Trump's 'Liberation Day' Tariffs: Fair trade or global trade war?

歷史視角：自由貿易變天使或惡魔　取決於民主化與否 羅德瑞克（Dani Rodrik） 2024年04月02日 羅德瑞克（Dani Rodrik） ●國際經濟學會主席 ●哈佛大學甘迺迪政府學院國際政治經濟學教授 經濟學中很少有像「自由貿易」這樣充滿意識形態的術語。在當今提倡自由貿易，你很可能被視為幫財閥、金融家和逐利而居的企業辯護。如果為開放經濟邊界發聲，你會被貼上天真幼稚的標籤，甚至被看成中國共產黨的走狗，中共對人權和國內普通工人的命運漠不關心。 正如所有諷刺漫畫所描述的，反貿易立場也有其道理。近幾十年來不斷增長的貿易，確實導致美國和其他已開發經濟體不平等狀況加劇、中產階級式微。如果說自由貿易落下一個壞名聲，那是因為全球化的推動者忽視其弊端，或表現得好像對這些弊端無能為力。這種盲點使川普之流的煽動家得以將貿易武器化，並將少數族裔、移民和經濟競爭對手妖魔化。 對貿易的反感也不僅是右翼民粹主義者的專利。這些人還包括激進左派、氣候活動家、食安倡導者、人權運動者、工會、消費者權益倡導者和反企業團體。美國總統拜登也明顯與自由貿易保持距離，拜登政府相信建立一個安全、綠色、公平、有韌性的美國經濟，必須優先於超級全球化。所有進步派似乎都認為，無論如何解讀，自由貿易都會成為社會公正的阻礙。 但情況並非總是如此。自由貿易是19世紀政治改革者的戰鬥號角，他們視其為打敗專制主義、結束戰爭和減少嚴重貧富不均的工具。正如艾克斯特大學歷史學家帕倫（Marc-William Palen）在《經濟和平：自由貿易世界的左翼願景》（Pax Economica: Left-Wing Visions of a Free Trade World,暫譯）一書中提醒我們的，那個時代的經濟世界主義包含了反軍國主義、反奴隸制和反帝國主義等進步目標。 而支持自由貿易的也不光只有政治自由主義者。19世紀末的美國民粹主義者堅決反對金本位制，但也反對進口關稅，因為他們認為這對大企業有利，損害一般民眾利益，並推動用更公平的累進所得稅來取代關稅。隨後在20世紀早期，許多社會主義者認為在超越國家監管支持下的自由貿易，是軍國主義、貧富差距和壟斷的解藥。 這些相互衝突的觀點似乎構成了一個難題。貿易是促進和平、自由和經濟機會，還是助長衝突、壓迫和不平等？事實上，這個謎團呈現的是更多表像而非實質。無論哪種結果（或是介乎其中的任何結果），其實都取決於貿易賦予誰權力。 19世紀的自由主義和改革派人士之所以是自由貿易者，因為他們認為保護主義是為土地貴族、商業壟斷者和戰爭販子等退步的利益集團服務，並將經濟民族主義與帝國主義、侵略視為一丘之貉。帕倫引用經濟學家熊彼得（Joseph Schumpeter）在1919年發表的一篇文章，文中將帝國主義描述為「返祖式軍國主義和保護主義的獨有症狀──唯有民主自由貿易力量才能治癒的疾病」。 而正是這一觀點影響二戰後的國際貿易體系。國際貿易組織（International Trade Organization）的美國設計者追隨赫爾（Cordell Hull，羅斯福總統的國務卿）的腳步，認為他們是透過自由貿易追求世界和平。赫爾是經濟世界主義者，也是19世紀激進的自由貿易提倡者科布登（Richard Cobden）的忠實信徒。不同於以往的制度，戰後秩序旨在成為一個摒棄雙邊主義和帝國特權的全球規則體系。雖然美國國會最終沒有批准成立國際貿易組織，但其中一些關鍵原則——包括多邊主義和非歧視——在世界貿易組織的前身、關稅暨貿易總協定（GATT）中留存下來。 但貿易一樣可以被輕易利用，達到專制和軍國主義目的。一個特別糟糕的例子就是南北戰爭之前的美國——自由貿易反而鞏固了奴隸制。在1787年起草美國憲法期間，南方奴隸主設法將禁止對出口徵稅寫進憲法文本，他們深知自由貿易將確保種植農耕繼續獲利，並維護其賴以生存的奴隸制。隨著北方在內戰中擊敗南方，奴隸制被廢除，自由貿易又被保護主義所取代，因為後者更符合北方的商業利益。 英國帝國主義時期的情況與此類似。1846年廢除《玉米法》後，英國政府在名義上放棄了保護主義，並帶頭在歐洲簽署了自由貿易協定。但在非洲、中東和亞洲，每當英國人遇到擁有價值商品和市場的弱勢統治者時，就會用槍桿子將自由貿易強加於人。 英國在19世紀中葉發動惡名昭彰的鴉片戰爭，迫使中國統治者向英國和其他西方商品（主要是鴉片）開放市場，這樣西方國家就可以在無需耗盡自身黃金的情況下，採購中國的茶葉、絲綢和瓷器。這些鴉片是在印度種植的，正如葛旭（Amitav Ghosh）在新書《煙與灰：鴉片秘史》（Smoke and Ashes：Opium's Hidden Histories，暫譯）中詳細的描述，英國的壟斷迫使農民在極其惡劣的條件下勞作，給當地人留下長期的傷痕。自由貿易可以為壓迫和戰爭服務，反之亦然。 相形之下，二戰後美國領導的多邊自由貿易體制要好得多。在GATT之下，商業外交取代了戰爭，許多非西方國家——例如日本、南韓、台灣以及最引人注目的中國，都借助全球市場迅速擴大了經濟規模。 但到了1990年代，貿易體制已成為自身成功的犧牲品。拜全球經濟擴張之賜，大型公司和跨國企業主導貿易談判的力量日漸增強。環境、公共衛生、人權、經濟安全和國內公平反而退居次要。國際貿易再次偏離了科布登和赫爾的最初設想，變成國際紛爭而非和諧的根源。 歷史的教訓在於，要使貿易成為積極的力量就必須使其民主化。這是確保貿易實現共同利益、不為私利服務的唯一途徑——也是我們在未來幾年重建世界貿易體制時，應當牢記的重要教訓。 （本篇翻譯由PS官方提供，責任編輯：楊淑華） © Project Syndicate （原標題為《The Two Faces of Free Trade》 The Two Faces of Free Trade Mar 8, 2024 DANI RODRIK Whereas free trade was once the central cause of progressive reformers seeking to combat entrenched interests on behalf of ordinary people, now it is the bête noire of both right-wing nationalists and the mainstream left. To understand why attitudes changed so radically, one must follow the money. CAMBRIDGE – Few terms in economics are as ideologically loaded as “free trade.” Advocate it nowadays, and you are likely to be regarded as an apologist for plutocrats, financiers, and footloose corporations. Defend open economic borders, and you will be labeled naive or, worse, a stooge of the Communist Party of China who cares little about human rights or the fate of ordinary workers at home. arezki19_MARCO LONGARIAFP via Getty Images_senegalelection Politics 0 Senegal’s Election and Africa’s Future RABAH AREZKI considers what Bassirou Diomaye Faye's presidency could mean for one of Africa's most closely watched democracies. As with all caricatures, there is a grain of truth in the anti-trade stance. Growing