy Gaza, and they will undoubtedly oppose any breakthrough with Saudi Arabia that requires concessions to Palestinians’ national aspirations. At some point or another, Netanyahu will have to choose between Biden and Ben-Gvir. Put simply, a unilateral Israeli cease-fire for four to six weeks would create a strategic opportunity—particularly if it creates an opening to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia and transform the tacit regional alignment that emerged after Iran’s attack on Israel into a more material reality. For the Biden administration, the role that Arab states played in helping defend Israel against Iran’s attack is a tangible new development that needs quick follow-up. The U.S. political calendar, too, makes achieving progress on Israeli-Saudi normalization urgent. Getting the Senate’s approval for the United States’ direct contributions to the deal—which include a U.S.-Saudi bilateral defense treaty and a civil-nuclear partnership between the two countries—is certain to become more difficult as the U.S. presidential election approaches. The new behavior that the Iran-Israel crisis in April provoked in numerous states shows that long-standing realities in the Middle East can change. Iran is now in a weak position, and Israel has a window of opportunity in an otherwise very difficult year. Rarely has Israel so urgently needed to seize a potential strategic opportunity. But this is equally true for the United States. Biden has a strong interest in showing that he was able to take the Israel-Hamas war and the chaos created by Iran’s proxies and forge a more stable and hopeful Middle East. There is a moment to do that now. But there is no telling how long it will last. DENNIS ROSS is Counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a Professor at Georgetown University. A former U.S. Envoy to the Middle East, he served in senior national security positions in the Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama administrations. DAVID MAKOVSKY is Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute and Director of its Koret Project on Arab-Israel Relations. MORE BY DENNIS ROSS MORE BY DAVID MAKOVSKY More: Middle East Israel Palestinian Territories Iran Saudi Arabia Security Defense & Military Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategy & Conflict War & Military Strategy U.S. Foreign Policy Biden Administration Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Israel-Hamas War U.S.-Israeli Relations Most-Read Articles America’s China Strategy Has a Credibility Problem A Muddled Approach to Economic Sanctions Won’t Deter Beijing Emily Kilcrease The Secret to Japanese and South Korean Innovation How Tokyo and Seoul Partner With Startups—and What Silicon Valley Can Learn Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Robyn Klingler-Vidra Will Saudi Arabia Get the Bomb? 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In 2023, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States insisted that China’s nuclear expansion should prompt U.S. policymakers to “re-evaluate the size and composition of the U.S. nuclear force.” In March, Admiral John Aquilino, the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned, “we haven’t faced a threat like this since World War II.” 点击此链接阅读中文版 (Read in Chinese). As Washington grapples with the severity of the threat and the risk of nuclear confrontation, U.S. policymakers must make an effort to better understand the motivation behind China’s actions. Analysts have been puzzled by China’s sudden shift away from its traditional policy of maintaining a relatively small nuclear arsenal. Some in Washington believe China’s buildup is a reaction to U.S. technological advances; others are concerned that Beijing may have unilaterally adopted a far more aggressive nuclear strategy. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. A close assessment of the evolving thinking within China’s political leadership and security policy circles reveals that Chinese officials are not simply expanding their nuclear arsenal for military-technical purposes. Rather, Chinese leaders seem to have embraced the untested belief that nuclear weaponry grants them greater geopolitical leverage to counter perceived threats. Beijing’s objections to what it sees as an unfair U.S. nuclear strategy and illegitimate U.S. security interests further solidify its willingness to use unilateral measures to address its security concerns. Washington must understand how these underlying perceptions shape Beijing’s nuclear policy if it wants to steer the U.S.-Chinese relationship in a more prudent direction—or risk responding on the basis of flawed assumptions, with potentially counterproductive or even catastrophic results. PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH? In Beijing’s view, growing tensions with Washington are the result of the shifting balance of power between China and the United States—a consequence of China’s rapid economic development rather than any change in behavior on its part. Washington feels threatened by China’s rise and has become increasingly hostile to Beijing, the thinking goes, and has developed containment strategies aimed at preserving U.S. geopolitical dominance. Given these circumstances, Beijing must persuade Washington to accept China’s ascendance as a major player and convince U.S. policymakers that they will be unable to contain, disrupt, or destabilize China. Beijing can do so only, according to China’s ruling elites, by bolstering its power. This reasoning has led China to perceive a mounting threat from the United States as the gap in power between the two countries has narrowed. A staunch advocate of the notion that the United States is hostile to China’s rise, Xi assigns great geopolitical significance to nuclear weapons as a means of showcasing Chinese power. His predecessors, influenced by China’s traditionally modest nuclear philosophy and with more limited resources at their disposal, exercised significant restraint in developing China’s nuclear capabilities and prioritized qualitative improvements over quantitative expansion. Xi, on the other hand, has elevated the missile force to the status of a full military service, issued specific instructions to expedite nuclear modernization, and boosted both the sophistication and the size of China’s nuclear arsenal. Xi’s commitment to nuclear weapons reflects a profound difference in how he perceives such arms as compared with his American counterparts. Rather than aiming to achieve clearly defined military objectives, such as deterring an enemy from undertaking specific military activities, Beijing sees nuclear weapons as symbols of military strength and believes that they wield a particular influence on an adversary’s perception of the power balance. This notion underpins what Chinese officials refer to as the “strategic counterbalance” mission of their nuclear forces—a bid to force the United States to take a more accommodating stance toward China. Xi assigns great geopolitical significance to nuclear weapons as a means of showcasing Chinese power. Xi has long believed in the merits of strategic counterbalancing through nuclear weapons. Shortly after coming to power in 2012, he commented that Russia had made the right decision to prioritize the development of its nuclear capabilities even as the country’s economy was in decline. Moscow’s move was in line with Xi’s view that the strength of a country’s nuclear arsenal shapes an adversary’s overall approach toward the bilateral relationship. In early 2021, amid internal warnings that a U.S.-led global anti-Chinese campaign following the COVID-19 outbreak could pose the greatest perceived challenge to Beijing’s state and regime security in decades, Xi called on the military to further speed up China’s nuclear expansion. This emphasis on nuclear weapons as a form of general leverage has taken hold among Chinese strategists, especially given rising tensions with the United States. As Beijing demands better treatment by Washington and rejects any dialogue that would take place from a position of U.S. superiority, Chinese public opinion leaders have contended that a larger nuclear arsenal would force Washington to genuinely respect Beijing and tread more cautiously. The notion that nuclear weapons possess extensive—almost magical—coercive power in and beyond the military realm is probably more a product of intuition than of rigorously examined logic and evidence. After all, Moscow’s formidable nuclear power during the Cold War did not deter Washington from seeking to undermine the Soviet Union through economic subversion and political warfare. Nonetheless, the highly centralized domestic power structure that Xi has established has prevented any serious evaluation of his guiding assumptions, leading instead to the rapid and unquestioning execution of his vision of China as a more robust nuclear power. The government’s suppression of what it has labeled “baseless criticisms of the Party’s decisions” and the secrecy with which it veils its planning mechanisms and activities make it hard for the Chinese expert community to assess and debate nuclear development, much less weigh in on future policy. The official military doctrine contains increasingly incoherent elements, such as the nuclear forces’ emphasis on “war preparation” and “winning strategic victories” alongside a persistent opposition to warfighting, suggesting that nuclear policymaking is a top-down process driven more by a nebulous political mandate than by distinct military necessity and robust methodology. The lack of well-defined and thoroughly examined military objectives impairs China’s ability to publicly explain its policy—or to formulate clear positions on the circumstances under which it would be prepared to negotiate nuclear limitations with the United States. FOUL IS FAIR A key obstacle to nuclear dialogue is China’s growing skepticism that cooperative security measures could defend it from the existential threat that it perceives is coming from the United States. Xi, for instance, has stressed the importance of “keeping the strategic initiative to safeguard national security firmly in our own hands.” This distrust is driving Beijing further toward achieving a more advantageous balance of power and diminishes its interest in nuclear restraint, let alone arms control talks. Beijing’s pessimism partly stems from perceived U.S. double standards in the nuclear realm. Chinese experts point to the fact that the U.S. government does not accept that China has the right to adopt the same nuclear strategies as those used by the United States. Washington, for instance, maintains the option for the first use of nuclear weapons but raises concerns over China potentially deviating from its unconditional pledge to not use nuclear weapons first—a commitment that China says it will not break. U.S. decision-makers explain away these double standards by hinting that American security objectives are more legitimate than China’s. They consider the U.S. goal of upholding the territorial status quo in the Asia-Pacific, including in the Taiwan Strait and the East China and South China Seas, as aligned with international laws and norms, and they contrast their regional aims with Chinese efforts to change the territorial status quo through coercive means. Therefore, U.S. policymakers deem it both morally defensible and strategically necessary to preserve a broad range of nuclear options for the United States and its allies. China believes it can force Washington to overlook the fundamental differences between them. Beijing, however, attributes these double standards to what Chinese officials describe as the United States’ “hegemonic arrogance.” In particular, China sees the U.S. claim of the right to defend Taiwan, a territory Beijing has identified as “the core of its core interests,” as illegitimate, especially when Washington frames it in terms of its own security needs. American strategists often highlight Taiwan’s significance and argue that keeping Taiwan separate from China is critically important to U.S. national security interests, which include maintaining a favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific, defending U.S. allies in the region, preserving U.S. global credibility, and advancing geoeconomic competition with China. These announced goals give further credence to Beijing’s concern that U.S. geopolitical gains will come at the expense of China’s territorial integrity. And they erode the moral basis of the U.S. opposition against China’s military agenda and strengthen Beijing’s conviction that it must challenge what it views as American hegemony. China believes it can rectify this unjust imbalance by more ambitiously showcasing its power, including by expanding its nuclear arsenal. Chinese experts argue, for instance, that the Soviet Union succeeded in altering U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War. By significantly enhancing its nuclear capabilities during the 1960s and 1970s, Moscow managed to pressure Washington into abandoning its policy of massive retaliation, which threatened a large-scale nuclear strike in response to any act of Soviet aggression, in favor of the more restrained strategy of flexible response, which made the level and scale of U.S. nuclear responses commensurate with the severity of the Soviet aggression. They are also quick to point out that Washington did not correspondingly adjust its policies toward weaker adversaries, such as China, but instead maintained expansive strike plans against them. Now that China has significantly more resources than it did during the Cold War, Beijing seeks to redress what it perceives as an ongoing injustice. This resistance underscores a broader theme in the U.S.