彭定康: 西方將對北京採更強硬立場 目標應該是中共
彭定康（Chris Patten） 2023年03月17日
Chris Patten
Says More…
Feb 21, 2023
This week in Say More, PS talks with Chris Patten, Chancellor of the University of Oxford and the last British governor of Hong Kong.
Project Syndicate: In December, you highlighted the difficult challenges facing the United Kingdom’s new prime minister, Rishi Sunak, but saw reason to hope that he would tackle them effectively. One hundred days into his tenure, Sunak has announced his intention to scrap thousands of European Union laws by the end of this year and is reportedly considering withdrawing the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights in order to enable a crackdown on immigration. Meanwhile, the National Health Service (NHS) is facing the biggest strike in its history. Do you still see reason for optimism about Sunak? Where will his current trajectory take the UK and the Conservative Party?
Chris Patten: Rishi Sunak is highly intelligent, hard-working, decent, and no ideologue. He certainly represents a huge improvement over his two predecessors (though that is not a very high bar). Nonetheless, Sunak is not above reproach. In fact, he has been wrong about two of the biggest issues in contemporary British politics: he long supported Brexit, and he strongly favored Boris Johnson becoming Conservative Party leader and UK Prime Minister.
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Sunak has inherited some awful problems. The British economy is in a miserable state, not least because the UK faces even worse inflation than other countries, owing not least to the policies of Johnson’s successor and Sunak’s immediate predecessor, Liz Truss. Meanwhile, the NHS, with an often badly paid and sometimes justifiably fractious workforce, is struggling to deal with a backlog of patients.
Above all, Sunak must cope with a divided Conservative Party, whose irresponsible right-wing faction is beyond satisfaction on any issue involving the European Union or sensible economic management. Intelligent policymaking – especially if it involves trying to achieve a decent working relationship with the EU – is threatened with sabotage. As a result, Sunak will be hard-pressed not only to unite his party, but also to run a sensible government between now and the next election, likely to come next year.
PS: Last October, you warned that a “post-peak China led by an all-powerful ruler will almost certainly aggravate global uncertainty and instability.” Recent developments – from the chaotic exit from zero-COVID to the flight of a Chinese surveillance balloon across the United States – seem to support this assessment. Are such episodes likely to raise alarm bells for Communist Party of China leaders – whose “growing nervousness” about the Party’s hold on power is what enabled Xi Jinping’s rise in the first place – or galvanize support for him? Is it already too late for the CPC on turn on Xi?
CP: China will struggle to recapture the GDP growth of the past – even the recent past – owing to economic imbalances, demographic challenges, and Xi’s apparent preference for the continued dominance of state-owned enterprises, rather than the innovative and growth-driving private sector.
In a totalitarian system like China’s surveillance state, outsiders can only guess at the internal political arguments that are taking place. But we can observe that Xi has made the sort of political errors that become more likely when a leader seems beyond criticism, and when those who surround him fear expressing opinions that do not match his own mood and instincts. In such a context, violent policy swings – like those over zero-COVID – become inevitable.
Xi certainly appears determined to maintain tight control over the CPC leadership. But it remains unclear how he will handle the political problems that will accompany slowing economic growth. The worry is that he will resort to stoking nationalist fervor – for example, by taking military action against Taiwan. We must hope that he has learned some lessons from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal and hugely unsuccessful invasion of Ukraine.
PS: You noted in June that “the CPC has now gotten rid of any school textbooks that might tell the truth about Hong Kong’s past and its aspirations.” But “for liberal democracy to prevail over authoritarianism,” you wrote in December, “people with [pro-democracy advocate Jimmy] Lai’s courage and convictions must not be forgotten.” And you make sure of that in your book The Hong Kong Diaries. What about your experience in Hong Kong were you most keen to put on record?
CP: I wanted to show that the citizens of Hong Kong – the majority of whom are refugees or descendants of refugees from communism in China – have a strong sense of citizenship based on an understanding of the relationship between the rule of law and the freedoms of an open society on the one hand, and economic success on the other. They are not going to forget the events – from the Great Chinese Famine and the Cultural Revolution to the Tiananmen Square massacre – that sent so many of them scrambling over barbed wire or stowing away on ships to get to the safe haven of the British colony.
Like Stalin, the CPC believes that education – even of young children – should aim to engineer the soul. But dictators never succeed in giving their populations total amnesia. Memories of the past remain.
BY THE WAY . . .
PS: In The Hong Kong Diaries, you describe how some British businessmen and civil-service officials – not just Chinese – resisted your efforts to entrench the rule of law and ensure the survival of self-government after 1997. What role have expatriates and other foreigners played in enabling China’s assault on Hong Kong today, and does your experience in the 1990s hold any lessons for dealing with them that remain relevant?