trade did contribute to rising inequality and the erosion of the middle class in the United States and other advanced economies in recent decades. If free trade got a bad name, that is because globalization’s boosters ignored its downsides or acted as if nothing could be done about them. This blind spot empowered demagogues like Donald Trump to weaponize trade and demonize racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, and economic rivals. Nor is antipathy to trade the province only of right-wing populists. It also includes radical leftists, climate activists, food-safety advocates, human-rights campaigners, labor unions, consumer advocates, and anti-corporate groups. US President Joe Biden, too, has noticeably distanced himself from free trade. His administration believes that building a secure, green, equitable, and resilient US economy must take precedence over hyper-globalization. All progressives, it seems, believe that free trade stands in the way of social justice, however understood. It wasn’t always this way. Free trade was the rallying cry of nineteenth-century political reformers, who saw it as a vehicle for defeating despotism, ending wars, and reducing crushing inequalities in wealth. As University of Exeter historian Marc-William Palen reminds us in Pax Economica: Left-Wing Visions of a Free Trade World, the era’s economic cosmopolitanism encapsulated progressive causes such as anti-militarism, anti-slavery, and anti-imperialism. Sign up for our weekly newsletter, PS on Sunday your@email.com And it wasn’t just political liberals who supported free trade. US populists in the late nineteenth century staunchly opposed the gold standard, but they were also against import tariffs, which they thought benefited big business and harmed ordinary people. They pushed to replace tariffs with a more equitable progressive income tax. Then, during the early part of the twentieth century, many socialists viewed free trade, supported by supranational regulation, as the antidote to militarism, wealth gaps, and monopolies. These conflicting views would seem to pose a conundrum. Does trade promote peace, freedom, and economic opportunity, or does it foster conflict, repression, and inequality? In fact, the enigma is more apparent than real. Either outcome – or anything in between – depends on whom trade empowers. PS_Digital_1333x1000_Intro-Offer1 Subscribe to PS Digital Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive. SUBSCRIBE NOW Nineteenth-century liberals and reformers were free traders because they thought protectionism served retrograde interests, including landed aristocrats, business monopolies, and warmongers. They believed economic nationalism went hand in hand with imperialism and aggression. Palen cites a 1919 essay by the economist Joseph Schumpeter, who depicted imperialism as a “monopolistic symptom of atavistic militarism and protectionism – an ailment that only democratic free-trade forces could cure.” It was this vision that informed the post-World War II international trade system. The American architects of the International Trade Organization followed in the footsteps of Cordell Hull, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s secretary of state, believing they were pursuing world peace through free trade. Hull was an economic cosmopolitan and a devotee of the nineteenth-century radical free-trade advocate Richard Cobden. Unlike previous regimes, the postwar order was meant to be a system of global rules that did