-Chinese rivalry: beyond divergences over specific security objectives, China increasingly demands fair rules and equal standards of conduct as an end in and of itself. Chinese officials have also emphasized the importance of fairness as an essential condition for engaging in discussions on security and arms control matters. This motive suggests that China is likely to continue focusing on unilateral capability development, rather than cooperative measures, to establish what it considers a more just and equitable nuclear relationship with the United States. THE UNDERLYING CHALLENGES These nontechnical factors introduce obstacles to nuclear dialogue that are complex and poorly understood by observers outside China. American analysts and others in the West continue to narrowly fixate on the military-technical factors that have shaped China’s nuclear strategy in the past to explain the country’s current nuclear expansion. To be sure, Chinese strategists have expressed concerns for decades that U.S. homeland missile defenses, conventional precision strike weapons, and other nonnuclear technologies would make it more difficult for China to retaliate if it endured a nuclear first strike. But the United States has not significantly expanded its nuclear forces, conventional missile stockpiles, or homeland missile defense systems in recent years, suggesting that additional factors lie behind Xi’s decision to embrace nuclear expansion. Most foreign analysts and policymakers fail to appreciate the extent to which China’s nuclear expansion is motivated by ambiguous political reasoning and muddled thinking and instead interpret it as being driven by an offensive military strategy. Drawing on worst-case nuclear warfighting scenarios, including a possible coordinated preemptive nuclear strike by China and Russia against the United States, many experts argue that the United States must build up its nuclear forces and defenses. These experts, aiming to strengthen U.S. deterrence for understandable reasons, overlook the possibility that their arguments might actually undermine U.S. security by giving further credence to the hawkish view in Beijing that Washington is intentionally overstating the threat posed by China to justify its pursuit of absolute nuclear superiority. The situation is made worse by the growing chasm between Chinese and American societies. The widening gap in worldviews and political perceptions between China and the West, facilitated in large part by China’s control of information and public opinion, is a major obstacle to achieving mutual understanding and trust. As a result, both sides have little faith that cooperative approaches will ensure future security. Beijing is hoping it can skirt the issue with the help of a larger nuclear stockpile. Aided by an expanded arsenal, China believes it can force Washington to overlook the fundamental differences between them, including escalating disputes over facts, norms, and values, and simply compel the United States to accept China as it is, respecting China’s core interests as defined by Beijing. If China stays this course, however, it will end up in an intensifying nuclear rivalry with the United States. BRIDGING THE PERCEPTION GAP The current U.S. approach to China’s nuclear program is ineffective. Proposals made by American analysts for de-escalating the arms race typically call for mutual restraint at the military-technical level through measures that enhance nuclear transparency or limit new strategic weapons. But these suggestions do not directly tackle the underlying concerns and grievances that drive China’s nuclear buildup, and unsurprisingly, they have failed to interest Xi. Ultimately, stabilizing the nascent U.S.-Chinese nuclear arms race requires that Beijing and Washington engage in direct discussions on the key security issues that fuel their mutual hostility. Such a dialogue aligns fully with both U.S. and Chinese objectives. The so-called rules-based international order championed by Washington relies on a mutual recognition of what constitutes legitimate interests and the acceptable means to pursue them. Meanwhile, in high-level government statements and recent documents, Chinese officials have repeatedly emphasized the importance of “taking into account the legitimate security interests of other countries” and ensuring “undiminished security for all countries.” The overlap in the two countries’ positions creates an opportunity for a thorough discussion to define legitimate security interests and the acceptable means to achieve them. It would also mirror the process leading up to the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which effectively reduced tensions between the Soviet and Western blocs during the Cold War. As an initial step, China and the United States could commit to not change the territorial status quo in the Asia-Pacific through military means. Such an agreement, or reciprocal unilateral declarations to the same end, would greatly bolster the credibility of China’s claims to be rising peacefully, help set fair and equitable rules of conduct, foster a shared vision for regional stability, and reduce all involved parties’ motivations for military buildup. Admittedly, given China’s ongoing reluctance to enter meaningful discussions on both nuclear and broader security issues, there is no guarantee that Beijing would immediately welcome a U.S. proposal for talks. Even if a dialogue were to begin—potentially prompted by international appeal and pressure—it would still require adept diplomacy to steer both parties through what would likely be challenging conversations. Nonetheless, a dialogue-based approach aimed at better understanding each other’s views on what constitutes legitimate security interests and approaches would address Beijing’s core concerns and offer the prospect of stabilizing the U.S.-Chinese security relationship. By prioritizing this discussion, Washington could demonstrate its goodwill—and help Beijing recognize that only cooperative measures will soften a U.S. policy of deterrence. You are reading a free article. Subscribe to Foreign Affairs to get unlimited access. Paywall-free reading of new articles and over a century of archives Unlock access to iOS/Android apps to save editions for offline reading Six issues a year in print and online, plus audio articles TONG ZHAO is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. MORE BY TONG ZHAO More: China Geopolitics Security Arms Control & Disarmament Defense & Military Nuclear Weapons & Proliferation War & Military Strategy U.S. Foreign Policy Xi Jinping U.S.-Chinese Relations Most-Read Articles Why Israel Should Declare a Unilateral Cease-Fire in Gaza A Chance to Turn the Tables on Hamas and Iran—and Advance Normalization With Saudi Arabia Dennis Ross and David Makovsky Putin’s Defector Obsession Moscow’s Ruthless Campaign Against Russians Who Fight for Ukraine Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan The Talks That Could Have Ended the War in Ukraine A Hidden History of Diplomacy That Came Up Short—but Holds Lessons for Future Negotiations Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko China’s Economic Collision Course As Growth Slows, Beijing’s Moves Are Drawing a Global Backlash Daniel H. Rosen and Logan Wright Recommended Articles Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden meeting in Woodside, California, November 2023 No Substitute for Victory America’s Competition With China Must Be Won, Not Managed Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher Tyler Comrie China’s Alternative Order And What America Should Learn From It Elizabeth EconomyThe Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion Beijing Seeks Geopolitical Leverage More Than Military Advantage By Tong Zhao May 3, 2024 Showcasing intercontinental ballistic missiles during a military parade in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, October 2019 Jason Lee / Reuters Sign in and save to read later Print this article Send by email Share on Twitter Share on Facebook Share on LinkedIn Get a link Page url https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/real-motives-chinas-nuclear-expansion Request Reprint Permissions China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing is on track to amass 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, up from around 200 in 2019, according to Pentagon estimates. This nuclear buildup, combined with China’s broader investments in modernizing its armed forces, has caused deep concern in Washington. In 2023, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States insisted that China’s nuclear expansion should prompt U.S. policymakers to “re-evaluate the size and composition of the U.S. nuclear force.” In March, Admiral John Aquilino, the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned, “we haven’t faced a threat like this since World War II.” 点击此链接阅读中文版 (Read in Chinese). As Washington grapples with the severity of the threat and the risk of nuclear confrontation, U.S. policymakers must make an effort to better understand the motivation behind China’s actions. Analysts have been puzzled by China’s sudden shift away from its traditional policy of maintaining a relatively small nuclear arsenal. Some in Washington believe China’s buildup is a reaction to U.S. technological advances; others are concerned that Beijing may have unilaterally adopted a far more aggressive nuclear strategy. A close assessment of the evolving thinking within China’s political leadership and security policy circles reveals that Chinese officials are not simply expanding their nuclear arsenal for military-technical purposes. Rather, Chinese leaders seem to have embraced the untested belief that nuclear weaponry grants them greater geopolitical leverage to counter perceived threats. Beijing’s objections to what it sees as an unfair U.S. nuclear strategy and illegitimate U.S. security interests further solidify its willingness to use unilateral measures to address its security concerns. Washington must understand how these underlying perceptions shape Beijing’s nuclear policy if it wants to steer the U.S.-Chinese relationship in a more prudent direction—or risk responding on the basis of flawed assumptions, with potentially counterproductive or even catastrophic results. PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH? In Beijing’s view, growing tensions with Washington are the result of the shifting balance of power between China and the United States—a consequence of China’s rapid economic development rather than any change in behavior on its part. Washington feels threatened by China’s rise and has become increasingly hostile to Beijing, the thinking goes, and has developed containment strategies aimed at preserving U.S. geopolitical dominance. Given these circumstances, Beijing must persuade Washington to accept China’s ascendance as a major player and convince U.S. policymakers that they will be unable to contain, disrupt, or destabilize China. Beijing can do so only, according to China’s ruling elites, by bolstering its power. This reasoning has led China to perceive a mounting threat from the United States as the gap in power between the two countries has narrowed. A staunch advocate of the notion that the United States is hostile to China’s rise, Xi assigns great geopolitical significance to nuclear weapons as a means of showcasing Chinese power. His predecessors, influenced by China’s traditionally modest nuclear philosophy and with more limited resources at their disposal, exercised significant restraint in developing China’s nuclear capabilities and prioritized qualitative improvements over quantitative expansion. Xi, on the other hand, has elevated the missile force to the status of a full military service, issued specific instructions to expedite nuclear modernization, and boosted both the sophistication and the size of China’s nuclear arsenal. Xi’s commitment to nuclear weapons reflects a profound difference in how he perceives such arms as compared with his American counterparts. Rather than aiming to achieve clearly defined military objectives, such as deterring an enemy from undertaking specific military activities, Beijing sees nuclear weapons as symbols of military strength and believes that they wield a particular influence on an adversary’s perception of the power balance. This notion underpins what Chinese officials refer to as the “strategic counterbalance” mission of their nuclear forces—a bid to force the United States to take a more accommodating stance toward China. Xi assigns great geopolitical significance to nuclear weapons as a means of showcasing Chinese power. Xi has long believed in the merits of strategic counterbalancing through nuclear weapons. Shortly after coming to power in 2012, he commented that Russia had made the right decision to prioritize the development of its nuclear capabilities even as the country’s economy was in decline. Moscow’s move was in line with Xi’s view that the strength of a country’s nuclear arsenal shapes an adversary’s overall approach toward the bilateral relationship. In early 2021, amid internal warnings that a U.S.-led global anti-Chinese campaign following the COVID-19 outbreak could pose the greatest perceived challenge to Beijing’s state and regime security in decades, Xi called on the military to further speed up China’s nuclear expansion. This emphasis on nuclear weapons as a form of general leverage has taken hold among Chinese strategists, especially given rising tensions with the United States. As Beijing demands better treatment by Washington and rejects any dialogue that would take place from a position of U.S. superiority, Chinese public opinion leaders have contended that a larger nuclear arsenal would force Washington to genuinely respect Beijing and tread more cautiously. The notion that nuclear weapons possess extensive—almost magical—coercive power in and beyond the military realm is probably more a product of intuition than of rigorously examined logic and evidence. After all, Moscow’s formidable nuclear power during the Cold War did not deter Washington from seeking to undermine the Soviet Union through economic subversion and political warfare. Nonetheless, the highly centralized domestic power structure that Xi has established has prevented any serious evaluation of his guiding assumptions, leading instead to the rapid and unquestioning execution of his vision of China as a more robust nuclear power. The government’s suppression of what it has labeled “baseless criticisms of the Party’s decisions” and the secrecy with which it veils its planning mechanisms and activities make it hard for the Chinese expert community to assess and debate nuclear development, much less weigh in on future policy. The official military doctrine contains increasingly incoherent elements, such as the nuclear forces’ emphasis on “war preparation” and “winning strategic victories” alongside a persistent opposition to warfighting, suggesting that nuclear policymaking is a top-down process driven more by a nebulous political mandate than by distinct military necessity and robust methodology. The lack of well-defined and thoroughly examined military objectives impairs China’s ability to publicly explain its policy—or to formulate clear positions on the circumstances under which it would be prepared to negotiate nuclear limitations with the United States. FOUL IS FAIR A key obstacle to nuclear dialogue is China’s growing skepticism that cooperative security measures could defend it from the existential threat that it perceives is coming from the United States. Xi, for instance, has stressed the importance of “keeping the strategic initiative to safeguard national security firmly in our own hands.” This distrust is driving