Trump's 'Liberation Day' Tariffs: Fair trade or global trade war?

FA： A Palestinian Revival How to Build a New Political Order After Israel’s Assault on Gaza By Khaled Elgindy December 18, 2023 After Israeli strikes in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, December 2023 After Israeli strikes in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, December 2023 Mohammed Salem / Reuters After ten weeks of waging a brutal war in Gaza, Israeli leaders continue to insist that their military campaign will press ahead until Hamas has been eliminated. They have yet to articulate what that would mean in practice or who or what they expect to fill the governance void such an outcome would leave. Given the absence of a clear endgame, there has been no shortage of speculation about what will happen after the bombs stop falling. Mooted “day after” scenarios run the gamut from fanciful notions of an Arab-run trusteeship over Gaza to downright disturbing calls, mostly from Israelis, for the transfer of most or all of Gaza’s population to Egypt. The Biden administration has laid out its own “day after” parameters, which, among other things, rule out the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza or the territory’s reoccupation by Israel. In addition, the administration has said it wants to see a return of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority (PA)—the Palestinian body nominally in control of parts of the West Bank—to Gaza and, in contrast with the last three years, now says it is serious about a political process that culminates in the two-state solution, with a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel. The administration’s hopeful vision, however, is likely to run up against some hard realities. For one, no one knows when or how this war will end or how much of Gaza and how many Gazans will be left when the fighting stops. Moreover, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel will not allow the PA to return to Gaza, promising to keep Israeli forces in Gaza indefinitely, including laying out plans for a permanent “buffer zone” inside Gaza that would further constrict the land available to Palestinians. He has assured his partners in his governing coalition that he is the only leader who can prevent the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. Events on the ground are already moving in dangerous directions. The sheer magnitude of death and destruction in Gaza is difficult to fathom. According to Gaza’s health ministry, the Israeli assault has so far killed at least 18,800 people, mostly civilians (including 8,200 children). The operation has uprooted more than 80 percent of Gaza’s 2.3 million inhabitants and rendered much of northern Gaza uninhabitable. Israel’s severe restrictions on supplies of food, water, and fuel to Gaza’s population have led to widespread outbreaks of disease and hunger and what the United Nations has described as an “epic humanitarian catastrophe” and have even prompted warnings from UN officials and other observers of the possibility of genocide. Moreover, the weaponization of mass starvation and disease, combined with the near-total collapse of Gaza’s health care system and the incessant bombardment of a population crammed into ever-shrinking spaces, make it more likely by the day that some or all of Gaza’s vulnerable residents will be forced over the border into Egypt. Such an outcome aligns with Netanyahu’s desire to see a “thinning out” of Gaza’s population. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. Alongside Israeli-imposed realities on the ground, the future of Gaza will also depend on developments within internal Palestinian politics. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that Palestinians need to be “at the center” of conversations about Gaza’s future. But for this to happen, Palestinians will need to revive not just institutions of governance and security but also, more fundamentally, of politics: the lack of effective political leadership owing to the decay of Palestinian political institutions, notably the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the umbrella organization that ostensibly represents the various factions involved in the Palestinian national movement. As is now clear, the division and stagnation that have plagued Palestinian political institutions for the last 16 years have been disastrous not only for Palestinians but for Israelis and the region as well. Indeed, as many analysts (including myself) have long warned, the debilitating split between Hamas and Fatah—the two biggest Palestinian political factions, which warred over Gaza in 2007—had become a perpetual source of violence and instability. Although much of this Palestinian political dysfunction was self-inflicted, Israel has actively worked to promote weakness and division among Palestinians to maintain its indefinite rule over the occupied territories. This divide-and-rule approach to the Palestinians was epitomized by Netanyahu’s cynical hope that propping up Hamas in Gaza would prevent an eventual two-state solution. The events of October 7 brought that policy to an end. Any discussion of the “day after” should therefore be predicated on encouraging the emergence of a unitary and cohesive Palestinian political leadership. Palestinian leaders will have to set aside their factional commitments, and Israel and the United States will have to relinquish the wholly unrealistic idea that Hamas can be permanently excluded from Palestinian politics. Convincing either Palestinians or Israel and its U.S. allies to do so will not be easy. But if they fail to make these accommodations, humanitarian and security conditions in Gaza are unlikely to improve and a diplomatic settlement will remain far out of reach. ANOTHER CATACLYSM The events unfolding in Gaza since October 7 are of a historic nature, on par with other cataclysmic moments in Palestinian history, such as the 1948 nakba or “calamity,” during which some 800,000 Palestinians, around two-thirds of the British Mandatory Palestine’s Arab population, were forced out of their homes or fled and barred from returning, and the Six-Day War of 1967, when Israel captured the remaining parts of historic Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and another 300,000 Palestinians were expelled from their homes or fled. Like 1948 and 1967, the current Gaza war is likely to alter the trajectory of Palestinian politics in ways that are impossible to predict. The ongoing assault on Gaza is already the deadliest single event and the largest forced displacement of Palestinians in history. Just as the horrific attack of October 7 by Hamas will be felt by Israelis for many years, the sheer magnitude of human and physical destruction inflicted on Gaza by Israel will leave an indelible imprint on Palestinian national consciousness for generations to come. Like the nakba, the collective trauma of Gaza today is being experienced well beyond its borders among Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Israel, and the diaspora, and even more broadly across the Arab world, and it will shape the political consciousness of the next generation of Palestinian leaders. In the meantime, the difficult but unavoidable reality is that Israel’s stated goal of eliminating Hamas as a political and military force cannot be achieved and is, quite frankly, a recipe for endless death and destruction. The sooner Israeli and U.S. officials come to terms with this fact, the better off everyone will be. Two months of ferocious bombing and the destruction of large portions of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure have failed to dislodge Hamas from power or significantly degrade its military capabilities, including its ability to launch rockets, and has done little to disrupt its systems of command and control. The hostages-for-prisoners deal, although short-lived, demonstrated Hamas’s continued relevance; Israel has no choice but to deal with the group. A recent study by +972 Magazine suggests that Israel may be deliberately inflicting mass civilian casualties and suffering in the hope of inducing Gazans to turn on Hamas, but there is little evidence that such a turn is happening. Indeed, it is more likely that the Israeli bombardment and invasion of Gaza have achieved the opposite effect, driving many Palestinians toward Hamas, as recent polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research have shown. Hamas is an integral component of Palestinian politics with deep roots in society and a significant following both inside and outside the occupied territories. However abhorrent some of its actions or ideas may be, Hamas will likely remain part of the Palestinian political landscape for the foreseeable future. Moreover, as long as the conditions of occupation, blockade, and other forms of Israeli structural violence persist in Gaza, some form of violent resistance from Hamas, or another group like it, will continue. A RETURN TO GAZA? Because of Hamas’s durability and other reasons, it is unrealistic to expect that the group’s rivals in the PA can simply swoop into Gaza and take control of the territory. Despite the preferences of the United States and other Western powers, the PA is unlikely to return to Gaza anytime soon—at least not as it is currently constituted. Netanyahu’s ruling coalition has also expressly rejected that possibility. But even if Israeli leaders could be convinced to change their minds, the PA sees the possibility of regaining control over the devastated territory as a poisoned chalice. No Palestinian leader wants to be seen taking over Gaza on the back of Israeli tanks, particularly someone as intensely weak and unpopular as PA President Mahmoud Abbas. He has said the PA will not return to Gaza unless a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood has been established. That remains highly improbable given Israel’s far-right government, parts of which favor the outright annexation of the Palestinian territories, and the Biden administration’s track record in the Middle East, including its reluctance to put pressure on Israel. Moreover, the PA can barely control the limited areas under its jurisdiction and is in a state of slow-motion collapse, and Abbas has no desire to inherit the monumental humanitarian and security problems resulting from Israel’s destruction of Gaza. The feeling is most likely mutual, as Palestinians in Gaza are unlikely to be enthusiastic about embracing Abbas’s corrupt and feckless bureaucracy. In the end, given Abbas’s intense unpopularity and Hamas’s intractable presence on the ground, any return of the PA would still require Hamas’s consent. In light of the flagging legitimacy of the current Palestinian leadership, many both inside and outside Palestine see new elections, which have not been held since 2006, as a necessary component of the postwar order and the eventual reconstruction of Gaza. But the chances of holding a vote are extremely low. The Israeli onslaught in Gaza has caused massive dislocation, destruction, and suffering, conditions likely to persist for some time. These conditions simply would not allow for elections to take place. Then there is the perennial and unavoidable question of whether Hamas would be allowed to participate. It is virtually impossible to imagine any circumstance under which Israel or the United States would allow even a reformed Hamas to contest future elections. And yet an electoral process that expressly excluded Hamas would rob it of legitimacy and could even lead to another civil war. In short, it is extremely difficult to see a way forward for Palestinian politics with Hamas, but equally, there is no way forward without it. THE REVIVAL OF THE PLO There are ways to overcome that basic conundrum, but they would require sober thinking and humility on the part of all parties. First and foremost, Israeli and U.S. officials will need to reconcile themselves to the fact that Hamas will, in one form or another, remain a force in Palestinian politics. In addition, they must abandon the idea that they can reengineer Palestinian politics to suit Israeli (or U.S.) political needs, a conceit that has helped erode the domestic legitimacy of Palestinian leaders since the Oslo process began in 1993. No less crucial, Palestinian leaders from across the political spectrum must set aside their parochial differences to address the truly existential challenges that they now face. Many Palestinians already recognize what must be done to revive their politics: the disentangling of the PA from the Palestine Liberation Organization. Whereas the PLO is supposed to be the official address of the Palestinian national movement that represents Palestinians everywhere, the PA was originally set up by the Oslo accords as a temporary governing body overseeing the affairs of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. In the process, the PLO was gutted and its institutional and human resources were effectively folded into the PA in anticipation of an eventual Palestinian state. That state never came to fruition; moreover, as the PA became the de facto locus for Palestinian politics, the PLO was sidelined and allowed to atrophy. The goal, then, should be to reverse this process by downgrading the PA and upgrading the PLO while more clearly delineating the lines between them. This delineation can be achieved through the creation of a technocratic government that is agreed to by all factions, including Hamas, but does