away with bilateralism and imperial privileges. While the US Congress ultimately failed to ratify the ITO, some of its key principles – including multilateralism and non-discrimination – survived in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor to the World Trade Organization. But trade can be instrumentalized just as easily for authoritarian and militaristic ends. A particularly egregious example is Antebellum America, where free trade served to entrench slavery. During the drafting of the US Constitution in 1787, slave-owning Southerners ensured that the text would prohibit the taxation of exports. They well understood that free trade would ensure that plantation agriculture remained profitable and safeguard the system of slavery on which it was based. When the North defeated the South in the Civil War, slavery was abolished and free trade was replaced with protectionism, which suited Northern business interests better. The situation under British imperialism was similar. After the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, the British government nominally turned its back on protectionism and led Europe in signing free-trade agreements. But in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, free trade was imposed through the barrel of a gun whenever the British encountered weak potentates ruling over valuable commodities and markets. The British fought the infamous Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century to force Chinese rulers to open their markets to British and other Western goods (opium chief among them), so that Western countries in turn could buy China’s tea, silk, and porcelain without draining their gold. The opium was grown in India, where, as Amitav Ghosh details in his new book, Smoke and Ashes, a British monopoly forced farmers to work under horrendous conditions that left long-term scars. Free trade served repression and war, and vice versa. The post-WWII regime of multilateral free trade under American leadership would fare much better. Under GATT, commercial diplomacy replaced wars, and many non-Western countries – such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and, most spectacularly, China – expanded their economies rapidly by leveraging global markets. By the 1990s, however, the trade regime had become a victim of its own success. Large corporations and multinationals, empowered by the expansion of the global economy, increasingly drove trade negotiations. The environment, public health, human rights, economic security, and domestic equity took a back seat. International trade had yet again moved away from Cobden and Hull’s original vision, turning into a source of international discord instead of harmony. The lesson of history is that turning trade into a positive force requires that we democratize it. That is the only way to ensure it serves the common good, rather than narrow interests – an important lesson to keep in mind as we reconstruct the world trade regime in the years ahead. PS_Digital_1333x1000_Intro-Offer1 Subscribe to PS Digital Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive. SUBSCRIBE NOW FEATURED The Hitler Trial’s Lessons in the Trump Era Apr 1, 2024 MARK JONES A European War Union? Apr 3, 2024 YANIS VAROUFAKIS Can AI Learn to Obey the Law? Apr 3, 2024 ANTARA HALDAR Europe Must Prepare for a Trump Presidency Apr 3, 2024 MARK LEONARD China Needs a Better Innovation Ecosystem Apr 2, 2024 ANDREW SHENG & XIAO GENG Dani Rodrik DANI RODRIK Writing for PS since 1998