Beijing further toward achieving a more advantageous balance of power and diminishes its interest in nuclear restraint, let alone arms control talks. Beijing’s pessimism partly stems from perceived U.S. double standards in the nuclear realm. Chinese experts point to the fact that the U.S. government does not accept that China has the right to adopt the same nuclear strategies as those used by the United States. Washington, for instance, maintains the option for the first use of nuclear weapons but raises concerns over China potentially deviating from its unconditional pledge to not use nuclear weapons first—a commitment that China says it will not break. U.S. decision-makers explain away these double standards by hinting that American security objectives are more legitimate than China’s. They consider the U.S. goal of upholding the territorial status quo in the Asia-Pacific, including in the Taiwan Strait and the East China and South China Seas, as aligned with international laws and norms, and they contrast their regional aims with Chinese efforts to change the territorial status quo through coercive means. Therefore, U.S. policymakers deem it both morally defensible and strategically necessary to preserve a broad range of nuclear options for the United States and its allies. China believes it can force Washington to overlook the fundamental differences between them. Beijing, however, attributes these double standards to what Chinese officials describe as the United States’ “hegemonic arrogance.” In particular, China sees the U.S. claim of the right to defend Taiwan, a territory Beijing has identified as “the core of its core interests,” as illegitimate, especially when Washington frames it in terms of its own security needs. American strategists often highlight Taiwan’s significance and argue that keeping Taiwan separate from China is critically important to U.S. national security interests, which include maintaining a favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific, defending U.S. allies in the region, preserving U.S. global credibility, and advancing geoeconomic competition with China. These announced goals give further credence to Beijing’s concern that U.S. geopolitical gains will come at the expense of China’s territorial integrity. And they erode the moral basis of the U.S. opposition against China’s military agenda and strengthen Beijing’s conviction that it must challenge what it views as American hegemony. China believes it can rectify this unjust imbalance by more ambitiously showcasing its power, including by expanding its nuclear arsenal. Chinese experts argue, for instance, that the Soviet Union succeeded in altering U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War. By significantly enhancing its nuclear capabilities during the 1960s and 1970s, Moscow managed to pressure Washington into abandoning its policy of massive retaliation, which threatened a large-scale nuclear strike in response to any act of Soviet aggression, in favor of the more restrained strategy of flexible response, which made the level and scale of U.S. nuclear responses commensurate with the severity of the Soviet aggression. They are also quick to point out that Washington did not correspondingly adjust its policies toward weaker adversaries, such as China, but instead maintained expansive strike plans against them. Now that China has significantly more resources than it did during the Cold War, Beijing seeks to redress what it perceives as an ongoing injustice. This resistance underscores a broader theme in the U.S.-Chinese rivalry: beyond divergences over specific security objectives, China increasingly demands fair rules and equal standards of conduct as an end in and of itself. Chinese officials have also emphasized the importance of fairness as an essential condition for engaging in discussions on security and arms control matters. This motive suggests that China is likely to continue focusing on unilateral capability development, rather than cooperative measures, to establish what it considers a more just and equitable nuclear relationship with the United States. THE UNDERLYING CHALLENGES These nontechnical factors introduce obstacles to nuclear dialogue that are complex and poorly understood by observers outside China. American analysts and others in the West continue to narrowly fixate on the military-technical factors that have shaped China’s nuclear strategy in the past to explain the country’s current nuclear expansion. To be sure, Chinese strategists have expressed concerns for decades that U.S. homeland missile defenses, conventional precision strike weapons, and other nonnuclear technologies would make it more difficult for China to retaliate if it endured a nuclear first strike. But the United States has not significantly expanded its nuclear forces, conventional missile stockpiles, or homeland missile defense systems in recent years, suggesting that additional factors lie behind Xi’s decision to embrace nuclear expansion. Most foreign analysts and policymakers fail to appreciate the extent to which China’s nuclear expansion is motivated by ambiguous political reasoning and muddled thinking and instead interpret it as being driven by an offensive military strategy. Drawing on worst-case nuclear warfighting scenarios, including a possible coordinated preemptive nuclear strike by China and Russia against the United States, many experts argue that the United States must build up its nuclear forces and defenses. These experts, aiming to strengthen U.S. deterrence for understandable reasons, overlook the possibility that their arguments might actually undermine U.S. security by giving further credence to the hawkish view in Beijing that Washington is intentionally overstating the threat posed by China to justify its pursuit of absolute nuclear superiority. The situation is made worse by the growing chasm between Chinese and American societies. The widening gap in worldviews and political perceptions between China and the West, facilitated in large part by China’s control of information and public opinion, is a major obstacle to achieving mutual understanding and trust. As a result, both sides have little faith that cooperative approaches will ensure future security. Beijing is hoping it can skirt the issue with the help of a larger nuclear stockpile. Aided by an expanded arsenal, China believes it can force Washington to overlook the fundamental differences between them, including escalating disputes over facts, norms, and values, and simply compel the United States to accept China as it is, respecting China’s core interests as defined by Beijing. If China stays this course, however, it will end up in an intensifying nuclear rivalry with the United States. BRIDGING THE PERCEPTION GAP The current U.S. approach to China’s nuclear program is ineffective. Proposals made by American analysts for de-escalating the arms race typically call for mutual restraint at the military-technical level through measures that enhance nuclear transparency or limit new strategic weapons. But these suggestions do not directly tackle the underlying concerns and grievances that drive China’s nuclear buildup, and unsurprisingly, they have failed to interest Xi. Ultimately, stabilizing the nascent U.S.-Chinese nuclear arms race requires that Beijing and Washington engage in direct discussions on the key security issues that fuel their mutual hostility. Such a dialogue aligns fully with both U.S. and Chinese objectives. The so-called rules-based international order championed by Washington relies on a mutual recognition of what constitutes legitimate interests and the acceptable means to pursue them. Meanwhile, in high-level government statements and recent documents, Chinese officials have repeatedly emphasized the importance of “taking into account the legitimate security interests of other countries” and ensuring “undiminished security for all countries.” The overlap in the two countries’ positions creates an opportunity for a thorough discussion to define legitimate security interests and the acceptable means to achieve them. It would also mirror the process leading up to the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which effectively reduced tensions between the Soviet and Western blocs during the Cold War. As an initial step, China and the United States could commit to not change the territorial status quo in the Asia-Pacific through military means. Such an agreement, or reciprocal unilateral declarations to the same end, would greatly bolster the credibility of China’s claims to be rising peacefully, help set fair and equitable rules of conduct, foster a shared vision for regional stability, and reduce all involved parties’ motivations for military buildup. Admittedly, given China’s ongoing reluctance to enter meaningful discussions on both nuclear and broader security issues, there is no guarantee that Beijing would immediately welcome a U.S. proposal for talks. Even if a dialogue were to begin—potentially prompted by international appeal and pressure—it would still require adept diplomacy to steer both parties through what would likely be challenging conversations. Nonetheless, a dialogue-based approach aimed at better understanding each other’s views on what constitutes legitimate security interests and approaches would address Beijing’s core concerns and offer the prospect of stabilizing the U.S.-Chinese security relationship. By prioritizing this discussion, Washington could demonstrate its goodwill—and help Beijing recognize that only cooperative measures will soften a U.S. policy of deterrence. TONG ZHAO is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. MORE BY TONG ZHAO More: China Geopolitics Security Arms Control & Disarmament Defense & Military Nuclear Weapons & Proliferation War & Military Strategy U.S. Foreign Policy Xi Jinping U.S.-Chinese Relations Most-Read Articles Why Israel Should Declare a Unilateral Cease-Fire in Gaza A Chance to Turn the Tables on Hamas and Iran—and Advance Normalization With Saudi Arabia Dennis Ross and David Makovsky Putin’s Defector Obsession Moscow’s Ruthless Campaign Against Russians Who Fight for Ukraine Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan The Talks That Could Have Ended the War in Ukraine A Hidden History of Diplomacy That Came Up Short—but Holds Lessons for Future Negotiations Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko China’s Economic Collision Course As Growth Slows, Beijing’s Moves Are Drawing a Global Backlash Daniel H. Rosen and Logan Wright Recommended Articles Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden meeting in Woodside, California, November 2023 No Substitute for Victory America’s Competition With China Must Be Won, Not Managed Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher Tyler Comrie China’s Alternative Order And What America Should Learn From It Elizabeth Economy American Aid Alone Won’t Save Ukraine To Survive, Kyiv Must Build New Brigades—and Force Moscow to Negotiate By Jack Watling May 2, 2024 A military recruitment poster in Kyiv, March 2024 After months of delay, Congress’s passage of a nearly $61 billion U.S. aid bill to Ukraine has provided a vital lifeline to Kyiv. But the aid package alone will not solve Ukraine’s larger problems in its war with Russia. Ukrainian forces are defending frontlines that span some 600 miles of the south and east of the country, and prolonged inaction in Washington has left them severely stretched. The influx of U.S. weapons and ammunition should significantly raise the cost to Russia of its impending summer offensive. The aid also offers Ukrainian forces enough materiel to support more systematic military planning for the summer and fall. Yet ending the war on terms favorable to Ukraine will require far more than a new pipeline of equipment. More than two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its objective in the war remains unchanged: the Kremlin seeks to subjugate Kyiv. Inconstant support and political delays among Ukraine’s international partners have left that outcome all too plausible. If Ukraine is to prevent Russian victory in the longer term, it will need a comprehensive strategy. This means training, equipping, and mobilizing new forces. It means convincing the Kremlin that continuing the war will become increasingly risky to Russia over time. And it means establishing a position of sufficient strength to be able to set forth, on Ukraine’s own terms, the parameters of a lasting peace. None of these tasks will be straightforward, and none can happen overnight. Nor can Ukraine and its international partners afford to fritter away months formulating a way forward. The United States and its NATO allies will need to make explicit long-term commitments; compelling Russia to negotiate will be especially difficult. But the alternatives are far worse. In the absence of such an overall strategy, the duration of the conflict may be extended, but its trajectory will not. GRIMACING AT GLIDE BOMBS Since the fall of 2023, Ukraine’s battlefield situation has steadily worsened. Largely because of ammunition shortages, Ukrainian forces have had to cede territory to Russian forces, often after sustaining significant casualties. Russia has amassed approximately 470,000 troops in Ukraine and seems intent on using them to try to complete the conquest of Donbas over the remainder of 2024. Russian forces have been focusing their attacks on key eastern towns that, once taken, will allow them to threaten Ukraine’s main logistics hubs in and around Donetsk. Talk of a new Russian offensive may conjure up images of tank units assaulting Ukrainian lines, breaking through, and then trying to exploit those gains deep into Ukrainian-held territory in order to cut off Ukrainian units. But Russia’s forces are not currently able to carry out these kinds of operations, nor do they intend to. After more than two years of war, Russia’s army has suffered heavy losses among its officer core, and its ability to plan and synchronize large-scale attacks is limited. Russian attacks mainly consist of successive assaults at platoon and company scale, resulting in slow advances with heavy losses. Ukrainian soldiers manning an artillery position near Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, April 2024 Ukrainian soldiers manning an artillery position near Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, April 2024 Thomas Peter / Reuters Still, Russia currently enjoys a more than ten-to-one advantage over Ukraine in available artillery. With the passage of the new U.S. aid package, that advantage will likely shrink to three to one in some regions, which will increase the rate of Russian casualties. But Russia has several ways of pulling Ukrainian forces into fights