not include members of any of them. Such a government should be transitional until the creation of an actual Palestinian state or at least until conditions allow for elections to be held. Because this government would not include Hamas, it could receive international donor aid and function as a service provider rather than a political body. Hamas’s exclusion from Palestinian politics enabled years of violence and instability. Unlike most other political systems, where the functions of governance and political leadership are generally held by the same people, the realities of Israeli occupation and the arrangements produced by the Oslo accords have meant that those who govern Palestinians are not necessarily the same as those who lead them. In that distinction lies an opportunity. At the same time as a technocratic Palestinian administration stabilizes and rebuilds Gaza, the PLO must evolve so that it can provide credible Palestinian political leadership and enjoy the legitimacy and support of the Palestinian people. It must expand to include Hamas and other factions currently outside the PLO umbrella as well as representatives of Palestinian civil society both inside the occupied territories and in the diaspora. This basic formula has been outlined in successive Palestinian reconciliation agreements since 2011, but thanks both to Abbas’s reluctance to share power as well as to U.S. and Israeli inability to accept a political role for Hamas, it has never been implemented. The idea of normalizing Hamas’s presence within the PLO will no doubt spark outrage in Israel, the U.S. Congress, and elsewhere. This is understandable, but it is not reasonable. It was precisely Hamas’s exclusion from Palestinian politics that allowed the group to serve as a free agent and spoiler, that enabled years of violence and instability culminating in October 7. Conversely, the inclusion of Hamas in the PLO’s governing bodies such as the Executive Committee and its long-dormant parliament, the Palestine National Council, would help to moderate the group and limit its ability to act on its own. Decisions of war and peace, including the disposition of Hamas’s weapons, would not be in the hands of any one party but matters of collective Palestinian decision-making and consensus. Although this will make a diplomatic settlement between Israel and the PLO more difficult to achieve, such an agreement is far more likely to stick. In any case, the question of who may or may not participate in Palestinian politics should not be subject to Israeli veto any more than Palestinians should be allowed to choose which parties may run in Knesset elections. Indeed, an effective Palestinian leadership must be able to act in accordance with Palestinian national needs and priorities independently of Israel and the United States, whose coercive influence over the past three decades has helped erode the legitimacy of Palestinian leaders in the eyes of their people. As Palestinians know all too well from their painful history, it is precisely in those moments when they do not have a credible political leadership that bad things tend to happen to them. This is certainly one of those moments—as the current Israeli leadership no doubt understands. But even though a pliable and ineffective Palestinian leadership may serve Israel’s short-term interests, it has been highly destabilizing to the region and detrimental to prospects for a diplomatic settlement. The challenges ahead for Palestinians require strong leadership of the sort that Abbas has not offered and cannot provide. Although Abbas is unlikely to embrace such reforms on his own, key Arab states that have a stake in regional stability and the fulfillment of Palestinian political aspirations, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, can help bring him along until such time as more credible leadership can emerge. It is impossible to imagine a process of rebuilding or stabilizing Gaza without a credible, legitimate, and united Palestinian leadership, which in turn requires a revival of Palestinian institutional politics and, more specifically, the PLO. For this to happen, the United States and especially Israel will need to abandon the dangerous notions that they can control or engineer Palestinian politics to suit their own political or ideological needs or that they can make peace with one set of Palestinians while simultaneously waging war on another. It is hard to take seriously U.S. rhetorical support for an independent Palestinian state if the United States is not even willing to allow Palestinians to control their own domestic politics. Normalizing Hamas within the context of revivified Palestinian politics will be a bitter pill to swallow, but the alternatives—such as continuing to insist on Hamas’s destruction, attempting to drag an illegitimate and ineffective PA to Gaza, or forcing elections in a volatile and crisis-ridden environment—will likely backfire as they have in the past. KHALED ELGINDY is Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs at the Middle East Institute. He is the author of Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians, From Balfour to Trump. The Atrophy of American Statecraft How to Restore Capacity for an Age of Crisis By Philip Zelikow January/February 2024 Published on December 12, 2023 Cinta Fosch The world has entered a period of high crisis. Wars rage in Europe and the Middle East, and the threat of war looms in East Asia. In Russia, China, and North Korea, the United States faces three hostile states with nuclear weapons and, in Iran, another on the verge of acquiring them. Beyond the headlines, states are failing in Africa, Latin America, and Southwest Asia, and enormous migrations are in motion. Having just weathered a pandemic that was the costliest crisis since 1945, the United States must now contend with other urgent transnational challenges, such as managing energy transition amid a deteriorating climate, the rapid development of artificial intelligence, and a global capitalist system under more pressure than it has been for decades. Unpacked, each one of these issues has its own set of complex problems that few understand. And on almost every issue, whether they like the Americans or resent them, people in the world look to the U.S. government for help, if only in organizing the work. The Americans cannot meet this demand. Their supply of effective policies is limited. The United States does not have the breadth and depth of competence—capabilities and know-how—in its contemporary government. The problem has existed for decades, as has been depressingly evident from time to time. What is new is the context. The current period of crisis challenges the United States and the other countries of the free world more than anything has in at least 60 years. They will have to cultivate new qualities of practical leadership. Saying what to do is the easy part. Designing how to do it is the hard part. “Ideas are not policies,” Dean Rusk observed while serving as U.S. secretary of state. “Besides, ideas have a high infant-mortality rate.” An even more experienced statesman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, commented that “hope flies on wings, and international conferences plod afterwards along dusty roads.” Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. The “how” is the “craft” in statecraft. Most of what the U.S. government does is distribute money and set rules. Relatively few parts of it mount policy operations, especially diplomatic ones. Doing so requires complex teamwork. Officials must master international choreographies, intricacies of law and practice, and a bewildering variety of instruments, cultures, and institutions spanning societies. The ability to do all that is a fading art in the United States and the rest of the free world. As it fades, handwringing and platitudes take its place. Officials paper over the gaps with meetings and pronouncements. The limited supply of effective U.S. policymaking was demonstrated tragically during the COVID-19 outbreak, when the world failed to create a global alliance to fight a global pandemic. It can be seen today in Ukraine, where the free world is struggling to sustain a country fighting a war of attrition. And it is surfacing in the Gaza Strip, where well-meaning countries try to help with Gaza’s future sustenance and governance. There will doubtless be new demands in the coming months and years, and one can debate which of them Washington and its allies must answer. But no one wants to take on a problem and then fail. Success has to be defined concretely and practically. Governments have to more effectively pool their capabilities and know-how. Only then can they convert blue-sky hopes into blueprints. THE AGE OF EMERGENCIES All three of the major anti-American partnerships of the last hundred years—the Axis powers in World War II, the communist countries during the Cold War, and the anti-American league today led by China, Russia, and Iran—had a common core. All regarded the United States (or the United Kingdom in its day) as the anchor of a domineering imperial system that tried to block their own aspirations. They rallied other countries that also felt oppressed. But beyond that, the partnerships exhibited no common master plan. The partners rarely trusted one another. They often did not even like one another. This generation’s period of high crisis may well subside, or it could get much worse. The history of past anti-American partnerships humbles complacent assumptions. It reveals rapid recalculations, quick turns, surprises. Dictatorships have always been riven by factions; their intentions and plans change suddenly, often affected by seemingly invisible details and circumstances. What is different this time, compared with those past eras of confrontation, is that the American public has not absorbed the gravity of the dangers, and the country’s industrial base is much narrower and less agile. The United States relies too much on ill-focused military insurance policies and has not adequately prepared plausible operational strategies short of direct warfare. In January 1941, while the United States was still at peace, President Franklin Roosevelt wrote to Joseph Grew, his old friend and prep school classmate and the U.S. ambassador to Japan. “We must recognize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict,” Roosevelt wrote. Each part had its own story. The president stressed that “the problems which we face are so vast and so interrelated that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas.” He went on: “We cannot lay down hard-and-fast plans. As each new development occurs we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.” So Roosevelt began marshaling resources on an epic scale. Congress had already resumed the conscription of soldiers, sailors, and airmen. In early 1941, the president and his team persuaded a bitterly divided Congress, in a bitterly divided country that was not yet at war, to spend ten percent of GDP to help foreigners. The money went to American supplies for those who were in the fight: the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China. The equivalent level of effort today would be about $2.6 trillion dollars—about 25 times the amount President Joe Biden requested in October 2023 from today’s divided Congress for Ukraine, Israel, and other priorities. The United States relies too much on ill-focused military insurance policies. The United States and its allies must now prepare for how they might be pulled into four different wars—with China, with Iran, with North Korea, and with Russia—and how these dangers could interact. The default assumption of most Western policymakers is that these rivals are led by fundamentally rational regimes that will not court the risks of seeking violent change. That was the default assumption a year before Russia invaded Ukraine. It was the default assumption the day before Hamas invaded Israel. The current era may well turn out to be a prewar period. But Americans, Europeans, Japanese, South Koreans, and Australians are not coordinating as if this were so. Meanwhile, the governments and media of China, Iran, and North Korea have been mobilizing for war. Russia is already at war and preparing for a long one. The existing level of conflict in the world is already the highest in more than a generation. Look just at the region surrounding the Gaza Strip. Even before Hamas’s October 7 attack, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen had already been shattered by conflict, resulting in millions of starving and displaced people. All the international mediation and reconstruction efforts to address these crises have been going poorly. All demonstrate the failure of the United Nations’ mediating and peacekeeping attempts. In each case, aid organizations struggle to meet needs and sustain support from weary donors. This tally does not include the ongoing international involvements in Iraq, Lebanon, and Somalia or in war-torn Ethiopia. Then there are the demands in other regions and on transnational concerns, such as the deteriorating climate, the digital and biological revolutions, and the fragility of global finance. Some of these issues have been festering for decades. Much of the news about cooperation among the free world is, again, disappointing: problems in orchestrating a global energy transition, with fragmented work on green technologies, frustrated talks on critical materials, and furious