CP: The Chinese civil servants who worked for me in Hong Kong were outstandingly brave and competent; they understood in full measure the integrity of public service. Most of the British diplomats who worked for me were also beyond reproach, and I of course always had political support from the government in London.
But there were a few diplomats who belonged to the mush school of diplomacy: they believed that China could do no wrong, and that we should effectively adopt a policy of pre-emptive cringe toward the country. Some business leaders in Hong Kong, particularly expatriates, also believed that one should never stand up to China. But they had foreign passports in their back pockets, as did some Chinese businessmen who likewise seemed to care little about those who might have to continue living in Hong Kong with their freedoms stripped away.
At the very least, many Hong Kong citizens have been able to take advantage of the British passport scheme since 1997, with about 140,000 leaving the city to settle in Britain in the last couple of years alone.
PS: In May 1997, you wrote that the Chinese communists “always act solely in what they believe to be their own best interests, and regard any agreement as a stage in a relationship, not as an immutable conclusion to a negotiation.” Yet “the mush school of diplomacy will be listened to,” so China would “continue to get away with bad behavior” and “therefore go on behaving badly.” Does the recent shift in the West’s approach to China and other authoritarian countries represent a correction in this regard?
CP: Two delusions have distorted and enfeebled policymaking on Communist China. The first is that economic and technical change would inevitably produce political change. A few years after China joined the World Trade Organization, then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke of an “unstoppable momentum” toward democracy in China. Alas, this turned out not to be the case at all.
The second delusion is that China will honor the agreements it makes. My main critic when I was governor of Hong Kong said that the Chinese leadership may be thuggish dictators, but they were men of their word. Unfortunately, only the first part of that statement is true. The Chinese have breached their agreements again and again. They have ignored maritime laws in the South China Sea, and violated the WHO health regulations to which they agreed in 2006. And they have of course run roughshod over the 1984 Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, a treaty lodged at the United Nations that guaranteed the preservation of Hong Kong’s way of life and a high degree of autonomy for 50 years after 1997.
The West may be taking a harder line on China, but the goal should not be to contain China. Rather, the objective should be to ensure that when the Chinese communists break their word, there are consequences. This is going to be particularly important when it comes to environmental diplomacy.
PS: As the title indicates, The Hong Kong Diaries comprises detailed journal entries you wrote during your five years as Hong Kong’s governor. Upon re-reading them, are there observations that seem more important now than they did then?