that are also costly to Ukraine. For example, Russian forces have been using converted glide bombs to devastating effect. These are Soviet-designed FAB-500s—large half-ton bombs—that have been outfitted with wings and guidance kits and that are lobbed by Russian aircraft from behind the Russian lines. With an approximately 40-mile range, they can easily strike Ukrainian towns, collapsing buildings and driving out local populations. As a result, Ukrainian forces have often been forced to expend significant resources defending costly single positions, simply to shield civilian settlements from coming into Russian glide-bomb range. Take Chasiv Yar, a small town on a key ridge line in the eastern Donetsk region. If it falls, Russian forces will gain a commanding position from which to bombard towns in Donbas and key Ukrainian supply routes. Thus, Ukrainian forces are desperately trying to hold on to it, even as the tactical situation becomes less favorable. The challenge has been amplified by Ukraine’s overstretched air defenses, a situation that now permits Russian planes to come close to the frontlines, increasing the accuracy of their bombing. Unfortunately, the more Ukraine needs its surface-to-air missile systems to protect its cities, the greater it puts at risk its ground forces at the front. Ukraine will lose ground to Russia this summer. The question is how much. The solution to this challenge would usually be what military strategists call an “active defense,” using small-scale counterattacks to disrupt the attacker’s efforts to consolidate its advances. If, say, Russian forces seized a key position in Chasiv Yar, the Ukrainians could use counterattacks to isolate the position so that the Russians were unable to dig in and keep moving forward. But Ukraine has few reserves and has lost many of the tactical vehicles needed to exploit Russian vulnerabilities soon after they take positions. Lacking the reserves to counterattack, Ukraine must settle for maximizing Russia’s losses for each position it takes, thereby slowing down its rate of advance. Under these conditions, even the passage of the U.S. aid bill can do only so much to change the battlefield calculus. The long delay in Washington means that it will take time to repair much of the damage to Ukrainian capabilities. Ukraine will lose ground to Russia this summer. The question is how much, and how high a price Ukrainian forces can make the Russians pay for their gains. FRESH BLOOD, NOT MORE BLOOD Other than the immediate provision of ammunition, the greatest effect of the new U.S. aid package is the certainty it offers. After months in which the timing and amount of U.S. support was in doubt, Ukraine will now have enough clarity about military resources for the next six months to allow for broader strategic planning. Paramount is the need to generate new forces. To do so, Ukraine will need to mobilize more people, improve its training pipeline to maintain a qualitative advantage over Russian units, and adequately equip those new troops. Until now this has been impossible. Lacking equipment and weapons, and unable to predict if and when more might arrive, Ukraine’s military leadership was forced to prioritize all materiel for troops already at the front. The size of the U.S. aid package—and the further support of European partners—means that Ukraine’s military leadership can now implement a deliberate plan to train and equip more troops. Contrary to widespread assumptions, Ukraine does not lack people to mobilize. (According to one recent analysis, there could be several million additional Ukrainians who are able to serve.) What it has lacked is an effective recruitment and training system to bring available people into the force and equipment to provision them. These problems can and must be resolved. Ukrainian commanders must form new brigades rather than simply bringing their existing formations back up to strength. The army currently lacks enough brigades to rotate them as a whole off the frontline. Instead, individual brigades have been rotating exhausted battalions just off the line of contact for brief respites—a strategy that provides rest but does not allow for collective training of the brigade, since brigade staff and enabling equipment remain at the front. Thus, it is crucial for Ukraine to build and train additional brigades now, so that it can mount an active defense in the fall. Over time, these new units will greatly enhance its ability to counterattack. A member of a Ukrainian artillery brigade in Donetsk region, Ukraine, April 2024 A member of a Ukrainian artillery brigade in Donetsk region, Ukraine, April 2024 Serhii Nuzhnenko / Radio Free Europe / Reuters The military must therefore pursue mobilization in three stages. First, it must immediately raise battlefield replacements for the existing force. But then it must regenerate reserves to allow existing units to rotate and, after that, build new units able to conduct offensive action. The first is the easiest to solve. Equipment is the limiting factor for the second. For the third, the most limiting factor is officer training. This can be addressed, but it must be done imminently if Ukraine is to generate the needed forces by fall. Russia will likely be most dangerous in the final months of 2024. By that point, having weathered months of Russian offensive operations, Ukrainian forces will be stretched thin, their air defenses depleted. Russia will likely have enough troops to rotate its units to allow for successive offensives in the fall. But Russian capabilities are not unlimited. Moscow has made some industrial and military choices that are likely to restrict its offensive potential over the course of 2025. For one, it has decided not to expand production of artillery barrels, with the result that fewer new guns will be available next year. Based on the current loss rate, Russian stockpiles of armored vehicles will also likely be depleted by the second half of 2025. This means that Russian forces will be entirely dependent on newly produced equipment rather than refurbished equipment from existing stock, severely constraining their ability to replenish weapons systems lost in battle. At the same time, beginning in late 2024, European armaments production will begin to climb steadily as investments made last year and in the first months of this year begin to bear fruit. By 2025, then, supply problems should be less acute for Ukraine and more acute for Russia—if Ukraine can hold on until then. With this longer-term perspective in view, the challenge facing Ukraine and its allies becomes clear. The top priorities must be to ensure not only that Russia’s summer offensive culminates at a high cost to Moscow but also that newly raised Ukrainian troops are in place to blunt further offensives in the autumn—and, ideally, to establish a stable frontline by early 2025. It is only from such a position that Ukraine can regain the initiative. Achieving that objective will depend to a significant degree on how rapidly Ukraine can mobilize and equip its forces. The one commodity it desperately lacks is time. BRINGING MOSCOW TO THE TABLE Even if Ukraine is able to blunt Russian gains by rapidly training, equipping, and deploying new forces, these steps will not in themselves produce a pathway to ending the conflict. Ultimately, this is because Kyiv’s international partners have built their case for support on the simpler objective of preserving Ukraine in the fight rather than on compelling Russia to negotiate on favorable terms. The United States and its European allies need to recognize that helping Ukraine negate Russian attacks is not the same as putting Ukraine in a strong negotiating position. The Kremlin is keen for negotiations based on the war’s current dynamics: it believes that once talks are underway, Ukraine’s Western backers will agree to nearly anything, seeing any settlement that can be reached as successful, even if it fails to protect Ukraine in the long term. And Russia’s demand would remain what it has been throughout: a surrender in all but name. For Moscow to truly negotiate, it must be confronted with a situation in which extending the conflict further will present an unacceptable threat to itself. It is only then that Ukraine will be able to extract meaningful concessions. Sanctions are only one of the tools for damaging Russia’s financial liquidity. Russia already faces several pressure points. First, Russia’s battlefield losses of critical systems—such as air defenses—matter, because they form the bulwark of Russia’s conventional deterrence of NATO. Equipping Ukraine to be able to damage or destroy prestige Russian assets is strongly in NATO’s interest. Second, Russia will be unable to fund the war indefinitely. Western sanctions are only one of the tools for damaging the regime’s financial liquidity, and they are less effective than other options. Damage to Russia’s oil infrastructure is likely to have a much greater impact. Although there are good reasons for the West to avoid directly aiding such attacks, that does not mean that Ukraine shouldn’t undertake them. Third, although the Russian public largely supports the war, there are deep frustrations with the Russian government that can be exploited. So far, Western governments have not aggressively pursued information operations against the Russian government, partly because they are perceived as escalatory and partly because they are not expected to have immediate effect. By contrast, Russia has been conducting active information operations across Europe with the intent of destabilizing the West. This asymmetry needs to be remedied. Western concerns that information warfare could provoke escalation are unconvincing: the Kremlin is as determined as the White House to avoid a direct confrontation over Ukraine. Moreover, the Kremlin has long assumed that the West has pursued extensive information operations against it since 2011, even though this is not the case. Any potential escalation risk of such operations is therefore already baked in. Moreover, most of the Kremlin’s routes to escalation do not actually involve countering such activities. Given this situation, there is much more that the West can do. Over the longer term, more and better information operations could heighten Moscow’s awareness of the domestic risks that its costly war has stirred up. THE FIREPOWER FIX Given the extent to which it is currently outgunned, Ukraine doesn’t yet have the ability to set forth favorable negotiating terms to end the war. A cease-fire would likely see Russia reconstitute its military power, while Ukraine would not be able to maintain its own forces at their current size. Moreover, Kyiv would likely receive waning support for reconstruction if renewed Russian hostilities were anticipated in the near future. Rebuilding Ukraine will depend critically on investment from the private sector, and the threat of a new conflict will make any such financing risky. To ensure that Ukraine can negotiate in the confidence that it can secure a lasting peace, Kyiv’s international partners will have to offer security guarantees that it trusts. Because Ukraine cannot propose those guarantees, it will be up to its international partners to make the first move. Ultimately, any successful end to the war will depend on NATO’s ability to convincingly deter Russia. That posture requires the alliance not only to field sufficient forces to counter a threat from Russia but also to establish sufficient production capacity among its members to sustain a steady flow of munitions in the event of another war. Establishing this supply will be necessary regardless of how the war ends. In the short term, expanded production of munitions will be essential to Ukraine’s ability to degrade the Russian military. If Ukraine manages to protract the conflict and the war is terminated in its favor, its partners will need munitions to bolster the credibility of their security guarantees. If, on the other hand, Russia achieves its objectives, then these munitions will be needed to underwrite the future security of NATO. The U.S. military aid package was passed just in time to stave off a Ukrainian collapse. But to truly shift the direction of the war, it will need to be accompanied by a far more comprehensive strategy to successfully end it. And that must come from Washington, its NATO allies, and Kyiv itself. JACK WATLING is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank. MORE BY JACK WATLING More: Ukraine Russian Federation Diplomacy Geopolitics Economics Foreign Aid Security Defense & Military Strategy & Conflict War & Military Strategy U.S. Foreign Policy War in Ukraine Most-Read Articles American Aid Alone Won’t Save Ukraine To Survive, Kyiv Must Build New Brigades—and Force Moscow to Negotiate Jack Watling The Myth of the Asian Swing State Great-Power Competition No Longer Dominates the Region’s Politics Paul Staniland China’s Alternative Order And What America Should Learn From It Elizabeth Economy Why Israel Should Declare a Unilateral Cease-Fire in Gaza A Chance to Turn the Tables on Hamas and Iran—and Advance Normalization With Saudi Arabia Dennis Ross and David Makovsky Recommended Articles Emergency workers at a destroyed building after a Russian strike, Chernihiv, Ukraine, April 2024 Brave New Ukraine How the World’s Most Besieged Democracy Is Adjusting to Permanent War Nataliya Gumenyuk Russian and Ukrainian negotiators meeting via videoconference in March 2022 The Talks That Could Have Ended the War in Ukraine A Hidden History of Diplomacy That Came Up Short—but Holds Lessons for Future Negotiations Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko Don’t Hype the Disinformation Threat Downplaying the Risk Helps Foreign Propagandists—but So Does Exaggerating It By Olga Belogolova, Lee Foster, Thomas Rid, and Gavin Wilde May 3, 2024 Russian President Vladimir Putin giving an interview to right-wing broadcaster Tucker Carlson, Moscow, February 2024 “Russian propaganda has made its way into the United States, unfortunately, and it’s infected a good chunk of my party’s base,” Representative Michael McCaul, the Texas Republican who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told the news platform Puck in March. Nancy Pelosi, the California Democrat and former House Speaker, made a related claim earlier this year when commenting on protesters who were demanding a cease-fire in Israel’s war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. “For them to call for a cease-fire is Mr. Putin’s message,” Pelosi told CNN, invoking the Russian president. She added: “Make no mistake, this is directly connected to what he would like to see. Same thing with Ukraine. It’s about Putin’s message. I think some of these protesters are spontaneous and organic