disagreements about how to ease the burdens on poor countries. LOST LESSONS In an emergency, people need effective action. No country faces more demands for providing that than the United States. The country may seem awfully powerful, in static enumerations of economic or military mass, but applied power—actual power out in the world—is something quite different. It is more like the measurement of kinetic energy, which is calculated with the formula 1/2 mv². The value of mass is halved. The value of velocity is squared. In statecraft, competence is velocity. Competence is a function of capabilities and know-how. When it comes to doing things in the world, Americans’ supply of both is constrained by two deep structural conditions. The first has been with the country, in varying degrees, since its founding: a sense of detachment. America is usually detached from foreign problems, often by a great distance, and Americans feel detached, too. Fortunate in its geology and continental breadth, the United States has never depended all that much on foreign commerce or foreign commodities. Public interest in foreign engagement—political, military, or economic—is limited. More than half of all Americans do not own a passport. Only one-third of them can find Taiwan on a map. The second factor limiting the United States’ global engagement is newer: its now limited repertoire of what it can do abroad. The repertoire dramatically expanded, as so much did, during World War II and the Cold War. By the middle of the twentieth century, U.S. officials were famous across the world for their know-how, esteemed as enterprising, imaginative problem solvers who could do almost anything in war or peace. The United States had helped organize D-Day, built the first atomic bomb, fed millions of people amid the ruins of Europe and Asia, rescued Western Europe with the Marshall Plan, and overcome a Soviet blockade with the Berlin airlift. Washington even helped eradicate smallpox. These and other awe-inspiring deeds drew on the exceptional and decentralized problem-solving culture of American business and civic planning that emerged in the twentieth century. The paradigmatic discipline of American business at the time was engineering. This can-do culture improved the way policy was designed and managed and encouraged strong habits of written staff work. It had emerged from vast and stressful trial and error, with plenty of rivalry and confusion. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaking at the United Nations in New York City, August 2023 Eduardo Munoz / Reuters Generations passed, the century ended, and little was done to preserve or teach the older skills and routines. Written operational analyses were subsumed by more meetings, with fewer efforts to record and reflect on what had been said. Unlike the methods taught for engineering, the techniques of policy staff work are rarely recognized or studied. There is no canon with norms of professional practice. American policymaking became procedural, less about deliberate engineering and more about improvised guesswork and bureaucratized habits. Meanwhile, as the mountains of superpower confrontation crumbled with the end of the Cold War, the remaining foothills began to seem like mountains. NATO and Croatia’s victory over little Serbia in 1995 fed years of hubris. That sensibility, mixed with the great fear after 9/11, ushered in the United States’ years of nemesis. Chastened, the American public’s already slender interest in foreign engagement thinned. The protectionist current became a flood. In the scholarly world, the fashion was to critique the United States’ hunger for empire, its endemic racism, its endless militarism, and its voracious capitalism. The implied corollary was that if the U.S. government was such a malign force in the world, then everyone would be better off if it stayed home. Even as the U.S. intelligence community grew and grew, the U.S. government’s capacity to analyze and solve problems did not. Its policy side became weakly staffed and poorly trained; officials had barely been taught about policy work at all. Those who excelled had usually taught themselves. When operations were needed, contractors had to be hired, and they often just compounded the problems. Although the military’s components were still potent, its force structure—the hugely expensive carriers, squadrons of aircraft, and brigades of troops stationed back home—became more symbolic and less relevant. Economic sanctions became the tool of first resort. Communiques and platitudes covered the rest. AGAINST VAGUENESS But paper palliatives will not address the world’s present emergencies. Generic doctrines of “restraint” or “realism” signal attitudes, not answers. George Marshall knew this well. In April 1947, Marshall, recently appointed secretary of state and fresh from a lengthy trip to Europe, gave a national radio address to tell the American people about the scale of the needed repairs on the continent. He implored them to be patient. “Problems which bear directly on the future of our civilization cannot be disposed of by general talk or vague formulae—by what Lincoln called ‘pernicious abstractions,’” Marshall warned. “They require concrete solutions for definite and extremely complicated questions.” Working with an extraordinary group of European leaders, Marshall and his team found those solutions, designing an extraordinary system that used American goods to cement new European partnerships and help European governments raise money to rebuild. Amid the spectacular recent failures in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, it is worth noticing some recent success stories, too. Consider the military realm. Between 2015 and 2019, after a year of floundering, having learned from prior missteps, and with relatively few troops, the United States helped lead a remarkable foreign coalition that liberated lands overrun by the Islamic State, or ISIS, in northern Iraq and eastern Syria. In global health, the United States and its partners, beginning in 2003, created an emergency plan for AIDS relief, known as PEPFAR, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Designed with the lessons of past failures in mind, these programs elicited broad support in Congress and across the world. They have saved millions of lives. Or look at diplomacy. Beginning in 2005, the United States orchestrated a complex global effort to accept India’s nuclear status and unwind a generation’s accumulation of restrictions. This diplomacy transformed relations and opened up trade in advanced technology with what is now the world’s most populous country. The United States has also authored economic success stories. Many rightly blame its failure to police highly leveraged asset speculation for the global financial crisis. But they should also recognize that as the crisis spread to Europe, American and European leaders did whatever it took to arrest it, backing financial guarantees to stave off sovereign defaults and keep the eurozone from plunging into the abyss. That continental collapse would have rippled back to the United States, and so this success may have prevented a replay of the sequence that produced the Great Depression. More recently, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, few would have predicted that Europe, and especially Germany, could ever wean itself from Russian energy. Yet after the invasion, a handful of European—especially German—leaders worked with Americans and rose to the challenge. What these and other successes demonstrate is a possibility theorem. Governments can still produce extraordinary results. But doing so will require a greater focus on the “how.” Consider three contemporary emergencies as illustrations: the failures in the war against COVID-19, the perilous situation now in Ukraine, and the challenge in Gaza. PANDEMIC POLICYMAKING Judged by its human and economic toll, the COVID-19 pandemic was a global war. More than 20 million people died. The United States spent, in discretionary fiscal policy, about $5 trillion. But in January 2020, few understood the pandemic that was unfolding. The so-called pandemic playbook prepared by the Obama administration did not actually diagram any plays. There was no “how.” It did not explain what to do. When it came to the job of containing COVID-19, the playbook was a blank page. What the ensuing months and years would expose was, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the erosion of operational capabilities in much of the U.S. government and the flailing reliance on management consultancies to plug these gaps. Early on, it became clear that the public sector did not have the resources it needed—drugs, masks, vaccines—from the private sector. The choices about what to do were relatively easy: almost everyone wanted tests, effective therapeutics, and vaccines. The problems arose in the “how.” The supposed U.S. success story in the pandemic was the Defense Department’s management of Operation Warp Speed, a public-private partnership to develop and deploy vaccines. But that success is more celebrated than understood. Thanks to prewar choices by some gifted officials, coronavirus R & D was already advanced when the pandemic broke out. The U.S. government and others had already sponsored early work on messenger RNA technology. An initiative improvised by career bureaucrats, outside experts, and administration gadflies, Operation Warp Speed did not score its main success in vaccine development. Rather, it succeeded by acquiring and manufacturing the vaccines at scale. It managed a portfolio of investments in different designs to hedge its bets on unproven mRNA technology, and it planned national distribution through the United States’ drugstores. Yet the mass production of vaccines was not knitted into strategies to coordinate global production and distribution or to persuade people to get the jabs. Global pandemics, like global wars, must be fought by global alliances. Only a handful of countries produced vaccines, but they never built an allied war effort against the virus. The disappointing performance of the World Health Organization, which neither warned of the outbreak nor coordinated a common response, did not cause that failure. Constrained by its members, the WHO reflected their failure. Paper palliatives will not address the world’s present emergencies. Reacting to prior decades of weak government work on vaccines, philanthropies had tried to fill the void by creating unusual nonprofit institutions such as Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and CEPI, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation. Some of the policymakers who spearheaded Operation Warp Speed wanted to use those nonprofits and organize a proper global effort. As the proposal for Operation Warp Speed made its way to President Donald Trump in April 2020, U.S. officials put aside building a global coalition and chose a national approach. In reaction, the nonprofits and their supporters had to quickly improvise a global structure. Aided by France and Singapore, they partnered with the WHO to create the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access initiative, or COVAX, to distribute vaccines across the world, based on need. By May 2020, there were thus two parallel structures: Operation Warp Speed and COVAX. COVAX immediately fell behind, spending months raising money. Watching what the United States had chosen, European countries decided they had to mimic that approach. The United Kingdom moved out on its own with a well-designed program. The EU tried to reconcile the desires of its 27 members’ health authorities. But European countries were growing impatient with the sluggish pace of the European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, in organizing a common vaccine effort. Shortly after the unveiling of Operation Warp Speed, four of them—France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands—announced that they would move ahead on their own. National, more self-interested, programs would thus be the pattern. In some ways, the story turned out well. The mRNA vaccine candidates worked. Private industry ramped up and produced vaccine doses on an astonishing scale. By the end of 2021, the supply of vaccines saturated global demand. Although it was improvised into existence practically overnight, COVAX was the principal reason a substantial fraction of people in low-income countries were vaccinated at all, helped by UNICEF and other organizations. Yet pushed to the back of the procurement queue, COVAX effectively lost at least a year of possible progress, instead fighting against vaccine hoarding, export restrictions, and problems with manufacturers. These delays caused millions of avoidable hospitalizations and deaths. The success of Operation Warp Speed is more celebrated than understood. Vaccine nationalism is no surprise. In a global coalition, major producers are not going to ignore the needs of their own people. But a coalition could have planned, from the start, to visibly take the whole world’s needs into account. In the absence of such planning, countries hoarded their own supplies until they were sure they would have a surplus, at which point some offered that surplus to COVAX. The problem was that it takes time to set up vaccine education campaigns, distribution networks, and cold storage facilities and to find people to do the work. In the short run, Trump’s “America first” vaccine strategy seemed to pay off