CP: I hope that when others read The Hong Kong Diaries, they will distinguish, as I do, between China and the Chinese on the one hand, and the CPC on the other. You don’t have to love the CPC in order to be a Chinese patriot. In fact, given the history of the Communist Party, the two might be incompatible.
I trust that readers will also recognize that the Chinese communists need to be held to account when they break their promises. And they might question, as I have, why the Chinese communists are so afraid of liberal democratic values, if they genuinely believe that their surveillance state represents the best model for governance. The CPC seems to know that these values represent an existential threat to hardline dictatorships everywhere.
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Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong and a former EU commissioner for external affairs, is Chancellor of the University of Oxford and the author of The Hong Kong Diaries (Allen Lane, 2022).
《大家論壇》獨裁視角：西方將對北京採更強硬立場 目標應該是中共
彭定康（Chris Patten） 2023年03月17日 07:00:00
{https://www.upmedia.mg/forum_info.php?SerialNo=168112}
彭定康（Chris Patten）
●英國末代港督
●歐盟前外務委員
●牛津大學校長
PS問：您在去年10月曾示警，「一個由全面掌權統治者領導、已過巔峰的中國，幾乎無庸置疑會加劇全球的不確定性與不穩定性。」近來事態發展，從中國「清零政策」混亂退場到間諜氣球飛越美國等，都似乎支持您的評估。這些事件是會替中共領導班子敲響警鐘 (習近平當初崛起的主因，就是因為這些人對於共黨能否持續掌權「日益擔憂」)，抑或是讓他們加倍支持習近平？中共要反制習近平是否為時已晚？
彭定康：在經濟失衡、人口挑戰，以及習近平明顯偏好由國有企業持續主導經濟，而非讓民間創新及成長驅動企業發揮所長的情況下，中國將難以恢復過去或甚至近期的經濟成長榮景。
在中國這種監控大國的極權體制中，局外人對於內部正在發生的政治鬥爭只能訴諸揣測。但我們可以觀察到，習近平已經犯下一些政治錯誤，常見於那些無人膽敢批評的領導人身上，無人敢發表迥異於其情緒及直覺的意見。在這種情境下，不可避免會發生諸如「清零政策」這類政策髮夾彎。
習近平顯然決心維持鐵腕掌控中共領導班子，但目前尚不清楚他將如何處理將隨經濟成長放緩而來的政治問題。令人擔憂的是，他可能為此煽動民族主義情緒，例如對台採取軍事行動等。我們只能冀望他已經從俄羅斯總統普丁對烏克蘭野蠻而失敗的入侵汲取到教訓。
PS問：你在6月份指出，「中共現在已經處理掉所有可能講述香港歷史真相及其願望的教科書。」但你在去年12月也寫到，「若要自由民主戰勝威權主義」，「我們不能忘記那些跟 (親民主派倡導者) 黎智英擁有一樣勇氣與信念的人。」您在著作《香港日記》中確保這一點。您最想記錄下來的香港經歷是什麼？
彭定康：我想指出的是，香港市民大多是逃離中共統治的難民或難民後裔，他們具有強烈的公民意識，深刻了解以下兩者之間的關係，一是開放社會的法治與自由，二則是經濟上的成功。從中國大饑荒和文化大革命，到天安門大屠殺，他們都不會忘懷，這些事件是促成他們其中許多人爭先恐後穿越帶刺鐵絲網或偷渡上船，以英國殖民地為避風港的原因。
跟史達林一樣，中共認為教育應該以洗腦為目的，就連幼兒教育也一樣。但獨裁者永遠無法成功讓人民完全失去記憶。關於過去的記憶猶在。
PS問：在《香港日記》書中，您提到不光只是中國人，甚至部分英國商人和公務員也抵制你企圖鞏固97之後香港的法治，以及確保自治政府還可以存續。外派人士和其他外籍人士在如今中國對香港的攻擊當中扮演什麼角色？您在1990年代與他們打交道的經驗，是否仍可沿用到今日？
彭定康：在我手下的中國籍公務員都非常勇敢能幹，充分理解公共服務的誠信。大多數為我工作的英國外交官也無可非議，倫敦方面當然也一直給予我政治支持。
但有少數「和稀泥派」的外交官，他們深信中國不會做錯，我們對中國應該有效採取「先發退縮」的政策。香港部分商界領袖，尤其是外籍人士，也認為我們永遠都不應該對抗中國。但他們口袋裡裝的是外國護照，部分中國商人也是如此，他們似乎同樣不關心那些可能不得不繼續在香港生活、自由卻遭剝奪的人。
至少自1997年以來，已有許多香港公民能利用英國護照計劃離開香港，單是過去幾年間，就有約14萬港人移居英國。
PS問：你在1997年5月寫到，中共「行事向來只按自視的最大利益而為，把所有協議都視為對外關係的某個階段，而非協商之後不可變更的定論。」然而，「和稀泥外交派的說法獲得聽信」，中國可以「胡作非為而毋需受罰」，「因此將繼續胡作非為」。最近西方對中國和其他專制國家的態度轉變，是否代表這方面的修正？
彭定康：國際社會對於共黨中國的政策制定，受到兩種錯覺的扭曲及弱化。首先是經濟和技術變革將不可避免地促成政治改革。在中國加入世界貿易組織幾年後，時任英國首相的布萊爾 形容中國走向民主將是「勢不可擋」。可是呢，事實證明並非如此。
第二個錯覺是中國會遵守其所達成的協議。我擔任香港總督時，主要批評者說，中國領導人或許是兇殘獨裁者，但他們不會出爾反爾。不幸的是，這個說法只有前半段是對的。中國人一再出爾反爾。他們無視於南海的《海事法》，違反他們在2006年同意的《世界衛生組織衛生條例》。他們當然也粗暴對待1984年關於香港的《中英聯合聲明》，該條約在聯合國登記有案，保證97後香港生活方式與高度自治可以維持50年。
西方可能對中國採取更強硬的立場，但目標不應該是遏制中國。相反的，目標應該是確保當中共食言時，後果自負。這一點在環境外交方面尤為重要。
PS問：正如標題所示，《香港日記》收錄您擔任香港總督5年期間所寫的詳細日記。如今重讀，是否有些觀察結果看來歷久彌新？
彭定康：我希望其他人在閱讀《香港日記》時，能像我一樣，將以下兩者作出區分：一個是中國和中國人，另一個是中共。你不一定要愛中共才能成為愛中國的人。事實上，鑑於共產黨的歷史，兩者可能背道而馳。
我相信讀者也會明白，中共食言就必須自負後果。讀者可能會跟我有一樣的疑問，如果中共真的相信監控國家是最佳治理模式，那麼為什麼如此害怕自由民主價值觀。中共似乎也明白，對於世界各地強硬獨裁政權而言，這些價值觀代表了生存威脅。
（翻譯：吳巧曦，責任編輯：楊淑華）
© Project Syndicate
（原標題為《Chris Patten on Taiwan, Chinese Diplomacy, and more》，文章未經授權，請勿任意轉載）
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