and sincere. Some, I think, are connected to Russia.” Such statements, from across the political spectrum, have several troubling things in common. They blame foreign interference for problems whose origins are clearly domestic. They imply that foreign disinformation is effective at influencing a significant proportion of U.S. citizens; it is not. And they are often presented without evidence. To be clear, foreign influence operations can impose some costs on open societies that encourage the unfettered exchange of ideas. But the self-serving and misleading way that some public officials and researchers talk about propaganda does not serve American democracy, especially during a contentious election season. In fact, when officials exaggerate the efficacy and impact of foreign influence operations, the ones who benefit the most are the very regimes that produce it. To avoid inadvertently assisting adversaries, American officials and investigators must steer clear of two pitfalls. Downplaying the threat of foreign disinformation campaigns risks making it easier for bad actors to take advantage of an unprepared public. But the reverse is also true: overstating the power of propaganda risks amplifying not only the original falsehood, but also an even more corrosive and polarizing narrative—that American politicians are somehow remote-controlled, and that U.S. citizens don’t have agency. WHO’S PARROTING WHOM? Often, Russian disinformation echoes talking points by the American far right, rather than the other way around. Last fall, Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Republican from Georgia, wrote on X, “Anyone who votes to fund Ukraine is funding the most corrupt money scheme of any foreign war in our country’s history.” She included a link to a debunked article published by the Strategic Culture Foundation, a Russian intelligence front already sanctioned by the Treasury Department for its role in interfering with U.S. elections in 2020. The article falsely claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s advisers had bought two yachts for $75 million. Two weeks after Green’s tweet, Senator J. D. Vance, a Republican from Ohio, repeated the false claim on a podcast hosted by Steve Bannon, a right-wing provocateur who served as a high-level adviser to President Donald Trump. “There are people who would cut Social Security, throw our grandparents into poverty,” Vance fulminated. “Why? So that one of Zelensky’s ministers can buy a bigger yacht?” At first glance, it would appear that Vance and Greene were indeed parroting Russian propaganda disseminated by an organization linked to the Kremlin that had been sanctioned by the U.S. government. In fact, the yacht rumor had been quietly circulating on the conspiratorial fringes of the American right for some time. Vance himself had made the claim as early as July 2023. Speaking at the Turning Point Action Conference, a far-right gathering in West Palm Beach, Florida, Vance told a packed auditorium that he did not wish to “immiserate our grandmothers and grandfathers to send another yacht to Volodymyr Zelensky.” Five months later, the Russians picked up the right-wing talking point, dressed it up as a reported fact, and amplified it. This dynamic, whereby American conspiracy theorists and foreign intelligence operatives feed off one another in a vicious circle, is not new. During the Cold War, the KGB carried out active measures against Moscow’s rivals, exploiting existing social fissures by, say, picking up and amplifying rumors in a target country. Then as now, foreign operatives rarely invent political divisions or conspiracy theories: they magnify existing ones. Often, Russian disinformation echoes talking points by the American far right, rather than the other way around. In the 1980s, the Soviet and the East German security services conducted a propaganda campaign code-named Operation Denver, promulgating the baseless claim that the U.S. Army created HIV in a biological warfare lab at Fort Detrick, Maryland. This pernicious and polarizing myth had a far reach. In 2005, long after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the American pop stars Kanye West and Adam Levine released a hit single that included the lyric “I know the government administered AIDS.” But it would be a mistake to attribute that rumor, or the extent of its reach, to outside influence peddlers. Historians have demonstrated that communist intelligence agencies did not invent the myth. Rather, the performers latched on to a conspiracy theory that had emerged on its own in the United States, after far-left activists had concocted the story and initially spread it. The fire had already been lit; the communists merely added fuel. In a counterintuitive twist, for U.S. adversaries, a propaganda campaign may receive its biggest boost after it has been uncovered. The U.S. government exposed and sanctioned the Strategic Culture Foundation as a front for Russian intelligence well before Greene cited it as a source on social media. Yet Russia’s foreign intelligence agency did not shut down the exposed front; it doubled down by pushing out more fake news stories. Russian intelligence officers are likely designing their campaigns so that such falsehoods will gain even more traction once the subterfuge is revealed. Once exposed as propaganda, a phony story about Zelensky’s advisers’ purchasing luxury yachts serves to amplify the idea that politicians, political commentators, and some significant portion of the voting public are unwitting stooges of foreign influence or even in cahoots with the enemy. More than foreign interference itself, it is this corrosive mistrust that poses the gravest threat to American democracy. TONE DOWN THE HYPE As the U.S. presidential election approaches, an unhealthy fixation on foreign disinformation has researchers and organizations rushing to publicize bold claims about the reach of foreign influence. There are powerful incentives to overhype the extent and power of foreign disinformation campaigns. For some investigative outfits and firms, a big exposé can bring press coverage, bigger budgets, investment dollars, grants, and reputational gains, even if the exposed activity does not warrant so much attention. Overhyped reports can make Russia’s active measures that much more successful. Before exposing a foreign influence operation, public officials and analysts at research organizations and security companies must ask themselves a few hard questions. Are their claims directly backed up by hard evidence—evidence that they are able and willing to share with the broader research community? Will exposure breathe new life into a concocted story? And will it undermine the public’s trust in public institutions and the media, thus serving the interests of adversaries? Journalists, too, should not draw dubious lines from cause to effect, repeat shaky claims about who is responsible, assert without appropriate evidence that an attempted disinformation operation was successful, quote sources without scrutinizing their assertions, or speculate about why a suspected adversary may have engaged in deceptive practices. News outlets covering the investigative reportage of other organizations and statements by public officials must take greater care not to repeat misleading claims. The very incident that prompted McCaul’s remarks about his own party being “infected” by Russian propaganda illustrates this dynamic. NBC News reported on McCaul’s comments, subtitling its article, “How Republican lawmakers echo Russian propaganda”; the story claimed that Republicans were “parroting” covert foreign disinformation. Outlets ranging from The Wall Street Journal to the BBC have made similar claims. A closer look at the facts in these cases, however, reveals the opposite: that Russian disinformation was parroting the American far right. Disrupting propaganda efforts by malign foreign actors is important work, but it must be done thoroughly, accurately, and proportionally. Exaggerating the effects of foreign influence campaigns serves only the foreign operatives. It fosters a conspiratorial outlook, in which shadowy enemies are supposedly creating wedge issues, dissenters are merely parroting foreign spies, and trust in open democratic debate is eroded. Most important, false claims of clandestine foreign interference absolve U.S. leaders of responsibility for the health of our political discourse. OLGA BELOGOLOVA is Director of the Emerging Technologies Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and a Lecturer at its Alperovitch Institute for Cybersecurity Studies. She has overseen policy for countering influence operations at Meta and Facebook. LEE FOSTER is an Adjunct Faculty Member at the Alperovitch Institute and former Director of Influence Operations Analysis at the cybersecurity company Mandiant. THOMAS RID is Professor of Strategic Studies and Founding Director of the Alperovitch Institute and the author of Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare. GAVIN WILDE is an Adjunct Faculty Member at the Alperovitch Institute, a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a former Director for Russia, Baltic, and Caucasus Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council. 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通常，俄羅斯的假訊息與美國極右翼的言論相呼應，而不是相反。去年秋天，來自喬治亞州的共和黨眾議員馬喬裡·泰勒·格林(Marjorie Taylor Greene) 在X 上寫道：「任何投票資助烏克蘭的人都是在資助我們國家歷史上所有外國戰爭中最腐敗的金錢計劃。她添加了戰略文化基金會發表的一篇被揭穿的文章的鏈接，該基金會是俄羅斯情報陣線，因其在幹擾2020 年美國大選中發揮的作用而受到美國財政部的製裁。聲稱烏克蘭總統弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基的顧問購買了兩艘遊艇7500萬美元。在格林發表推文兩週後，俄亥俄州共和黨參議員JD 萬斯在史蒂夫班農(Steve Bannon) 主持的播客中重複了這一錯誤說法。 ，曾擔任唐納德·特朗普總統的高級顧問。 「有人會削減社會安全保障，讓我們的祖父母陷入貧困，」萬斯怒斥。 「為什麼？這樣澤連斯基的一位部長就可以買一艘更大的遊艇了？ 乍一看，萬斯和格林確實是在鸚鵡學舌地模仿俄羅斯的宣傳，這些宣傳是由一個與克里姆林宮有聯繫的組織傳播的，該組織已受到美國政府的製裁。事實上，遊艇謠言已經在美國右翼陰謀論的邊緣悄悄流傳了一段時間。萬斯本人早在 2023 年 7 月 就提出了這一主張。輩遭受苦難”。再派一艘遊艇給弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基。”五個月後，俄羅斯人抓住了右翼的談話要點，將其打扮成報道的事實，並加以放大。 美國陰謀論者和外國情報人員相互影響形成惡性循環的這種動態並不新鮮。冷戰期間，克格勃對莫斯科的競爭對手採取了積極的措施，利用現有的社會裂痕，例如在目標國家拾取和放大謠言。過去和現在一樣，外國特工很少發明政治分歧或陰謀論：他們放大現有的分歧或陰謀論。 通常，俄羅斯的假訊息與美國極右翼的言論相呼應，而不是相反。 1980年代，蘇聯和東德安全部門開展了代號為「丹佛行動」的宣傳活動，宣揚美國陸軍在馬裡蘭州德特里克堡的生物戰實驗室製造愛滋病病毒的毫無根據的說法。這種惡毒且兩極化的神話影響深遠。 2005 年，在蘇聯解體很久之後，美國流行歌手坎耶·韋斯特 (Kanye West) 和亞當·萊文 (Adam Levine) 發行了一首熱門單曲，其中包括歌詞“我知道政府管理愛滋病”。但如果將這一謠言或其影響範圍歸因於外部影響力販子，那就錯了。歷史學家已經證明，這個神話並不是共產主義情報機構發明的。相反，表演者們抓住了一種陰謀論，這種陰謀論是在極左派活動分子編造了這個故事並最初傳播後在美國自行出現的。火已經點燃了；共產黨人只是添加了燃料。 與直覺相反的是，對於美國的對手來說，宣傳活動在被發現後可能會得到最大的推動。早在格林在社群媒體上引用戰略文化基金會作為俄羅斯情報來源之前，美國政府就揭露並制裁了基金會作為俄羅斯情報的幌子。然而俄羅斯外國情報機構並沒有關閉暴露的戰線；它透過推出更多假新聞故事而加倍努力。俄羅斯情報官員可能正在設計他們的活動，以便一旦詭計被揭露，此類謊言就會獲得更多關注。關於澤倫斯基顧問購買豪華遊艇的虛假故事一旦被揭露為宣傳手段，就會強化這樣一種觀點：政客、政治評論員和部分選民在不知情的情況下是外國影響力的傀儡，甚至與敵人勾結。這種對腐蝕性的不信任比外國干涉本身對美國民主構成了最嚴重的威脅。 淡化炒作 隨著美國總統大選的臨近，對外國虛假資訊的不健康執著使得研究人員和組織爭相公開有關外國影響力的大膽主張。過度誇大外國假訊息活動的範圍和力量有強大的動機。對於一些調查機構和公司來說， 大規模的曝光可以帶來媒體報道、更大的預算、投資、撥款和聲譽收益，即使曝光的活動並不值得那麼多關注。 誇大其辭的報道可能會讓俄羅斯的積極措施更加成功。在揭露外國影響力行動之前，研究機構和保全公司的公職人員和分析師必須問自己幾個難題。他們的主張是否直接得到確鑿證據的支持──他們能夠並且願意與更廣泛的研究界分享的證據？曝光會為編造的故事帶來新的生命嗎？是否會損害公眾對公共機構和媒體的信任，從而服務於對手的利益？ 記者也不應該在因果關係上劃出可疑的界限，重複關於誰應該負責的不可靠的說法，在沒有適當證據的情況下斷言試圖進行的虛假信息行動是成功的，引用消息來源而不仔細審查他們的主張，或猜測為什麼可疑的對手可能會這樣做。 報道其他組織的調查報告和公職人員聲明的新聞媒體必須更加小心，不要重複誤導性的說法。促使麥考爾發表關於他自己的政黨受到俄羅斯宣傳「感染」的言論的事件本身就說明了這一動態。 NBC 新聞報導了麥考爾的評論，並在文章中添加了副標題：「共和黨議員如何回應俄羅斯的宣傳」；該報道聲稱共和黨人正在「鸚鵡學舌」地「重複」秘密的外國虛假資訊。從《華爾街日報》到BBC等媒體都發表了類似的聲明。然而，仔細觀察這些案例中的事實，就會發現相反的情況：俄羅斯的假訊息是在模仿美國極右翼。 幹擾外國惡意行為者的宣傳工作是一項重要工作，但必須徹底、準確和適度地完成。誇大外國影響力活動的影響只為外國特工服務。它助長了一種陰謀論，認為陰暗的敵人正在製造楔子問題，持不同政見者只是鸚鵡學舌般的外國間諜，對公開民主辯論的信任受到侵蝕。最重要的是，有關外國秘密干涉的虛假指控免除了美國領導人對我們政治話語健康的責任。 奧爾加貝洛洛娃 (OLGA BELOGOLOVA) 是約翰霍普金斯大學高級國際研究學院新興技術計畫主任，也是該大學阿爾佩羅維奇網路安全研究所的講師。她負責監督 Meta 和 Facebook 的反影響力運作政策。 LEE FOSTER 是 Alperovitch Institute 的兼任教員，也是網路安全公司 Mandiant 的影響力營運分析總監。 托馬斯·里德（THOMAS RID）是阿爾佩羅維奇研究所的戰略研究教授和創始所長，也是《積極措施：虛假資訊和政治戰爭的秘密歷史》一書的作者。 加文·王爾德 (GAVIN WILDE) 是阿爾佩羅維奇研究所的兼職教員、卡內基國際和平基金會的高級研究員、美國國家安全委員會俄羅斯、波羅的海和高加索事務部前主任。 更多奧爾加·貝洛戈洛娃的作品 更多李福斯特的作品 托馬斯·里德的更多作品 更多加文王爾德的作品 更多的： 俄羅斯聯邦 政治與社會 媒體與新聞 安全 美國外交政策 美國政治 宣傳與虛假訊息 最常閱讀的文章 僅靠美國的援助無法拯救烏克蘭 為了生存，基輔必須建立新的旅並迫使莫斯科進行談判 傑克沃特林 亞洲搖擺州的神話 大國競爭不再主導該地區政治 保羅‧史丹尼蘭 中國的替代秩序 美國該從中學到什麼 伊麗莎白經濟 以色列為何應宣布加薩單方面停火 扭轉哈馬斯和伊朗局面並推動與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化的機會 丹尼斯·羅斯和大衛·馬科夫斯基 推薦文章 俄羅斯領導人弗拉基米爾·普丁於 2024 年 1 月在莫斯科舉行的總統競選活動中發表講話 普丁脆弱的政權 與前蘇聯一樣，他的體制始終處於崩潰的邊緣 馬克西姆·薩莫魯科夫 2023 年 9 月，莫斯科，飄揚著俄羅斯國旗 扭曲美國對俄羅斯看法的神話，反之亦然 互相誤解如何滋長緊張和衝突 麥可金馬奇和傑瑞米夏皮羅 僅靠美國的援助無法拯救烏克蘭 為了生存，基輔必須建立新的旅並迫使莫斯科進行談判 作者：傑克沃特林 2024 年 5 月 2 日 2024 年 3 月，基輔的徵兵海報 經過幾個月的拖延，國會通過了一項近 610 億美元的美國對烏克蘭援助法案，為基輔提供了重要的生命線。但單靠援助計畫並不能解決烏克蘭在與俄羅斯的戰爭中所面臨的更大問題。烏克蘭軍隊正在保衛該國南部和東部約 600 英里的前線，而華盛頓的長期無所作為使他們嚴重捉襟見肘。美國武器彈藥的湧入將大大增加俄羅斯即將到來的夏季攻勢的成本。該援助還為烏克蘭軍隊提供了足夠的物資，以支持夏季和秋季更有系統的軍事計劃。 然而，以對烏克蘭有利的條件結束戰爭需要的不僅僅是新的設備管道。俄羅斯全面入侵烏克蘭已經兩年多了，戰爭目標始終沒有改變：克里姆林宮尋求征服基輔。烏克蘭國際夥伴的不穩定支持和政治上的拖延使得這一結果看起來非常可信。如果烏克蘭想要阻止俄羅斯取得長期勝利，就需要一個全面的戰略。這意味著訓練、裝備和動員新的力量。這意味著要讓克里姆林宮相信，隨著時間的推移，繼續戰爭對俄羅斯來說將面臨越來越大的風險。這意味著建立一個足夠強大的地位，能夠按照烏克蘭自己的條件製定持久和平的參數。 這些任務都不是一蹴可幾的，也不是一朝一夕就能完成的。烏克蘭及其國際夥伴也無法承受花費數月時間來製定前進道路的代價。美國及其北約盟國需要做出明確的長期承諾；迫使俄羅斯進行談判將尤其困難。但其他選擇則糟糕得多。如果沒有這樣的整體策略，衝突的持續時間可能會延長，但其軌跡不會延長。 對著滑翔炸彈做鬼臉 自2023年秋天以來，烏克蘭戰場局勢不斷惡化。很大程度上由於彈藥短缺，烏克蘭軍隊不得不將領土割讓給俄羅斯軍隊，而且往往是造成重大傷亡後。俄羅斯已在烏克蘭集結了約47 萬軍隊，似乎有意利用他們在2024 年剩餘時間內完成對頓巴斯的征服。烏克蘭的領土。 談到俄羅斯的新攻勢，人們可能會想到坦克部隊攻擊烏克蘭防線、突破並試圖利用這些成果深入烏克蘭控制的領土，以切斷烏克蘭部隊的聯繫。但俄羅斯軍隊目前無法、也不打算執行此類行動。經過兩年多的戰爭，俄軍核心軍官損失慘重，策劃和同步大規模攻擊的能力有限。俄軍的攻擊主要以排、連規模的連續攻擊為主，進展緩慢，損失慘重。 2024 年 4 月，烏克蘭士兵在烏克蘭 Chasiv Yar 附近的砲兵陣地上執勤 2024 年 4 月，烏克蘭士兵在烏克蘭 Chasiv Yar 附近的砲兵陣地上執勤 托馬斯彼得/路透社 儘管如此，俄羅斯目前在可用火砲方面仍比烏克蘭擁有十比一的優勢。隨著美國新一攬子援助計畫的通過，在某些地區這一優勢可能會縮小到三比一，這將增加俄羅斯的傷亡率。但俄羅斯有許多方法可以將烏克蘭軍隊拖入戰鬥，而這些方法也讓烏克蘭付出了高昂的代價。例如，俄羅斯軍隊一直在使用改裝的滑翔炸彈，以達到毀滅性的效果。這些是蘇聯設計的 FAB-500 大型半噸炸彈，配備了機翼和導引套件，由俄羅斯飛機從俄羅斯戰線後方投擲。它們的射程約為 40 英里，可以輕鬆襲擊烏克蘭城鎮，摧毀建築物並驅逐當地居民。 結果，烏克蘭軍隊經常被迫花費大量資源來保衛 代價高昂的單一 陣地，只是為了保護平民定居點不進入俄羅斯滑翔炸彈的射程。以恰西夫亞爾 (Chasiv Yar) 為例，這是頓內茨克東部地區關鍵山脊線上的一個小鎮。如果它陷落，俄羅斯軍隊將獲得一個制高點，可以轟炸頓巴斯的城鎮和烏克蘭的主要補給路線。因此，即使戰術情況變得不太有利，烏克蘭軍隊仍拼命地試圖守住它。烏克蘭過度緊張的防空系統加劇了這項挑戰，這種情況現在允許俄羅斯飛機接近前線，提高轟炸的準確性。不幸的是，烏克蘭越需要地對空飛彈系統來保護其城市，前線地面部隊面臨的風險就越大。 今年夏天烏克蘭將輸給俄羅斯。問題是多少。 應對這一挑戰的解決方案通常是軍事戰略家所說的“積極防禦”，即利用小規模反擊來破壞攻擊者鞏固其進步的努力。比如說，如果俄羅斯軍隊佔領了恰西夫亞爾的一個關鍵陣地，烏克蘭人可以利用反擊來孤立該陣地，這樣俄羅斯人就無法深入挖掘並繼續前進。但烏克蘭的後備力量很少，而且在佔領陣地後不久就失去了許多利用俄羅斯弱點所需的戰術車輛。由於缺乏反擊儲備，烏克蘭必須滿足於將俄羅斯的每個陣地損失最大化，從而減緩其前進速度。 在這種情況下，即使美國援助法案的通過，也只能起到有限的作用來改變戰場格局。華盛頓的長期拖延意味著需要時間來修復烏克蘭能力的大部分損害。今年夏天烏克蘭將輸給俄羅斯。問題是烏克蘭軍隊可以讓俄羅斯人為他們的成果付出多少代價，以及付出多大的代價。 新鮮血液，而不是更多血液 除了立即提供彈藥之外，美國新一攬子援助計劃的最大作用在於它提供的確定性。在美國支持的時間和數量受到質疑的幾個月後，烏克蘭現在對未來六個月的軍事資源有了足夠的了解，以便能夠進行更廣泛的戰略規劃。 最重要的是需要產生新的力量。為此，烏克蘭需要動員更多人員，改善訓練管道以保持相對於俄羅斯部隊的品質優勢，並為這些新部隊提供充分裝備。到目前為止，這都是不可能的。由於缺乏裝備和武器，並且無法預測更多裝備和武器是否以及何時抵達，烏克蘭軍事領導層被迫優先為已經在前線的部隊提供所有物資。美國援助計畫的規模以及歐洲夥伴的進一步支持意味著烏克蘭軍事領導層現在可以實施一項精心計劃來訓練和裝備更多部隊。 與普遍的假設相反，烏克蘭並不缺乏可以動員的人員。 （根據最近的一項分析，可能還有數百萬烏克蘭人能夠服役。）它缺乏的是有效的招募和培訓系統，無法將可用人員納入部隊並為其提供裝備。這些問題可以而且必須解決。 烏克蘭指揮官必須組成新的旅，而不是單純地恢復現有部隊的實力。陸軍目前缺乏足夠的旅來將其作為一個整體輪換到前線。相反，各旅一直在將精疲力盡的營輪換到接觸線外進行短暫休息——這一策略提供了休息，但不允許對旅進行集體訓練，因為旅人員和支援設備仍留在前線。因此，烏克蘭現在必須建立和訓練更多的旅，以便在秋季進行積極防禦。隨著時間的推移，這些新部隊將大大增強其反擊能力。 