for Americans. Then it backfired. “Buy American” provisions—which accompanied the government’s use of its authorities under the Defense Production Act to tell U.S. firms what to produce—ended up pushing most production for the global market outside the United States. The fragmented national approaches to selecting vaccine candidates and managing the supply chains to produce vaccines created unnecessary friction and duplication, wasted investments, and tangled negotiations with industry. The opportunity to more intelligently coordinate the huge national investments, procurements, and supply chains was lost. The end result put the pharmaceutical firms in the driver’s seat. The war against COVID-19 relied on a few major powers to help the rest of the world. The United States, the major European countries, and the big Asian powers never joined forces effectively enough. They, along with the rest of the world, paid the price for that. There is no reason to believe that biological dangers will diminish, and they may get worse. Yet policymakers have absorbed few lessons about how to do better next time. THE FIGHT FOR UKRAINE By the end of 2022, it was clear the war in Ukraine would not end quickly. Rightly inspired by the Ukrainians’ heroic resistance, many commentators and officials underestimated Russia. Much of the debate was about whether Ukraine should drive on to victory or accept a stalemate, or whether certain weapons systems would be the magic ingredients the country needed to win. Over the course of 2023, however, Ukraine’s military, social, economic, and financial condition became increasingly grave and unsustainable. And although Russia has geared up for a long war, Ukraine’s supporters have not. As with the pandemic, the “what to do” part seems easy, since citizens in the free world generally support Ukraine’s survival as a free country with a hopeful future. Surely, people think, the coalition’s combined resources and economies can overmatch what Russia and its friends can do. Yet again, what stands out is the problem of “how.” Again, the free world has not adequately pooled and mobilized its resources. At the start of the war, the G-7 countries froze about $300 billion worth of Russian state financial assets that were being held in their own currencies. Never in history has an aggressor left such an immense sum in the hands of countries wounded by its aggression. None of the G-7’s members doubt that Russia has committed the gravest possible breaches of international law or that it is legally obligated to compensate those it has damaged. No one can deny that Ukraine’s economy is in critical condition. The question of what to do seems clear. Yet as the war finishes its second year, this enormous, game-changing war chest of Russia’s money remains virtually untouched. There is no plausible scenario in which it goes back to Russia. The potentially decisive assets lie there, inert and useless to anyone. Why? For too long, the handful of relevant officials were preoccupied with other matters and were put off by a welter of confused and often superficial legal and financial arguments. Privately, some have confided fears about Russian retaliation against their countries’ companies. Or in the German case, some fear that Polish nationalists might then ask for more reparations from Germany for World War II. An artillery shell near Donetsk, Ukraine, November 2023 Alina Smutko / Reuters All these arguments are slowly being sorted out as lawyers rediscover the international law of state responsibility and state countermeasures. Needed next is the design for a monumental European recovery program, anchored in the recovery of Ukraine. That program should have two dimensions. One would be policy-driven. The West would support reconstruction and recovery across several sectors, linking its spending to Ukrainian reforms that would also facilitate Ukraine’s EU accession process. The other dimension would be a substantial and painstaking claims process from Ukraine and other state and private entities damaged by Russia’s internationally wrongful acts, including expropriated companies and poor countries victimized by price shocks. Work to set up this enormous recovery program has barely begun. By contrast, the military assistance program for Ukraine would seem to be the great success story. It is, to some extent. But it is flagging. The public story is dominated by arguments about which weapons to send to Ukraine. The real story, however, is about the “how” of finding enough weapons to begin with. In theory, the quantity of weaponry sent to Ukraine should be both sufficient and affordable if all of Ukraine’s partners efficiently pooled their potential resources and industrial capacities. That efficient pooling of resources is not happening. Aside from the usual challenges of transport, training, and maintenance that are multiplied with each new donated system, five big factors seem to cripple the effort, even if Congress appropriates needed money. First, most of the help has come from drawing down inventories. By now, the U.S. military’s branches have sent all the equipment they regard as disposable, and they are protecting the rest. Pushing them to give up more means making difficult tradeoffs among risks. In the early Lend Lease era, these tradeoffs were frequently resolved in the White House, often by Roosevelt himself. Second, European inventories were often more useful to Ukraine, because the Europeans had stockpiled more. Those inventories have been drawn down. The United States’ allies in Europe are anxious. They were promised backfills that are not in sight, as they form queues that look to the 2030s. The strain to mobilize resources to help Ukraine is a tragedy. Third, the U.S. defense industrial base cannot expand quickly enough to meet the emergencies of the next year or two. That puts a premium on quick mass production of relatively inexpensive defensive systems such as drones. These novel systems are being developed by new producers. The Defense Department does not like to buy from new producers. They are not “programs of record,” in Pentagon parlance, and thus do not have an associated acquisition bureaucracy. In the years it takes to meet that threshold, the new producers often die or are bought out. Even if they survive to receive a contract, they often face a thicket of export controls in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, a U.S. government regime that is a vestige of the Cold War. Ukraine does not have that kind of time. Fourth, much could be accomplished if U.S. money could be more freely used, including by Ukraine, to buy drones and other needed weapons from non-American suppliers. The Pentagon’s acquisition process makes it hard to spend defense dollars on foreigners. Influential U.S. companies like to keep it that way. Americans are not alone in this; several U.S. allies have understandable habits of defense industry protectionism. But these national stovepipes are a peacetime luxury. In World War II, the legendary P51 Mustang, an American-made fighter, flew with a British engine. Leaders should dramatically change the way they buy in this time of crisis, recognizing that the results could benefit them all, including financially. Fifth, the big defense contractors will not expand their production base without multiyear contracts. But even if they got them, there is little slack in the American industrial base. Contractors also face bottlenecks in supplies of certain critical components. So the longer-term challenge circles back to the goal of pooling the free world’s resources. There is more slack in industrial bases outside the United States, very much including Ukraine itself. The strain to mobilize resources to help Ukraine is a tragedy. It is tragic not only because of the suffering of heroic Ukrainians. It is tragic also because some in the U.S. government are valiantly trying to solve these “how” problems, whether they are banging on the table at the U.S. Army headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany, where Ukraine’s partners try to coordinate their military help, or in the White House. Yet in a new age of emergencies, they find that most people in most governments are still conducting business as usual. GOVERNING GAZA The Gaza Strip has been an international policy problem for 75 years. Since 1948, the international goals have been clear and limited: aid Palestinians and prevent war. Raids out of Gaza and Israeli reprisals were part of the spiral of violence that led to the first Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1956. The international community responded brilliantly, showing some of the skills and energy that the West could command in that era. Within the space of about a week, in November 1956, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and his team, including the American diplomat Ralph Bunche, created the UN Emergency Force, a coalition that was led by Canada and India and enjoyed strong support from the United States. The UN leadership and those three countries drove the work. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower boosted the UNEF strategy from the start but deferred to India and Canada to provide the military muscle. The Palestinians in Gaza still felt they were at war with Israel. But there was no war. UNEF effectively kept the peace on the Gazan-Israeli border for ten years. When the force was withdrawn in 1967 at the request of Egypt, war quickly followed, and then 38 years of Israeli military rule. In 2005, when Israel withdrew, outside actors had hoped that Gaza would be ruled by the Palestinian Authority and become part of a Palestinian state, including the West Bank, willing to develop peaceably alongside Israel. That strategy for replacing the Israeli occupation and solving the security problem failed. Hamas, a military movement at war with Israel, then took over Gaza in 2007, throwing out the PA. It resumed warfare, culminating in its bloody raids on Israel on October 7. The United States will not and should not be central in governing Gaza. A common proposal for the future of Gaza, which the United States has endorsed, is to use the current war to establish a reconfigured PA. The new PA would be more competent and legitimate than the present one based in the West Bank. It would replace Hamas and renew progress toward a two-state solution. This is a reboot of the original goal sought after 2005. I was at the State Department back then and worked on the policy choices and negotiations involving Israel and the PA about the future of Gaza and Palestinian statehood. The “how” for this strategy is much harder now. The mutual fear and hatred have intensified. Israeli settlements in the West Bank have multiplied. A democratically legitimate PA is more likely to reflect Hamas than replace it. And relevant American capabilities and know-how are more constrained, including by other U.S. priorities. To many, the current crisis in Gaza seems to demand a central role for the United States. But the United States will not and should not be central in governing Gaza. It should play a secondary role, at most, in providing aid and reconstruction assistance to the strip. It may have capabilities and know-how to help prevent future attacks from Gaza against Israel, but any maritime and commercial control regime to stem the flow of weapons into Gaza would obviously have to be multilateral. As with efforts in Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, the talks on Gaza already involve the UN, a group of interested Western states, and a group of interested Muslim states. While the United States makes pronouncements on general goals, the best approach to Gaza would begin by looking at the menu of plausible solutions on the ground there: in governance, sustenance, and security. Officials should work hard on the policy designs these solutions might entail. Each will be complex. With some of that analysis done, they should next ask who in the world has assets, knowledge, or people that can help make one of these designs viable or can incentivize those who can. Then, policymakers should see where, among other countries, the United States comes into play. Finally, they should design and defend the U.S. contribution. RECOVERY ACT Across the free world, the current period of crisis has spotlighted the mismatch between the institutions it had going in and the quality of effort it needs now. The public debates about national interests are largely disconnected from the practical issues. In the medium term, the U.S. government and its partners must examine whether their institutions—especially the civilian institutions that deal with finance, commerce, technology, and humanitarian relief—are really fit for purpose. People meet constantly, but they strain to get things done. At the end of 2023, the economic side of the U.S. government was taking protectionist actions that were sabotaging cooperation with allies on green technology, critical materials, and common management of the digital revolution at the same time that Biden claimed to be rallying the free world. The U.S. Foreign Service could be tripled in size and reconceived on a whole-of-government basis, with overhauled training, and the costs would amount to a rounding error in the overall federal budget. Across the Atlantic, the EU should develop a better growth strategy, with a streamlined European Commission and more effective decision processes by the European Council, the EU’s governing board of member states. But the European experiment in common foreign policymaking has not been successful, and national governments must step up to their heightened responsibilities in this time of crisis. As for military power, the overreliance on small numbers of extremely expensive, exquisite American systems seems out of date and unaffordable, even for the United States. The Ukraine war has encouraged the Pentagon to make big bets—for example, instituting the Replicator Initiative, which is supposed to mass produce and field thousands of weapons that use emerging technologies. In the next year or two, if East Asia stays relatively quiet and the war in the Middle East does not widen to Iran, the course of the Ukraine war may be the most important bellwether. A rare opportunity beckons in that conflict. Enormous resources are available, thanks to the aggressor’s overconfidence in leaving hundreds of billions of dollars and euros in law-abiding states. A landmark recovery program could give Ukraine the future its people yearn for, regardless of where the battle line ends up. The resources could ease the burdens of enlarging the EU and reinvigorate that project. To do the job right is an enormous challenge of policy design. But one lesson of the Marshall Plan was that success breeds successes. The operational talent that Western policymakers displayed in the twentieth century was not in their genes. It was the accumulation of hard-earned experience and an accompanying culture that reinforced practical professionalism, including new and difficult habits of cooperation with international partners. There is only one way to recover these skills: practice them again. PHILIP ZELIKOW is a Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. A historian, former U.S. diplomat, and former Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations. The Self-Doubting Superpower America Shouldn’t Give Up on the World It Made Fareed Zakaria The Washington Monument in Washington, D.C., November 2019 The Long Unipolar Moment? Debating American Dominance Joshua Shifrinson; Anne-Marie Slaughter; Bilahari Kausikan; Robert Keohane; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth 美國治國之道的萎縮 如何在危機時代復原能力 作者：Philip Zelikow 2024 年 1 月/2 月 發表於2023 年 12 月 12 日 辛塔‧福施 登入並儲存以供稍後閱讀 列印這篇文章 透過電子郵件發送 分享到Twitter 在臉書上分享 在領英上分享 獲取連結 頁面網址 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/atrophy-american-statecraft-zelikow 獲取引用 請求轉載權限 玩 下載文章 世界已進入高度危機時期。歐洲和中東戰事肆虐，東亞戰爭威脅迫在眉睫。在俄羅斯、中國和朝鮮，美國面臨三個擁有核武的敵對國家，而在伊朗則面臨另一個即將獲得核武的國家。除了頭條新聞之外，非洲、拉丁美洲和西南亞的國家正在失敗，大規模的移民正在發生。美國剛剛經歷了1945年以來代價最慘重的一場大流行危機，現在必須應對其他緊迫的跨國挑戰，例如在氣候惡化的情況下管理能源轉型、人工智慧的快速發展以及面臨更大壓力的全球資本主義體系與過去幾十年相比。拆開來看，這些問題中的每一個問題都有其自己的一套複雜問題，但很少人理解。在幾乎所有問題上，無論他們喜歡或憎恨美國人，世界人民都會向美國政府尋求幫助，即使只是在組織工作方面。 美國人無法滿足這個要求。他們提供的有效政策是有限的。 美國其當代政府不具備能力的廣度和深度－能力和專業知識。這個問題已經存在了幾十年，而且時不時地表現得令人沮喪。新的是上下文。當前的危機時期對美國和自由世界其他國家的挑戰比至少 60 年來的任何時期都要大。他們必須培養務實領導力的新特質。 說出要做什麼是最容易的部分。設計如何做是困難的部分。 「想法不是政策，」迪恩·臘斯克在擔任美國國務卿期間觀察到。 “此外，想法的嬰兒死亡率很高。”更有經驗的政治家、英國首相溫斯頓·邱吉爾評論道：“希望展翅高飛，國際會議隨後沿著塵土飛揚的道路緩慢前行。” 隨時了解狀況。 每週提供深入分析。 「如何」就是治國之術中的「技巧」。美國政府所做的大部分工作就是分配資金和製定規則。其中涉及政策行動的部分相對較少，尤其是外交行動。這樣做需要複雜的團隊合作。官員必須掌握國際編排、錯綜複雜的法律和實踐，以及跨社會的各種令人眼花撩亂的工具、文化和機構。在美國和其他自由世界，做到這一切的能力是一門正在衰落的藝術。當它消失時，取而代之的是令人沮喪和陳詞濫調。官員們透過會議和聲明來掩蓋差距。 在新冠肺炎-19 疫情期間，悲劇性地證明了美國有效決策的有限性，當時世界未能建立一個全球聯盟來對抗全球流行病。今天在烏克蘭就可以看到這一點，自由世界正在努力維持一個正在消耗戰的國家。它正在加薩地帶出現，善意的國家試圖幫助加薩未來的生存和治理。毫無疑問，未來幾個月和幾年將會出現新的要求，人們可以爭論華盛頓及其盟友必須回應其中哪些要求。但沒有人願意解決問題然後失敗。成功必須具體、實際地定義。各國政府必須更有效地匯集其能力和專業知識。這樣，他們才能把藍天的希望變成藍圖。 緊急時代 過去百年的所有三個主要反美夥伴關係－第二次世界大戰中的軸心國冷戰時期，以及今天由中國、俄羅斯和伊朗領導的反美聯盟——有一個共同的核心。所有人都將美國（或當時的英國）視為專橫的帝國體系的支柱，試圖阻止他們自己的願望。他們團結了其他同樣感到受壓迫的國家。但除此之外，合作關係並沒有表現出共同的總體規劃。合作夥伴很少互相信任。他們常常甚至不喜歡彼此。 這一代人的高度危機時期很可能會消退，也可能會變得更糟。過去反美夥伴關係的歷史使自滿的假設變得卑微。它揭示了快速的重新計算、快速的轉變和驚喜。獨裁政權歷來都是派系分裂的。他們的意圖和計劃突然改變，常常受到看似看不見的細節和環境的影響。與過去的對抗時代不同的是，這次美國公眾還沒有吸收危險的嚴重性，而且該國的工業基礎更加狹窄和不靈活。美國過度依賴沒有重點的軍事保險政策，並且沒有充分準備好除直接戰爭之外的可行的作戰戰略。 1941 年1 月，美國仍處於和平時期，總統富蘭克林·羅斯福寫信給他的老朋友兼預科學校約瑟夫·格魯(Joseph Grew)同學，美國駐日本大使。羅斯福寫道：“我們必須認識到，歐洲、非洲和亞洲的敵對行動都是單一世界衝突的一部分。”每個部分都有自己的故事。總統強調，“我們面臨的問題如此巨大且相互關聯，以至於任何試圖陳述這些問題的嘗試都迫使人們從五大洲和七大洋的角度來思考。”他接著說：「我們不能製定一成不變的計畫。隨著每一個新的發展的出現，我們必須根據當時的情況，決定何時何地以及如何最有效地調動和利用我們的資源。」 因此，羅斯福開始大規模整合資源。國會已經恢復了士兵、水手和飛行員的徵兵。 1941 年初，總統和他的團隊說服了一個嚴重分裂的國會，在一個尚未陷入戰爭的嚴重分裂的國家，花費 GDP 的 10%幫助外國人。這筆錢用於美國為參戰人員提供物資：英國、蘇聯和中國。今天的同等努力水準約為 2.6 兆美元，大約是喬·拜登總統在 2023 年 10 月要求今天分裂的國會處理烏克蘭、以色列和其他優先事項的金額的 25 倍。 美國過度依賴沒有重點的軍事保險政策。 美國及其盟國現在必須做好準備，以應對如何捲入四場不同的戰爭——與中國、與伊朗、北韓和俄羅斯——以及這些危險如何相互作用。大多數西方政策制定者的預設假設是，這些競爭對手由根本上理性的政權領導，不會冒尋求暴力變革的風險。這是俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭前一年的預設假設。這是哈馬斯入侵以色列前一天的預設假設。當前的時代很可能是戰前時期。但美國人、歐洲人、日本人、韓國人和澳洲人並沒有這樣協調。與此同時，中國、伊朗和北韓的政府和媒體一直在為戰爭動員。俄羅斯已經處於戰爭狀態，並正在為長期戰爭做準備。 世界上現有的衝突程度已經是一代多來的最高水準。看看加薩走廊週邊地區就知道了。甚至在哈馬斯10 月7 日襲擊之前，利比亞、蘇丹、敘利亞和也門就已經因衝突而四分五裂，導致數百萬人挨餓和流離失所。所有解決這些危機的國際調解和重建努力均進展不佳。這一切都顯示聯合國的斡旋和維和努力的失敗。在每種情況下，援助組織都在努力滿足需求並維持疲倦的捐助者的支持。這項統計不包括國際社會在伊拉克、黎巴嫩和索馬里或飽受戰爭蹂躪的 埃塞俄比亞的持續參與。 此外還有其他地區的需求和跨國問題，例如氣候惡化、數位和生物革命以及全球金融的脆弱性。其中一些問題已經持續了數十年。關於自由世界之間合作的許多消息再次令人失望：協調全球能源轉型的問題、綠色技術工作的支離破碎、關鍵材料談判的失敗以及關於如何減輕貧窮國家負擔的激烈分歧。 失去的教訓 在緊急情況下，人們需要採取有效行動。沒有哪個國家比美國面臨更多的要求。從經濟或軍事實力的靜態運算來看，這個國家看起來可能非常強大，但實際實力——世界上的實際實力——卻截然不同。它比較像是動能的測量，用公式1/2mv²計算。質量值減半。速度值是平方。在治國之道中，能力就是速度。 能力是能力和專業知識的函數。當談到在世界上做事時，美國人的供給受到兩個深層結構性條件的限制。第一個是自建國以來不同程度地與國家相關的：一種疏離感。美國通常與外國問題保持距離，而且距離很遠，美國人也有這種感覺。幸運的是，美國的地質條件和大陸幅員遼闊，因此從未如此依賴外國貿易或外國商品。公眾對對外交往（政治、軍事或經濟）的興趣是有限的。超過一半的美國人沒有護照。只有三分之一的人能在地圖上找到台灣。 限制美國全球參與的第二個因素是較新的：目前美國在海外能做的事情有限。正如第二次世界大戰和冷戰期間的情況一樣，劇目急劇擴大。冷戰。到了二十世紀中葉，美國官員因其專業知識而聞名於世，被視為有進取心、富有想像力的問題解決者，無論在戰爭還是和平時期，他們幾乎無所不能。美國幫助組織了諾曼第登陸，製造了第一顆原子彈，在歐洲和亞洲的廢墟中養活了數百萬人，透過馬歇爾計畫拯救了西歐，並透過柏林空運克服了蘇聯的封鎖。華盛頓甚至幫忙消滅了天花。 這些和其他令人驚嘆的事蹟借鑒了二十世紀美國商業和公民規劃中獨特的、分散的解決問題的文化。當時美國商業的典範學科是工程學。這種積極進取的文化改善了政策的設計和管理方式，並鼓勵員工養成良好的書面工作習慣。它是經過大量、充滿壓力的反覆試驗、充滿競爭和困惑而誕生的。 美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯於 2023 年 8 月在紐約聯合國總部發表演說 愛德華多·穆尼奧斯/路透社 幾代人過去了，世紀結束了，但人們幾乎沒有採取任何措施來保存或傳授舊的技能和慣例。書面操作分析被更多的會議所包含，而記錄和反思所講內容的努力卻減少了。與工程教授的方法不同，政策人員的工作技術很少被認可或研究。不存在專業實務​​規範的準則。美國的決策變得程序化，不再是深思熟慮的工程，而是即興猜測和官僚化習慣。 同時，隨著超級大國對抗的大山隨著冷戰的結束而崩塌，剩下的山麓開始看起來像山脈。 NATO 以及克羅埃西亞 1995 年戰勝小塞爾維亞的比賽助長了多年的狂妄自大。這種敏感，加上 911 事件後的巨大恐懼，迎來了美國的復仇之年。美國公眾在受到打擊後，對外交往本已微薄的興趣也減弱了。保護主義潮流變成了洪水。在學術界，流行的是批評美國對帝國的渴望、普遍的種族主義、無休無止的軍國主義和貪婪的資本主義。隱含的推論是，如果美國政府是世界上如此邪惡的力量，那麼如果它留在家裡，每個人都會過得更好。 儘管美國情報界不斷發展壯大，但美國政府分析和解決問題的能力卻沒有提高。其政策部門人員不足，訓練不足；官員們幾乎沒有接受過有關政策工作的教育。那些表現出色的人通常都是自學的。當需要營運時，必須僱用承包商，而他們往往只會使問題變得更加複雜。儘管軍隊的組成部分仍然強大，但其部隊結構——昂貴的航空母艦、飛機中隊和駐紮在國內的旅——變得更具象徵意義，不再那麼重要。經濟制裁成為首選手段。其餘的內容都是公報和陳腔濫調。 反對含糊不清 但是紙上的姑息療法並不能解決世界當前的緊急情況。 「克制」或「現實主義」的一般學說表明了態度，而不是答案。喬治·馬歇爾深知這一點。 1947 年 4 月，剛結束歐洲長途旅行的馬歇爾剛被任命為國務卿，他發表了全國廣播講話，告訴美國人民歐洲大陸所需維修的規模。他懇求他們保持耐心。 「直接關係到我們文明未來的問題不能透過一般談話或模糊的公式來解決——林肯所說的『有害的抽象，'”馬歇爾警告。 “他們需要針對明確且極其複雜的問題的具體解決方案。”馬歇爾和他的團隊與一群傑出的歐洲領導人合作，找到了這些解決方案，設計了一個非凡的系統，利用美國商品鞏固新的歐洲夥伴關係，並幫助歐洲政府籌集重建資金。 在最近伊拉克和阿富汗的慘敗中，最近的一些成功故事也值得注意。考慮軍事領域。 2015 年至2019 年間，經過一年的掙扎，從之前的失誤中吸取了教訓，美國以相對較少的軍隊幫助領導了一個非凡的外國聯盟，解放了被伊斯蘭國佔領的土地，ISIS，位於伊拉克北部和敘利亞東部。 在全球健康領域，美國及其合作夥伴從2003 年開始製定了一項針對愛滋病救援的緊急計畫，稱為 愛滋病救援緊急計畫。a> 愛滋病、全球抗擊基金PEPFAR 美國也創造了經濟成功的故事。許多人正確地將全球金融危機歸咎於其未能監管高槓桿資產投機行為。但他們也應該認識到，隨著危機蔓延至歐洲，美國和歐洲領導人已採取一切措施來遏制危機，支持金融擔保以避免主權違約並防止歐元區陷入困境。深淵。大陸崩盤可能會波及美國，因此這項成功可能會阻止大蕭條的重演。最近，在俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭之前，很少人會預測到歐洲，尤其是德國，能夠擺脫對俄羅斯能源的依賴。然而，入侵之後，一些歐洲領導人（尤其是德國領導人）與美國人合作並迎接挑戰。 這些和其他成功所證明的是可能性定理。政府仍然可以取得非凡的成果。但這樣做需要更多地關注「如何」。以三個當代緊急情況為例：新冠肺炎戰爭-19的失敗、烏克蘭目前的危險局勢以及加薩的挑戰。< a i=1>COVID-19一個> 流行病政策制定 從造成的傷亡和經濟損失來看，新冠肺炎-19 大流行是一場全球戰爭。超過2000萬人死亡。美國在酌情財政政策上的支出約為 5 兆美元。但在 2020 年 1 月，很少人了解正在發生的這場大流行。歐巴馬政府準備的所謂的流行病劇本實際上並沒有規劃任何劇本。沒有「如何」。它沒有解釋要做什麼。當談到遏制 COVID-19 的工作時，劇本是一張白紙。 接下來的幾個月和幾年將暴露出，就像在阿富汗和伊拉克一樣，美國政府大部分部門的運作能力受到侵蝕，並且不斷依賴管理諮詢來填補這些空白。很明顯，公共部門沒有從私營部門獲得所需的資源——藥品、口罩、疫苗。關於做什麼的選擇相對容易：幾乎每個人都想要檢測、有效的治療方法和疫苗。問題出現在「如何」上。 美國在這​​場大流行中所謂的成功故事是國防部對「曲速行動」的管理，這是一項公私合作夥伴關係，旨在開發和部署疫苗。但人們對這種成功的慶祝卻比人們所理解的還要多。由於一些有才華的官員在戰前做出的選擇，冠狀病毒研發工作得以順利進行。疫情爆發時D已經提前了。美國政府和其他機構已經資助了信使 RNA 技術的早期研究。 「曲速行動」是由職業官僚、外部專家和行政管理人員臨時發起的一項舉措，但並沒有在疫苗開發方面取得主要成功。相反，它通過大規模獲取和生產疫苗而取得了成功。它管理著不同設計的投資組合，以對沖其對未經證實的 mRNA 技術的賭注，並計劃透過美國藥局進行全國分銷。 然而，疫苗的大規模生產並沒有被納入協調全球生產和分配或說服人們接種疫苗的策略中。全球流行病就像全球戰爭一樣，必須透過全球聯盟來應對。只有少數國家生產了疫苗，但它們從未建立對抗病毒的聯盟戰爭努力。世界衛生組織的表現令人失望，既沒有就疫情爆發發出警告，也沒有協調共同應對措施，這並不是導致這次失敗的原因。受其成員的製約，世界衛生組織反映了他們的失敗。 紙質的姑息療法無法解決世界當前的緊急情況。 針對過去幾十年政府在疫苗方面工作薄弱的情況，慈善機構試圖透過創建Gavi、疫苗聯盟和CEPI 等不同尋常的非營利機構來填補空白。 CEPI新冠肺炎合作創建了世界衛生組織，流行病防範創新聯盟。一些帶頭「曲速行動」的政策制定者希望利用這些非營利組織並組織適當的全球努力。隨著「曲速行動」提案於 2020 年 4 月提交給唐納德·川普總統，美國官員擱置了建立全球聯盟的建議，並選擇了全國性的做法。作為回應，非營利組織及其支持者必須迅速建立一個全球結構。在法國和新加坡的幫助下，他們與COVAX，根據需要在世界各地分發疫苗。 到 2020 年 5 月，出現了兩個平行結構：曲速行動和COVAX。 COVAX 立即落後，花了幾個月的時間籌集資金。看到美國的選擇，歐洲國家決定必須效法這種做法。英國憑藉精心設計的計劃自行退出。 歐盟試圖協調 27 個成員國衛生當局的願望。但歐洲國家對歐盟執行機構歐盟委員會在組織共同疫苗工作方面的緩慢步伐越來越不耐煩。在「曲速行動」揭幕後不久，其中四個國家—法國、德國、義大利和荷蘭—宣布他們將自行推進。因此，國家的、更自利的計劃將成為模式。 從某些方面來說，這個故事的結局不錯。 mRNA 候選疫苗發揮了作用。私人企業加速生產疫苗，規模驚人。 2021年底，疫苗供應已使全球需求飽和。儘管它幾乎是在一夜之間臨時產生的，COVAX 是低收入國家相當一部分人接種疫苗的主要原因，這得益於 < / a>被排在了採購隊列的後面，實際上失去了至少一年的可能進展，而是與疫苗囤積、出口限制和問題作鬥爭與製造商。這些延誤導致數百萬人住院和死亡，本可避免。COVAX及其他組織。然而，聯合國兒童基金會 曲速行動的成功比人們所理解的更值得慶祝。 疫苗民族主義並不令人意外。在全球聯盟中，主要生產國不會忽視本國人民的需求。但聯盟本可以從一開始就計劃明顯地考慮到全世界的需求。在缺乏此類規劃的情況下，各國會囤積自己的物資，直到確定自己會有盈餘，此時一些國家將盈餘提供給COVAX 。問題是建立疫苗教育活動、分發網絡和冷藏設施以及尋找人員來完成這項工作需要時間。 從短期來看，川普的「美國優先」疫苗策略似乎為美國人帶來了回報。然後適得其反。 「購買美國貨」條款——伴隨著政府利用《國防生產法》下的權力來告訴美國公司生產什麼——最終將大部分生產推向美國以外的全球市場。 各國在選擇候選疫苗和管理疫苗生產供應鏈方面採取的分散做法造成了不必要的摩擦和重複、投資浪費以及與業界的混亂談判。 更聰明地協調龐大的國家投資、採購和供應鏈的機會已經喪失。最終結果讓製藥公司佔據了主導地位。 對抗新冠肺炎新冠肺炎-19 的戰爭依靠幾個大國來幫助世界其他國家。美國、歐洲主要國家和亞洲大國從來沒有足夠有效地聯手。他們和世界其他國家一樣，為此付出了代價。沒有理由相信生物危險會減少，而且可能會變得更糟。然而，政策制定者在下次如何做得更好方面並沒有吸取什麼教訓。 為烏克蘭而戰 到 2022 年底，烏克蘭戰爭顯然不會很快結束。受到烏克蘭人英勇抵抗的鼓舞，許多評論家和官員低估了俄羅斯。爭論的大部分內容是烏克蘭應該繼續取得勝利還是接受僵局，或者某些武器系統是否會成為該國獲勝所需的神奇要素。然而，2023年，烏克蘭的軍事、社會、經濟和金融狀況變得日益嚴峻和不可持續。儘管俄羅斯已經做好了長期戰爭的準備，但烏克蘭的支持者卻沒有。 與大流行一樣，「做什麼」部分似乎很容易，因為自由世界的公民普遍支持烏克蘭作為一個自由國家的生存，並擁有充滿希望的未來。當然，人們認為，該聯盟的資源和經濟綜合實力可以超越俄羅斯及其盟友。再次強調的是「如何」的問題。自由世界再次沒有充分匯集和調動其資源。 戰爭開始時，七國集團國家凍結了以本國貨幣持有的價值約 3,000 億美元的俄羅斯國家金融資產。歷史上從來沒有一個侵略者將如此龐大的資金交給受其侵略的國家。七國集團成員中沒有一個人懷疑俄羅斯已經犯下了最嚴重的違反國際法的行為，也沒有人懷疑俄羅斯有法律義務賠償其所造成的損害。沒有人可以否認烏克蘭經濟正處於危急狀態。做什麼的問題似乎很清楚。然而，隨著戰爭進入第二年，俄羅斯這筆巨大的、改變遊戲規則的資金幾乎沒有受到影響。沒有可能出現它返回俄羅斯的情況。潛在的決定性資產就在那裡，對任何人來說都是惰性且無用的。為什麼？ 長期以來，少數相關官員全神貫注於其他事務，並被一堆混亂且往往膚淺的法律和財務論點所拖延。一些人私下表達了對俄羅斯對其國家公司進行報復的擔憂。或者就德國而言，有些人擔心波蘭民族主義者可能會要求德國為二戰提供更多賠償。 2023 年 11 月，烏克蘭頓內茨克附近的一枚砲彈 阿麗娜·斯穆特科/路透社 隨著律師們重新發現國家責任和國家反措施的國際法，所有這些爭論正在慢慢整理。接下來需要設計一項以烏克蘭復甦為基礎的具有里程碑意義的歐洲復甦計畫。該計劃應該有兩個維度。其中之一是政策驅動。西方將支持多個部門的重建和復甦，將其支出與烏克蘭的改革聯繫起來，這也將促進烏克蘭的加入歐盟進程。另一個方面是烏克蘭和其他因俄羅斯國際不法行為而受損的國家和私人實體（包括被沒收的公司和遭受價格衝擊的貧窮國家）的實質和艱苦的索賠程序。建立這個龐大的恢復計劃的工作才剛開始。 相較之下，對烏克蘭的軍事援助計畫似乎是一個巨大的成功故事。從某種程度上來說確實如此。但它正在衰退。公眾的故事主要是關於向烏克蘭運送哪些武器的爭論。然而，真正的故事是關於「如何」找到足夠的武器。從理論上講，如果烏克蘭的所有合作夥伴有效地匯集其潛在資源和工業能力，那麼向烏克蘭運送的武器數量應該是充足且負擔得起的。 這種有效的資源匯集並沒有發生。除了運輸、培訓和維護方面的常見挑戰（隨著每個新捐贈的系統而增加）之外，即使國會撥款所需的資金，五個主要因素似乎也會削弱這項努力。 首先，大部分幫助來自庫存減少。目前，美軍各部門已經送去了所有他們認為是一次性的裝備，剩下的裝備正在保護之中。迫使他們放棄更多意味著在風險之間做出艱難的權衡。在早期的租借法案時代，這些權衡經常在白宮得到解決，通常是由羅斯福本人解決。 其次，歐洲庫存往往對烏克蘭更有用，因為歐洲庫存更多。這些庫存已被減少。美國在歐洲的盟友很焦慮。他們得到的承諾是回填，但目前還看不到，因為他們排隊的時間預計到 2030 年代。 調動資源幫助烏克蘭的壓力是一場悲劇。 第三，美國國防工業基礎的擴張速度不足以應付未來一兩年的緊急情況。這使得快速大規模生產相對便宜的防禦系統（例如無人機）顯得格外重要。這些新穎的系統正在由新的生產商開發。國防部不喜歡從新生產商購買。用五角大廈的話來說，它們不是“記錄項目”，因此沒有相關的採購官僚機構。在達到這個門檻所需的幾年裡，新的生產商往往會死亡或被收購。即使他們能夠倖存下來並獲得合同，他們也經常面臨《國際武器貿易條例》中的嚴格出口管制，這是美國政府的一項制度，是冷戰時期的殘餘。烏克蘭沒有這樣的時間。 第四，如果美國資金能夠更自由地用於從非美國供應商購買無人機和其他所需武器，包括烏克蘭在內，就能取得巨大成就。五角大廈的收購過程使得很難將國防資金花在外國人身上。有影響力的美國公司喜歡保持這種狀態。美國人並不孤單。美國的一些盟友有國防工業保護主義的習慣，這是可以理解的。但這些民族瘦腿器卻是和平時期的奢侈品。在第二次世界大戰中，傳奇的 P51 野馬是一款美國製造的戰鬥機，使用英國發動機進行飛行。領導者應該在危機時期大幅改變他們的購買方式，並認識到結果可能使他們所有人受益，包括經濟上的好處。 第五，大型國防承包商不會在沒有多年合約的情況下擴大生產基地。但即使他們得到了它們，美國的工業基礎也幾乎沒有鬆懈。承包商也面臨某些關鍵零件的供應瓶頸。因此，長期挑戰又回到了集中自由世界資源的目標。美國以外的工業基地更加閒置，其中包括烏克蘭本身。 調動資源幫助烏克蘭的壓力是一場悲劇。這是悲劇性的，不僅因為英雄的烏克蘭人所遭受的苦難。悲劇還在於，美國政府中的一些人正在勇敢地嘗試解決這些「如何」問題，無論他們是在德國威斯巴登的美國陸軍總部敲桌子，烏克蘭的合作夥伴都在那裡嘗試協調他們的軍事幫助，或者在白宮。然而，在緊急情況的新時代，他們發現大多數政府的大多數人仍然照常開展業務。 治理加沙 75 年來，加薩地帶一直是國際政策議題。自 1948 年以來，國際目標一直明確且有限：援助巴勒斯坦人並防止戰爭。對加薩的攻擊和以色列的報復是導致以色列 1956 年首次佔領加薩的暴力升級的一部分。國際社會做出了出色的反應，展示了西方在那個時代可以掌握的一些技能和能量。 1956 年11 月，在大約一週的時間裡，聯合國秘書長達格·哈馬舍爾德和他的團隊，包括美國外交官拉爾夫邦奇創建了聯合國緊急部隊，這是一支由加拿大和印度領導的聯盟，並得到了美國的大力支持。 聯合國領導階層和這三個國家推動了這項工作。美國總統艾森豪威爾從一開始就大力推動UNEF戰略，但推遲了印度和加拿大提供軍事力量的決定。加薩的巴勒斯坦人仍然覺得他們正在與以色列交戰。但沒有發生戰爭。 UNEF有效地維持了加薩-以色列邊境的和平十年。 1967 年應埃及要求撤軍後，戰爭很快就爆發了，隨後是以色列長達 38 年的軍事統治。 2005年以色列撤軍時，外界人士曾希望加薩由巴勒斯坦權力機構統治，並成為包括約旦河西岸在內的巴勒斯坦國的一部分，願意與以色列一起和平發展。取代以色列佔領並解決安全問題的戰略失敗了。哈馬斯是一個與以色列交戰的軍事運動，隨後於 2007 年接管加沙，驅逐了巴勒斯坦權力機構。它恢復了戰爭，並於 10 月 7 日對以色列進行了血腥襲擊。 美國不會也不應該成為加薩治理的核心。 關於加薩未來的一個共同建議​​是利用當前的戰爭建立一個重新配置的巴勒斯坦權力機構巴勒斯坦權力機構，這一建議得到了美國的認可。新的巴勒斯坦權力機構將比目前駐紮在西岸的巴勒斯坦權力機構更有能力、更合法。它將取代哈馬斯並在兩國解決方案方面取得新的進展。這是 2005 年後尋求的最初目標的重新啟動。當時我在國務院，負責涉及以色列和巴勒斯坦權力機構的政策選擇和談判巴勒斯坦權力機構 關於加薩和巴勒斯坦建國的未來。現在，「如何」實施這項策略變得更加困難。相互的恐懼和仇恨加劇了。以色列在約旦河西岸的定居點倍增。一個民主合法的巴勒斯坦權力機構更有可能反映哈馬斯而不是取代它。美國的相關能力和專業知識受到更多限制，包括受到美國其他優先事項的限制。 對許多人來說，當前的加薩危機似乎需要美國發揮核心作用。但美國不會也不應該成為加薩治理的核心。它最多應該在向加薩走廊提供援助和重建援助方面發揮次要作用。它可能擁有幫助防止未來加薩對以色列發動攻擊的能力和知識，但任何阻止武器流入加薩的海上和商業控制制度顯然都必須是多邊的。就像利比亞、蘇丹、敘利亞和葉門的努力一樣，加薩談判已經有聯合國、一組感興趣的西方國家和一個團體的參與。感興趣的穆斯林國家。 雖然美國就總體目標發表了聲明，但解決加薩問題的最佳方法是從研究當地可行的解決方案清單開始：治理、生計和安全。官員們應該努力製定這些解決方案可能需要的政策設計。每一個都會很複雜。完成一些分析後，他們接下來應該詢問世界上誰擁有資產、知識或人員，可以幫助使這些設計之一變得可行，或者可以激勵有能力的人。然後，政策制定者應該看看美國在其他國家中扮演什麼角色。最後，他們應該設計並捍衛美國的貢獻。 恢復法案 在整個自由世界中，當前的危機凸顯了現有機構與當前所需努力品質之間的不匹配。關於國家利益的公開辯論很大程度上與實際問題脫節。從中期來看，美國政府及其合作夥伴必須檢查其機構——尤其是處理金融、商業、技術和人道主義救濟的民間機構——是否真正適合其目標。人們常常見面，但他們卻努力把事情做好。 2023 年底，美國政府經濟方面採取了保護主義行動，同時破壞了與盟友在綠色技術、關鍵材料和數位革命共同管理方面的合作拜登聲稱正在團結自由世界。 美國外交部門的規模可以擴大兩倍，並在整個政府的基礎上重新構想，並進行徹底的培訓，其成本將相當於聯邦總體預算的四捨五入誤差。在大西洋彼岸，歐盟應制定更好的成長策略，精簡歐盟委員會，並由歐洲理事會制定更有效的決策流程，就軍事力量而言，過度依賴少數極端力量昂貴、精緻的美國系統似乎已經過時且難以承受，即使對美國來說也是如此。烏克蘭戰爭促使五角大廈下了大賭注，例如發起複製計劃，該計劃旨在大規模生產和部署數千種使用新興技術的武器。成員國管理委員會。但歐洲共同外交政策制定的實驗並未成功，各國政府必須在危機時刻承擔起更大的責任。歐盟 未來一兩年，如果東亞保持相對平靜，中東戰事不擴大到伊朗，烏克蘭戰爭的進程可能是最重要的風向標。這場衝突中出現了一個難得的機會。由於侵略者過度自信地將數千億美元和歐元留在守法國家，因此可以獲得大量資源。一項具有里程碑意義的恢復計畫可能會為烏克蘭帶來人民渴望的未來，無論戰線最終走向何方。這些資源可以減輕擴大歐盟的負擔歐盟並重振該計畫。做好這項工作是政策設計的巨大挑戰。但馬歇爾計畫的一個教訓是，成功孕育成功。 西方決策者在二十世紀所表現出的操作才能並非來自於他們的基因。來之不易的經驗累積和伴隨的文化增強了實際的專業精神，包括與國際夥伴合作的新的和困難的習慣。恢復這些技能只有一種方法：再次練習。 美國治國之道的萎縮 菲利普‧澤利科 (PHILIP ZELIKOW) 是史丹佛大學胡佛研究所的高級研究員。他是一位歷史學家、前美國外交官和 9/11 委員會前執行主任，曾為五屆總統政府工作。 