2024 年 4 月，烏克蘭頓內茨克地區烏克蘭砲兵旅的一名成員 2024 年 4 月，烏克蘭頓內茨克地區烏克蘭砲兵旅的一名成員 Serhii Nuzhnenko /自由歐洲電台/路透社 因此，軍隊必須分三個階段進行動員。首先，它必須立即為現有部隊籌集戰場替代者。但隨後它必須重新建立後備力量，以允許 現有部隊輪換，然後建立能夠實施進攻行動的新部隊。第一個是最容易解決的。設備是第二個限制因素。第三，最大的限制因素是軍官訓練。這個問題可以解決，但如果烏克蘭要在秋天之前組成所需的部隊，就必須立即解決這個問題。 2024 年最後幾個月，俄羅斯可能是最危險的。俄羅斯可能有足夠的部隊來輪換部隊，以便在秋季發動連續攻擊。 但俄羅斯的能力並不是無限的。莫斯科做出了一些工業和軍事選擇，這些選擇可能會限制其在 2025 年的進攻潛力。根據目前的損失率，俄羅斯的裝甲車庫存也可能在2025年下半年耗盡。在戰鬥中失去的武器系統。同時，從 2024 年底開始，隨著去年和今年頭幾個月的投資開始取得成果，歐洲軍備生產將開始穩步攀升。那麼，到 2025 年，如果烏克蘭能夠堅持到那時，烏克蘭的供應問題應該不會那麼嚴重，而俄羅斯的供應問題就會更加嚴重。 從長遠來看，烏克蘭及其盟國面臨的挑戰變得清晰起來。當務之急不僅是確保俄羅斯的夏季攻勢在莫斯科付出高昂代價的情況下達到高潮，而且要確保新組建的烏克蘭軍隊就位以削弱秋季的進一步攻勢，並且最理想的是在 2025 年初之前建立穩定的前線只有這樣，烏克蘭才能奪回主動權。實現這一目標在很大程度上取決於烏克蘭動員和裝備部隊的速度。它極度缺乏的一種商品就是時間。 將莫斯科帶到桌面上 即使烏克蘭能夠透過快速訓練、裝備和部署新部隊來削弱俄羅斯的成果，這些步驟本身也不會產生結束衝突的途徑。歸根結底，這是因為基輔的國際夥伴將他們的支持建立在更簡單的目標上，即在戰鬥中保護烏克蘭，而不是迫使俄羅斯以有利的條件進行談判。 美國及其歐洲盟友需要認識到，幫助烏克蘭抵禦俄羅斯的攻擊並不等於讓烏克蘭在談判中處於有利地位。克里姆林宮熱衷於根據當前戰爭動態進行談判：它相信，一旦談判開始，烏克蘭的西方支持者幾乎會同意任何事情，認為任何可以達成的解決方案都是成功的，即使它無法長期保護烏克蘭學期。俄羅斯的要求將一如既往：名義上投降。莫斯科要真正進行談判，就必須面對這樣一種情況：進一步擴大衝突將對其自身構成不可接受的威脅。只有這樣，烏克蘭才能做出有意義的讓步。 制裁只是破壞俄羅斯金融流動性的工具之一。 俄羅斯已經面臨幾個壓力點。首先，俄羅斯在戰場上損失的關鍵系統（例如防空系統）很重要，因為它們構成了俄羅斯對北約的常規威懾的堡壘。使烏克蘭能夠損害或摧毀俄羅斯的聲望資產非常符合北約的利益。其次，俄羅斯將無法無限期地為戰爭提供資金。 西方制裁只是破壞政權金融流動性的工具之一，而且其效果不如其他選擇。俄羅斯石油基礎設施的損壞可能會產生更大的影響。儘管西方有充分的理由避免直接援助此類攻擊，但這並不意味著烏克蘭不應該進行此類攻擊。 第三，儘管俄羅斯公眾在很大程度上支持這場戰爭，但對俄羅斯政府有著深深的挫敗感，這是可以利用的。 到目前為止，西方政府尚未積極對俄羅斯政府採取資訊行動，部分原因是這些行動被視為升級，部分原因是預計不會立即產生效果。相較之下，俄羅斯一直在歐洲各地進行積極的資訊行動，其目的是破壞西方的穩定。 這種不對稱性需要被糾正。西方對資訊戰可能引發升級的擔憂並不令人信服：克里姆林宮和白宮一樣堅決避免在烏克蘭問題上發生直接對抗。此外，克里姆林宮長期以來一直認為西方自 2011 年以來一直對其進行廣泛的資訊行動，儘管事實並非如此。因此，此類行動的任何潛在升級風險都已經存在。鑑於這種情況，西方可以做的還有很多。從長遠來看，更多更好的資訊行動可以提高莫斯科對其代價高昂的戰爭所引發的國內風險的認識。 火力修復 鑑於烏克蘭目前的武器裝備落後程度，它尚無能力提出有利的談判條件來結束戰爭。停火可能會讓俄羅斯重建其軍事力量，而烏克蘭將無法維持目前的軍隊規模。此外，如果預計俄羅斯在不久的將來會再次爆發敵對行動，基輔對重建的支持可能會逐漸減弱。烏克蘭的重建將主要依賴私營部門的投資，而新衝突的威脅將使任何此類融資都面臨風險。為了確保烏克蘭能夠滿懷信心地進行談判並確保持久和平，基輔的國際夥伴必須提供其信任的安全保證。由於烏克蘭無法提出這些保證，因此將由其國際夥伴採取行動。 最終，戰爭的成功結束將取決於北約令人信服地威懾俄羅斯的能力。這種姿態要求聯盟不僅要部署足夠的部隊來應對俄羅斯的威脅，還要在其成員之間建立足夠的生產能力，以便在發生另一場戰爭時維持穩定的彈藥供應。無論戰爭如何結束，建立這種供應都是必要的。短期內，擴大彈藥生產對於烏克蘭削弱俄羅斯軍隊的能力至關重要。如果烏克蘭設法拖延衝突，並且戰爭以對其有利的方式結束，那麼其合作夥伴將需要軍火來增強其安全保證的可信度。另一方面，如果俄羅斯實現其目標，那麼將需要這些彈藥來確保北約未來的安全。 美國的軍事援助計劃及時通過，避免了烏克蘭的崩潰。但要真正改變戰爭方向，就需要製定更全面的戰略來成功結束戰爭。這必須來自華盛頓、其北約盟國和基輔本身。 傑克‧沃特林 (JACK WATLING) 是 倫敦智庫皇家聯合三軍研究所的陸戰高級研究員。 更多傑克沃特林的作品 更多的： 烏克蘭 俄羅斯聯邦 外交 地緣政治 經濟學 對外 援助 安全 防禦與軍事 戰略與衝突 戰爭與軍事戰略 美國外交政策 烏克蘭戰爭 勇敢新烏克蘭 世界上最受圍困的民主國家如何適應永久戰爭 娜塔莉亞·古梅紐克 2024 年 4 月 19 日 2024 年 4 月，烏克蘭切爾尼戈夫，俄羅斯罷工後，急救人員在一座被毀的建築中 在與世界上最強大的軍隊之一作戰兩年多後，烏克蘭頒布了一項新的動員法，此舉被西方譽為緊急改革。該法案於 4 月 16 日簽署成為法律，正值烏克蘭在防禦俄羅斯方面面臨一系列日益嚴峻的挑戰，從烏克蘭士兵和彈藥的短缺到西方支持的動搖。從這個角度來看，新法律可以使政府在準備今年夏天應對俄羅斯的大規模攻擊時更容易補充兵力。 然而，對烏克蘭人來說，法律還 "僅靠美國的援助無法拯救烏克蘭 為了生存，基輔必須建立新的旅並迫使莫斯科進行談判 傑克沃特林 亞洲搖擺州的神話 大國競爭不再主導該地區政治 保羅‧史丹尼蘭 中國的替代秩序 美國該從中學到什麼 伊麗莎白經濟 以色列為何應宣布加薩單方面停火 扭轉哈馬斯和伊朗局面並推動與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化的機會 丹尼斯·羅斯和大衛·馬科夫斯基 推薦文章 2024 年 4 月，烏克蘭切爾尼戈夫，俄羅斯罷工後，急救人員在一座被毀的建築中 勇敢新烏克蘭 世界上最受圍困的民主國家如何適應永久戰爭 娜塔莉亞·古梅紐克 俄羅斯和烏克蘭談判代表將於 2022 年 3 月透過視訊會議舉行會議 本來可以結束烏克蘭戰爭的談判 一段失敗的外交隱密歷史——但為未來談判提供了教訓 塞繆爾·查拉普和謝爾蓋·拉琴科 中國的替代秩序 美國該從中學到什麼 伊麗莎白經濟 2024 年 5 月/6 月 發表於2024 年 4 月 23 日 泰勒·科姆裡 到目前為止，中國國家主席習近平重塑世界的野心是不可否認的。他希望解散華盛頓的聯盟網絡，並從國際機構中清除他認為是「西方」價值觀的東西。他希望將美元從基座上推下來，並消除華盛頓對關鍵技術的控制。在他的新多極秩序中，全球機構和規範將以中國的共同安全和經濟發展理念、中國國家決定的政治權利價值和中國技術為基礎。中國將不再需要為領導權而戰。它的中心地位將得到保證。 中國巔峰的錯覺 美國不能希望趕走它最強大的挑戰者 埃文·梅代羅斯 黃瓊插圖；麥克布萊克/路透社攝 中國陷阱 美國外交政策與零和競爭的危險邏輯 傑西卡·陳·維斯 亞洲搖擺州的神話 大國競爭不再主導該地區政治 保羅‧史丹尼蘭 2024 年 5 月 2 日 中國國家主席習近平和馬爾地夫總統穆罕默德·穆伊祖，北京，2024 年 1 月 圍繞亞洲所謂的搖擺州的競爭正在升溫。中國日益增長的經濟和政治影響力迫使澳洲、印度、日本和美國試圖在尚未與任何一個集團緊密結盟的國家獲得影響力。美國總統拜登多次將亞洲描述為獨裁與民主之間的戰場。擔心這種競爭的觀察家指出，所羅門群島最近出現了親中國的轉變，該群島於2019 年斷絕了與台灣的外交關係，然後與中國簽署了安全協議，而馬爾地夫則於2023 年選出了一位批評他的總統。 許多領導人和分析人士，包括在《外交事務》上撰文的馬特·波廷格和麥克·加拉格爾，現在將美中競爭描述為一場新的冷戰。但重要的是，美國及其合作夥伴不要過度強調與最初冷戰的類比，也不要誤解中國在爭奪亞洲搖擺國家的競爭中所構成的挑戰。華盛頓面臨巨大的政治壓力，要求從美國與中國競爭的角度來看整個地區。但這並不符合許多亞洲國家的政治利益，而且基於這種框架的做法可能會削弱美國對它們的戰略和經濟吸引力。 中國的影響力在這場競爭中構成了真正的挑戰，但弄清楚其本質至關重要。今天的亞洲與冷戰時期的亞洲截然不同，冷戰時期，該地區許多新獨立國家都遭受暴力和破壞穩定的政變、叛亂和戰爭的蹂躪，使它們極易受到外部影響。 儘管中國無疑比三十年前更具影響力，但大多數亞洲國家並沒有受到中國影響的風險。亞洲國家現在擁有複雜且自主的國內政治，與中國或美國的優先事項並不完全一致。有時，這些國家確實陷入了關於是否與中國或美國及其夥伴結盟的內部爭論。但同樣，與這些國家更迫切的內部挑戰和外交政策目標相比，這種辯論是次要的，甚至是無關緊要的。 亞洲國家的政治和利益也未能與拜登政府的獨裁與民主框架無縫接軌。顯然，無論是馬克思列寧主義的黨國模式還是自由民主，都沒有在該地區取得進展。事實上，許多地區國家相信，在打造自己的國內政治形式時，他們能夠成功地平衡與雙方的關係。 中國在搖擺國家日益增長的影響力需要美國及其亞洲夥伴做出深思熟慮、持續的反應。但影響力之爭在整個地區的表現並不統一。拜登政府對該地區的當代現實表現出了一定的敏感性，並於 2023 年 5 月向印太國家保證，他們可以有「喘息空間」與中國接觸。政策制定者應注意繼續抵抗使亞洲複雜政治格局趨於扁平化的誘惑。美國在亞洲的有效戰略需要了解各國之間的重大差異，認真對待它們，並根據具體的當地情況仔細調整政策舉措。 死的隱喻 冷戰類比對亞洲現況的詮釋存在著重要的限制。如今，大多數亞洲國家比冷戰時期穩定得多。因此，它們不太容易成為代理衝突的熱點。奧斯陸和平研究所和烏普薩拉衝突資料計畫彙編的數據顯示，冷戰結束後，亞洲與衝突相關的死亡人數急劇下降。亞洲國家的國內政治基礎更加堅固，更能抵禦外部影響。 部分由於這種更大的穩定性，亞洲國家的國內政治現在往往與支撐大國競爭的宏大主題無關。例如，5G 和台灣海峽等中美競爭的核心問題與許多亞洲搖擺國家內部的核心政治分歧並不重疊。對許多其他亞洲國家來說，美國和中國的政治模式都不是特別有吸引力，甚至不相關。拜登政府將亞洲視為獨裁與民主之間的較量，這一框架並不能很好地體現該地區的國內政治。例如，孟加拉、巴基斯坦、斯里蘭卡和泰國不太可能成為嚴格製度化的馬克思列寧主義政黨國家或自由民主國家。對於亞洲搖擺國家的大多數菁英來說，採用中國的政治模式在政治上將是災難性的，需要無情的集權並結束最有利可圖的選舉競爭和贊助形式。 同時，該地區的民主國家並不急於接受美國政府於 2022 年初公佈的拜登版美國印太戰略所倡導的自由主義價值觀。活力的公民社會」是美國對亞洲政策的核心價值觀，但這些價值觀並不總是亞洲主要搖擺國家的領導人或公民優先考慮的價值觀。印度、印尼、馬來西亞和菲律賓都是選舉民主國家，但其國內偏好往往與自由主義相悖：政教分離、平等適用法治以及強有力的言論自由保護並不一定是這些政治傾向。新加坡執政黨自稱與美國關係密切，並擔心中國在亞洲的影響力。但它並不急於解除對政治和社會的嚴格控制。 五味雜陳 亞洲的政治穩定、意識形態極化的減少以及國內環境的變化意味著大國競爭是透過極其複雜的內部政治競爭來折射的。尼泊爾就是一個突出的例子，中國和印度都在爭奪影響力。 2015年至2021年間，當尼泊爾反印度情緒高漲時，中國努力維持尼泊爾共產黨的統一。這些努力引起了人們的警覺，中國打算將尼泊爾政治朝向持久親中國的方向重塑。 （一篇2022 年外交政策文章提出疑問：“尼泊爾受中國控制嗎？” 但尼泊爾的政治並沒有永久地沿著明顯的親華和親印路線兩極化。相反，聯盟的操縱、個人的競爭以及關於聯邦制、世俗主義和資源分配的辯論佔據了首要地位。北京無法阻止統一的共產黨因先前存在的競爭而分裂成派別。印度也發現很難可靠地影響尼泊爾的政治結果，近年來，它選擇克制影響該國政治的努力。聯合政府來了又去，領導人找到了與中國和印度合作的方法，大國競爭仍然是政治動員的不平衡和零星的驅動力。 尼泊爾絕非獨一無二。在印尼二月的選舉中，美中競爭並沒有在政客的競選活動中佔據突出地位。在巴基斯坦，在過去一年裡，該國頗具影響力的軍隊與阿富汗政府的衝突日益加劇，並面臨巴基斯坦塔利班叛亂分子沿阿富汗邊境擴張的情況，他們向美國示好，而不是堅定地與阿富汗獨裁者同僚結盟。 大國競爭並不總是推動中國與其他亞洲國家的互動。 經濟可能是亞洲搖擺國家拒絕在美中競爭中堅定選邊站隊的壓力的最大舞台。亞洲國家高度關注經濟成長，它們將抓住機遇，在美中競爭中佔據優勢，例如與美國合作，將供應鏈從中國轉移到自己的市場。但這些努力可以與中國在其他經濟議題上的合作同時進行。許多亞洲國家都採取「是的，並且」的方式來建立多元化的政治和經濟關係。正如卡內基國際和平基金會分析師埃文·費根鮑姆 (Evan Feigenbaum) 2020 年所說，在經濟領域，“北京和華盛頓為該地區定義零和未來的努力迄今為止都失敗了。” 大國競爭並不總是推動中國和印度與其他亞洲國家的互動。這兩個大國經常存在分歧，但當地的緊迫挑戰也可以推動它們走向政策一致。例如，在緬甸，中國和印度追求相似的目標，而不是尋求相互競爭的優勢。為了保護聯合基礎設施項目並維持穩定的邊界，兩國最初都尋求與緬甸軍政府保持良好關係，認為緬甸軍政府將擊敗其面臨的零散叛亂。 然而去年，隨著叛亂活動的擴張和軍隊的衰弱，中國和印度都開始向叛亂分子伸出援手。中國鼓勵叛軍對親軍政府民兵發動大規模進攻，這些民兵從事人口販運和網路詐騙活動，傷害了中國公民。印度也與緬甸邊境的反軍政府武裝團體合作，希望防止該國東北部反印叛亂死灰復燃，並與新興權力掮客建立穩定關係。這兩個目標都與亞洲的權力鬥爭無關，緬甸也沒有成為代理人衝突。 複雜性理論 過去十年來，一些亞洲國家——尤其是那些與中國存在陸地和海上爭端的國家——一直在尋求與美國加強結盟。這種趨勢可能會持續下去，華盛頓應該鼓勵這種趨勢。然而，問題是美國及其合作夥伴如何與受中國直接威脅較小的國家建立並維持牢固的關係。 好消息是，亞洲國家的穩定和自治限制了中國將它們變成代理人國家的能力。當觀察家擔心中國在整個亞洲的影響力日益增強時，他們經常強調馬爾地夫和所羅門群島。這些國家具有地緣戰略意義，中國對這些國家的影響力值得持續關注。但美國及其合作夥伴不應對中國的這些進步反應過度，認為它們是更廣泛的區域轉變的先兆。與馬來西亞和尼泊爾相比，這些國家都是小國，更不用說孟加拉和印尼這樣的龐然大物了。 此外，中國本身也提供了一個警示，說明一個國家如果不謹慎地調整其外交政策以適應其他國家的當地政治，就會面臨風險。近年來，北京試圖將各種項目和關係納入自上而下的「一帶一路」倡議之中，這種做法有時會導致強烈反對和緊張局勢。特別是在緬甸、巴基斯坦和斯里蘭卡，中國資源的湧入並沒有帶來許多人所擔心的那種持久的政治影響力和權力。 華盛頓必須抵制在亞洲國家內部尋找穩定的親美派系的衝動。 部分由於中國自身在亞洲多元化政治格局中所面臨的挑戰，美國有大量機會來補充或超越北京的努力。然而，要成功做到這一點，需要具體情況具體分析。印度-太平洋戰略提供了一個寶貴的框架，用於協調美國政府對亞洲的外展活動並在主要亞洲盟友之間建立合作。但它也可能成為將搖擺州推離美國的避雷針。 例如，2018 年，當國務卿 Mike Pompeo 表示美國對尼泊爾的政策屬於 IPS 的支持時，尼泊爾領導人並不滿意。這一說法引發了人們長期以來的懷疑，即美國未來對該國採取的任何舉措主要目的都是為了將其拉入反華聯盟。華盛頓對大國競爭的過度關注，讓在亞洲國家工作的外交官左右為難，一方面要履行IPS的職責，另一方面要向當地領導人保證該戰略並不只與中國有關。政策制定者需要面對並創造性地管理鞏固核心夥伴的支持和吸引搖擺國家之間潛在的權衡。 美國的亞洲戰略最好的方式是注重適應當地的具體情況。華盛頓應該克制住尋找穩定的親美派系與之合作以及譴責或反對親中派系的衝動。雖然有時會存在這樣的派系，但更多時候這些派係是不穩定的、不斷變化的。美國決策者必須更加適應模糊性，關注美國及其合作夥伴在特定環境下所能提供的最佳服務，而不管中國的影響力如何。 當華盛頓接近亞洲搖擺國家時，它們是最有效的：複雜而自治的國家，而不是北京和華盛頓操縱的棋盤上的棋子。大多數亞洲國家有很多需求。即使美國及其合作夥伴選擇在某一領域與中國接觸，他們也可以在其他領域推進其戰略目標。 保羅·斯坦尼蘭是芝加哥大學政治學教授。 更多保羅史坦尼蘭的作品 更多的： 亞洲 中國 外交政策 政治與 社會政治發展 美國外交政策 拜登政府 美中關係 最常閱讀的文章 僅靠美國的援助無法拯救烏克蘭 為了生存，基輔必須建立新的旅並迫使莫斯科進行談判 傑克沃特林 亞洲搖擺州的神話 大國競爭不再主導該地區政治 保羅‧史丹尼蘭 中國的替代秩序 美國該從中學到什麼 伊麗莎白經濟 以色列為何應宣布加薩單方面停火 扭轉哈馬斯和伊朗局面並推動與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化的機會 丹尼斯·羅斯和大衛·馬科夫斯基 推薦文章 中國國家主席習近平和美國總統拜登於 2023 年 11 月在加州伍德賽德會晤 勝利無可取代 美國與中國的競爭必須是勝利，而不是管理 馬特·波廷格和邁克·加拉格爾 泰勒·科姆裡 中國的替代秩序 美國該從中學到什麼 伊麗莎白經濟 The Myth of the Asian Swing State Great-Power Competition No Longer Dominates the Region’s Politics By Paul Staniland May 2, 2024 Chinese President Xi Jinping and Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu, Beijing, January 2024 The competition over Asia’s so-called swing states is heating up. China’s growing economic and political reach has impelled Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to try to gain influence in the countries not yet tightly aligned with either bloc. U.S. President Joe Biden has repeatedly characterized Asia as a battleground between autocracy and democracy. Observers who worry about such a contest point to recent pro-China turns in the Solomon Islands, which in 2019 severed its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan and then signed a security pact with China, and the Maldives, which in 2023 elected a president who criticized his predecessor’s ties to India and vowed to draw closer to China. Numerous leaders and analysts, including Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher writing in Foreign Affairs, now frame the U.S.-Chinese competition as a new cold war. Yet it is important that the United States and its partners not overemphasize the analogy to the original Cold War or misunderstand the challenges China poses in the competition over Asia’s swing states. There is immense political pressure from Washington to view the whole region through the prism of the United States’ competition with China. But this does not speak to the political interests of many Asian countries—and an approach based on this framing risks undermining America’s strategic and economic appeals to them. Chinese influence presents a real challenge in this competition, but it is crucial to be clear about its nature. Asia today is radically different from Asia during the Cold War, an era when many of the region’s newly independent states were wracked by violent and destabilizing coups, insurgencies, and wars that made them exceptionally vulnerable to outside influence. Although China is undoubtedly more influential than it was three decades ago, the bulk of Asia’s states are not at risk of falling under China’s sway. Asian countries now boast complex and autonomous domestic politics that do not align neatly with either Chinese or U.S. priorities. At times, these countries are indeed gripped by internal debates about whether to align with China or the U.S. and its partners. But just as often, that debate is secondary or even irrelevant compared with these countries’ more pressing internal challenges and foreign policy goals. Asian countries’ politics and interests also do not map seamlessly onto the Biden administration’s autocracy-versus-democracy framing. Neither the Marxist-Leninist party-state model nor liberal democracy is clearly on the march in the region. Indeed, many regional states believe they can successfully balance ties with both sides as they forge their own forms of domestic politics. China’s growing influence in swing states requires a thoughtful, sustained response from the United States and its partners in Asia. But the struggle for influence is not playing out uniformly across the region. The Biden administration has shown some sensitivity to the region’s contemporary realities, reassuring Indo-Pacific states in May 2023 that they can have “breathing space” to engage with China. Policymakers should take care to continue to resist the temptation to flatten Asia’s complex political landscape. An effective U.S. strategy in Asia requires understanding crucial differences among countries, taking them seriously, and carefully adapting policy initiatives to very specific local contexts. DEAD METAPHOR There are important limits to what a Cold War analogy illuminates about Asia’s present. Most Asian countries today are vastly more stable than they were during the Cold War; as a result, they are far less susceptible to becoming flash points for proxy conflict. Data compiled by the Peace Research Institute Oslo and Uppsala Conflict Data Program show that conflict-related deaths in Asia declined dramatically after the Cold War ended. Asian countries’ domestic political foundations are sturdier and more resistant to outside influence. In part because of this greater stability, Asian states’ domestic politics now often have little to do with the grand themes undergirding the major powers’ rivalries. The issues at the heart of the U.S.-Chinese competition, for instance—such as 5G and the Taiwan Strait—do not overlap with the core political cleavages within many of Asia’s swing states. Neither the American nor the Chinese political model is especially attractive, or even relevant, to many other Asian states. The Biden administration’s vision of Asia as a contest between autocracy and democracy is not a framing that captures the region’s domestic politics well. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, for example, are unlikely to become either rigidly institutionalized Marxist-Leninist party-states or liberal democracies. Adopting the Chinese political model would be politically disastrous for most elites in Asia’s swing states, requiring ruthless centralization and ending the most profitable forms of electoral competition and patronage. At the same time, democracies in the region are not rushing to embrace the liberal values heralded by Biden’s version of the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, which the administration unveiled in early 2022. That strategy called for emphasizing the promotion of “democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil society” in the U.S. approach to Asia, but these values are not always the ones that either leaders or citizens in key Asian swing states prioritize. India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are electoral democracies, but their domestic preferences are often at odds with liberalism: the separation of church and state, the equal application of the rule of law, and strong free speech protections are not necessarily these political systems’ highest priorities. Singapore’s ruling party boasts close links to the United States and is concerned about China’s influence in Asia. But it is in no hurry to dismantle its tight controls over politics and society. MIXED FEELINGS Asia’s combination of political stability, reduced ideological polarization, and varying domestic contexts means that great-power competition is refracted through the lens of incredibly complicated internal political competitions. A striking example can be found in Nepal, where both China and India are vying for influence. When anti-Indian sentiment surged there between 2015 and 2021, China worked to maintain a unified Nepali Communist Party. Those efforts raised alarms that China intended to reshape Nepali politics in an enduringly pro-China direction. (“Is Nepal Under China’s Thumb?” a Foreign Policy essay wondered in 2022.) But Nepal’s politics did not permanently polarize along clear pro-Chinese and pro-Indian lines. Instead, coalitional maneuvering, personal rivalries, and debates over federalism, secularism, and the allocation of resources took primacy. Beijing was unable to stop the unified Communist Party from collapsing into factions driven by preexisting rivalries. India has also found it difficult to reliably sway political outcomes in Nepal, and in recent years, it has chosen to restrain its efforts to influence the country’s politics. Coalition governments have come and gone, leaders have found ways to work with both China and India, and great-power competition remains an uneven and sporadic driver of political mobilization. Nepal is far from unique. In Indonesia’s February election, U.S.