自我懷疑的超級大國 美國不應放棄自己創造的世界 法里德·扎卡里亞 華盛頓紀念碑，華盛頓特區，2019 年 11 月 漫長的單極時刻？ 爭論美國的主導地位 約書亞‧希夫林森；安妮·瑪麗·斯勞特；比拉哈里·考斯坎；羅伯特·基歐漢；史蒂芬·G·布魯克斯和威廉·C·沃爾福斯 How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views Support Is Falling for America and the Two-State Solution—but Rising for Iran and Violent Resistance By Michael Robbins, MaryClare Roche, Amaney A. Jamal, Salma Al-Shami, and Mark Tessler December 14, 2023 At a pro-Palestinian protest in Tunis, Tunisia, October 2023 At a pro-Palestinian protest in Tunis, Tunisia, October 2023 Jihed Abidellaoui / Reuters Sign in and save to read later Print this article Send by email Share on Twitter Share on Facebook Share on LinkedIn Get a link Page url https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/how-israel-hamas-war-gaza-changing-arab-views Request Reprint Permissions Download Article Since October 7, the latest war between Hamas and Israel has claimed the lives of more than 15,000 Palestinians and over 1,200 Israelis. Scores more have been injured. The war has displaced more than 1.8 million Palestinians and left the fates of many of Israel’s people unknown; over 100 of those abducted in Israel remain hostages. Fighting has resulted in damage to 15 percent of the buildings in Gaza, including over 100 cultural landmarks and more than 45 percent of all housing units. As many analysts have already declared, the high costs in Gaza have reverberated around the Arab world, reaffirming the salience and power of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in shaping regional politics. Yet it has been difficult to say exactly how much the attack has affected Arab attitudes—and in what particular ways. Now, that is changing. In the weeks leading up to the attack and the three weeks that followed, our nonpartisan research firm, Arab Barometer, conducted a nationally representative survey in Tunisia in conjunction with our local partner, One to One for Research and Polling. By chance, about half the 2,406 interviews were completed in the three weeks before October 7, and the remaining half occurred in the three weeks after. As a result, a comparison of the results can show—with unusual precision—how the attack and subsequent Israeli military campaign have changed views among Arabs. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. The findings are striking. U.S. President Joe Biden recently warned that Israel was losing global support over Gaza, but that is only the tip of the iceberg. Since October 7, every country in the survey with positive or warming relations with Israel saw its favorability ratings decline among Tunisians. The United States saw the steepest drop, but Washington’s Middle East allies that have forged ties to Israel over the last few years also saw their approval numbers go down. States that have stayed neutral, meanwhile, experienced little shift. And the leadership of Iran, which is ardently opposed to Israel, saw its favorability figures rise. Three weeks after the attacks, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has approval ratings that matched or even exceeded those of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed, known as MBZ. Tunisia is but one country in the Middle East and North Africa, a region of vast differences, and this survey cannot tell experts everything about how people throughout the region think and feel. But Tunisia is about as close to a bellwether as one could imagine. In previous Arab Barometer surveys, Tunisians have had views similar to those found in most other Arab countries. The population is open to the West but is also open to other global powers, such as China and Russia. It is geographically removed from the immediate effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it has a history of direct involvement, including once housing the Palestine Liberation Organization. Analysts and officials can safely assume that people’s views elsewhere in the region have shifted in ways similar to the recent changes that have taken place in Tunisia. Those shifts have been dramatic: rarely are changes of this magnitude seen in the course of a few weeks. But that does not indicate knee-jerk reactions on the part of Tunisians. If Tunisia’s people were changing their views simply because they supported Hamas’s actions, a major shift would have occurred within a day of the attack and then Tunisians’ opinions would have quickly stabilized. Instead, their opinions moved little by little on a daily basis over a three-week period, but significantly over the whole period. As a result, it is most likely that Tunisians’ views shifted not in response to Hamas’s attack but to the subsequent events, namely, the increasing cost to civilians of Israel’s military operation in Gaza. Still, the war has certainly increased Tunisians’ support for Palestinian fighting. Compared with surveys taken before the October 7 attack, far more Tunisians today want the Palestinians to resolve their conflict with Israel via force rather than with a peaceful settlement. Public opinion matters even in nondemocracies, where leaders must worry about protests, and these shifting views will reshape politics in the Arab world—as well as around the globe. The United States and its regional allies will have great difficulty expanding the Abraham Accords, which normalized ties between several Arab states and Israel. Washington may also lose the advantage in its contest with a rising China and a resurgent Russia. The United States could even find that many long-standing allies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates become less friendly toward the United States and more receptive toward its rivals as they seek to stave off their own regional declines. Since the attack, for example, both countries have welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin for his first visit to the region since the invasion of Ukraine. The growing support for armed resistance could also have dangerous consequences. The war against Hamas has not yet led to a wider conflict, but Israel has had to fend off strikes from Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Middle East and North Africa overall are prone to instability. It is not hard to imagine how the current invasion could spiral or open the door to a future conflict. To stabilize the region, Israel and its allies must, therefore, find a way to end this war and then pivot, quickly, to peacefully resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ROCK BOTTOM Arab Barometer, our academic research project, was in the process of conducting a wide-ranging issues survey with a random sample of Tunisia’s residents when Hamas attacked Israel on October 7. We decided to use this timing to investigate how this event and the war that followed affected public opinion. Since we did not expect significant changes in the views of Tunisians before October 7, we first took the average opinion for the initial three weeks of fieldwork. We then looked at how public opinion changed in the weeks that followed. Since the sample size is relatively small on each given day of our post–October 7 analysis, we made our estimates of how people felt at any given time using three-day moving averages of public opinion. This means that each data point represents an estimate on the day of the survey and the two days prior. (Although the last day of fielding was November 4, October 27 was the last day enough daily interviews were collected to provide sufficient data for meaningful analysis.) After plotting this moving average, we calculated a best-fit line for interviews conducted before and after October 7 to understand what changes, if any, resulted for each question. This line helped show how Tunisians’ views shifted in real time. Our ultimate estimates for the change in public opinion, however, focused on two numbers. The first is the average view of Tunisians before October 7. The second is the level of support based on the average from the best-fit line for October 27. There were many shifts. Yet the largest had to do with perceptions of the United States. In the 1,146 interviews carried out before the October 7 attack, 40 percent of Tunisians had a positive or somewhat positive view of the United States, compared with 56 percent who had an unfavorable opinion. But after the war in Gaza began, that quickly changed. By the end of our fieldwork, only ten percent of Tunisians had a positive view of the United States. Eighty-seven percent, by contrast, had an unfavorable impression. Before October 7, 56 percent of Tunisians wanted closer economic relations with the United States. Three weeks later, that number had fallen to 34 percent. Biden was never particularly popular in Tunisia, with an approval rating of 29 percent before October 7. But after Israel began its campaign—and Biden declared there were “no conditions” on U.S. support—his favorability rating fell to just six points. Correlation, of course, does not mean causation. But in this case, it is hard to see an alternative explanation, particularly given the steady, daily shift in Tunisian opinion. The war was by far the biggest news event that took place during the survey, and other responses made it clear that Tunisians were thinking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as they evaluated the United States. When Tunisians were asked which U.S. policies are most important to them in the Middle East and North Africa, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rose dramatically after October 7—from 24 percent to 59 percent. By comparison, the number of Tunisians who answered “economic development” fell from 20 percent to four percent. So far, worsening opinions about the United States have not directly translated into gains for China and Russia, both of which have stayed neutral in the war. Before the Hamas attack, 70 percent of Tunisians had a positive view of China; by October 27, that figure had increased by a modest five points. The number of people who wanted warmer economic relations with China dipped from 80 percent to 78 percent, within the margin of error. Before the attack, 56 percent of Tunisians held a favorable view of Russia compared with 53 percent at the end of our research. The share of people who wanted closer economic ties to Moscow went from 72 percent to 75 percent. But there are signs that China, at least, could win greater support at the expense of the United States. When asked before October 7 whether Beijing or Washington had better policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a third of Tunisians preferred China’s policies to the United States’. By the end of our polling, this figure had risen to 50 percent. (The share of Tunisians preferring U.S. policy went from 13 percent to 14 percent.) When asked whether China or the United States had better policies for maintaining regional security, the results were similar. Before October 7, the number of people who preferred Chinese policy rose from 31 percent to 50 percent. The percentage of Tunisians who preferred U.S. policy fell from 19 percent to 12 percent. GUILT BY ASSOCIATION Great powers are not the only states that Tunisians now view differently. The population’s attitude toward a number of regional powers also shifted after October 7. Much like shifts in opinion toward Washington, the changes largely track with how these states treat Israel. Consider, for example, Saudi Arabia. In the period leading up to the attack, there was widespread speculation that Riyadh would normalize relations with Israel. As anger at Israel built among Tunisians in the weeks following October 7, their views of Saudi Arabia also darkened—with the country’s approval rating dropping from 73 percent to 59 percent. Similarly, the percentage of Tunisians who wanted closer economic relations with Saudi Arabia fell from an average of 71 percent to 61 percent. MBS’s approval rating declined from 55 percent before the attack to 40 percent by October 27. These changes are especially notable given that Tunisian President Kais Saied, who enjoys high approval ratings at home, has very close links with MBS. The questionnaire did not include direct queries about the United Arab Emirates, which normalized ties with Israel in August 2020. But it did ask about MBZ’s foreign policies, and the results proved very similar to those for MBS. Before the October 7 attack, MBZ’s policies were seen favorably by 49 percent of Tunisians. By the end of the fieldwork, that figure had dropped to a third. Views of Turkey, by contrast, were largely unchanged. Ankara has long sought to highlight and empathize with the plight of the Palestinians, albeit from the sidelines, and 68 percent of Tunisians had a positive view of Turkey both before and after the attack. Views of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policy declined from 54 percent to 47 percent, but the number of people who wanted a closer economic relationship with the country increased, going from 57 percent to 64 percent. Still, the war in Gaza did not seem to improve the views of Turkey among Tunisians, perhaps because its condemnation of Israel was relatively constrained. But one country’s leadership did seem to benefit: that of Iran. The Islamic Republic is ardently opposed to Israel’s existence, and it cheered on Hamas’s attack. In an appeal that surely resonated with Arab public opinion, on October 17, Khamenei called for an end to the bombing of Gaza and labeled Israel’s actions a “genocide.” Although the survey did not include views toward Iran itself, it