-Chinese competition did not prominently figure into politicians’ campaigns. In Pakistan over the past year, the country’s influential military, which is increasingly in conflict with Afghanistan’s government and faced with the expansion of the Pakistani Taliban insurgency along the Afghan border, has made overtures to the United States instead of steadfastly aligning with fellow autocrats in Beijing. Great-power competition does not always drive China’s interactions with other Asian states. Economics may be the biggest arena in which Asian swing states reject pressure to firmly choose sides in a U.S.-Chinese competition. Asian states are heavily focused on economic growth, and they will seize opportunities to take advantage of the U.S.-Chinese competition—for instance by working with the United States to relocate supply chains out of China into their own markets. But such efforts can run alongside working with China on other economic issues. Many Asian states have a “yes, and” approach to building a diversified set of political and economic relationships. As the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace analyst Evan Feigenbaum argued in 2020, in the economic realm, “efforts by Beijing and Washington to define a zero-sum future for the region have thus far failed.” Great-power competition does not always drive even China’s and India’s interactions with other Asian states. These two major powers are often at odds, but local, pressing challenges can also push them toward policy alignment. In Myanmar, for example, China and India have pursued similar goals rather than seek advantages against each other. To protect joint infrastructure projects and maintain stable borders, both countries initially sought to maintain good terms with Myanmar’s junta on the assumption that it would defeat the fragmented insurgency it faced. Yet over the last year, as that insurgency expanded and the military faltered, both China and India began reaching out to the insurgents. China encouraged a major rebel offensive against pro-junta militias engaging in human trafficking and online scams that hurt Chinese citizens. India has also cooperated with anti-junta armed groups along its borders with Myanmar, hoping to prevent the resurgence of an anti-India insurgency in the country’s northeast and to build stable ties with emerging power brokers. Neither aim relates to a grand struggle for power in Asia, and Myanmar has not become a proxy conflict. COMPLEXITY THEORY Over the last decade, a number of Asian countries—especially those that have land and maritime disputes with China—have been pursuing greater alignment with the United States. This trend is likely to continue, and Washington should encourage it. The question, however, is how the United States and its partners can build and maintain strong ties with states that are less directly threatened by China. The good news is that Asian countries’ stability and autonomy limit China’s ability to turn them into proxy states. When observers point with concern to the growing Chinese influence throughout Asia, they often emphasize the Maldives and the Solomon Islands. These countries are geographically strategic, and China’s influence over them is worth sustained scrutiny. But the United States and its partners should not overreact to these Chinese advances by assuming they are harbingers of a much broader regional shift. These are tiny states compared with Malaysia and Nepal, much less behemoths such as Bangladesh and Indonesia. Moreover, China itself offers a cautionary tale of the risks a country incurs by not carefully adapting its foreign policy to other countries’ local politics. In recent years, Beijing has tried to lump various projects and relationships into the top-down aegis of its Belt and Road Initiative, an approach that has sometimes led to backlash and tension. In Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, in particular, the influx of Chinese resources has not led to the kind of enduring political influence and power that many feared. Washington must resist the urge to search for stable pro-American factions within Asian countries. In part thanks to China’s own challenges navigating Asia’s diverse political landscape, the United States has plenty of opportunities to complement or outcompete Beijing’s efforts. Doing so successfully, however, will require case-by-case approaches. The Indo-Pacific Strategy provides a valuable framework by which to coordinate U.S. government outreach to Asia and build cooperation among key Asian allies. But it can also be a lightning rod that pushes swing states away from the United States. In 2018, for instance, Nepali leaders were not pleased when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that U.S. policy toward Nepal fell under the aegis of the IPS. That assertion triggered an enduring suspicion that any future U.S. initiatives toward the country would be intended principally to draw it into an anti-China coalition. Washington’s overwhelming focus on great-power competition has left diplomats working in Asian countries torn between trying to meet the IPS’s mandate and reassuring local leaders that the strategy is not all about China. Policymakers need to face—and creatively manage—the potential trade-offs between consolidating their core partners’ support and appealing to swing states. American strategy in Asia is best served by focusing on adapting to specific local contexts. Washington should resist the urge to search for stable pro-American factions with which to partner and pro-China ones to denounce or oppose. While such factions sometimes exist, more often these alignments are fluid and shifting. U.S. policymakers must become more comfortable with ambiguity, focusing on what the United States and its partners can best offer in a particular setting, regardless of China’s influence. Washington will be most effective when it approaches Asia’s swing states as they are: complicated and autonomous countries, not pieces on a chessboard maneuvered by Beijing and Washington. Most Asian countries have many needs. Even if they choose to engage with China in one arena, the United States and its partners can advance their strategic goals in others. PAUL STANILAND is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. MORE BY PAUL STANILAND More: Asia China Foreign Policy Politics & Society Political Development U.S. Foreign Policy Biden Administration U.S.-Chinese Relations Most-Read Articles American Aid Alone Won’t Save Ukraine To Survive, Kyiv Must Build New Brigades—and Force Moscow to Negotiate Jack Watling The Myth of the Asian Swing State Great-Power Competition No Longer Dominates the Region’s Politics Paul Staniland China’s Alternative Order And What America Should Learn From It Elizabeth Economy Why Israel Should Declare a Unilateral Cease-Fire in Gaza A Chance to Turn the Tables on Hamas and Iran—and Advance Normalization With Saudi Arabia Dennis Ross and David Makovsky Recommended Articles Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden meeting in Woodside, California, November 2023 No Substitute for Victory America’s Competition With China Must Be Won, Not Managed Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher Tyler Comrie China’s Alternative Order And What America Should Learn From It Elizabeth Economy Why Israel Should Declare a Unilateral Cease-Fire in Gaza A Chance to Turn the Tables on Hamas and Iran—and Advance Normalization With Saudi Arabia By Dennis Ross and David Makovsky May 1, 2024 Israeli soldiers patrolling the Gazan-Israeli border, April 2024 Israeli soldiers patrolling Gazan-Israeli border, April 2024 Amir Cohen / Reuters Sign in and save to read later Print this article Send by email Share on Twitter Share on Facebook Share on LinkedIn Get a link Page url https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/why-israel-should-declare-unilateral-cease-fire-gaza Get Citation Request Reprint Permissions Download Article Until last month, the war between Iran and Israel was largely fought in the shadows. The Iranians decided to take it out of the shadows, openly attacking Israeli territory directly, from Iranian soil, for the first time in the Islamic Republic’s history. Some observers have argued that Iran’s April 13 drone and missile assault on Israel was a symbolic gesture. Yet given the quantity of drones and missiles fired at Israel and their payloads, Iran clearly meant to inflict serious damage. Israel’s defenses were nearly flawless, but it did not repel Iran’s attack entirely on its own. Just as Iran’s assault was unprecedented, so was the direct military intervention of the United States and a number of its allies, including some Arab states. U.S. Central Command, with the participation of the United Kingdom and Jordan, intercepted at least a third of the drones and cruise missiles that Iran fired at Israel; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also shared intelligence that helped Israel defend itself. Their readiness to play this role was remarkable, given how unpopular Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza is among Arab publics. Five days later, when Israel responded to Iran’s attack, it took Washington’s calls for restraint into account, firing three missiles at a radar facility that guides the S-300 missile defense battery in Isfahan, the site of Iran’s uranium conversion plant. This was a very limited response, one crafted to avoid casualties while showing Israel can penetrate Iran’s defenses and strike any target it seeks to hit. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. Israel seemingly recognized that the best way to deal with the threat Iran and its proxies pose is to work with a coalition. This, too, is without precedent. The idea that Americans, Europeans, and Arabs would come together to help intercept drones and cruise missiles Iran launched against Israel would, in the recent past, have seemed like a fantasy—and, to Israel, undesirable. Israel’s ethos on defense has always been: “We defend ourselves by ourselves.” This has been both a source of pride and a principle—that no one besides Israelis would have to pick up weapons on Israel’s behalf. But now that Israel faces not only Iran but multiple Iranian proxy groups, the cost of taking on all these fronts by itself is simply becoming too high. This development, as well as the willingness that Arab states showed in April to join Israel to confront the threat Iran and its proxies pose, suggests that a window has opened for the creation of a regional coalition pursuing a common strategy to counter Iran and its proxies. To take advantage of this opening, however, Israel, the United States, and Arab countries—particularly Saudi Arabia—need to recognize the unique nature of the moment and seize it. A U.S.-brokered breakthrough in a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia would do a great deal to cement this emerging coalition. If the Saudis, whose king is the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites, made peace with Israel, that would likely transform Israel’s relationship with other Sunni-majority states within and outside the Middle East following suit. U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration, as well as Israeli and Saudi leaders, indicate that they would still like to see such a deal happen soon. But the Biden administration believes that the fighting in Gaza must be paused before negotiations about normalization can proceed. A unilateral cease-fire of four to six weeks would offer Israel many strategic benefits. There is some hope that negotiations in Egypt on a hostage deal between Israel and Hamas will finally be achieved and produce a cease-fire of at least six weeks. But the Biden administration must not put all its eggs in that basket. Again and again, Hamas has raised hopes that a deal is imminent only to dash them. Should no deal emerge in Egypt, the Biden administration should turn to the only realistic alternative: encouraging Israel to announce a unilateral cease-fire in Gaza of four to six weeks. Such an Israeli decision may be the only way to create the conditions for an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal to advance. Of course, a unilateral cease-fire would be controversial in Israel, both because it de-links pausing the fighting in Gaza from the release of hostages and because it may seem to concede something to Hamas for nothing in return. But a unilateral cease-fire of four to six weeks would, in fact, offer Israel many strategic benefits with few material drawbacks. And in truth, if their negotiations with Hamas fail once again, Israeli leaders will need to adopt a different approach if they hope to get hostages released while some are still alive. The fact that Israel listened to the Biden administration when crafting its response to Iran’s attack shows that it is open to U.S. persuasion. Indeed, a new reality may be taking shape in Israel, one that could change how it approaches defense, deterrence, and the region. A PRECEDENT FOR RESTRAINT When it comes to defense strategy, Israel has long been committed to doing its own fighting. All it asked of the United States was to help ensure that it had the means to do so. The help that Israel received to defend itself against the Iranian attack, however, might have been not only welcome but also necessary. But such help also creates an obligation on Israel’s part. When others participate in Israel’s defense, they gain the right to ask Israel to take their interests and concerns into account. After Iran’s attack, Biden made it clear to Israeli leaders that they did not need to retaliate because their successful defense itself constituted a great success—and, by implication, an embarrassing failure for Iran. For Israel, not to hit back at all would have contradicted the country’s basic concept of deterrence: if you attack us, you will pay, and no one can pressure us not to respond to threats. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not easily dismiss the American position. Israel’s concept of deterrence has always shaped its responses to direct threats—with one exception that is worth recalling today. During the 1991 Gulf War, the night after U.S. forces attacked Iraq, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein hit Israel with Scud missiles. The Israeli defense minister, Moshe Arens, and other senior military officials wanted to retaliate. But U.S. President George H. W. Bush’s administration, particularly Secretary of State James Baker, persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir not to do so. Baker reassured Shamir that Israel could give the United States specific targets it wanted hit, and the United States would hit them. But he also stressed that the world stood against Saddam, and that if Israel retaliated directly, it risked disrupting the coalition fighting Iraq. Saddam was trying to transform the conflict into an Arab-Israeli war, and it was not in Israel’s interest to play into his hands. In 1991, Israel’s prime minister accepted the counsel of the American president. There is, of course, one big difference between 1991 and today: back then, the U.S. military was attacking Iraq, not simply trying to intercept its missile launches. The United States is not about to attack Iran today. That said, in 1991, Israel was not already in the midst of another war, as it is today in Gaza. And unlike today, Israel was not also juggling a tense northern front with Hezbollah that could easily escalate into an all-out conflict. In 1991, Israel’s prime minister accepted the counsel of the American president and secretary of state because he could see that it was in Israel’s interest for the coalition against Saddam to remain intact. Shamir also believed that by responding favorably to the United States, he could repair his relationship with Bush, which had become strained over disagreements about Israel’s settlements policy. Bush appreciated Shamir’s decision, but the two leaders continued to clash over the United States’ provision of $10 billion in loan guarantees, which Israel needed to manage a surge in immigrants from the Soviet Union. Bush wanted to condition those guarantees on Israel’s freezing settlement building in the West Bank. Shamir would not agree, and the Bush administration did not provide the guarantees until it reached an agreement with Shamir’s successor, Yitzhak Rabin, on reducing the value of the guarantees by the amount the United States estimated that Israel was spending annually on settlements. MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY The nature of Israel’s response to the Iranian attack shows that Netanyahu, too, is willing to take American concerns into account—not going as far as Shamir did to placate Washington but clearly limiting Israel’s response. Today, Netanyahu is also under pressure to repair rifts in his relationship with America’s president, ones that have opened not over Israel’s fundamental war aims in Gaza—ensuring that Hamas can never again threaten Israel—but over Israel’s approach to its military campaign and to humanitarian assistance entering Gaza. As was the case in 1991, Israel’s restraint in its response to an outside attack will not, by itself, reset its relationship with the United States. With Israel’s assault on Rafah looming, the ties between Biden and Netanyahu could become even more strained. But a U.S.-brokered normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia is the most important thing that could change the trajectory of the relationship. Biden understands that because the Saudis require a credible political advance for the Palestinians in order to finalize a normalization deal, Netanyahu will have to take on the part of his political base that most staunchly opposes Palestinian statehood. And the negotiations cannot make serious progress unless the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is eased—something that cannot easily be done without a cease-fire. No doubt such a move will be politically difficult for Netanyahu to undertake. He is likely to argue that a pause would take the military pressure off Hamas. Having already greatly reduced its military presence in Gaza since November, however, Israel is not putting the kind of military pressure on Hamas that it was when a hostage deal was brokered that month. No hostages have been released since, a reality that suggests that Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, does not feel any serious pressure to seek a reprieve. Israel’s threat to invade Rafah may increase the pressure on Sinwar, but a Rafah operation cannot take place until Netanyahu fulfills his pledge to Biden that no invasion will happen before Israel evacuates the 1.4 million Palestinians crammed into the area. Because evacuation involves not only moving people but also ensuring they have a place to go that has adequate shelter, food, water, and medicine, an evacuation will itself take four to six weeks, probably longer. Netanyahu will have to choose between Biden and Ben-Gvir. In light of these realities, Israel should make a virtue of necessity. If it cannot go into Rafah for some weeks, the cease-fire means that it is giving up little but gaining a number of advantages. A four-to-six-week cease-fire would allow international organizations to ease conditions in Gaza and address the world’s concerns about famine there. They could put better mechanisms in place to ensure that sufficient humanitarian assistance not only enters Gaza but is also actually distributed to those most in need. A cease-fire would refocus the world’s attention onto Hamas’s intransigence and the plight of the Israeli hostages. And it would help alter the skeptical narrative that has taken hold about Israel internationally and reduce the pressure on it to end the war unconditionally. To be sure, the far-right Israeli ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir will oppose any unilateral cease-fire, no matter its duration. But their war aims are not the same as Netanyahu’s or the Israeli public’s. They want to reoccupy Gaza, and they will undoubtedly oppose any breakthrough with Saudi Arabia that requires concessions to Palestinians’ national aspirations. At some point or another, Netanyahu will have to choose between Biden and Ben-Gvir. Put simply, a unilateral Israeli cease-fire for four to six weeks would create a strategic opportunity—particularly if it creates an opening to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia and transform the tacit regional alignment that emerged after Iran’s attack on Israel into a more material reality. For the Biden administration, the role that Arab states played in helping defend Israel against Iran’s attack is a tangible new development that needs quick follow-up. The U.S. political calendar, too, makes achieving progress on Israeli-Saudi normalization urgent. Getting the Senate’s approval for the United States’ direct contributions to the deal—which include a U.S.-Saudi bilateral defense treaty and a civil-nuclear partnership between the two countries—is certain to become more difficult as the U.S. presidential election approaches. The new behavior that the Iran-Israel crisis in April provoked in numerous states shows that long-standing realities in the Middle East can change. Iran is now in a weak position, and Israel has a window of opportunity in an otherwise very difficult year. Rarely has Israel so urgently needed to seize a potential strategic opportunity. But this is equally true for the United States. Biden has a strong interest in showing that he was able to take the Israel-Hamas war and the chaos created by Iran’s proxies and forge a more stable and hopeful Middle East. There is a moment to do that now. But there is no telling how long it will last. You are reading a free article. Subscribe to Foreign Affairs to get unlimited access. Paywall-free reading of new articles and over a century of archives Unlock access to iOS/Android apps to save editions for offline reading Six issues a year in print and online, plus audio articles DENNIS ROSS is Counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a Professor at Georgetown University. A former U.S. Envoy to the Middle East, he served in senior national security positions in the Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama administrations. DAVID MAKOVSKY is Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute and Director of its Koret Project on Arab-Israel Relations. 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Iran, Hezbollah, and the Coming War in Lebanon Maha Yahya 以色列為何應宣布加薩單方面停火 扭轉哈馬斯和伊朗局面並推動與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化的機會 作者：丹尼斯·羅斯和大衛·馬科夫斯基 2024 年 5 月 1 日 2024 年 4 月，以色列士兵在加薩-以色列邊境巡邏 直到上個月，伊朗和以色列之間的戰爭基本上都是在暗處進行的。伊朗人決定將其帶出陰影，在伊斯蘭共和國歷史上首次從伊朗領土上直接公開攻擊以色列領土。一些觀察家認為，伊朗 4 月 13 日對以色列發動的無人機和飛彈攻擊是一種象徵性姿態。然而，考慮到向以色列發射的無人機和飛彈的數量及其有效載荷，伊朗顯然打算造成嚴重損害。 以色列的防禦幾乎無懈可擊，但它並沒有完全擊退伊朗的進攻。正如伊朗的攻擊是史無前例的，美國及其包括一些阿拉伯國家在內的一些盟友的直接軍事幹預也是史無前例的。美國中央司令部在英國和約旦的參與下攔截了伊朗向以色列發射的至少三分之一的無人機和巡航飛彈；沙烏地阿拉伯和阿拉伯聯合大公國也分享了幫助以色列保衛自己的情報。考慮到以色列與哈馬斯在加薩的戰爭在阿拉伯公眾中是多麼不受歡迎，他們願意扮演這個角色是引人注目的。 五天后，當以色列對伊朗的襲擊作出回應時，它考慮到華盛頓的克制呼籲，向伊朗鈾轉化工廠所在地伊斯法罕的 S-300 飛彈防禦系統導引雷達設施發射了三枚飛彈。這是一種非常有限的回應，旨在避免人員傷亡，同時表明以色列可以突破伊朗的防禦並打擊其想要打擊的任何目標。 以色列似乎認識到，應對伊朗及其代理人構成的威脅的最佳方式是與聯盟合作。這也是史無前例的。美國人、歐洲人和阿拉伯人聯合起來幫助攔截伊朗針對以色列發射的無人機和巡航飛彈的想法在不久前似乎是一種幻想，對以色列來說也是不可取的。以色列的國防精神一直是：“我們靠自己保衛自己。”這既是一種自豪感，也是一項原則——除了以色列人之外，沒有人必須代表以色列拿起武器。 但現在以色列不僅面臨伊朗，還面臨多個伊朗代理人組織，獨自面對所有這些戰線的成本實在太高了。這一事態發展，以及阿拉伯國家四月份表現出的與以色列一道應對伊朗及其代理人構成的威脅的意願，表明建立區域聯盟的窗口已經打開，該聯盟奉行共同戰略來對抗伊朗及其代理人。 。 然而，為了利用這一機遇，以色列、美國和阿拉伯國家——特別是沙烏地阿拉伯——需要認識到這一時刻的獨特性並抓住它。在美國的斡旋下，以色列和沙烏地阿拉伯之間的正常化協議取得突破，將為鞏固這一新興聯盟發揮巨大作用。如果沙烏地阿拉伯——其國王是伊斯蘭教兩大聖地的守護者——與以色列實現和平，那麼以色列與中東內外其他遜尼派多數國家的關係可能​​會隨之改變。美國總統拜登政府以及以色列和沙烏地阿拉伯領導人表示，他們仍然希望看到這樣的協議盡快達成。但拜登政府認為，在正常化談判能夠進行之前，加薩的戰鬥必須暫停。 四到六週的單方面停火將為以色列帶來許多戰略利益。 有人希望，以色列和哈馬斯在埃及就人質協議的談判最終能夠達成，並實現至少六週的停火。但拜登政府絕對不能把所有雞蛋都放在那個籃子裡。哈馬斯一次又一次地提出即將達成協議的希望，但最後卻落空了。如果埃及無法達成協議，拜登政府應採取唯一現實的選擇：鼓勵以色列宣布加薩單方面停火四到六週。 以色列的這樣的決定可能是為以色列與沙烏地阿拉伯正常化協議的推進創造條件的唯一途徑。當然，單方面停火在以色列會引起爭議，一方面是因為它將暫停加薩戰鬥與釋放人質脫鉤，另一方面因為它似乎向哈馬斯做出了一些讓步，但沒有任何回報。但事實上，四到六週的單方面停火將為以色列帶來許多戰略利益，而幾乎沒有實質缺點。事實上，如果與哈馬斯的談判再次失敗，以色列領導人如果希望在人質還活著的情況下釋放人質，就需要採取不同的做法。 以色列在製定對伊朗襲擊的回應時聽取了拜登政府的意見，這一事實表明它對美國的說服持開放態度。事實上，以色列可能正在形成一種新的現實，這種現實可能會改變其防禦、威懾和該地區的方式。 克制的先例 在國防戰略方面，以色列長期以來一直致力於自己打仗。它對美國的唯一要求就是幫助確保它有能力這樣做。然而，以色列為防禦伊朗攻擊而獲得的幫助不僅值得歡迎，而且也是必要的。 但這種幫助也為以色列帶來了義務。當其他國家參與以色列的防禦時，他們就有權要求以色列考慮他們的利益和關切。伊朗襲擊後，拜登向以色列領導人明確表示，他們不需要報復，因為他們的成功防禦本身就是巨大的成功，並且暗示對伊朗來說是令人尷尬的失敗。對以色列來說，完全不反擊將違背該國的基本威懾理念：如果你攻擊我們，你就會付出代價，沒有人可以迫使我們不應對威脅。但以色列總理本傑明·內塔尼亞胡不能輕易忽視美國的立場。 以色列的威懾概念始終影響著對直接威脅的反應，但今天值得回顧的例外。 1991年海灣戰爭期間，美軍進攻伊拉克後的第二天晚上，伊拉克總統薩達姆·侯賽因用飛毛腿飛彈襲擊了以色列。以色列國防部長摩西·阿倫斯和其他高級軍事官員想要報復。但美國總統喬治·H·W·布希政府，特別是國務卿詹姆斯·貝克，說服以色列總理伊扎克·沙米爾不要這樣做。貝克向沙米爾保證，以色列可以向美國提供其想要打擊的具體目標，而美國將打擊這些目標。但他也強調，全世界都反對薩達姆，如果以色列直接報復，就有可能破壞聯軍的伊拉克作戰能力。薩達姆試圖將衝突轉變為阿以戰爭，以色列不符合他的利益。 1991年，以色列總理接受了美國總統的建議。 當然，1991 年和今天有一個很大的區別：當時，美軍正在攻擊伊拉克，而不僅僅是試圖攔截其飛彈發射。美國今天不打算攻擊伊朗。也就是說，1991 年，以色列還沒有像今天的加薩那樣陷入另一場戰爭。與今天不同的是，以色列並沒有同時應對與真主黨緊張的北部戰線，這很容易升級為全面衝突。 1991年，以色列總理接受了美國總統和國務卿的建議，因為他認為保持反對薩達姆的聯盟完整符合以色列的利益。沙米爾也相信，透過對美國做出有利的回應，他可以修復與布希的關係，這種關係因對以色列定居點政策的分歧而變得緊張。 布希讚賞沙米爾的決定，但兩位領導人繼續在美國提供 100 億美元貸款擔保的問題上發生衝突，以色列需要這筆貸款來應對來自蘇聯的移民激增。布希希望以以色列凍結西岸定居點建設作為這些保證的條件。沙米爾不會同意，布希政府直到與沙米爾的繼任者伊扎克·拉賓達成協議，按照美國估計的以色列每年在定居點上花費的金額減少擔保價值，才提供這些擔保。 創造必要的美德 以色列對伊朗攻擊反應的性質表明，內塔尼亞胡也願意考慮美國的擔憂——不像沙米爾那樣安撫華盛頓，而是明確限制以色列的反應。如今，內塔尼亞胡還面臨修復與美國總統關係中裂痕的壓力，這不是因為以色列在加薩的基本戰爭目標——確保哈馬斯永遠無法再次威脅以色列——而是因為以色列對其軍事行動和人道行動的態度。 與 1991 年的情況一樣，以色列對外部攻擊反應的克製本身並不會重置與美國的關係。隨著以色列對拉法的攻擊迫在眉睫，拜登和內塔尼亞胡之間的關係可能​​會變得更加緊張。但在美國斡旋下，以色列和沙烏地阿拉伯之間的正常化協議是可能改變兩國關係軌跡的最重要的事情。拜登明白，由於沙烏地需要巴勒斯坦人取得可信的政治進展才能最終敲定正常化協議，內塔尼亞胡將不得不接受其政治基礎中最堅決反對巴勒斯坦建國的部分。除非加薩的人道危機得到緩解，否則談判就無法取得實質進展——如果沒有停火，這一點是不可能輕易實現的。 毫無疑問，內塔尼亞胡在政治上很難採取這樣的行動。他可能會辯稱，暫停將減輕哈馬斯的軍事壓力。然而，自去年11月以來，以色列已經大幅減少了在加薩的軍事存在，因此並沒有像當月促成人質交易時那樣向哈馬斯施加軍事壓力。此後，沒有人質被釋放，這一事實表明，哈馬斯在加薩的領導人葉海亞·辛瓦爾並沒有感受到任何尋求緩刑的巨大壓力。以色列威脅入侵拉法可能會增加辛瓦爾的壓力，但在內塔尼亞胡兌現他對拜登做出的承諾（即在以色列撤離擠在該地區的140萬巴勒斯坦人之前不會發生入侵）之前，拉法行動無法進行。由於疏散不僅涉及轉移人員，還涉及確保他們有一個可以去的地方，並有足夠的住所、食物、水和藥品，因此疏散本身需要四到六週的時間，甚至可能更長。 內塔尼亞胡將不得不在拜登和本格維爾之間做出選擇。 鑑於這些現實，以色列應該將其視為必要的美德。如果它幾週內無法進入拉法，停火意味著它幾乎沒有放棄，但獲得了許多優勢。為期四到六週的停火將使國際組織能夠緩解加薩的局勢並解決世界對那裡飢荒的擔憂。他們可以建立更好的機制，確保充足的人道援助不僅進入加沙，而且實際上分發給最需要的人。停火將使世界的注意力重新集中到哈馬斯的頑固立場和以色列人質的困境。這將有助於改變國際上對以色列的懷疑態度，並減輕以色列無條件結束戰爭的壓力。 可以肯定的是，以色列極右翼部長貝扎雷爾·斯莫特里奇和伊塔馬爾·本·格維爾將反對任何單方面停火，無論停火持續多久。但他們的戰爭目標與內塔尼亞胡或以色列公眾的不同。他們想要重新佔領加沙，他們無疑會反對任何需要對巴勒斯坦人的民族願望做出讓步的與沙烏地阿拉伯的突破。在某個時候，內塔尼亞胡將不得不在拜登和本格維爾之間做出選擇。 簡而言之，以色列單方面停火四到六週將創造一個戰略機會——特別是如果它創造了與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化的機會，並將伊朗襲擊以色列後出現的默契區域聯盟轉變為更物質的現實。對拜登政府來說，阿拉伯國家在幫助保衛以色列免受伊朗攻擊方面發揮的作用是一個切實的新進展，需要迅速跟進。美國的政治日程也使得以色列與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化取得進展變得緊迫。隨著美國總統選舉的臨近，獲得參議院批准美國對該協議的直接貢獻（包括美國與沙烏地阿拉伯雙邊防禦條約以及兩國之間的民用核夥伴關係）肯定會變得更加困難。 四月份的伊朗-以色列危機在許多國家引發的新行為表明，中東長期存在的現實可能會改變。伊朗現在處於弱勢地位，而以色列在原本非常困難的一年裡有機會之窗。以色列很少如此迫切地需要抓住潛在的戰略機會。但這對美國來說也是如此。拜登非常希望能表明他能夠應對以色列與哈馬斯的戰爭和伊朗代理人所製造的混亂，並創造一個更穩定和充滿希望的中東。現在是時候這樣做了。但沒有人知道它會持續多久。 丹尼斯·羅斯是華盛頓近東政策研究所的顧問兼喬治城大學的教授。身為前美國駐中東特使，他曾在雷根、喬治·H·W·布希、柯林頓和歐巴馬政府中擔任高階國家安全職務。 大衛‧馬科夫斯基 是華盛頓研究所的齊格勒傑出研究員，也是該研究所阿拉伯-以色列關係科雷特計畫的主任。 更多丹尼斯羅斯的作品 大衛·馬科夫斯基的更多作品 更多的： 中東 以色列 巴勒斯坦 領土 伊朗沙烏地 阿拉伯 安全 防務與軍事 衝突後重建 戰略與衝突 戰爭與軍事戰略 美國外交政策 拜登政府 巴以 衝突 以色列 與哈馬斯戰爭 美以關係 最常閱讀的文章 僅靠美國的援助無法拯救烏克蘭 為了生存，基輔必須建立新的旅並迫使莫斯科進行談判 傑克沃特林 亞洲搖擺州的神話 大國競爭不再主導該地區政治 保羅‧史丹尼蘭 中國的替代秩序 美國該從中學到什麼 伊麗莎白經濟 以色列為何應宣布加薩單方面停火 扭轉哈馬斯和伊朗局面並推動與沙烏地阿拉伯關係正常化的機會 丹尼斯·羅斯和大衛·馬科夫斯基 推薦文章 2024 年 4 月，德黑蘭，一幅描繪伊朗飛彈的橫幅 中東正在形成反伊朗聯盟嗎？ 以色列與阿拉伯國家合作的局限性 達莉亞·達薩·凱和薩南·瓦基爾 2024 年 4 月，黎巴嫩人在貝魯特觀看真主黨領導人賽義德·哈桑·納斯魯拉的講話 以色列的下一個陣線？ 伊朗、真主黨和即將到來的黎巴嫩戰爭 摩訶葉海亞 The Delusion of Peak China America Can’t Wish Away Its Toughest Challenger By Evan S. Medeiros May/June 2024 Published on April 24, 2024 Illustration by the Project Twins Sign in and save to read later Print this article Send by email Share on Twitter Share on Facebook Share on LinkedIn Get a link Page url https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/delusion-peak-china-united-states-evan-medeiros Request Reprint Permissions Play Download Article Ever since Chinese President Xi Jinping secured his third term in power in the fall of 2022, he has had a rough time. Shortly after his reappointment, street protests pushed him to abruptly abandon his signature “zero COVID” policy. After a quick reopening bump in early 2023, the economy has progressively slowed, revealing both cyclical and structural challenges. Investors are leaving in droves, with foreign direct investment and portfolio flows reaching record lows. Meanwhile, Xi has fired his handpicked minsters for defense and foreign affairs in the wake of allegations of corruption and worse. His military bungled its balloon intelligence-collection program, precipitating Finish reading this article for free. Enter your email and we'll send a paywall-free link directly to your inbox. name@provider.com In addition to your unlocked article, you will receive our flagship weekly newsletter Foreign Affairs This Week, as well as occasional updates and offers from Foreign Affairs. You can unsubscribe at any time. For more information, visit our user agreement and privacy policy. Get unlimited access to all Foreign Affairs. Subscribe now. Are you already a subscriber? Sign in. EVAN S. MEDEIROS is Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council during the Obama administration. MORE BY EVAN S. 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