did ask about the foreign policies of Khamenei, and approval clearly went up. Before the attack, just 29 percent of Tunisians held a favorable view of his foreign policies. At the end of our fieldwork, this figure had risen to 41 percent. The jump in support was most notable in the days following Khamenei’s October 17 statement. And then there is Israel itself. Even before the attack, Tunisians had an extremely unfavorable view of Israel—just five percent of people rated the country positively. As a result, the country’s decline to effectively zero percent was not much of a fall at all. But opinions about normalization did shift. Normalizing ties with Israel was never popular, yet after the attack, what little support there was had completely dissipated. On October 7, 12 percent of people supported normalization. By October 27, that figure hit just one percent. Views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also changed in important ways. Before October 7, when asked about their preferred means of solving the conflict, 66 percent of Tunisians favored a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, whereas 18 percent favored an alternative diplomatic path, such as a single state with equal rights for all or a confederation. Just six percent of Tunisians chose “other,” the vast majority of whom proposed armed resistance to Israel’s occupation, possibly entailing the elimination of the state of Israel. But by the end of our fieldwork, only 50 percent of Tunisians supported the two-state solution. Those in favor of a one-state solution or a confederation fell by seven points combined. The biggest gain was the “other” category, which increased by 30 points to 36 percent. Once again, the vast majority of these Tunisians wanted continued, armed resistance. BREAK THE CYCLE Tunisia is geographically remote from Israel, and its population’s growing appetite for an armed resistance is unlikely to directly affect the war. But if other Arab states have had similar shifts in opinion, fighting on Israel’s borders could flare further. And in all likelihood, anger at Israel has grown even more in countries closer to the conflict or in those housing more Palestinian refugees, such as Jordan and Lebanon. The potential for greater violence is, therefore, serious. The Middle East and North Africa, after all, are plagued by more ongoing conflicts than any other part of the world. As the bombardment of Gaza continues, this risk will only grow. In fact, even after the fighting ends, the region may remain more precarious. A new generation has now seen the horrors of the occupation on television and on social media, including tragic images of dead bodies and anguished families that they are unlikely to forget. Some percentage of them may choose to fund, join, or otherwise help armed groups fighting against Israel’s existence. The country’s politicians may think this war will make them safer, but Israel’s security will not increase because of the conflict. The simple fact is that the Palestinian cause remains vitally important to the Arab world, and Israel cannot hope to simply defeat it with bombs. This issue has not lost its salience to a new generation. Despite what many Western (and some Arab) capitals may have assumed, Israel will not be able to make peace with its neighbors as long as the Palestinians do not have a state. In just 20 days, Tunisians’ views on the world shifted in ways that rarely happen even over the course of a few years. There is no other issue across the Arab world to which people feel so individually and emotionally connected. This intensity is particularly striking given Tunisia’s domestic challenges. The state now has a GDP per capita that is lower than it was before the country’s 2010 revolution. And yet Tunisians still wanted less economic engagement with the United States. According to our data, by October 27, Tunisians preferred international engagement on the Palestinian cause over economic development by an enormous margin—59 percent to four percent. If Israel and the United States seek genuine peace with the Arab world—rather than a cold peace with the repressive regimes that rule most of it—they must change their policies. They need to find a way to end the ongoing struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians. And that means all these groups must diligently work toward a fair and dignified future for the Palestinian people: specifically, a two-state solution. It is the only way to change the hearts and minds of neighboring populations and bring an end to the cycle of violence that has plagued the Middle East for the last century. MICHAEL ROBBINS is Director and Co-Principal Investigator at Arab Barometer. MARYCLARE ROCHE is Director of Technology and Innovation at Arab Barometer. AMANEY A. JAMAL is Co-Founder and Co-Principal Investigator at Arab Barometer, Dean of the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, and Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. SALMA AL-SHAMI Salma Al-Shami is Director of Research at Arab Barometer. MARK TESSLER is Co-Founder and Co-Principal Investigator at Arab Barometer and the Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. The War That Remade the Middle East How Washington Can Stabilize a Transformed Region By Maria Fantappie and Vali Nasr January/February 2024 Published on November 20, 2023 Mike McQuade Before October 7, 2023, it seemed as if the United States’ vision for the Middle East was finally coming to fruition. Washington had arrived at an implicit understanding with Tehran about its nuclear program, in which the Islamic Republic of Iran effectively paused further development in exchange for limited financial relief. The United States was working on a defense pact with Saudi Arabia, which would in turn lead the kingdom to normalize its relations with Israel. And Washington had announced plans for an ambitious trade corridor connecting India to Europe through the Middle East to offset China’s rising influence in the Finish reading this article for free. Enter your email and we'll send a paywall-free link directly to your inbox. 烏克蘭有一條勝利之路 西方失敗主義聲音的錯覺與危險 作者：德米特羅‧庫勒巴{DMYTRO KULEBA 是烏克蘭外交部長。} 2023 年 12 月 14 日 烏克蘭外交部長德米特羅·庫萊巴（右）於 2023 年 9 月在基輔聆聽烏克蘭總統弗拉基米爾·澤倫斯基講話 俄羅斯全面入侵烏克蘭已是近兩年前的事了。隨著又一個戰爭冬天的到來，對國家前景持懷疑態度的聲音越來越大——不是在外交會議或軍事規劃會議上，而是在新聞報導和專家評論中。大多數人並沒有公開主張烏克蘭應該放棄戰鬥，但這種悲觀主義在所謂的務實論點的支持下，帶有明顯的戰略意義，既危險又錯誤。 這些懷疑論者認為，當前戰場局勢不會改變，而且鑑於俄羅斯擁有更多的資源，烏克蘭將無法奪回更多領土。他們認為，國際社會對烏克蘭的支持正在減弱，並將在未來幾個月急劇下降。他們引用「戰爭疲勞」和我們軍隊的暗淡前景。 懷疑論者是正確的，我們最近的反攻並沒有像烏克蘭軍隊 2022 年秋天在哈爾科夫地區和赫爾松市那樣閃電般地解放被佔領的土地。包括烏克蘭一些觀察家在內的觀察家在過去幾個月中預計會出現類似的結果，但當立竿見影的成功沒有實現時，許多人陷入了悲觀和沮喪。但悲觀主義是沒有根據的，讓失敗主義影響我們未來的政策決定將是錯誤的。相反，華盛頓和其他國家首都的政策制定者應該牢記大局並堅持走正軌。烏克蘭的勝利需要戰略耐力和遠見——就像我們最近的反攻一樣，解放每一平方英里的領土都需要我們的士兵做出巨大犧牲——但毫無疑問，勝利是可以實現的。 隨時了解狀況。 每週提供深入分析。 在烏克蘭近兩年的殘酷戰爭中，俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普丁加大了賭注，以至於不可能採取半解決方案。除了俄羅斯在烏克蘭的明顯失敗之外，任何結果都會產生令人不安的影響，而且不僅是對我國而言，它還會造成全球混亂，最終也威脅到美國及其盟友。世界各地的獨裁領導人和侵略者正在密切關注普丁軍事冒險的結果。他的成功，即使是部分的，也會激勵他們跟隨他的腳步。他的失敗將表明這種嘗試是愚蠢的。 勝利的階段 這種規模的戰爭是分階段進行的。其中一些階段可能比其他階段更成功。重要的是最終結果。在烏克蘭，這意味著全面恢復我們的領土完整，並將應對國際罪行負責的人繩之以法——這些目標既明確又可行。實現這些目標不僅可以確保烏克蘭實現公正和持久的和平，而且還可以確保世界各地的其他惡意勢力不會留下模仿普丁最終會得到回報的印象。 戰爭的當前階段戰爭對烏克蘭或我們的合作夥伴來說並不容易。每個人都希望在戰場上取得好萊塢式的快速突破，從而迅速瓦解俄羅斯的佔領。儘管我們的目標不會一蹴而就，但隨著時間的推移，國際社會對烏克蘭的持續支持將確保當地的反攻在前線取得切實成果，逐步摧毀俄羅斯軍隊並挫敗普丁的持久戰計劃。 一些懷疑論者反駁說，儘管這些目標是正義的，但它們根本無法實現。事實上，只要具備三個因素，我們的目標在軍事上就仍然可行：充足的軍事援助，包括噴射機、無人機、防空、砲彈以及使我們能夠深入敵後進行打擊的遠程能力； 美國以及烏克蘭的工業能力快速發展，既滿足烏克蘭的軍事需求，又補充美國和歐洲的國防庫存;並對與俄羅斯的談判前景採取原則性和現實的態度。 有了這些要素，我們的努力將在前線取得顯著進展。然而，這並不要求僅僅因為某個階段沒有達到一些觀察家的期望就偏離方向並得出戰鬥毫無希望的結論。儘管面臨重大挑戰，烏克蘭近幾個月仍取得了顯著成果。我們贏得了黑海之戰，從而恢復了穩定的海運出口，有利於我們的經濟和全球糧食安全。我們在南線取得了進展，最近在第聶伯河東岸佔領了一個橋頭堡。在其他地方，我們阻止了俄羅斯的大規模進攻，給俄羅斯軍隊造成了重大損失，包括挫敗了他們對阿夫季夫卡和庫皮安斯克的企圖。 D儘管他們g巨大俄羅斯軍隊未能在地面上取得任何進展. 事實上，在過去的一年半里，烏克蘭軍方已經證明了其讓懷疑者感到驚訝的能力。儘管困難重重，烏克蘭軍隊還是解放了自 2022 年 2 月以來被俄羅斯佔領的一半以上的領土。這並非一擊就能實現的。在戰爭的頭幾個月解放烏克蘭東北部後，我們在東部失去了一些領土，然後又恢復了勢頭——這一過程說明了為什麼根據一個階段的戰鬥得出廣泛的結論是具有誤導性的。如果戰爭只是數量問題，我們早就輸了。俄羅斯可能會試圖在數量上超過我們，但正確的戰略、先進的規劃和足夠的支持將使我們能夠有效反擊。 談判的謬誤 一些分析師認為，目前透過停火來凍結衝突是一個現實的選擇。這種方案的支持者認為，這將減少烏克蘭的傷亡，讓烏克蘭及其合作夥伴能夠專注於經濟復甦和重建、融入歐盟和北約，以及我們國防能力的長期發展。 問題不只是現在停火會獎勵俄羅斯的侵略。停火並不能結束戰爭，而只是暫停戰鬥，直到俄羅斯準備再次向內陸推進。同時，這將允許俄羅斯佔領軍用混凝土和雷區加固陣地，使他們在未來幾乎不可能被趕走，並使數百萬烏克蘭人在佔領下遭受數十年的鎮壓。俄羅斯對烏克蘭臨時佔領領土的2024年預算高達3.2萬億俄羅斯盧布（約350億美元），清楚地表明莫斯科計劃長期堅持並鎮壓對俄羅斯佔領當局的抵抗。 此外，無論有什麼論點認為這種情況對烏克蘭及其合作夥伴來說成本會更低，但現實是這樣的停火談判根本沒有提上日程。 2014 年至 2022 年間，我們與俄羅斯進行了大約 200 輪各種形式的談判，並在俄羅斯 2014 年非法吞併克里米亞之後的小規模戰爭中進行了 20 次停火嘗試並佔領烏克蘭東部。我們的合作夥伴敦促莫斯科採取建設性態度，當他們遇到克里姆林宮的外交牆時，他們堅持認為烏克蘭必須邁出“第一步”，即使只是為了證明俄羅斯才是問題所在。按照這種有缺陷的邏輯，烏克蘭做出了一些痛苦的讓步。它通往何方？針對俄羅斯於2022年2月24日發動的全面攻擊。再次宣稱烏克蘭必須邁出第一步既不道德又天真。 如果現在前線被凍結，沒有理由相信俄羅斯不會利用這樣的喘息機會，在幾年內策劃一次更殘酷的襲擊，可能不僅涉及烏克蘭，還涉及鄰國，甚至成員。那些相信俄羅斯在慶祝烏克蘭勝利後不會攻擊北約國家的人應該回想一下，就在兩年前，大規模入侵烏克蘭是多麼難以想像。北約 支持烏克蘭不是慈善事業 懷疑論者也認為，支持烏克蘭爭取自由的鬥爭成本太高，而且不能無限期地持續下去。我們烏克蘭充分了解我們從美國、歐洲國家和其他盟國獲得的援助金額，我們非常感謝向我們國家伸出援手的政府、立法者和個人。戰爭。我們以最透明和最負責任的方式管理支援：美國對烏克蘭軍事援助的檢查人員沒有發現任何重大浪費、詐欺或濫用的證據。 這種支持不是、也從來不是慈善事業。投資烏克蘭國防的每一美元都會為其支持者帶來明顯的安全紅利。它使烏克蘭能夠成功擊退俄羅斯的侵略並避免歐洲災難性的升級。烏克蘭在美國的援助下完成了這一切，其援助總額約為美國年度國防預算的百分之三。更重要的是，這些錢實際上大部分都花在了美國，資助美國國防工業，支持尖端技術發展，為美國創造就業機會——這也是美國一些本土商界領袖的理由。公開反對扣留或削減對烏克蘭的軍事援助。 此外，雖然美國是烏克蘭的最高國防夥伴——而且華盛頓在為烏克蘭爭取支持方面發揮的領導作用堪稱典範且至關重要——但美國很難獨自承擔這一負擔。正如北約秘書長延斯·斯托爾滕貝格最近指出的那樣，包括歐洲國家和加拿大在內的其他北約成員國佔烏克蘭軍事援助的一半以上。許多國家提供的支持佔國內生產毛額的百分比高於美國：捷克共和國、丹麥、愛沙尼亞、芬蘭、拉脫維亞、立陶宛、荷蘭、挪威、波蘭、斯洛伐克和英國。德國的援助持續增加，使其成為烏克蘭絕對數量上最大的歐洲支持者。 投資烏克蘭國防的每一美元都會為其支持者帶來明顯的安全紅利。 一些懷疑論者試圖將烏克蘭爭取自由的鬥爭稱為另一場徒勞的“永遠的戰爭”，但他們忽視了這些事實。烏克蘭從未要求美國派遣實地部隊。 此交易是公平的：我們的合作夥伴為我們提供勝利所需的一切，剩下的工作由我們自己完成，不僅保衛我們的邊界，而且保衛全球民主的邊界。 美國花了數十年和數千億美元來建立和保護能夠維持和保護民主和市場經濟的國際秩序，從而確保美國人的安全和繁榮。現在放棄這項投資是愚蠢的。如果烏克蘭任由民主制度倒塌，美國的對手就會意識到自己的弱點，並明白侵略是有代價的。捍衛美國國家安全免受此類威脅的代價將比支持烏克蘭高出許多倍，並可能引發數十年的全球動盪，且結果不確定。 學者和分析家經常警告第三次世界大戰將引發大國之間的核衝突。但他們可能忽視了世界各國之間爆發較小規模熱戰的風險，大國感覺自己有權利用其較小的鄰國——第一次世界大戰，而不是第三次世界大戰。如果沒有對烏克蘭勝利的共同承諾，事後看來，俄羅斯的侵略可能標誌著這樣一個世界的開始。 聽聽烏克蘭人的聲音 世界上沒有哪個國家比烏克蘭更渴望和平。我們並不希望這場戰爭無限期地拖延下去——普丁卻希望如此。 （正如弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基總統的十點和平公式所闡述的那樣，我們對和平之路有著清晰的願景。）烏克蘭為這場戰爭付出了最大的代價。我們每天都在失去一些最優秀的男女。幾乎沒有一個烏克蘭家庭沒有直接感受到戰爭的痛苦。在許多情況下，我們的戰士已經服役了20多個月，每天都在俄羅斯的轟炸下，被困在泥濘或冰冷的戰壕里，看不到返回日期；無論是遭受殘酷空襲還是佔領，平民傷亡都在不斷增加，烏克蘭兒童被偷走然後被俄羅斯家庭「收養」進行「再教育」的恐怖繼續困擾著我們所有人。 然而，即使我們遭受痛苦、疲倦和掙扎，烏克蘭人也不願意放棄，不惜任何代價選擇「和平」。基輔國際社會學研究所最近進行的一項調查顯示，百分之八十的烏克蘭人反對向俄羅斯做出領土讓步。另一項民調發現，53％的烏克蘭人準備為了烏克蘭的勝利而忍受多年的戰時苦難。即使外國軍事援助大幅減少，烏克蘭人也不會放棄：新歐洲中心11月的民調顯示，只有8%的烏克蘭人認為減少應該促使我們與俄羅斯進行談判。 （35% 的人表示，俄羅斯願意從烏克蘭撤軍將是開始談判的必要條件，33% 的人表示，在任何情況下都不應開始談判。） 敦促烏克蘭接受不利條件的倉促停火的西方分析人士忽視了這種觀點。多年來，歐洲和美國的政策制定者和專家沒有聽取烏克蘭的警告，即與俄羅斯的外交和業務已不再可能。經過大規模的入侵、巨大的破壞和痛苦，他們才意識到烏克蘭的警告是正確的。他們不應該再陷入同樣的陷阱。 戰爭中的盟友 1944 年夏天，二戰盟軍諾曼第登陸後的幾週內，盟軍首都的頭條新聞常常是悲觀的：“盟軍步伐緩慢”、“諾曼底的延誤：盟軍的過度謹慎和惡劣天氣被視為因素”打亂進度”，“美國軍官解釋說，地形會減慢坦克的速度。”即使盟軍在諾曼第取得成功，1944 年 9 月在德佔荷蘭進行的大規模市場花園行動仍充滿挑戰。人們原本期望它能結束戰爭，但結果卻是有限的勝利和盟軍的巨大損失。然而悲觀的頭條新聞和令人失望、甚至代價高昂的挫折並沒有導致盟軍放棄。 上月底，我出席了在布魯塞爾舉行的北約部長級會議。最讓我印象深刻的是室內和室外的氣氛之間的差異。在場外，記者們提出問題，聲稱戰爭已經陷入“僵局”，“戰爭疲勞”會削弱支持，然後想知道為什麼烏克蘭不會提出用領土換取和平。然而，官方討論中並沒有這種失敗主義的敘述，部長們堅定地承諾提供額外的軍事援助和持續的支持。 無論關於消耗的錯誤敘述變得多麼普遍，我們都不應該讓它讓政策制定和我們的共同策略走上災難性的道路。我們也不應該被欺騙，相信莫斯科已經準備好透過談判達成公平的解決方案。選擇接受普丁的領土要求並獎勵他的侵略行為將意味著承認失敗，這對烏克蘭、美國及其盟國以及整個全球安全架構來說都將付出高昂的代價。堅持到底是一項艱鉅的任務。但我們知道如何獲勝，而且我們會的。 烏克蘭遏止戰略 西方如何幫助基輔經歷長期戰爭 利亞娜·菲克斯和邁克爾·金馬奇 2023 年 7 月，克里米亞刻赤附近的一艘俄羅斯海軍兩棲登陸艦 普丁與克里米亞的薄弱聯繫 基輔應該瞄準刻赤大橋——但需要飛彈才能摧毀它 本·霍奇斯、萊德·克洛斯基、羅伯特·珀森和埃里克·威廉森 There Is a Path to Victory in Ukraine The Delusions and Dangers of Defeatist Voices in the West By Dmytro Kuleba December 14, 2023 DMYTRO KULEBA is Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, right, listening to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv, September 2023 Pool / Reuters https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/path-victory-ukraine-dmytro-kuleba It was almost two years ago that Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As another winter of war arrives, voices skeptical of the country’s prospects are growing louder—not in diplomatic meetings or military planning sessions, but rather in news reports and in expert commentary. Most do not openly argue that Ukraine should simply give up its fight, but the pessimism, buttressed by supposedly pragmatic arguments, carries clear strategic implications that are both dangerous and wrong. These skeptics suggest that the current situation on the battlefield will not change and that, given Russia’s vastly greater resources, the Ukrainians will be unable to retake more of their territory. They argue that international support for Ukraine is eroding and will plummet sharply in the coming months. They invoke “war fatigue” and the supposedly bleak prospects of our forces. The skeptics are correct that our recent counteroffensive did not achieve the lightning-fast liberation of occupied land, as the Ukrainian military managed in the fall of 2022 in the Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson. Observers, including some in Ukraine, anticipated similar results over the past several months, and when immediate success did not materialize, many succumbed to doom and gloom. But pessimism is unwarranted, and it would be a mistake to let defeatism shape our policy decisions going forward. Instead, policymakers in Washington and other capitals should keep the big picture in mind and stay on track. A Ukrainian victory will require strategic endurance and vision—as with our recent counteroffensive, the liberation of every square mile of territory requires enormous sacrifice by our soldiers—but there is no question that victory is attainable. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. Over nearly two years of brutal war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has upped the ante to the point that half-solutions are impossible. Any outcome besides a clear defeat of Russia in Ukraine would have troubling implications, and not just for my country—it would cause a global disarray that would ultimately threaten the United States and its allies, as well. Authoritarian leaders and aggressors around the world are keeping a close watch on the results of Putin’s military adventure. His success, even if partial, would inspire them to follow in his footsteps. His defeat will make clear the folly of trying. STAGES OF VICTORY Wars of this scale are fought in stages. Some of those stages may be more successful than others. What matters is the end result. In Ukraine, that means both fully restoring our territorial integrity and bringing those responsible for international crimes to justice—goals that are both clear and feasible. Meeting those objectives would ensure not only a just and lasting peace in Ukraine but also that other malicious forces around the world are not left with the impression that mimicking Putin will ultimately pay off. The current phase of the war is not easy for Ukraine or for our partners. Everyone wants quick, Hollywood-style breakthroughs on the battlefield that will bring a quick collapse of Russia’s occupation. Although our objectives will not be reached overnight, continued international support for Ukraine will, over time, ensure that local counteroffensives achieve tangible results on the frontlines, gradually destroying Russian forces and thwarting Putin’s plans for a protracted war. Some skeptics counter that although such goals are just, they simply aren’t achievable. In fact, our objectives will remain militarily feasible as long as three factors are in place: adequate military aid, including jets, drones, air defense, artillery rounds, and long-range capabilities that allow us to strike deep behind enemy lines; the rapid development of industrial capacity in the United States and Europe as well as in Ukraine, both to cover Ukraine’s military needs and to replenish U.S. and European defense stocks; and a principled and realistic approach to the prospect of negotiations with Russia. With these elements in place, our effort will bring marked progress on the frontlines. Yet that requires not veering off course and concluding that the fight is hopeless simply because one stage has fallen short of some observers’ expectations. Even with significant challenges, Ukraine has achieved notable results in recent months. We won the battle for the Black Sea and thereby restored a steady flow of maritime exports, benefiting both our economy and global food security. We’ve made gains on the southern front, recently securing a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. And elsewhere, we have held off enormous Russian assaults and inflicted major losses on Russian forces, including by thwarting their attempts on Avdiivka and Kupiansk. Despite their gargantuan effort, Russian troops failed to secure any gains on the ground. Indeed, over the last year and a half, the Ukrainian military has proved its ability to surprise skeptics. Against all odds, Ukrainian forces have liberated more than half the territory taken by Russia since February 2022. This did not happen with a single blow. After the liberation of Ukraine’s northeast in the first months of the war, we lost some ground in the east before regaining momentum—a sequence that demonstrates why drawing broad conclusions based on one stage of fighting is misleading. If the war were only about numbers, we would have already lost. Russia may try to outnumber us, but the right strategy, advanced planning, and adequate support will allow us to effectively strike back. THE FALLACY OF NEGOTIATIONS Some analysts believe that freezing the conflict by establishing a cease-fire is a realistic option at the moment. Proponents of such a scenario argue that it would lower Ukrainian casualties and allow Ukraine and its partners to focus on economic recovery and rebuilding, integration into the European Union and NATO, and the long-term development of our defense capabilities. The problem is not just that a cease-fire now would reward Russian aggression. Instead of ending the war, a cease-fire would simply pause the fighting until Russia is ready to make another push inland. In the meantime, it would allow Russian occupying troops to reinforce their positions with concrete and minefields, making it nearly impossible to drive them away in the future and condemning millions of Ukrainians to decades of repression under occupation. Russia’s 2024 budget for the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, amounting to 3.2 trillion Russian rubles (around $35 billion), is clear evidence of Moscow’s plan to dig in for the long haul and suppress resistance to Russian occupation authorities. Moreover, whatever the arguments that such a scenario would be less costly for Ukraine and its partners, the reality is that such a negotiated cease-fire is not even on the table. Between 2014 and 2022, we endured approximately 200 rounds of negotiations with Russia in various formats, as well as 20 attempts to establish a cease-fire in the smaller war that followed Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and occupation of Ukraine’s east. Our partners pressed Moscow to be constructive, and when they ran into the Kremlin’s diplomatic wall, they insisted that Ukraine had to take the “first step,” if only to demonstrate that Russia was the problem. Following this flawed logic, Ukraine made some painful concessions. Where did it lead? To Russia's full-scale attack on February 24, 2022. Declaring yet again that Ukraine must take the first step is both immoral and naive. If the frontline were frozen now, there is no reason to believe that Russia would not use such a respite to plan a more brutal attack in a few years, potentially involving not only Ukraine but also neighboring countries and even NATO members. Those who believe Russia will not attack a NATO country after celebrating success in Ukraine should recall how unimaginable a large-scale invasion of Ukraine seemed just two years ago. SUPPORTING UKRAINE IS NOT CHARITY Skeptics also argue that supporting Ukraine’s fight for freedom is too expensive and cannot be sustained indefinitely. We in Ukraine are fully aware of the amounts of assistance that we have received from the United States, European countries, and other allies, and we are immensely grateful to the governments, legislators, and individuals who have extended a helping hand to our country at war. We manage the support in the most transparent and accountable way: U.S. inspectors of military aid to Ukraine have found no evidence of significant waste, fraud, or abuse. This support is not, and never has been, charity. Every dollar invested in Ukraine’s defense returns clear security dividends for its supporters. It has enabled Ukraine to successfully rebuff Russian aggression and avert a disastrous escalation in Europe. And Ukraine has done all this with American assistance totaling roughly three percent of the annual U.S. defense budget. What is more, most of this money has in fact been spent in the United States, funding the U.S. defense industry, supporting the development of cutting-edge technology, and creating American jobs—a reason that some local business leaders in the United States have publicly opposed withholding or cutting military aid to Ukraine. Moreover, while the United States is Ukraine’s top defense partner—and Washington’s leadership in rallying support for Ukraine has been exemplary and essential—the United States has hardly borne the burden alone. As NATO’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, recently noted, other NATO members, including European countries and Canada, account for more than half of Ukraine’s military aid. A number of countries have provided more support as a percentage of GDP than the United States has: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom. Germany's assistance continues to grow, making it Ukraine's largest European supporter in absolute terms. Every dollar invested in Ukraine’s defense returns clear security dividends for its supporters. Attempts by some skeptics to brand Ukraine’s fight for freedom as just another futile “forever war” ignore these facts. Ukraine has never asked for American boots on the ground. The deal is fair: our partners provide us with what we need to win, and we do the rest of the job ourselves, defending not only our borders but also the borders of global democracy. The United States has spent decades, and hundreds of billions of dollars, building and protecting an international order that could sustain and protect democracy and market economies, thus ensuring security and prosperity for Americans. It would be foolish to give up on that investment now. If democracy is allowed to fall in Ukraine, adversaries of the United States will perceive weakness and understand that aggression pays. The price tag for defending U.S. national security against such threats would be many times higher than the one for supporting Ukraine and could spark decades of global turbulence with an uncertain outcome. Scholars and analysts often warn of a World War III involving nuclear conflict between great powers. But they may overlook the risk of a world of smaller hot wars between states, with bigger powers feeling empowered to take advantage of their smaller neighbors—World Wars I, plural, rather than World War III. Without a common commitment to Ukrainian victory, Russian aggression could in hindsight mark the onset of such a world. LISTEN TO UKRAINIANS No country in the world desires peace more than Ukraine. It is not our side that wants this war to drag on indefinitely—Putin does. (We have a clear vision of the path to peace, as laid out in President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ten-point Peace Formula.) And it is Ukraine that is paying the greatest price for this war. We are losing some of our best men and women every day. There is hardly a Ukrainian family that has not directly felt the pain of war. Our warriors have in many cases been serving for more than 20 months, stuck in muddy or icy trenches under daily Russian bombardment, with no return date in sight; the toll on civilians, whether enduring brutal airstrikes or occupation, keeps growing, and the horror of Ukrainian children being stolen and then “adopted” by Russian families for “re-education” continues to haunt us all. Yet even with our suffering, weariness, and struggles, Ukrainians are not willing to give up, to opt for “peace” at any price. Eighty percent of Ukrainians oppose making territorial concessions to Russia, according to a recent survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Another poll found that 53 percent of Ukrainians were prepared to endure years of wartime hardship for the sake of a Ukrainian victory. Ukrainians would not be ready to give up even in the event of a significant decrease in foreign military aid: polling in November by the New Europe Center showed that only eight percent of Ukrainians think that such a reduction should push us into negotiations with Russia. (Thirty-five percent said that a Russian willingness to withdraw troops from Ukraine would be the necessary condition for starting talks, and 33 percent said that under no conditions should talks begin at all.) Western analysts who urge Ukraine to accept a hasty cease-fire on unfavorable terms neglect such views. For years, policymakers and experts in Europe and the United States failed to listen to Ukrainian warnings that both diplomacy and business as usual with Russia were no longer possible. It took a large-scale invasion and enormous destruction and suffering for them to recognize that the Ukrainian warnings were right. They should not fall into the same trap again. ALLIES AT WAR In the summer of 1944, in the weeks after the World War II Allies’ D-Day landing, the headlines in allied capitals were often pessimistic: “Allied Pace Slows,” “Delays in Normandy: Overcaution of Allies and Bad Weather Seen as Factors Upsetting Schedule,” “Terrain Slows Tanks, U.S. Officer Explains.” Even after Allied success in Normandy, the massive Operation Market Garden in the German-occupied Netherlands in September 1944 proved challenging. It had been expected to bring the war to a close but instead yielded limited successes and massive Allied losses. Yet pessimistic headlines and disappointing, even costly, setbacks did not cause the Allies to give up. At the end of last month, I attended a NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. What struck me most was the disparity between the mood inside the chamber and the mood outside it. On the sidelines, reporters opened their questions by asserting that the war had reached a “stalemate” and that “war fatigue” would cripple support, before wondering why Ukraine wouldn’t offer to trade territory for peace. Yet such defeatist narratives were absent in the official discussions, with ministers making a firm commitment to additional military aid and sustained support. However prevalent a false narrative of attrition becomes, we should not allow it to set policymaking and our shared strategy on a disastrous course. Nor should we be duped into believing that Moscow is ready for a fair negotiated solution. Opting to accept Putin’s territorial demands and reward his aggression would be an admission of failure, which would be costly for Ukraine, for the United States and its allies, and for the entire global security architecture. Staying the course is a difficult task. But we know how to win, and we will.